FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 1524
Citation: SZTFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1524 Appeal from: SZTFM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2039 Parties: SZTFM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 984 of 2015 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 13 November 2015 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A Date of hearing: 13 November 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 31 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter. Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 984 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZTFM
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 NOVEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 984 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZTFM
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE:
13 NOVEMBER 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. In mid-2012, he attempted to travel to Australia by boat without any visa or travel papers. He ended up arriving on Christmas Island on 5 June 2012 as a so-called “Offshore Entry Person”. On 10 September 2012, the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister), determined that the appellant was not precluded by s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) from applying for a visa. The appellant subsequently applied for a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. His visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. That refusal decision was affirmed on review by the second respondent, then the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal). Undeterred, the appellant then sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, alleging jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. That application was dismissed on 31 July 2015. The appellant now appeals from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing his review application.
THE VISA APPLICATION AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The appellant claimed that he was entitled to a protection visa on the basis that he had a…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1524
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the Tribunal had, in fact, considered and made findings about the risk of harm to the appellant during the process of returning to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal's reasons demonstrated that it had addressed the risk of harm the appellant would face, including during detention on remand. The Court concluded that the appellant's argument that the Tribunal had made legal errors in this regard was without merit. The Court also found that the Tribunal had applied the correct legal tests in its decision-making process, and the appellant's argument to the contrary was not supported by the Tribunal's reasons. The Court further noted that the Tribunal's findings regarding the appellant's credibility were open to it and could not be successfully challenged on the grounds presented.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. This decision underscores the importance of a Tribunal thoroughly considering and clearly articulating its findings in relation to the risk of harm to an applicant upon return to their country of origin, as well as the necessity for a Tribunal to correctly apply the appropriate legal tests in its decision-making process. The Court's ruling reinforces the principle that findings of fact, particularly those concerning the credibility of an applicant's evidence, are generally within the Tribunal's domain and can only be successfully challenged if there is a demonstrated jurisdictional error.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As earlier indicated, the appellant’s oral submissions in support of his appeal did not engage with either of those two appeal grounds. They focussed almost entirely on the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal. The appellant submitted that all of the claims that he made in support of his protection visa application were true. He maintained that his uncle was in the LTTE and that it was true that persons came to his home and interrogated him and his father in relation to his uncle’s activities. The appellant submitted that, contrary to the Tribunal’s findings, there were in fact no inconsistencies in the accounts that he gave of those events in Sri Lanka. CONSIDERATION OF APPEAL GROUNDS The appellant has not pointed to any, let alone any arguable, reason for finding that the primary judge erred as contended in appeal ground one. Appeal ground one appears to be directed at the primary judge’s rejection of ground one of his amended application in the court below. The primary judge was plainly correct to reject that ground and the submissions advanced in support of it for the reasons his Honour gave. The Tribunal not only considered and made findings about the outcome of the process faced by failed asylum seekers upon their return to Sri Lanka, it also considered and made clear findings in relation to the risk of harm during that process, including at the airport and on remand. The contention that the Tribunal made legal errors, or asked itself the wrong question, in relation to that aspect of the appellant’s case was and is without foundation. Likewise, the appellant has failed to point to any reason why the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal wrongly applied a balance of probabilities test, rather than a real chance test. Any fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons clearly reveals that the Tribunal applied the correct test in conducting its review of the refusal of the appellant’s protection visa application. The primary judge was correct to dismiss the appellant’s arguments to the contrary for the reasons his Honour gave. It remains to briefly consider the appellant’s submissions in relation to the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal. Even putting aside the fact that those findings were not challenged in the court below, it is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that the findings it made in relation to the appellant’s credibility were open to the Tribunal on the material before it. As has been said by this Court on many occasions, findings of fact, and in particular findings about the truthfulness and credibility of evidence given by a review applicant, are quintessentially matters for the Tribunal. Whilst such findings are not completely immune from review, they can only be attacked if jurisdictional error is demonstrated. That is plainly not the case here. The appellant’s submission that there were in fact no inconsistencies in the various accounts he gave of the events that he claimed occurred to him in Sri Lanka is without foundation. It is readily apparent that, before the Tribunal, the appellant, through his advisers, conceded that there were differences between the various accounts he had given in relation to the events in Sri Lanka. The submissions that were advanced on behalf of the appellant before the Tribunal sought to explain those inconsistencies. The Tribunal did not accept those explanations.