SZTDB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

[2014] FCCA 1605

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTDB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2014] FCCA 1605

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal’s findings in relation to complementary protection were open to it – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal dealt with all claims made by the applicant – whether there was any information that enlivened s.424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal raised with the applicant all issues that may be the reason for affirming the decision under review that were otherwise not obvious – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 31, 36, 65, 91R, 411, 422B, 424A, 425, 474
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg.2.01.

Cases Cited:
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123

Applicant: SZTDB

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1739 of 2013

Judgment of: Judge Emmett

Hearing date: 23 July 2014

Date of Last Submission: 23 July 2014

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 23 July 2014

REPRESENTATION

The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter.

Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms Michelle Stone
DLA Piper

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1739 of 2013

SZTDB

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Pt.8, Div.2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 28 June 2013 (“the RRT”).

2. The applicant claims to be a citizen of Sri Lanka and of Hindu faith and Tamil ethnicity, who fears harm from police authorities in Sri Lanka, as well as various paramilitary groups.

3. Prior to considering the proceeding before this Court, these Reasons provide the relevant procedural background, a summary of the legislative framework, a summary of the applicant’s claims in support of a protection visa, a summary of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Delegate”), and a summary of the RRT’s review and decision.

Background

1. The applicant arrived in Australia on 1 July 2012, having departed illegally from Sri Lanka.

2. On 5 November 2012, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”).

3. On 22 March 2013, the Delegate refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa.

4. On 28 March 2013, the applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the RRT.

5. On 28 June 2013, the RRT affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa.

6. On 26 July 2013, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the RRT’s decision.

Legislative framework

1. Pursuant to s.65(1) of the Act, if satisfied of a number of matters, the first respondent may grant a visa. Section 31(1) of the Act provides that there are to be prescribed classes of visa. One class of visa is a Protection (Class XA) visa (reg.2.01 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) and Schedule 1 to the Regulations).

2. Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that an applicant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has a protection obligation under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Act defines “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” as meaning the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”).

3. Article 1A(2) of the Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:

   “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

4. Section 91R of the Act expands on the notion of persecution and serious harm when considering Article 1A(2) of the Convention.

5. Section 36(2)(aa) of the Act provides that:

   “(2)  A criterion for a protection visa is that the Applicant for the visa is:

   (aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm.”

6. Section 36(2A) of the Act defines “significant harm.”

7. Under s.411(1)(c) of the Act, a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa is a decision which may be reviewed by the second respondent.

8. The requirements of the natural justice hearing rule are exhaustively stated in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act (s.422B(1) of the Act). Division 4 Part 7 includes ss.424A and 425, which provide that:

   “424A  Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal

   (1)  Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:

   (a)  give to the Applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review.

   425  Tribunal must invite Applicant to appear

   (1)  The Tribunal must invite the Applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.”

9. Section 424AA of the Act permits the RRT to give orally to an applicant clear particulars of any information that the RRT considers would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The RRT must ensure that the applicant understands the relevance of the information and the consequences of any information being relied upon. The RRT must also invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information and advise the applicant that the applicant may seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information.

10. Under s.474(2) of the Act, a decision of the second respondent is a 'privative clause decision'. Under s.474(1)(a) of the Act, a privative clause decision is final and conclusive.

11. However, a purported decision of the second respondent which is affected by jurisdictional error is not a decision which is made under the Act and therefore is not a privative clause decision. (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476).

The applicant’s application for a protection visa

1. The applicant provided a statement in support of his protection visa application, in which he stated:

   a)In Sri Lanka, the applicant worked with his cousin at a mechanic workshop. A local business rival told the police that the applicant and his cousin were assisting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“the LTTE”) by repairing their motorcycles.

   b)The police apprehended the applicant and his cousin for questioning. The applicant and his cousin told the police that they did not know the identity of the customers for whom they repaired motorcycles and so were not aware whether they were LTTE or not.

   c)The police did not believe the applicant and his cousin’s explanation. The applicant’s cousin was sentenced to six months in gaol, as the applicant’s cousin was the owner of the mechanic workshop. The applicant himself was released, and applied for a working visa in Kuwait where he spent five years working as a gardener.

   d)In May 2012, the applicant learned that his father was very ill and so returned to Sri Lanka. Within two days of his return, police appeared at the applicant’s parents’ house and questioned him over his alleged ties to the LTTE.

   e)The applicant repeated his denials of any involvement with the LTTE and told the police that he had been resident in Kuwait for the previous five years. The police ordered the applicant to attend the police station for further questioning, which the applicant did.

   f)The applicant was questioned for several hours before being released. Upon the applicant’s release, the police threatened to kill the applicant if they discovered that he was, or had been, involved with the LTTE. Further, the police said that if they caught the applicant trying to leave Sri Lanka, they would make him “disappear”.

   g)By the time the applicant had “gained the courage to flee Sri Lanka” his Kuwaiti visa had expired. The applicant then learned that many Tamils were “fleeing” Sri Lanka by boat.

   h)The applicant paid “an agent” a fee and boarded a boat in Trincomalee to Australia.

   i)The applicant fears “being abducted and killed” by the police or a paramilitary group if he returns to Sri Lanka.

   j)The applicant believes that the police and paramilitary groups will “harm and mistreat” him because of his Tamil ethnicity and alleged links to the LTTE. Further, the applicant fears mistreatment because of having left Sri Lanka illegally.

The Delegate’s decision

1. On 22 January 2013, the applicant attended an interview with the Delegate.

2. On 22 March 2013, the Delegate refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention and does not meet the alternative complementary protection criterion.

3. The Delegate did not accept the applicant’s claim that he was questioned by the police when he returned to Sri Lanka in 2012 about an incident that occurred in 2007. Further, the Delegate did not accept the applicant is of any interest to the authorities in Sri Lanka as he was able to travel on a legally obtained passport and had departed and re-entered Sri Lanka in the past without incident.

The RRT’s review and decision

1. On 28 March 2013, the applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the RRT.

2. On 13 May 2013, the RRT wrote to the applicant informing him that the RRT had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. The letter invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 5 June 2013 to give oral evidence and present arguments.

3. On 5 June 2013, the applicant attended the RRT hearing and gave evidence.

4. The RRT explored the applicant’s claims with him in some detail at the hearing and put to him concerns it had about his evidence, noting his responses.

5. The decision of the RRT is accurately summarised in the submissions of the solicitor of the first respondent, as follows:

   “The decision of the Tribunal

   8   With respect to the applicant's claim to be imputed as a supporter of the LTTE, the RRT did not accept any aspect of the applicant's account about him and his cousin being apprehended in 2007 on suspicion of assisting the LTTE, or his account of being visited by the authorities in 2012.  This was on the basis of a number of concerns with the applicant's evidence, set out at [51] and [52]. 

   9. The RRT did not accept that the applicant would otherwise be harmed due to his ethnicity as a young Tamil male or being a suspected LTTE supporter for the reasons set out at [53] and [58].

   10. With respect to the applicant's claim to fear harm as a failed asylum seeker, the RRT extracted at [48]-[49] country information regarding the treatment of returnees who departed illegally from Sri Lanka which included information about the Immigration and Emigration Act of 1948 and its enforcement. On the basis of, and consistently with, this country information the RRT found at [55] and [58] that the applicant would be questioned by the Sri Lankan authorities upon return to Sri Lanka and that he may be remanded in jail for a short period due to his illegal departure from Sri Lanka before being fined and bailed. The RRT was not satisfied that being questioned by the authorities, being held in jail for a short period of time, or being fined and then bailed amounted to serious harm, persecution or significant harm. The RRT found that the applicant would be able to return to his home area when released, and that although he may then be visited by the authorities this did not constitute serious harm, persecution or significant harm.”

6. Accordingly, having determined that the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act, or the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act, the RRT affirmed the decision under review.

The proceeding before this Court

1. The applicant was unrepresented before this Court, although had the assistance of a Tamil interpreter. 

2. On 1 November 2013, the applicant filed an Amended Application.

3. At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he relies on the grounds contained in the Amended Application, filed on 1 November 2013, as follows:

   “1. The correct test under the Migration Act for the Complementary Protection was not correctly applied when the RRT found that I may be subjected to questioning by the police on my return or fined or even jailed for a period.

   2. The main element of claim that I would be detained and abused on my arrival was not correctly dealt.

   3. The RRT did not provide me all of the evidence on which it rejected my case for comments.

   4. The RRT’s reasons for rejecting my case are not supported by evidence.”

4. Each of the grounds was interpreted for the assistance of the applicant and the applicant was invited to make submissions in support of each of the grounds and in support of the application generally.

Ground 1

1. Ground 1 asserts that the RRT did not apply the correct test when considering whether the applicant met the complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. Ground 1 is otherwise unsupported by particulars, evidence, or submissions. In oral submissions, the applicant submitted the RRT had not considered what would happen to him in Sri Lanka when questioned and interviewed and had failed to consider his personal circumstances.

2. A fair reading of the RRT decision record does not support any of the assertions made by the applicant in support of Ground 1.

3. In considering whether the applicant met the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act, the RRT referred to the findings it had made in considering if the applicant had suffered Convention-based persecution. In particular the RRT referred to its finding that the applicant had twice been granted a genuine Sri Lankan passport and had legally exited and re-entered Sri Lanka without issue when travelling to Kuwait. The RRT also referred to its finding, based on the applicant’s evidence, that he had otherwise resided in the one premises in Sri Lanka where his parents and sister continue to reside. The RRT accepted that the applicant will be questioned by authorities upon his return and may be held “for a relatively short period” on remand due to his illegal departure from Sri Lanka and that he may then be fined and bailed. The RRT also accepted that the applicant may be visited by authorities after his return. However, based on country information before it regarding the treatment of returnees, the RRT was not satisfied that the questioning process by the authorities, the period of remand or the imposition of a fine amounted to significant harm.

4. Accordingly, the RRT concluded, as stated above, that the applicant does not have substantial grounds for believing, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm.

5. The RRT correctly identified the criterion to be satisfied by s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. It was open to the RRT to make the findings that it did in considering s.36(2)(aa) of the Act and for the reasons it gave. In particular, the RRT’s decision record discloses that the RRT put to the applicant that the fact that he might be held on remand and released and may be subject to a fine did not appear to be significant harm or serious harm. The RRT noted the applicant’s response that this may be correct.

6. The RRT specifically addressed the complementary protection claim by reference to the language of the statute and made findings of fact which led to the conclusion that it did not accept the applicant’s claims. There is no jurisdictional error in the RRT referring to its previous findings of fact in considering complementary protection if the claim under complementary protection could not survive those findings of fact (see: SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774 at [56] per Robertson J).

7. In relation to the applicant’s assertion that the RRT did not consider what would happen to the applicant after he was questioned, the RRT’s decision record, and the reasons above, make clear that it did.

8. In relation to the applicant’s assertion that the RRT failed to look into his circumstances, it is well established that there is no general obligation on a RRT to investigate an applicant’s claims (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43] per Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gleeson CJ agreeing); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 at [20] per Black CJ, Sundberg and Bennett JJ in joint judgment). The duty imposed on the RRT by the Act is a duty to review and not a duty to enquire (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 at [25] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

9. Accordingly, Ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2

1. Ground 2 asserts that the applicant’s main claim that he would be detained and abused on arrival in Sri Lanka was not correctly dealt with. Ground 2 was not supported by particulars, evidence, or any submissions, either written or oral. I asked the applicant in what way was his claim not correctly dealt with, and he simply asserted that he would be subjected to harm by authorities.

1. The RRT’s decision record makes clear that the RRT considered what may happen to the applicant on his return to Sri Lanka as a failed asylum seeker. As stated above, the RRT was not satisfied that being questioned by authorities and being held for a short time in gaol on remand before being fined and bailed did not amount to significant harm. Whether the treatments faced by the applicant met the definition of significant harm was a factual determination for the RRT. As stated above, the RRT’s findings were assessed against country information.

2. It is well established that the country information to which the RRT has regard and the weight it gives that information is a matter for the RRT (NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10, and VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29).

3. As stated above, the RRT’s findings were open to it on the evidence and materials before it and for the reasons it gave.

4. To the extent that Ground 2 is otherwise an expression of the applicant’s disagreement with the RRT’s findings, such a complaint invites merits review which this Court cannot undertake. (see Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 53-54; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

5. Accordingly, Ground 2 is not made out.

Ground 3

1. Ground 3 asserts that the RRT did not provide to the applicant for comment the evidence upon which it rejected his case. Again, the assertion in Ground 3 is not supported by particulars, evidence, or submissions. I asked the applicant what was the information with which he should have been provided for comment. The applicant responded that the RRT had told him that his credibility was in question but did not elaborate on areas with which the RRT was unhappy.

2. The RRT’s decision record does not support the applicant’s assertion.

3. There was no transcript of the RRT hearing provided to this Court, nor did the applicant provide any evidence to this Court to suggest that the RRT’s decision record is not accurate. At the directions hearing on 23 September 2013, the applicant was given an opportunity to file a transcript of the RRT hearing. The applicant was also directed to give notice if he wished to rely on recordings of the hearing. However, no step was taken by the applicant to rely on any such evidence. In the circumstances, the Court accepts as accurate the RRT’s summary of the oral evidence given by the applicant and exchanges it had with the applicant at the RRT hearing. The Court is entitled to accept the RRT’s decision record as accurately reflecting the matters to which it refers as taking place at the hearing in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (see NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1).

4. The RRT identified in its decision record with great particularity the matters of concern about the applicant’s evidence that it raised with him. The RRT noted that the combination of its concerns indicated that the applicant had fabricated his evidence. Further, the applicant was told at the commencement of the RRT hearing that “just because something has been accepted by the department does not mean that it will be accepted by the Tribunal.” A fair reading of the RRT’s decision record makes clear that the applicant’s credibility was raised as a serious and significant issue for the RRT, as it was required to do in circumstances where the issues before the RRT were not necessarily the same as those before the Delegate (see: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152)

5. It is well established that the RRT is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant (Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J). Nor does the RRT have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out (Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J).

6. The applicant was also assisted at the RRT hearing by a migration agent who provided written submissions following the hearing, addressing the various concerns raised by the RRT at the hearing. The RRT noted in its decision record that it had had regard to those submissions.

7. To the extent that Ground 3 appeared to suggest that there was an obligation on the RRT to give to the applicant information that it considered may be the reasons for affirming the decision under review, no such information was identified by the applicant, and no such obligation to give information arises on the face of the RRT’s decision record. All information, evidence, and material relied on by the RRT was not information that enlivened any obligation under s.424A of the Act. Moreover, it is well established that the RRT’s disbelief of an applicant’s evidence arising from inconsistencies therein is not “information” for the purposes of s.424A of the Act. Neither does information include the RRT’s subjective appraisals, thought processes and determinations, defects, gaps or lack of detail in an applicant’s evidence (see SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [18] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123 at [14] per Finn and Stone JJ).

8. Ultimately, as stated above, the RRT’s findings were open to it on the materials and evidence before it and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the RRT (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J). A credit finding is sound if it was “open to [the RRT] on the material, was based on rational grounds and was arrived at on consideration of matters that were logically probative of the issue of credibility.” (see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547).

9. Accordingly, Ground 3 is not made out.

Ground 4

1. Ground 4 asserts that the RRT’s reasons for rejecting the applicant’s case are not supported by evidence. Ground 4 is also not supported by particulars, evidence, or submissions.

2. When I asked the applicant whether there was anything he wished to say in support of Ground 4. The applicant responded that the RRT did not give him evidence or assurance that he would not suffer harm by authorities upon his return to Sri Lanka. There is no jurisdictional error in the failure of the RRT to provide such evidence or assurance.

3. It is for the applicant to satisfy the RRT, being the relevant decision-maker, that the applicant meets the criteria for being a refugee. As stated in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187]:

   “…The proceedings before the [RRT] are inquisitorial and the [RRT] is not in the position of a contradictor. It is for the applicant to advance whatever evidence or argument she wishes to advance in support of her contention that she has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The [RRT] must then decide whether that claim is made out.”

4. Section 65(1)(b) of the Act mandates that if the RRT, as the relevant decision-maker, is not so satisfied the applicant must be refused a protection visa.

5. Accordingly, Ground 4 is not made out.

Conclusion

1. A fair reading of the RRT’s decision record makes clear that the RRT understood the claims being made by the applicant; explored those claims with the applicant at a hearing; and, had regard to all material provided in support, including a post-hearing submission provided by the applicant’s migration agent. The RRT put to the applicant in significant detail matters of concern it had about his evidence and noted the applicant’s responses. The RRT identified independent country information to which it had regard. The RRT also put to the applicant independent country information before it and invited the applicant to comment upon it.

2. The RRT then made findings based on the evidence and material before it. Those findings of fact were open to the RRT on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. A fair reading of the RRT’s decision record makes clear that the RRT reached conclusions based on the findings made by it and to which it applied the correct law.

3. In the circumstances, the RRT complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.

4. The RRT’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.

5. The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Emmett

Associate: 

Date:  23 July 2014