SZRSN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRSN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2014] FCA 527

Citation: SZRSN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 527
Appeal from: SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 557
Parties: SZRSN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File number: NSD 337 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 5 May 2014
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 applied
Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 applied
SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 distinguished
SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FMCA 78 referred to
SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 557 referred to
Date of hearing: 5 May 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 23
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 337 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRSN
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 337 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRSN
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

5 MAY 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application to that Court for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 15 January 2014 (the delegate’s decision) that the applicant’s application for a protection visa lodged on that day was not a valid application by reason of s 48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 557.

    Background

  2. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court on the first court date of 18 March 2014. Judge Manousaridis decided to hear the Minister’s application that the proceedings be summarily dismissed under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). That rule provided that, at the hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court could dismiss the proceedings if it were not satisfied that the applicant’s application raised an arguable case for relief. His Honour decided that the application did not raise an arguable case for relief because the applicant’s claim for complementary protection within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, the subject of the delegate’s decision, had been already refused by the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 527
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZRSN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an applicant, a citizen of New Zealand, who had been in Australia since the age of 11. The applicant had previously been granted a special category visa, which was subsequently cancelled due to criminal activities. Following unsuccessful appeals to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Federal Circuit Court, the applicant applied for a protection visa, which was denied by a delegate of the Minister. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the applicant's subsequent application for judicial review of the delegate's decision. The applicant sought leave to appeal this decision to the High Court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's application for leave to appeal was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The applicant argued that there were material differences between his current application and the earlier one, which had already been rejected by the Refugee Review Tribunal. However, the court found that the application for a protection visa made on 15 January 2014 was not materially different from the earlier application for a protection visa that had been refused by the Tribunal in 2012. The court held that the applicant's claim for complementary protection under section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 had already been rejected by the decision of Driver FM, which determined that the forced separation of the applicant from his children did not constitute significant harm for the purposes of section 36(2A). The court concluded that there was no arguable basis on which the application to review the delegate’s decision could be successful.

In dismissing the application for leave to appeal, the court noted that the criteria for leave to appeal were well established. The applicant must establish that the decision in question was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal, and that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of that leave. The court found that the applicant had not met these criteria, as the application for a protection visa made on 15 January 2014 was not materially different from the earlier application for a protection visa that had been rejected by the Tribunal. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

The final orders of the court were as follows: (1) The application for leave to appeal be dismissed. (2) The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In earlier proceedings brought by the applicant challenging the Tribunal’s decision, Driver FM had held that the Tribunal had considered and decided, in the course of rejecting his claims that Australia had protection obligations to him under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol within the meaning of s 36(2)(a), that Australia did not have protection obligations in respect of him on the complementary protection ground in s 36(2)(aa): SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FMCA 78 at [67].Background The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand. He came here with his mother and siblings when aged 11 in 1995, and he became entitled to a special category visa entitling him to residency. The applicant subsequently engaged in criminal activities that ultimately resulted in his visa being cancelled on character grounds under s 501 of the Act. He unsuccessfully applied to, first, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and then this Court, for review of those decisions, following which he made his initial application for a protection visa in 2012. In the course of dealing with the applicant’s personal circumstances, the Refugee Review Tribunal found that the applicant and his then partner were working on their relationship, and that she needed him to help her with the care of his three children, two twins born in 2004 and a daughter born in 2006. The applicant also had two stepchildren who, in 2012, were under three years of age. The applicant had been in prison for some time prior to the proceedings in the Tribunal, and then was held in immigration detention on becoming eligible for parole. He claimed not to have been in contact with his father since he came to Australia. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied about his evidence about his relationship with his father. It accepted the applicant’s evidence that one of his twin children had been diagnosed with AD-HD and his youngest daughter with cerebral palsy. It also found there was no real chance of serious harm to the applicant from his father or his family were he to be returned to New Zealand. The Tribunal noted that, although he claimed that he did not have any friends in New Zealand, that was not a Convention related claim. It found that there was no real chance of him suffering any discrimination in respect of his employment because he did not have a criminal record in New Zealand, albeit he had one here, and that, also, he would be able to find appropriate accommodation there. It found that any other harm which the applicant had claimed might befall him in New Zealand was simply harm of a kind that would affect citizens in New Zealand generally, and that he was not exposed to any such harm in a way that would amount to found any Convention or other claim that Australia owed him protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa). It found that he did not genuinely fear that he would suffer serious harm in New Zealand or face any real chance of serious harm there. The Tribunal did refer the applicant’s case to the Department for consideration under s 417 of the Act as to whether the Minister should exercise his power to substitute a more favourable decision than that at which the Tribunal had arrived.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application to that Court for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 15 January 2014 (the delegate’s decision) that the applicant’s application for a protection visa lodged on that day was not a valid application by reason of s 48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 557.Background The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court on the first court date of 18 March 2014. Judge Manousaridis decided to hear the Minister’s application that the proceedings be summarily dismissed under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). That rule provided that, at the hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court could dismiss the proceedings if it were not satisfied that the applicant’s application raised an arguable case for relief. His Honour decided that the application did not raise an arguable case for relief because the applicant’s claim for complementary protection within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, the subject of the delegate’s decision, had been already refused by the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 30 June 2012. In earlier proceedings brought by the applicant challenging the Tribunal’s decision, Driver FM had held that the Tribunal had considered and decided, in the course of rejecting his claims that Australia had protection obligations to him under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol within the meaning of s 36(2)(a), that Australia did not have protection obligations in respect of him on the complementary protection ground in s 36(2)(aa): SZRSN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FMCA 78 at [67].Background The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand. He came here with his mother and siblings when aged 11 in 1995, and he became entitled to a special category visa entitling him to residency. The applicant subsequently engaged in criminal activities that ultimately resulted in his visa being cancelled on character grounds under s 501 of the Act. He unsuccessfully applied to, first, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and then this Court, for review of those decisions, following which he made his initial application for a protection visa in 2012. In the course of dealing with the applicant’s personal circumstances, the Refugee Review Tribunal found that the applicant and his then partner were working on their relationship, and that she needed him to help her with the care of his three children, two twins born in 2004 and a daughter born in 2006. The applicant also had two stepchildren who, in 2012, were under three years of age. The applicant had been in prison for some time prior to the proceedings in the Tribunal, and then was held in immigration detention on becoming eligible for parole. He claimed not to have been in contact with his father since he came to Australia. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied about his evidence about his relationship with his father. It accepted the applicant’s evidence that one of his twin children had been diagnosed with AD-HD and his youngest daughter with cerebral palsy. It also found there was no real chance of serious harm to the applicant from his father or his family were he to be returned to New Zealand.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant argued his case today on the basis that there was a material difference between the application for a visa that he had made on 15 January 2014 and the earlier one, on the basis that I have outlined. He said that he had not been able fully to explain himself to his Honour because of his lack of legal knowledge and the difficulties which a person in his position would have in grappling with the complexities of the legislation and legal criteria. He said that he would suffer significant harm because, if he was returned to New Zealand, he would not be here for his children and that he had changed his life since his imprisonment. He said that the children’s mother was no longer with them, and that they were under the care of his brother, that his whole family was here, and that he had nothing in New Zealand, and that he did not get on with his father. He wanted now to be with his children. Consideration All of those matters may be understandable from a human point of view. Unfortunately for the applicant, they are not matters of a kind that would suggest that Judge Manousaridis or the delegate made any jurisdictional error that would authorise the court to find that the application made on 15 January 2014 for a protection visa was, in any way, materially different from the earlier application for a protection visa that had been refused by the Tribunal in 2012. Judge Manousaridis’ decision was interlocutory, and the applicant requires leave to appeal: Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 at 3-4 [7]-[10] per McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ. The criteria for leave to appeal are well established. First, an applicant must establish the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal and, secondly, the applicant must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of that leave: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ. I have given serious consideration to all the things that the applicant has said to me today as to why Judge Manousaridis’ decision was in error, but I am not able to ascertain any such error. The only basis on which the applicant could claim complementary protection could have been under s 36(2)(aa). Neither of ss 36(2)(b) or (c) could apply to him because none of his family members held a protection visa, and therefore the criteria in subparagraphs 36(2)(b)(ii) and (c)(ii) could not possibly be met. Moreover, the decision of Driver FM determined that, as between the applicant and the Minister, his claim for a protection visa rejected by the Tribunal on 30 June 2012 did deal with whether Australia’s complementary protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) applied in respect of the applicant. Driver FM found that the forced separation of the applicant from his children, were he to be returned to New Zealand, did not constitute significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2A). In my opinion, that is in substance the basis of the application for a protection visa made and rejected on 15 January 2014 and considered by Judge Manousaridis. In those circumstances, his Honour was correct to find that there was no arguable basis on which the application to review the delegate’s decision could be successful.