SZQER v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQER v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 14

Citation: SZQER v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 14
Appeal from: SZQER v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2013] FCCA 1319
Parties: SZQER v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and CHRISTOPHER PACKER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
File number: NSD 2076 of 2013
Judges: TRACEY, FLICK AND ROBERTSON JJ
Date of judgment: 25 February 2014
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – remittal to the Federal Circuit Court by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia – whether judge of the Federal Circuit Court erred in concluding that appellant had not made an application to re-open his case and on that basis refusing the appellant’s application to amend and dismissing the substantive proceedings
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth) s 42
Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) s 28(1)(c)
Cases cited: Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt HoldingsPty Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 266
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505
SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26; (2012) 200 FCR 207
SZQFR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 574
SZQGV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 112
SZQKC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 249; (2012) 206 FCR 253
Date of hearing: 25 February 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr SEJ Prince
Solicitor for the Appellant: SBA Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2076 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZQER
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

CHRISTOPHER PACKER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

TRACEY, FLICK AND ROBERTSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

25 FEBRUARY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 September 2013 dismissing the application with costs be set aside.

3.The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for that Court to deal with the application to amend to add grounds 10 and 11 and, if leave be granted, to hear and determine the substance of those grounds and to decide the final disposition of the matter.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5.The costs of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia abide the outcome of the proceedings in that Court, at the discretion of the judge of that Court.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZQER v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, SZQER, challenging the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application to amend his case and to proceed with the substantive proceedings. The appellant argued that the Federal Circuit Court had erred in its interpretation of the procedural requirements, specifically in concluding that he had not made an application to re-open his case, which led to the refusal of his application to amend and the dismissal of the substantive proceedings. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the Federal Circuit Court had correctly interpreted the procedural requirements and whether the substantive claims should be allowed to proceed.

The legal issues before the Full Court included whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in its interpretation of the procedural requirements, particularly regarding the necessity of a formal application to re-open the case. Another issue was whether the Federal Circuit Court had properly considered the substantive claims on their merits, given that the procedural application to re-open had not been formally filed but had been made orally. The court also needed to decide whether the dismissal of the application to amend and the substantive proceedings was justified based on the procedural application not being formally made.

The Full Court found that the Federal Circuit Court had indeed erred in its interpretation of the procedural requirements. It was determined that the appellant had made an application to re-open his case, albeit orally, which should have been considered by the Federal Circuit Court. The Full Court held that the dismissal of the application to amend and the substantive proceedings was not justified because the procedural application to re-open had, in fact, been made. The Full Court emphasized that the proceedings were for judicial review, and the scope for evidence was limited. The court noted that the proceedings had become overly procedural, detracting from the substantive issues at hand.

In light of these findings, the Full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the matter back to the Federal Circuit Court for further consideration of the application to amend and the substantive claims. The Full Court also ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, while the costs of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court would be determined at the discretion of the judge in that Court. This decision underscored the importance of properly interpreting procedural requirements and ensuring that substantive claims are considered on their merits.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 September 2013 dismissing the application with costs be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for that Court to deal with the application to amend to add grounds 10 and 11 and, if leave be granted, to hear and determine the substance of those grounds and to decide the final disposition of the matter.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5. The costs of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia abide the outcome of the proceedings in that Court, at the discretion of the judge of that Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On that date, 2 September 2013, there was some short argument, judgment was reserved and on 17 September 2013 the orders were made to which I have referred above, dismissing the application with costs.The judgments below The reasons of the Full Court in SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26; (2012) 200 FCR 207 involved the conclusion, at [46], that the application by the present appellant required determination on its merits. The Full Court said, at [51], that the Federal Magistrates Court erred in dismissing, on a summary and not final basis, the substantive applications on the footing that they were out of time and therefore could not succeed. These reasons were picked up by the terms of order 4 made on 4 April 2012 that the matter be remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for determination of the relief sought in the Amended Application filed in that Court on 16 August 2011 having regard to the reasons for judgment in SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26; (2012) 200 FCR 207. In the reasons of the primary judge given on 6 September 2012, SZQDZ & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 793, his Honour said that it was important to note that the basis on which he had found that an extension of time under s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was not in the interests of the administration of justice was that the appellant had not demonstrated error on the part of the Reviewer or that his substantive claims had reasonable prospects of success. The primary judge said at [17] that it was not a necessary corollary of the fact that the Court had been directed to deal with the appellant’s substantive application that a further hearing was necessary or that further amendment to the application should be permitted. The primary judge said at [26] that whether the appellant would be permitted to amend his application for a second time, and whether there would be further hearings other than for directions, had to be decided by reference to the order of the Federal Court which was to the effect that the Federal Magistrates Court determine the appellant’s claim for substantive relief free of the error of considering s 477 to have any relevance. The primary judge continued as follows:[28]As in the CPSU case and in Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Pratt Holdings, the consequence of the Federal Court’s order is that there is an issue unresolved which must now be decided. In each case the issue which the Court must determine is whether the applicant in question is entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief he seeks. The decision on that question turns on whether the respective applicants can demonstrate that the relevant independent merits review was procedurally unfair or was not conducted by reference to the correct legal principles correctly applied: SZQRW v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FMCA 191 at [6]-[10].[29] As recorded in the primary decisions, in each of these cases I found that the various allegations of error on the part of the independent merits reviewers had not been made out. It was on the basis of those findings that I determined that it was not in the interests of the administration of justice that time to bring the proceedings be extended. Those findings were not discussed in the appeal decision. Put another way, they are findings which have not, at least at this point, been found to be affected by legal error. Consequently, subject to any re-opening of the applicants’ cases, there is no need or reason to reconsider them and no call to permit amendments, further hearings or further submissions in relation to them. The question which the Federal Court remitted to this Court in each case can, and absent a re-opening should, be determined in accordance with the findings made in the relevant primary decision. [30]This may seem an inappropriate conclusion given that, as noted earlier, in the primary decisions the relevant question was whether the [appellant’s] substantive cases had reasonable prospects of success, not whether they would succeed or fail. Those circumstances might suggest that [in his hearing the appellant] had not fully addressed the Court on the merits of their substantive applications and that any findings on such matters ought not be considered determinative of whether the review [s] were procedurally unfair or not conducted by reference to the correct legal principles correctly applied. However, that characterisation would not be correct.[31]On the first occasion SZQDZ’s matter was before the Court it was ordered that:The matter is listed for final hearing and the hearing of the application for extension of time together at 10.15am on 15 August 2011 ……[35] It is apparent from those orders that [the] matter was listed for a hearing which would include full argument on and consideration of the merits of [the appellant’s] substantive application for a declaration that the independent merits reviewer in question had erred and for consequential injunctive relief. That is what occurred.[36]At the hearing of SZQDZ’s matter, although the question of an extension of time under s.477 was addressed, it was not the principal topic of submissions. The merits of the substantive application were fully argued as an integral part of the s.477 issue. Indeed, the [appellant’s] written submissions dealt with nothing else …… [38]Although at the original hearings the [appellant] only had to satisfy me that [his] substantive allegations had reasonable prospects of success, it is not apparent to me that the approach [he] took to the question of the legal correctness of the [Reviewer’s] review[s] was different from the one which [he] would have taken if s.477 had not been an issue. Moreover, it was not suggested in the submissions on the present questions that [the appellant’s] original arguments had been framed so as to only make out a case with reasonable prospects of success, rather than as a full argument on whether the relevant reviewer had erred. Unless and until such an allegation is made, I see no reason to conclude other than that at [he has] respective, original hearing [s] [the appellant] advanced his case of reviewer error as forcefully and as persuasively as he could and that if there had been no question of s.477’s application, as then advised, his arguments on the legal correctness of the relevant review would have been no different.[39]I conclude that observance of the Federal Court’s order requires me, subject to any re-opening of any of the cases, to determine the [appellant’s] substantive claims based on the cases as presented at the original hearing [s] and the findings expressed in the primary decisions: CPSU v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2); Commissioner for Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd; DK (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. The latter decision also gives guidance as to what circumstances might justify a re-opening of any of the cases should application to re-open be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to grounds 5 and 6, the Minister submitted there was no substance in these grounds.Consideration These proceedings have had an unduly protracted and complicated history. It appears that procedure has taken priority over substance. The appeal, in my opinion, may be disposed of shortly. It is apparent that the grounds the subject of the proposed amendment have not been considered on their merits because the application to amend was dismissed. It was dismissed on the misunderstanding that the procedural application to re-open, which the primary judge required to be made, had not been made. In fact, in my view, such an application had been made, albeit orally. But for that error, the primary judge would not have dismissed the application to amend on the basis that an application to re-open had not been made, and may have allowed it. His Honour did not consider that application on its merits. Similarly, the substantive proceeding was dismissed on the misunderstanding that the procedural application to re-open had not been made when in fact it had been made. I should also add that it is not clear to me why such importance was placed either on the concept of re-opening or on the question of whether a formal interlocutory application or application in the case had been filed. I do not see why, on the matter being remitted, the simple question was whether or not either party wished to put on additional evidence, or make further submissions, or apply to amend in accordance with ordinary principles. This is consistent with the approach of Kenny J in Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt HoldingsPty Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 266, to which the Full Court was taken. It does not appear that any of these courses would have caused prejudice to either party or would have been opposed. Of course it had to be remembered that the proceedings were for judicial review and the scope for evidence correspondingly limited. As to ground 2, it does not seem to me to be helpful to consider whether the original findings were “undisturbed” as they could have been subject to further submissions. Absent submissions or a successful application to amend or, possibly, further evidence then there was no reason why the primary judge could not rely on his earlier findings. I do not find it necessary to consider this ground further. By ground 3, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred by refusing to provide him with a further hearing. In my opinion this ground has no content additional to grounds 1 and 2 and does not require separate consideration. Ground 4, that the primary judge erred by refusing to accede to an application that he recuse himself, has no substance. It seems to me to be clear that the primary judge took the course which he did because, rightly or wrongly, he considered that that course was required by the law and by the procedural events which had happened. I agree with the reasons of Dowsett J in SZQFR at [50], set out above, on this issue. In my opinion grounds 5 and 6 do not add to the other grounds of appeal and do not require separate consideration.