SZTRJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTRJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 555

Citation: SZTRJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 555
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: SZTRJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2885
Parties: SZTRJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1399 of 2014
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 6 May 2015
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Date of hearing: 6 May 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms M Stone
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order the Court may make in the proceeding, save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1399 of 2014

BETWEEN:

SZTRJ
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MAY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1399 of 2014

BETWEEN:

SZTRJ
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

6 MAY 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  1. The applicant is unrepresented, but assisted by an interpreter.  Ms Stone appears for the Minister.  This is an application for leave to appeal.  Leave is necessary because the Federal Circuit Court of Australia ruled that there was no arguable case advanced in the application to review the decision in that Court.  That was an interlocutory decision so that leave to appeal from that decision is necessary before there can be an appeal in this Court. 

    BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived in Australia on 29 May 2008 as a trainee on a subclass 442 visa.  That visa was valid until 30 August 2009, but he applied for a protection visa on 15 June 2012.  The claim advanced by the applicant was that he worked as a stable hand in the Lahore Race Club.  He contended that in 2008 he and three of his friends who also worked there were kidnapped and taken to meet an identified ‘boss’, where they were threatened and directed to tell a jockey riding a horse that was the favourite in the race on the following day to pull the horse. 

  3. On the following day,…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 555
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In SZTRJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had rejected the applicant's application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the AAT had undervalued the risk of harm to him if he were returned to Pakistan, and that the Federal Circuit Court had erred in not considering this issue.

The court had to determine whether the applicant's grounds of appeal established sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the Federal Circuit Court's decision, such that leave to appeal should be granted. The court noted that the applicant's grounds of appeal were not capable of establishing jurisdictional error on the part of the AAT or appellable error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court. Rather, they were complaints about the merits of the AAT's decision, which the Federal Circuit Court was not empowered to review.

The court held that the applicant had not shown that there was sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the Federal Circuit Court's decision to warrant leave to appeal. The court also held that the applicant's argument that the Federal Circuit Court had failed to consider his situation was not substantiated. The court therefore dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

The decision in SZTRJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection highlights the limited scope of review of AAT decisions by the Federal Circuit Court, and the high threshold that must be met for leave to appeal to be granted. The court's decision suggests that where an applicant's grounds of appeal are complaints about the merits of the AAT's decision, rather than jurisdictional error, leave to appeal is unlikely to be granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant advances the following grounds of appeal:1.The [Tribunal] made an error of law in my case. I am under the serious risk of harm, which was undervalued by the [Tribunal].2.In the [Federal Circuit Court] interview, judger (sic) said that [Tribunal] did consider the opinion of "the psychologist's report in regard to the analysis of the applicant's mental state, that he has PTSD, is stressed, unable to concentrate for long periods and suffers memory loss" but no relief was given to me in this regards.(At number 41 of the decision)3.[The Federal Circuit Court] judger (sic) did discuss the issue raised by me in regards to [Tribunal’s] comments that "the Tribunal did not understand its obligation under the Act how to review an application for protection", but no proper consideration was given to this point and no relief was given to me in this regards. (At number 24.5. of the decision).4.The [Tribunal] committed an error of law by undervaluing the risk of harm to me.5. The [Federal Circuit Court] did not consider my situation.CONSIDERATION I have referred to the fact that leave to appeal is required because the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was interlocutory, and it is necessary, therefore, in accordance with the principles discussed in a variety of cases, including Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, that the applicant must show there is sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the judgment below to warrant review and that if the judgment below is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered if leave to appeal were refused. Ground 5 is not particularised at all but just generally says that the Federal Circuit Court did not consider the applicant’s situation. I will disregard that ground as there is clearly no substance in it. Grounds 1 and 4 of the appeal both refer to the Tribunal’s undervaluing of the risk of harm. Ground 1 is that the Tribunal made an error of law as the applicant is under the serious risk of harm, which was undervalued by the Tribunal. Ground 4 similarly is that the Tribunal committed an error of law by undervaluing the risk of harm. However the ground is expressed, it is a complaint about the merits of the decision of the Tribunal. That is, it is a complaint as to the findings of fact in relation to the degree of risk of harm, if any, to the applicant on returning to Pakistan. Those grounds could not succeed. It is difficult to see that grounds 1 and 4 are anything other than complaints about the conclusion or complaints about the factual findings leading to the merits of the Tribunal’s conclusions. It was not for the Federal Circuit Court to engage in review of the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. The task of the Federal Circuit Court was to determine whether or not the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error, that task being prescribed by statute under s 474 of the Migration Act, as discussed in numerous cases. The grounds outlined above are not capable of establishing jurisdictional error, either on the part of the Tribunal, or appellable error on the part of the judge in the Federal Circuit Court.