SZTFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] FCA 1524

Citation: SZTFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1524
Appeal from: SZTFM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2039
Parties: SZTFM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 984 of 2015
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 13 November 2015
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A
Date of hearing: 13 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter.
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 984 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTFM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 984 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTFM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE:

13 NOVEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.  In mid-2012, he attempted to travel to Australia by boat without any visa or travel papers.  He ended up arriving on Christmas Island on 5 June 2012 as a so-called “Offshore Entry Person”.  On 10 September 2012, the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister), determined that the appellant was not precluded by s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) from applying for a visa. The appellant subsequently applied for a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. His visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. That refusal decision was affirmed on review by the second respondent, then the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal).  Undeterred, the appellant then sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, alleging jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.  That application was dismissed on 31 July 2015.  The appellant now appeals from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing his review application.

    THE VISA APPLICATION AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

  2. The appellant claimed that he was entitled to a protection visa on the basis that he had a…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1524
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, who had applied for a protection visa in Australia. The application was rejected, and the subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit Court was also dismissed. The appellant then appealed to the High Court. The core legal issues in this case revolved around whether the Tribunal had made certain legal errors in its assessment of the appellant's risk of harm upon return to Sri Lanka and whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the appropriate legal tests in its decision-making process. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to assess the risk of harm he would face during the process of returning to Sri Lanka, conflated different legal tests, and incorrectly applied the balance of probabilities test instead of the real chance test.

The Court found that the Tribunal had, in fact, considered and made findings about the risk of harm to the appellant during the process of returning to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal's reasons demonstrated that it had addressed the risk of harm the appellant would face, including during detention on remand. The Court concluded that the appellant's argument that the Tribunal had made legal errors in this regard was without merit. The Court also found that the Tribunal had applied the correct legal tests in its decision-making process, and the appellant's argument to the contrary was not supported by the Tribunal's reasons. The Court further noted that the Tribunal's findings regarding the appellant's credibility were open to it and could not be successfully challenged on the grounds presented.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. This decision underscores the importance of a Tribunal thoroughly considering and clearly articulating its findings in relation to the risk of harm to an applicant upon return to their country of origin, as well as the necessity for a Tribunal to correctly apply the appropriate legal tests in its decision-making process. The Court's ruling reinforces the principle that findings of fact, particularly those concerning the credibility of an applicant's evidence, are generally within the Tribunal's domain and can only be successfully challenged if there is a demonstrated jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As can be seen, [170] of the Tribunal’s reasons addressed its findings in terms of the Refugee Convention criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. Paragraph 175 of the reasons addressed the factual findings in terms of the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDINGS AND JUDGMENT The appellant’s amended application in the Federal Circuit Court contained four grounds. Only grounds one, two and four were ultimately pressed at the hearing. Those grounds were in the following terms:1. The Tribunal made legal errors in asking itself the wrong question about the outcome of a process instead of assessing the risk of harm to the applicant. PARTICULARSa.At [123] and [175] the Tribunal assessed whether the applicant would be given a jail sentence or a fine and failed to assess whether the applicant would be at risk of suffering serious or significant harm during the process.2. The Tribunal made a legal error in failing to consider the risk of harm to the applicant after being convicted of illegal departure from Sri Lanka and returning to his nominated address. …4. The Tribunal made a legal error in applying the wrong test. PARTICULARSa.At [172] and [173], the Tribunal explicitly conflated the tests under section 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act - making the findings under complementary protection for the same reasons as those made under the Refugee Convention; b.At [174], the Tribunal’s reasoning is confined to whether the harm could flow as a result of his Refugee convention-related nexus - namely “because he is a young Tamil male from Udapu and will return there as a f[a]iled asylum seeker”;c.At [174], the Tribunal found there is no credible evidence that Sri Lankan authorities or anyone else in Sri Lanka “wish” to harm the applicant, drawing into the test under complementary protection the element of motivation on the part of those who would persecute as required under the Refugee convention; and d.At [175], the Tribunal has failed to apply the “real chance” test to the findings there stated, preferring a balance of probabilities formulation. The primary judge rejected each of those grounds and dismissed the application. In relation to ground one, the primary judge rejected the appellant’s submission that the Tribunal was focussed on the outcome of the process the appellant would face on return to Sri Lanka, rather than the risk of harm to the appellant during that process. The appellant’s argument appeared to be that the Tribunal only made findings concerning whether the appellant would ultimately be either gaoled or fined as a person who had illegally departed Sri Lanka, and ignored the risk of harm faced by the appellant during the period of detention on remand. The primary judge carefully reviewed the Tribunal’s reasons and found that the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal did not consider that aspect of his claim must be rejected on any plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision and reasons. The Tribunal clearly addressed and made findings about the risk of harm to the appellant when initially detained upon his return. The primary judge referred, in particular, to the Tribunal’s findings and reasons on this topic at [118], [119], [120], [123], [124], [162]-[164], [170] and [175] of its reasons. The primary judge’s ultimate conclusion in relation to ground one was succinctly stated at [27] of the judgment under appeal in the following terms:Given the Tribunal’s plain language used in its analysis, and clear findings, it is difficult to see how the applicant conceived the ground as raising an arguable case, let alone that it revealed jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As earlier indicated, the appellant’s oral submissions in support of his appeal did not engage with either of those two appeal grounds. They focussed almost entirely on the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal. The appellant submitted that all of the claims that he made in support of his protection visa application were true. He maintained that his uncle was in the LTTE and that it was true that persons came to his home and interrogated him and his father in relation to his uncle’s activities. The appellant submitted that, contrary to the Tribunal’s findings, there were in fact no inconsistencies in the accounts that he gave of those events in Sri Lanka. CONSIDERATION OF APPEAL GROUNDS The appellant has not pointed to any, let alone any arguable, reason for finding that the primary judge erred as contended in appeal ground one. Appeal ground one appears to be directed at the primary judge’s rejection of ground one of his amended application in the court below. The primary judge was plainly correct to reject that ground and the submissions advanced in support of it for the reasons his Honour gave. The Tribunal not only considered and made findings about the outcome of the process faced by failed asylum seekers upon their return to Sri Lanka, it also considered and made clear findings in relation to the risk of harm during that process, including at the airport and on remand. The contention that the Tribunal made legal errors, or asked itself the wrong question, in relation to that aspect of the appellant’s case was and is without foundation. Likewise, the appellant has failed to point to any reason why the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal wrongly applied a balance of probabilities test, rather than a real chance test. Any fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons clearly reveals that the Tribunal applied the correct test in conducting its review of the refusal of the appellant’s protection visa application. The primary judge was correct to dismiss the appellant’s arguments to the contrary for the reasons his Honour gave. It remains to briefly consider the appellant’s submissions in relation to the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal. Even putting aside the fact that those findings were not challenged in the court below, it is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that the findings it made in relation to the appellant’s credibility were open to the Tribunal on the material before it. As has been said by this Court on many occasions, findings of fact, and in particular findings about the truthfulness and credibility of evidence given by a review applicant, are quintessentially matters for the Tribunal. Whilst such findings are not completely immune from review, they can only be attacked if jurisdictional error is demonstrated. That is plainly not the case here. The appellant’s submission that there were in fact no inconsistencies in the various accounts he gave of the events that he claimed occurred to him in Sri Lanka is without foundation. It is readily apparent that, before the Tribunal, the appellant, through his advisers, conceded that there were differences between the various accounts he had given in relation to the events in Sri Lanka. The submissions that were advanced on behalf of the appellant before the Tribunal sought to explain those inconsistencies. The Tribunal did not accept those explanations.