SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 844

Citation: SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 844
Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 949
Parties: SZTIP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 490 of 2015
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 13 August 2015
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 424A, Pt 7 Div 4
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 949
Date of hearing: 13 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr L Dennis of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 490 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZTIP
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 AUGUST 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2.The application be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 490 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZTIP
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE:

13 AUGUST 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and leave to appeal a judgment of Judge Cameron of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 13 April 2015: see SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 949 (“SZTIP”). The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth); that was an interlocutory decision: see r 44.12(2). The applicant had sought judicial review by the Federal Circuit Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 1 August 2012 to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  2. The Minister made an application to amend the name of the second respondent to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”. I granted…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 844
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZTIP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a male citizen of Pakistan who had arrived in Australia on a student visa, sought to appeal the Tribunal's decision which affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. The applicant's claim for protection was based on his prominence in the Shia community in Karachi, Pakistan, and the threats he had received due to his involvement. The Tribunal found the applicant to be an unreliable witness and did not accept his claims of fear of persecution and serious harm.

The legal issues before the court included whether the applicant had demonstrated sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the Tribunal's decision and if refusal of leave to appeal would cause substantial injustice. Additionally, the court considered whether the Tribunal had failed to comply with its obligations under the Migration Act or general concepts of procedural fairness, and if there were any legal and factual errors in the Tribunal's decision.

The court found that the applicant's grounds for extension of time and proposed grounds of appeal were template grounds that had been raised in several other proceedings, and the applicant did not offer any further explanation for the proposed grounds. The court also found that the Tribunal's findings of fact were open to it to make for the reasons the Tribunal gave, and there was nothing before the court which showed that the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations or procedural fairness. The court further found that the Tribunal was not under an obligation to investigate the applicant's claims, and the applicant did not identify other "legal and factual errors" in the decision of the Tribunal.

As a result, the court dismissed the application, ordered that the name of the second respondent be changed to "Administrative Appeals Tribunal," and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The application be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister made an application to amend the name of the second respondent to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”. I granted that application.BACKGROUND The applicant is a male citizen of Pakistan, born in Karachi in 1988. He arrived in Australia on 25 January 2009 on a student visa. On 26 March 2010, he lodged a further application for a student visa while he was in Australia. This student visa expired on 22 December 2011 and he applied for a protection visa on that day. The basis for the applicant’s claim for protection was set out at [6] of the Tribunal’s Statement of Decision and Reasons dated 28 August 2013 (“Decision Record”) as follows (footnote omitted):The applicant is a Shia Muslim. His parents and his brother still live in Karachi. The applicant claims to have been prominent in the Shia community in Karachi. While in Karachi on holiday, in February 2010, the applicant claimed to have witnessed a bombing and to have been severely traumatised as a result. He provided a document claimed to be from a medical practitioner in Karachi who treated him after the bombing. The applicant claims that he was threatened by members of Seppah-i-Sahaba who called his parents after the applicant had returned to Australia. The applicant also claimed that his brother in Pakistan continues to receive threats. He claimed these threats were made because the applicant has prominence in the Shia community. In Australia, he claimed, the applicant was threatened by Seppah-i-Sahaba via Facebook.TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 28 August 2013. The Decision Record reveals the following matters. The applicant provided a number of documents to the Tribunal:·A psychologist’s report dated 12 December 2010. The psychologist said that she had been asked to provide the report to assist in an assessment of the applicant’s ability to continue studying. The psychologist noted that the report was limited by the extent of information before her derived from interviews with the applicant and his family, a letter from a medical practitioner and media reports of the bombing. The assessment was not part of usual psychological treatment for the applicant. Her assessments “were congruent with the applicant’s account of psychological harm that has occurred since the bomb blasts” and that the applicant would benefit from counselling. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that he attended one further counselling session with the psychologist. The Tribunal noted the limitations on the psychologist’s report and gave weight to the fact that the applicant received no other counselling nor did he take medication for his condition. The Tribunal confirmed that he was well enough to participate in the hearing: [13], [21]-[22].·Photographs of demonstrations in Australia in which the applicant was not featured and a photograph which the applicant claimed was of himself during a Shia procession in Pakistan: [15]. ·Web pages dealing with the situation of Shias in Pakistan: [15]. ·A document which the applicant claimed to be from a medical practitioner in Karachi who treated him after the bombing: [6] and [36].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The basis for the applicant’s claim for protection was set out at [6] of the Tribunal’s Statement of Decision and Reasons dated 28 August 2013 (“Decision Record”) as follows (footnote omitted):The applicant is a Shia Muslim. His parents and his brother still live in Karachi. The applicant claims to have been prominent in the Shia community in Karachi. While in Karachi on holiday, in February 2010, the applicant claimed to have witnessed a bombing and to have been severely traumatised as a result. He provided a document claimed to be from a medical practitioner in Karachi who treated him after the bombing. The applicant claims that he was threatened by members of Seppah-i-Sahaba who called his parents after the applicant had returned to Australia. The applicant also claimed that his brother in Pakistan continues to receive threats. He claimed these threats were made because the applicant has prominence in the Shia community. In Australia, he claimed, the applicant was threatened by Seppah-i-Sahaba via Facebook.TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 28 August 2013. The Decision Record reveals the following matters. The applicant provided a number of documents to the Tribunal:·A psychologist’s report dated 12 December 2010. The psychologist said that she had been asked to provide the report to assist in an assessment of the applicant’s ability to continue studying. The psychologist noted that the report was limited by the extent of information before her derived from interviews with the applicant and his family, a letter from a medical practitioner and media reports of the bombing. The assessment was not part of usual psychological treatment for the applicant. Her assessments “were congruent with the applicant’s account of psychological harm that has occurred since the bomb blasts” and that the applicant would benefit from counselling. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that he attended one further counselling session with the psychologist. The Tribunal noted the limitations on the psychologist’s report and gave weight to the fact that the applicant received no other counselling nor did he take medication for his condition. The Tribunal confirmed that he was well enough to participate in the hearing: [13], [21]-[22].·Photographs of demonstrations in Australia in which the applicant was not featured and a photograph which the applicant claimed was of himself during a Shia procession in Pakistan: [15]. ·Web pages dealing with the situation of Shias in Pakistan: [15]. ·A document which the applicant claimed to be from a medical practitioner in Karachi who treated him after the bombing: [6] and [36]. The Tribunal found the applicant not to be a reliable witness because of inconsistencies and discrepancies in central components of the applicant’s evidence that detracted from the plausibility of his claims and his overall credibility in the Tribunal’s view: [24].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment requires the applicant to show that there is sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the judgment below, and further, that if the judgment below is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. CONSIDERATION The Minister opposes the grant of an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and leave to appeal on the basis that the proposed grounds of appeal have no prospects of success. The Minister noted that the applicant’s grounds for extension of time and proposed grounds of appeal are different from those raised in the Federal Circuit Court and as a result leave would also be required for those grounds. The applicant offered no written submissions and explained that the grounds to the Federal Circuit Court and the grounds in relation to the application for extension of time and leave to appeal were prepared by different lawyers. He did not offer any further explanation in relation to the proposed grounds. In relation to the applicant’s grounds:·I accept the Minister’s submission that the grounds in the application and the draft notice of appeal are template grounds which have been raised in several proceedings before this Court. I note that ground two of the application for extension of time refers to a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court who was not the primary judge from whose judgment the applicant seeks leave to appeal. I am prepared to accept that the grounds generally express dissatisfaction with the outcome of the application to the Federal Circuit Court. ·The Tribunal did consider, but did not accept, the applicant’s claims to fear persecution and serious harm as noted previously in this judgment. The Tribunal’s findings of fact, including as to the applicant’s credibility, were open to it to make for the reasons the Tribunal gave. Those reasons did not lack evident and tangible justification nor were they findings at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. ·There is nothing before this Court which shows that the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations under Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Migration Act or more general concepts of procedural fairness. The applicant was invited to a hearing by the Tribunal which he attended on 20 August 2013. The Tribunal member considered the applicant’s documentary and oral evidence and put issues of concern arising from that evidence to the applicant for comment including issues raised by the delegate’s decision record. The Tribunal member also put to the applicant issues raised by general “country information” concerning sectarian violence experienced by Shia Muslims in Pakistan and considered the likelihood of the applicant being exposed to that violence having regard to the significant proportion of the population of Pakistan which Shia adherents comprise; the primary judge was correct to note that the “country information” fell within the exception set out in s 424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act. ·The primary judge did not err by finding that the Tribunal was under no obligation to investigate the applicant’s claims. The applicant did not identify any failure by the Tribunal to inquire into a critical fact whose existence would be easily ascertained.·The applicant did not identify other “legal and factual errors” in the decision of the Tribunal which the primary judge failed to consider. I have carefully considered the Tribunal’s Decision Record and the primary judge’s reasons. I do not perceive any appellable error on the part of the primary judge or jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.