FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2014] FCA 621
Citation: SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 621 Appeal from: SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 2080 Parties: SZRUA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and WENDY BODDISON IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR File number: NSD 2600 of 2013 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 26 May 2014 Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZRUA v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2080 referred toDate of hearing: 26 May 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J King Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2600 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZRUA
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentWENDY BODDISON IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MAY 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2600 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZRUA
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentWENDY BODDISON IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
26 MAY 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court rejecting the appellant’s claim for a declaration that the assessor’s recommendation in her independent protection assessment dated 8 August 2012, that the appellant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia had protection obligations, was not made in accordance with law: SZRUA v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2080.
The appeal has been very well argued. The sole issue is whether, in finding that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of a particular social group of adulterers in Iran, the assessor failed to consider whether there was a real chance that he would be persecuted in the future were he to return to Iran or that Australia owed complementary protection obligations in respect of such a possibility.
Background
The appellant has been represented throughout the administrative and Court processes. He made a number of other claims that are not presently relevant. He made a statutory declaration on 10 October 2011 when filing his…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 621
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue at the heart of this appeal was whether the trial judge had erred in his interpretation of the assessor's findings and in his conclusion that the appellant had not made a claim to fear persecution that was independent of the alleged intervention of the police. The appellant contended that his claim implicitly included a fear of future persecution based solely on his having committed adultery, and that the assessor's findings did not adequately address this aspect of his claim. The court needed to determine whether the assessor's reasoning was sufficient and whether the trial judge had correctly interpreted the assessor's decision.
In addressing the appeal, the court found that the primary judge's reasoning was flawed. The court held that the appellant's claims included a fear of persecution that was not solely dependent on the alleged intervention of the police. The court referenced the principles established in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2), which emphasized that the review process is inquisitorial and requires consideration of claims that are apparent on the face of the material before the tribunal. The court concluded that the assessor's findings did not adequately address the appellant's implicit claim of a well-founded fear of persecution based on his past adultery. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The second argument put by the appellant was that his Honour had erred in holding that the assessor did not need to respond to the appellant’s claim to fear harm for reasons of his membership of the particular social group of adulterers in Iran. He argued that his express claim, based on the circumstances he relied on as founding his fear of persecution in respect of his membership of a particular social group of adulterers were he to return to Iran, also would have raised by implication, as an aspect of that claim, the question whether even if his allegations of past harm were not made out, he had a genuine fear of persecution based solely on the fact of his having committed adultery with Sosan. In essence, the appellant contended that the finding at [123] of the assessor’s reasons did not follow from any evaluation of the facts of his simply being an adulterer so as to assess whether he had any such well-founded fear. He argued that such an examination was required on the basis of the reasoning in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574-575. He argued that the assessor’s findings in both [122] and [123] were, in terms, confined to the evaluation of his overall claims on the basis that he had been accused of adultery. He said that the assessor’s reasoning did not engage in an evaluation of whether, by reason of his having committed adultery in the past (without having been accused of that), he had a well-founded fear of persecution in the future were he to return to Iran.Consideration In my opinion, the primary judge’s reasoning process was inaccurate. He asserted that the appellant had made no claim to fear persecution that was independent of the alleged intervention of the police. That was not the case. The appellant’s claims were also based on his assertions, rejected by the assessor, that Sosan’s husband and family were pursuing him and had threatened to harm him, and that his brother had been attacked by the husband’s family in his stead. I am of opinion that the question whether the assessor was obliged to consider what the appellant argued was the implicit basis of his claim to fear persecution falls to be decided in accordance with the principles in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1. There, Black CJ, French and Selway JJ considered the review process by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which is relevantly analogous to the process undertaken by the assessor. They held that (144 FCR at 18-19 [58]):“The review process is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. The Tribunal is required to deal with the case raised by the material or evidence before it: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 157 at [114] (Merkel J). There is authority for the proposition that the Tribunal is not to limit its determination to the “case” articulated by an applicant if evidence and material which it accepts raise a case not articulated: Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28 at 63 (Merkel J); approved in Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 at 293-294 (Wilcox and Madgwick JJ). By way of example, if a claim of apprehended persecution is based upon membership of a particular social group the Tribunal may be required in its review function to consider a group definition open on the facts but not expressly advanced by the applicant: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 184 at 196 per Merkel J, Heerey and Sundberg JJ agreeing. It has been suggested that the unarticulated claim must be raised “squarely” on the material available to the Tribunal before it has a statutory duty to consider it: SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137 at [19] per Cooper J. The use of the adverb “squarely” does not convey any precise standard but it indicates that a claim not expressly advanced will attract the review obligation of the Tribunal when it is apparent on the face of the material before the Tribunal. Such a claim will not depend for its exposure on constructive or creative activity by the Tribunal.” (emphasis added)