SZTBR v Minister for Immigration

[2013] FCCA 2093

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTBR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2013] FCCA 2093

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal decision – whether Tribunal raised with the applicant for a protection visa for his comments information about the applicant’s circumstances on which Tribunal relied for finding it was reasonably practicable for the applicant to relocate to Karachi or Peshawar – whether Tribunal was obliged under s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to raise these matters with the applicant – whether Tribunal was required to give particulars of these matters under s.424A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal correctly applied the relocation principle – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424A, 425, 441A

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZFLX & Anor (2009) 238 CLR 507
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515
SZBYR v The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190

SZSRB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1382

Applicant: SZTBR

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1645 of 2013

Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis

Hearing date: 28 October 2013

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 6 December 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant in person

Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper

ORDERS

1. The application is dismissed.

2. Subject to order 3, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $6,646 or such lesser amount as the first respondent, on the publication of these reasons, informs the Court the first respondent has actually incurred.

3. The first respondent is at liberty to apply to the Court within seven days for an order to vary the amount of the costs assessed under order 2.

4. The title of the first respondent recorded in the application is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.

5. Pursuant to order 2, the costs of the First Respondent be fixed in the sum of $6,000.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1645 of 2013

SZTBR

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant is a Shi’a Hazara male. He is also a national of Pakistan who lived in Quetta in the province of Balochistan.

2. In August 2012 the applicant applied to the first respondent (Minister) for a protection visa because he feared persecution by extremist groups in Pakistan. The reason he gave for his fear was that Shi’a Hazaras are attacked by extremist groups and that, in 2009 and 2011, he received threats from members of one such extremist group. A delegate of the Minister accepted the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution but refused to grant a protection visa because the delegate found it was safe, reasonable, and practicable for the applicant to relocate from Quetta to Karachi.

3. On an application for review of the delegate’s decision, the second respondent (Tribunal), like the delegate, found the applicant was a credible witness and that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to Quetta. The Tribunal too, however, refused to grant the applicant a protection visa. The Tribunal found there are Shi’a Hazara populations in Karachi and Peshawar that do not face the risks Hazaras face in Quetta, and that the applicant, therefore, would face no appreciable risk of the persecution he fears if he relocated to Karachi or Peshawar. The Tribunal further found the applicant was well placed to find employment and accommodation in Karachi or Peshawar because the applicant speaks a number of languages, he managed to find work in Australia and Great Britain, and he had a number of businesses when he lived in Quetta.

4. In his application to this Court for judicial review, the applicant claims that, in making these findings, the Tribunal failed to comply with s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The applicant contends the Tribunal was required, but failed, to provide the applicant an opportunity to comment on whether he was well placed to find employment and accommodation in Karachi or Peshawar because of the applicant’s ability to speak a number of languages, his education, and his past ability to find employment. The applicant further claims that the Tribunal did not comply with s.424A of the Act because, in finding that it was reasonable for the applicant to settle in Karachi or Peshawar, it relied on information that the applicant was relatively well-educated with prior work experience, and the Tribunal did not inform the applicant before the hearing that the Tribunal intended to rely on that information.

5. At the hearing of the application, the applicant, who was not legally represented, expressed what I would characterise as incredulity at the Tribunal’s conclusion that it was reasonable for him to live in Karachi or Peshawar. The applicant submitted that “if Hazara people can relocate in Karachi or Peshawar, all of Hazaras they could relocate in Karachi or Peshawar”. I have taken this as a claim that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in concluding that it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Karachi or Peshawar. More precisely, I will take this as a claim that the Tribunal did not ask itself the correct question when considering whether the applicant can reasonably resettle in Karachi or Peshawar.

6. I will consider each of these grounds of review.

Ground 1 – failure to observe s.425

1. The claim that the Tribunal failed to comply with s.425 of the Act is based on two related contentions. The first is that, although the Tribunal asked the applicant to comment on country information which suggested that the applicant could live safely in Karachi or Peshawar, the Tribunal “did not raise with the Applicant whether or not he could reasonably and practicably relocate with his family to either of those two cities”.[1] The second contention is that the Tribunal did not raise with the applicant whether the applicant would be well placed to find employment, accommodation, and settle in Karachi or Peshawar “by reason of the number of languages he spoke, his being relatively well educated, and his prior work experience”.[2]

   [1] Amended application, ground 1, paragraph (b) of particulars.

   [2] Amended application, ground 1, paragraph (b) of particulars.

2. The applicant’s claims and contentions raise the following issues. The first is whether the Tribunal did fail to raise with the applicant the matters the applicant claims the Tribunal ought to have raised with him. The second issue arises if the first is answered in the affirmative: was the Tribunal obliged to raise with the applicant these matters? This issue will require me to briefly review the relevant legal principles for determining what information or matters the Tribunal is obliged to inform an applicant of when conducting a review as required by s.425 of the Act before it can make a decision. That discussion will then lead me to consider the matters relating to relocation that were considered by the delegate.

Did the Tribunal raise with the applicant the matters he claims were not raised with him?

1. The Tribunal does not state in its reasons that it brought to the applicant’s attention that the Tribunal might rely on the fact that the applicant can speak Urdu and English, is well educated, and had managed to find employment, to conclude that it is reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Karachi or Peshawar (Claimed Relevant Information). The Minister submits that, in the absence of a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, it was not open to the Court to infer from the Tribunal’s not referring to its raising with the applicant the Claimed Relevant Information that the Tribunal did not in fact raise these matters with the applicant.

2. In support of that submission, the Minister relies on NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs.[3] One issue in that case was whether certain country information had been put to the applicant in circumstances where the Tribunal’s reasons for decision did not say it did. Although Driver FM (as his Honour then was) had not found that the Tribunal did not raise the matter with the applicant in that case, the Full Court of the Federal Court said it would not have been open to his Honour to make any such finding in the absence of a transcript. The Court said:[4]

   On the evidence before his Honour, it was not open to him to have made a finding that this issue had not been canvassed. His Honour had no transcript. . . The appellant had not given any evidence (in affidavit form or orally) to the effect that this issue had not been raised. There was simply no basis upon which his Honour could properly have made this finding. His reasons should not be read as if he did so. In the absence of evidence about what occurred at the hearing, the appellant has no sufficient evidential basis for the grounds he seeks to raise, thus he has not, in our opinion, established that the Tribunal did not comply with the rules of natural justice.

   [3] NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241 (Beaumont, Merkel, and Hely JJ)

   [4] At [21] (Beaumont, Merkel, and Hely JJ)

3. In the face of this authority, I must accept the Minister’s submission that, in the absence of a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, it is not open to me to find that the Tribunal did not raise the Claimed Relevant Information with the applicant. For this reason alone, this part of the application must fail.

4. Notwithstanding this conclusion, I will consider the applicant’s ground on the assumption that the Tribunal did not raise with the applicant the Claimed Relevant Information. For the reasons that follow, however, I conclude that the ground still fails. If I had concluded otherwise, I would have invited submissions from the Minister as to why I should not direct that the recording of the hearing before the Tribunal be admitted into evidence with a view to my hearing the tape to determine whether, as the applicant claims, the Tribunal did not raise with the applicant the Claimed Relevant Information.

Was the Tribunal obliged to raise the Claimed Relevant Information with the applicant?

1. The circumstances in which the Tribunal may be required under s.425 of the Act to raise with an applicant matters on which the Tribunal may rely in rejecting an application for review were considered by the High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.[5] I summarised in SZSRB v Minister for Immigration & Anor[6] the principles that are derived from that case as follows:

   a)Subject to b), the only issues that will be before the Tribunal on an application for review of a delegate’s decision will be those which the delegate regarded as dispositive of the applicant’s claim for a protection visa.

   b)The Tribunal, however, is not bound to decide an application of review by reference to the issues the delegate considered dispositive; subject to c), the Tribunal is free to identify additional or different issues which it may consider to be dispositive or potentially dispositive of the applicant’s claim for a protection visa.

   c)The Tribunal can dispose of an application for review on the basis of additional or different issues only if the Tribunal has sufficiently alerted the applicant that the Tribunal may decide the application for review on the basis of the additional or different issues, and has provided the applicant an opportunity “to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising”.[7]

   d)What the Tribunal must do to adequately alert the applicant that it may decide the application for review on the basis of additional or different issues will depend on the circumstances of the case. Where the additional or different issues on which the Tribunal may decide an application for review is the Tribunal’s not accepting all or part of the applicant’s account which the delegate accepted, “the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted”.[8]

   [5] [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515 (15 December 2006)

   [6] [2013] FCCA 1382 at [46] and [47]

   [7] Section 425 of the Act

   [8] [2006] HCA 63at [47]

2. Also relevant are the principles contained in the following passage from the joint reasons of French CJ and Kiefel J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR:[9]

   Procedural fairness requires a decision-maker to identify for the person affected any critical issue not apparent from the nature of the decision or the terms of the statutory power. The decision-maker must also advise of any adverse conclusion which would not obviously be open on the known material. However, a decision-maker is not otherwise required to expose his or her thought processes or provisional views for comment before making the decision.

   [9] (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [9]

3. The application of these principles requires me to first consider whether the delegate regarded the Claimed Relevant Information as dispositive. And here the record of the delegate’s decision makes it clear that he did regard the information as dispositive. Having concluded that, if the applicant were relocated to Karachi the chance of harm to the applicant because of his Shi’a religion or his Hazara ethnicity to be remote rather than real, the delegate also considered whether the relocation by the applicant to Karachi would be “reasonable and practicable, taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances”.[10]

   [10] CB193

4. On that topic, the delegate concluded:[11]

   In this applicant’s case he is a relatively young man. He is well educated and has significant work experience. He speaks fluent English and can speak Urdu and Pashto as well as his native Hazaragi. He is married with a child, however his wife remains in Quetta where she is employed as a public school teacher. The applicant has shown considerable resilience and adaptability in the past, having previously travelled to Australia, where he was able to leave after sourcing a bogus Australian passport with which to travel to the UK. In the UK he was able to find employment and remained there for 3 years. He has travelled to a number of countries unaided. He has also had access to funds, having sold properties in Quetta for reasonable sums.

   While I acknowledge Karachi suffers from various problems and strains because of the size of its population, there is no reason for me to consider, with his education, age, skills and proven adaptability and resilience that he could not live a reasonably normal life there. . . .

   [11] CB 193-194

5. In support of his application for review by the Tribunal, the applicant, through his migration agent, provided detailed written submissions.[12] Those submissions principally addressed the issue of whether Hazara Shi’a face persecution in Pakistan. The submissions did not address that part of the delegate’s decision concerning the reasonableness and practicality of the applicant relocating to Karachi.

   [12] CB208-247

6. Given that the delegate regarded the Claimed Relevant Information in his decision as dispositive, the applicant was on notice that those matters would be relevant to his application for review before the Tribunal and, for that reason, had sufficient notice that they might have been matters on which the Tribunal too would rely for rejecting his application. For that reason, the Tribunal was not required to raise with the applicant at the hearing or otherwise the Claimed Relevant Information and that, accordingly, the Tribunal did not fail to observe s.425 of the Act as the applicant has claimed.

7. The first ground of the application for review, therefore, fails.

Ground 2 – failure to observe s.424A of the Act

1. The applicant claims that the Claimed Relevant Information constitutes “information” within the meaning of s.424A(1) of the Act of which the Tribunal, in accordance with s.424A(1), was obliged to give particulars to the applicant by one of the methods specified in s.441A of the Act, and to do the other things prescribed by s.424A(1).

2. The Minister, relying on SZBYR v The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,[13] submits that the Claimed Relevant Information did not constitute “information” because the Claimed Relevant Information did not “contain in their terms a rejection, denial or undermining” of the applicant’s claims. The Minister’s submission assumes that for information to be “information” within the meaning of s.424A(1) of the Act, it must be information that “in its terms” must amount to “a rejection, denial or undermining” of an applicant’s claim.

   [13] (2007) 81 ALJR 1190 at [17]-[18]

3. That assumption is correct. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZFLX & Anor[14] the High Court noted that in SZBYR the High Court “emphasised that for s 424A(1)(a) to be engaged, the material in question should in its terms contain a “rejection, denial or undermining” of the review applicant’s claim to be a refugee”. And there are many cases where the Federal Court and this Court have rejected challenges to Tribunal decisions based on s.424A of the Act because what was claimed to be information was information which did not in its terms contain a “rejection, denial or undermining” of an applicant’s claim for a protection visa.

   [14] (2009) 238 CLR 507 at 513 ([22]) (French CJ, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ)

4. In my opinion, and contrary to the Minister’s submission, the Claimed Relevant Information was “information” within the meaning of s.424A(1) of the Act. The Claimed Relevant Information was considered by the Tribunal and formed a part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the delegate’s decision. The reason was that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a Shi’a Hazari in Pakistan because he could reasonably be expected to relocate to Karachi or Peshawar. As can be seen from the following passage, the Claimed Relevant Information undermined the applicant’s claim.[15]

   The applicant speaks a number of languages including Urdu and English and is relatively well educated. He has managed to find work in Australia and Great Britain when he lived there and had different businesses when he lived in Quetta. Accordingly, he should be well placed to find employment, accommodation and settle in Karachi or Peshawar.

   He will no doubt want to make arrangements for his family to come and live with him there and the Tribunal considers the risk of harm for them as Hazaras to be no greater than it is for the applicant. As he will be well placed to find employment in Karachi or Peshawar, he will be able to provide for and settle his family there.

   [15] CB273, [83] [84]

5. To conclude, as I have done, that the Claimed Relevant Information was “information” does not mean, however, that the Tribunal was required to give the written particulars prescribed by s.424A(1). Sub-section 424A(3) excludes from the operation of s.424A(1) certain classes of information. Relevant to the applicant’s claim are paragraphs (b) and (ba) of s.424A(3) of the Act which provide:

   This section does not apply to information:

   . . . .

   (b)that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

   (ba)that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department.

1. The Claimed Relevant Information relates to the personal circumstances of the applicant, and is information which the applicant would know. There is nothing in the material before me to suggest that the Tribunal became aware of that information other than as a result of the applicant giving the information to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) or the Tribunal, either during the process that led to the decision of the delegate or for the purpose of the application for review by the Tribunal of the delegate’s decision. I find that the applicant gave the Claimed Relevant Information to either or both DIAC and to the Tribunal. For these reasons, the Claimed Relevant Information is information to which either or both of paragraphs (b) and (ba) of s.424A(3) applies or apply. That, in turn, means that the Tribunal was not required under s.424A(1) to give the applicant particulars of the Claimed Relevant Information.

2. The second ground of the application for review also fails.

Ground 3 – failure to afford procedural fairness

1. The third ground of review is a claim that the Tribunal failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness.

2. The applicant relies on the same particulars as he relies for the first ground. This ground of review fails for the reasons I concluded that the first ground of review fails.

Did the Tribunal correctly apply the relocation principle?

1. In concluding that the applicant was not entitled to a protection visa, the Tribunal applied what is often called the “relocation principle”. The final matter I will consider is whether the Tribunal correctly applied that principle to the circumstances of this case.

2. The “relocation principle” is a reference to a particular reason for concluding that an applicant for a protection visa does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her country of nationality. It comes into play where the fear of a particular claimant for a protection visa is well founded with respect to only part of the territory of the applicant’s country of nationality. The principle operates to deny an applicant an entitlement to a protection visa where the relevant decision maker is satisfied that it is reasonably practicable for the applicant to relocate to that part of the applicant’s country of nationality where the applicant would not have a well founded fear of persecution.

3. The relocation principle was accepted by the High Court in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.[16] The plurality accepted that the issue which the relocation principle required to be answered is “whether it be reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the [applicant] to relocate to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution”.[17] The plurality further said that what “is “reasonable”, in the sense of “practicable”, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality”.[18]

   [16] (2007) 233 CLR 18

   [17] At [23], Callinan J agreeing at [105]

   [18] At [24], Callinan J agreeing at [105]

4. Accordingly, the correct application of these principles in any given case requires the decision-maker to undertake two enquiries. The first is to determine whether there is an area within the applicant’s country of nationality in which the applicant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution, were the applicant to live there. The second is whether, in the particular circumstances of the applicant, it is reasonably practicable for the applicant to live in the area where he or she would not have a well-founded fear of persecution.

5. In my opinion, the Tribunal in this case undertook both enquiries. First, the Tribunal found there is “no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the persecution the applicant fears in Karachi”.[19] The Tribunal based that finding on the following country information.

   a)An article titled “Hazaras not safe even in Karachi” published in the October 2011 edition of The News. The article quoted a Hazara resident of Karachi that Karachi has a Hazara population of $13,000, and that three Hazaras were recently killed in the Karachi neighbourhood of Manghopir.[20]

   b)An article published on 30 April 2011 in the Hazara Nation reporting that a Hazaran rickshaw driver was shot and killed.[21] The victim was reported to be a social worker and general secretary of the Hazari Mughal Yekjehti Forum.

   c)An article published during  2010 in the Hazara Nation reporting of “a wave of Hazara target killing in Karachi recently”.[22] This article did not suggest these killings were sectarian; it ascribes responsibility to a Mr Mirza Yousaf who is described as “the leader of Shi’a Action Committee and staunch anti-Hazara”.[23]

   d)Various reports that, although members of the Laskkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) do not specifically target the ethnic Hazara community in Karachi, they have attacked Shi’s Muslim targets in the city.[24]

   [19] CB271 [67]

   [20] CB268 [51]

   [21] CB268 [52]

   [22] CB268, [53]

   [23] CB268, [53]

   [24] CB268, [54] – [59]

6. The Tribunal summarised the effect of this information as follows:[25]

   . . . there is a Hazara population in Karachi in that city of approximately 13,000 and that there have been isolated incidents in which they have been killed; although at least one report indicates that the victim had held a position in a Hazara group. Other incidents relate to harm being caused by another Shi’a group to Hazaras living in a particular area of Karachi.

   In addition to the risk of harm for being Hazara, country information also indicates attacks on Shi’as in Karachi predominantly at locations on occasions where large numbers are likely to gather in public. . . .

   [25] CB271-272, [67] [68]

7. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant “is at risk of suffering harm in Karachi because of his ethnicity and religion”, and that Hazaras “are identifiable by their facial features”. The Tribunal found, however, that “this risk is remote”.[26] In response to the applicant’s example of a Hazari man who had been killed in Karachi, and who the applicant claimed provided security to President Zadari,[27] the Tribunal found that that person had a “greater profile than that having provided security to the Pakistan President and so the Tribunal considers that person would have been at a much higher level of risk than the applicant”.[28]

   [26] CB272, [69]

   [27] CB272, [71]

   [28] CB272, [73]

8. The Tribunal accepted that Shi’a professionals had been killed in Karachi, and Sunni extremist groups have a presence there.[29] The Tribunal said, however, that these attacks “need to be considered in the context of the size of the Shi’a population of that city (the Shi’a population being approximately six million)”.[30] The Tribunal also found that these incidents, and another attack on Shi’as resulting in the collapse of a building, occurred where “large numbers of Shi’as will be present”, and were “isolated and they must be considered in the context of the size of the Shi’a population in that city”.[31]

   [29] CB272, [68]

   [30] CB272, [68]

   [31] CB272, [75]

9. The Tribunal also found that “there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the persecution the applicant fears in Peshawar”.[32] The Tribunal based this conclusion on the following country information:

   a)there are approximately 5,000 Hazara families in Peshawar, about two thirds of which live in the Haji Camp neighbourhood;[33]

   b)a report published by Al Jazeera on 12 November 2011 indicated that Peshawar had welcomed Hazaras and that trade seemed to be thriving for many members of that community;[34] and

   c)reports concerning attacks made on Shia’s.[35]

   [32] CB273, [76]

   [33] CB270, [60]

   [34] CB270, [60]

   [35] CB270-271 [61]-[62]

10. The Tribunal noted it had received no reports of attacks on Hazaras in Peshawar and that the predominant targets of attacks referred to in the country information the Tribunal reviewed were “government, law enforcement and other like agencies”.[36]

    [36] CB273, [77]

11. Having found there was no appreciable risk in Karachi or Peshawar of the persecution the applicant feared, the Tribunal considered whether it was reasonably practicable for the applicant to relocate to Karachi or Peshawar. The Tribunal found that the applicant would be “well placed to find employment, accommodation and settle in Karachi and Peshawar”.[37] The basis of that conclusion was the Tribunal’s finding that the “applicant speaks a number of languages including Urdu and English and is relatively well educated”, and that he has managed to find work in Australia and Great Britain and had “different businesses when he lived in Quetta”.[38] The Tribunal’s ultimate finding was as follows:[39]

    For all these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the applicant can reasonably be expected to relocate to Karachi or Peshawar where there is not an appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. His fear of persecution in Pakistan is not well founded.

    [37] CB273, [83]

    [38] CB273, [83]

    [39] CB274, [85]

12. In my opinion, in concluding that the applicant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a Hazara Shi’a if he were to live in Karachi or Peshawar, and that it would be reasonably practicable for the applicant to relocate in those cities, the Tribunal applied the correct legal tests associated with the “relocation principle”.  Further, these conclusions were reasonably open to the Tribunal on the material it considered.

Conclusion and disposition

1. The Tribunal did not fail to comply with s.425 or s.424A of the Act, and did not otherwise fail to accord the applicant procedural fairness. The Tribunal made no jurisdictional error in concluding that the applicant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution if he were to relocate in Karachi or Peshawar, and that it would be reasonably practicable for the applicant to relocate to one of those cities.

2. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the application and order that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs in the amount of $6,646 or such lesser sum as the Minister on the publication of these reasons informs the Court the Minister has actually incurred. I also propose to grant the Minister leave to apply to the Court within seven days for an order varying the amount of the costs I propose to award.

I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis

Associate: 

Date:  6 December 2013