SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2014] FCA 621

Citation: SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 621
Appeal from: SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 2080
Parties: SZRUA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and WENDY BODDISON IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
File number: NSD 2600 of 2013
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 26 May 2014
Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZRUA v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2080 referred to
Date of hearing: 26 May 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J King
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2600 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRUA
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

WENDY BODDISON IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.   

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2600 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRUA
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

WENDY BODDISON IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

26 MAY 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court rejecting the appellant’s claim for a declaration that the assessor’s recommendation in her independent protection assessment dated 8 August 2012, that the appellant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia had protection obligations, was not made in accordance with law:  SZRUA v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2080.

  2. The appeal has been very well argued.  The sole issue is whether, in finding that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of a particular social group of adulterers in Iran, the assessor failed to consider whether there was a real chance that he would be persecuted in the future were he to return to Iran or that Australia owed complementary protection obligations in respect of such a possibility.

    Background 

  3. The appellant has been represented throughout the administrative and Court processes.  He made a number of other claims that are not presently relevant.  He made a statutory declaration on 10 October 2011 when filing his…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 621
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZRUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the central issue before the court was whether the assessor, during the assessment of the appellant's claim for a protection visa, failed to properly consider the appellant's assertion that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Iran due to his status as an adulterer. The appellant argued that his fear was based on his past relationship with a married woman, which led to his detention, abuse, and threats from her husband and family. The primary judge had dismissed the appeal, finding that the assessor did not need to respond to the appellant's claim regarding his fear of persecution based on his membership of a particular social group of adulterers in Iran.

The legal issue at the heart of this appeal was whether the trial judge had erred in his interpretation of the assessor's findings and in his conclusion that the appellant had not made a claim to fear persecution that was independent of the alleged intervention of the police. The appellant contended that his claim implicitly included a fear of future persecution based solely on his having committed adultery, and that the assessor's findings did not adequately address this aspect of his claim. The court needed to determine whether the assessor's reasoning was sufficient and whether the trial judge had correctly interpreted the assessor's decision.

In addressing the appeal, the court found that the primary judge's reasoning was flawed. The court held that the appellant's claims included a fear of persecution that was not solely dependent on the alleged intervention of the police. The court referenced the principles established in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2), which emphasized that the review process is inquisitorial and requires consideration of claims that are apparent on the face of the material before the tribunal. The court concluded that the assessor's findings did not adequately address the appellant's implicit claim of a well-founded fear of persecution based on his past adultery. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal has been very well argued. The sole issue is whether, in finding that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of a particular social group of adulterers in Iran, the assessor failed to consider whether there was a real chance that he would be persecuted in the future were he to return to Iran or that Australia owed complementary protection obligations in respect of such a possibility.Background The appellant has been represented throughout the administrative and Court processes. He made a number of other claims that are not presently relevant. He made a statutory declaration on 10 October 2011 when filing his application for a protection visa, in which he asserted that, in about May 2011, he began a friendship that developed into a sexual relationship with a woman called Sosan. He claimed that, during the third time that he and Sosan had sex, the Iranian police came to the door of his family home and said that they had to search the house, asserting that they had been informed that something was going on. He claimed that the police found Sosan in the house and then they were both taken to the police station, where he found out for the first time that Sosan was married. He claimed that she had told him that she was divorced. He claimed that the police put him into detention and, whilst he was detained, he was beaten and kicked. He claimed that he then appeared in court, when his trial date was set and bail was fixed on the security of his parent’s home. He claimed that while he was at court, he saw Sosan’s husband, who threatened to kill him. The appellant claimed that he feared, were he returned to Iran, that he would be killed or imprisoned for a long time and that the government and Sosan’s family would harm him because he had had sexual relations with a married woman, being conduct that was un-Islamic and against Sharia law.The initial review An officer of the Minister’s department conducted a protection obligations evaluation referral of the appellant’s case. The officer found that she was prepared to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt, and so accepted that he was known to the authorities for committing adultery. The officer found that the appellant did have a relationship with Sosan, that it was plausible that her family had come to find out about that relationship and that he subsequently feared harm from her family and tribe. Nonetheless, the officer concluded that the adultery laws were laws of general application in Iran that did not attract any protection obligations to which he was entitled in Australia.The assessment During the course of the assessment, the assessor appears to have proceeded on the basis that the whole of the appellant’s claims were to be re-examined, and no complaint is made of that. The appellant’s migration advisers, who were and continue to be his solicitors, made a detailed written submission before his interview with the assessor. In it, they submitted that he had been arrested, detained, physically abused and charged with adultery in Iran, and that by that stage, additional to what had been before the officer, three court summonses had been issued by the Iranian authorities in respect of the appellant. They argued that it was evident that the appellant had come to the attention of the authorities in Iran for his adulterous actions, and that in light of the country information, together with his experiences, there was a real chance that he would be at risk of persecution, and not merely prosecution, owing to his adultery in Iran.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The assessor did find that there was a real chance that the appellant would be questioned and monitored on return to Iran, but that this treatment did not amount to serious harm or persecution within the meaning of the Convention.The decision of the trial judge The trial judge considered the appellant’s argument and rejected it. He said that, while the alleged adultery in Iran was relevant to his claim to fear persecution, the determination of the claim turned on a different issue, namely, whether the claimed fear was well-founded. He found that:“He made no claim to fear persecution which was independent of the alleged intervention of the police. However, to all intents and purposes the Assessor rejected that allegation in para.122 of her reasons when she concluded that the applicant had not been arrested or accused of adultery. In circumstances where the Assessor rejected the foundational allegation on which the objective element of the claim to fear persecution was based, it was sufficient that she say so without engaging in further discussion of other elements of the applicant’s claims which could not have affected the review’s outcome, including his claimed membership of the particular social group of adulterers in Iran.” Next, his Honour said that he was not convinced that the assessor had accepted that the appellant had had an adulterous relationship in Iran and inferred that she was not persuaded that he had committed adultery. He found that she had proceeded on the basis of expressing a more limited finding, based on her critical analysis of his evidence concerning the events said to have arisen out of the discovery of alleged adultery. For those reasons, his Honour dismissed the application.The appellant’s submissions The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in inferring that the assessor did not accept that the appellant had committed adultery in Iran with Sosan. The Minister does not suggest that that finding was defensible. In my view, it was not. It was plain that the assessor had proceeded on the basis that she accepted that the appellant had had a sexual relationship with Sosan but then had proceeded to deal with the appellant’s claims concerning how that relationship had been exposed in his community and the consequences of that exposure. The second argument put by the appellant was that his Honour had erred in holding that the assessor did not need to respond to the appellant’s claim to fear harm for reasons of his membership of the particular social group of adulterers in Iran. He argued that his express claim, based on the circumstances he relied on as founding his fear of persecution in respect of his membership of a particular social group of adulterers were he to return to Iran, also would have raised by implication, as an aspect of that claim, the question whether even if his allegations of past harm were not made out, he had a genuine fear of persecution based solely on the fact of his having committed adultery with Sosan. In essence, the appellant contended that the finding at [123] of the assessor’s reasons did not follow from any evaluation of the facts of his simply being an adulterer so as to assess whether he had any such well-founded fear. He argued that such an examination was required on the basis of the reasoning in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574-575. He argued that the assessor’s findings in both [122] and [123] were, in terms, confined to the evaluation of his overall claims on the basis that he had been accused of adultery. He said that the assessor’s reasoning did not engage in an evaluation of whether, by reason of his having committed adultery in the past (without having been accused of that), he had a well-founded fear of persecution in the future were he to return to Iran.Consideration

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The second argument put by the appellant was that his Honour had erred in holding that the assessor did not need to respond to the appellant’s claim to fear harm for reasons of his membership of the particular social group of adulterers in Iran. He argued that his express claim, based on the circumstances he relied on as founding his fear of persecution in respect of his membership of a particular social group of adulterers were he to return to Iran, also would have raised by implication, as an aspect of that claim, the question whether even if his allegations of past harm were not made out, he had a genuine fear of persecution based solely on the fact of his having committed adultery with Sosan. In essence, the appellant contended that the finding at [123] of the assessor’s reasons did not follow from any evaluation of the facts of his simply being an adulterer so as to assess whether he had any such well-founded fear. He argued that such an examination was required on the basis of the reasoning in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574-575. He argued that the assessor’s findings in both [122] and [123] were, in terms, confined to the evaluation of his overall claims on the basis that he had been accused of adultery. He said that the assessor’s reasoning did not engage in an evaluation of whether, by reason of his having committed adultery in the past (without having been accused of that), he had a well-founded fear of persecution in the future were he to return to Iran.Consideration In my opinion, the primary judge’s reasoning process was inaccurate. He asserted that the appellant had made no claim to fear persecution that was independent of the alleged intervention of the police. That was not the case. The appellant’s claims were also based on his assertions, rejected by the assessor, that Sosan’s husband and family were pursuing him and had threatened to harm him, and that his brother had been attacked by the husband’s family in his stead. I am of opinion that the question whether the assessor was obliged to consider what the appellant argued was the implicit basis of his claim to fear persecution falls to be decided in accordance with the principles in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1. There, Black CJ, French and Selway JJ considered the review process by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which is relevantly analogous to the process undertaken by the assessor. They held that (144 FCR at 18-19 [58]):“The review process is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. The Tribunal is required to deal with the case raised by the material or evidence before it: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 157 at [114] (Merkel J). There is authority for the proposition that the Tribunal is not to limit its determination to the “case” articulated by an applicant if evidence and material which it accepts raise a case not articulated: Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28 at 63 (Merkel J); approved in Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 at 293-294 (Wilcox and Madgwick JJ). By way of example, if a claim of apprehended persecution is based upon membership of a particular social group the Tribunal may be required in its review function to consider a group definition open on the facts but not expressly advanced by the applicant: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 184 at 196 per Merkel J, Heerey and Sundberg JJ agreeing. It has been suggested that the unarticulated claim must be raised “squarely” on the material available to the Tribunal before it has a statutory duty to consider it: SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137 at [19] per Cooper J. The use of the adverb “squarely” does not convey any precise standard but it indicates that a claim not expressly advanced will attract the review obligation of the Tribunal when it is apparent on the face of the material before the Tribunal. Such a claim will not depend for its exposure on constructive or creative activity by the Tribunal.” (emphasis added)