SZOXR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2011] FCA 897
•9 August 2011
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZOXR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 897
Citation: SZOXR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 897 Appeal from: SZOXR v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 186 Parties: SZOXR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 436 of 2011 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 9 August 2011 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2); 91R; 422B(1); 424A; 430; 474; 476(1) Cases cited: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealthof Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471Date of hearing: 3 August 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person. Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms K Whittemore of Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 436 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZOXR
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 AUGUST 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 436 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZOXR
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE:
9 AUGUST 2011
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The appellant is a 28 year old woman, who travelled by plane to Australia from the People’s Republic of China on a Chinese passport and a subclass 572 student visa, arriving here on 15 May 2009. Her student visa was cancelled on 19 November 2009. On 3 June 2010 she (and her husband) applied to the first respondent (“the Minister”) for a protection visa, claiming to fear persecution because of her adherence to the teachings of Falun Gong. Her application was unsuccessful (as was her husband’s). She (and he) sought merits review from the second respondent (“the tribunal”), but the tribunal affirmed the Minister’s decision. She then applied to the Federal Magistrates Court for judicial review. Once again she failed and she now appeals to this Court. Appeals from the Federal Magistrates Court are in the nature of a rehearing but error must still be shown: SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129 at [11]. The notice of appeal identifies three alleged errors in the decision made by the tribunal. Presumably, the alleged error on the part of the federal magistrate is in failing to discern those errors. The alleged errors of the tribunal are:
(a)Failing to provide the appellant with a proper opportunity to respond to some information.
(b)Failing to provide particulars of the information that was part of the reason for affirming the decision.
(c)Failing to explain why the information was relevant and to provide the appellant with an opportunity to comment.
For the reasons given below, none of these grounds succeeds, there is no discernible error in the federal magistrate’s judgment, and therefore the appeal must be dismissed.
Eligibility for a protection visa
In order to obtain a protection visa the appellant had to satisfy the terms of ss 36(2)(a) and 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Section 36(2) provides:
A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or
(b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa.
Australia’s obligations under the Refugees Convention (that is, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951) as amended by the Refugees Protocol (collectively, “the Convention”) are owed to refugees. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as a person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country …
For the purposes of the Act and Regulations, s 91R(1) excludes the operation of Art A(2) in any particular case, unless the reason(s) for the fear is (or are) (a) “the essential and significant reason(s)”; (b) “the persecution involves serious harm to the person”; and (c) “the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct”. Section 91R(2) contains a non-exhaustive definition of “serious harm” for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b).
Section 91R(3) provides that any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded for the purpose of determining whether that person has a well-founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Art 1A(2), unless the person satisfies the Minister that she or he engaged in that conduct “otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee within the meaning of [the Convention]”.
The application for a protection visa
In a statement attached to her application the appellant stated that she began practising Falun Gong in 1997 in an attempt to cure serious congenital heart disease for which her mother, a medical practitioner, could do nothing. She said she ceased her practice of Falun Gong in 1999 when Falun Gong was suppressed by the Chinese government. By then, she stated, her health had recovered and she was living a normal life. But she claimed that she relapsed after the birth of her son, became very ill, and, upon her return from hospital in 2004, she secretly resumed her practice of Falun Gong. She claimed that her husband practised with her. She also stated that she carefully read Falun Gong texts.
She claimed that she and her husband were arrested on 23 April 2006 after they were discovered practising Falun Gong. She stated that they were detained separately by the police and interrogated. She said she was scared and was afraid to get her husband into trouble so she denied practising; but the police did not believer her, tortured her and then sent her to a labour camp where she was again interrogated and detained. There too she said she was assaulted and her body covered in bruises. She claimed she was also forced to perform heavy physical labour by day and to attend “brainwashing classes” by night. She claimed to have been transferred to hospital when she became ill again. She said she was detained for around four months but her husband was released a month earlier after signing a statement to promise not to practise Falun Gong. On her release she said they had to report weekly to the police and to provide them with gifts because it would otherwise have been very difficult to pass “the standard checking”. She also claimed that they had to pay people to obtain passports and visas, which the application states were issued in 2007. According to the application, her son, now six years of age, remained in China, but her husband was in Adelaide.
The appellant said she feared that if she were to return to China she would be arrested and she did not want to cause trouble for her mother and child again.
On 12 August 2010 a delegate of the Minister wrote to the appellant and her husband inviting them to attend an interview on 3 September 2010. They did not and, as he had foreshadowed in his letter, the delegate proceeded to deal with and dismiss the claim without hearing further from them.
The proceeding before the tribunal
The tribunal dealt with the claims of the appellant and her husband.
On 5 November 2010 the tribunal wrote to them jointly, advising that it had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. It invited them to attend a hearing on 6 December 2010 to give oral evidence and present arguments.
On 8 November 2010 the tribunal wrote again to the appellant and her husband inviting them to comment on certain matters, no doubt pursuant to s 424A of the Act (“the s 424A letter”). The tribunal stated (original emphasis):
In conducting its review, the Tribunal is required by the Migration Act to invite you to comment on or respond to certain information which the Tribunal considers would, subject to your comments or response, be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decisions under review.
Please note, however, that the Tribunal has not made up its mind about the information.
The particulars of the information are:
•Electronic records before the Tribunal indicate that you were granted Student visas on 30 April 2009 and you entered Australia on 15 May 2009.
• Your student visas were cancelled on 19 November 2009.
• You did not apply for protection until 25 June 2010.
This information is relevant because it may cause the Tribunal to find that you did not have a genuine fear of persecution in China. It may also cause the Tribunal to find that you are not persons of credibility and to reject your claims. If the Tribunal does not accept your claims, the Tribunal may find that you are not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations. You will then not be entitled to the grant of the protection visa for which you have applied.
You are invited to give comments on or respond to the above information in writing.
Your comments or response should be received at the Tribunal by 1 December 2010. If the comments or response are in a language other than English, they must be accompanied by an English translation from an accredited translator.
If you cannot provide your written comments or response by 1 December 2010, you may ask the Tribunal for an extension of time in which to provide the comments or response. If you make such a request, it must be received by the Tribunal before 1 December 2010 and you must state the reason why the extension of time is required.
The Tribunal will carefully consider any request for an extension of time and will advise whether or not the extension has been granted.
If the Tribunal does not receive your comments or response within the period allowed or as extended, the Tribunal may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain your views on the information. You will also lose any entitlement you might otherwise have had under the Migration Act to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments …
No reply to this letter was evidently received.
The appellant appeared before the tribunal on 6 December 2010. The hearing was conducted with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. Although the appellant had a migration agent at the time, the agent did not attend the hearing. Neither did her husband. According to the tribunal decision record, which is the only evidence before the Court on what happened at the hearing, the appellant informed the tribunal that her husband was not there because he could not take time off work. When asked to explain why neither of them attended the interview with the delegate she said she was sick on the day.
The tribunal found that the appellant was not a credible witness and rejected her claim to have had any association with Falun Gong in China. It found that the she had been “vague” in many aspects of her claims and that there were a number of significant inconsistencies between the oral and written evidence. It went on to refer to a number of specific matters. First, it found the evidence that the appellant gave about her conversation with her husband concerning Falun Gong, which purportedly led to their arrest, to be confused. It referred to inconsistent accounts of where the conversation had taken place. In her evidence the appellant said that her husband’s colleague, whom neither realised was there, overheard the conversation and tipped off the police. She repeatedly told the tribunal that the conversation occurred at work, but when the tribunal pointed out to her that in her written evidence she had said it had taken place at home, she resiled from what she had told the tribunal. She was unable to satisfactorily account for why she would have a conversation in her own home without realising that there was another person present.
Secondly, the tribunal was troubled by the appellant’s evidence that one of the reasons she had the conversation was that by 2006 the situation with the Falun Gong was “not that bad”. When asked why, she claimed that she did not believe Falun Gong was still banned by the government in 2006. Having regard to independent country information, the tribunal considered that if she had had any involvement with the Falun Gong she would have known that the situation had not improved by 2006 and there was no basis for her belief that the situation was “not that bad”.
Thirdly, although the appellant could recall the precise date and time of her arrest, she could not recall the date she was released from detention. She also claimed she was arrested on a weekday when the date she gave was a Sunday. And she was uncertain about whether she or her husband had been charged with any offence. The tribunal formed the impression that she was only able to recall details that were contained in her written statement.
Fourthly, the tribunal said that the appellant was unable to satisfactorily explain why she did not leave China until 2008 when she had been issued with a passport in 2007. Her attempts to account for that were largely non-responsive. Her final suggestion (that it was “easier to put the earlier date on the passport”) the tribunal said had “little merit” and appeared to have been an afterthought.
Finally, the tribunal noted that the appellant had repeatedly informed the tribunal that, as a Falun Gong practitioner, she could not get a passport and yet both she and her husband had been given passports which they used to leave the country, despite her claims that they were required to report weekly to the police and when independent country information refers to checks at departure ports. Information about these checks is contained in reports of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 2003, 2005 and 2006, extracts of which appear in the decision of the delegate, which was before the tribunal. The tribunal said that the fact that the appellant and her husband were able to leave the country legally suggested they were of no interest to the Chinese authorities.
The tribunal found that the appellant’s “significant delay” of 12 months in applying for a protection visa after arriving in Australia indicated that she did not have a fear of persecution in China. It noted that her claim that she was too ill to leave home was unsupported by medical evidence, inconsistent with the grant of the student visa, and could not explain why her husband had not made inquiries. The tribunal also considered that the appellant’s claims were undermined by the couple’s apparent lack of interest in their protection visa applications, given that they had both failed to attend the Departmental interview and her husband the tribunal hearing. The tribunal concluded that the appellant had fabricated her claim that her husband was a Falun Gong practitioner for the purpose of her protection visa and she is not “a person of credibility”.
Further, the tribunal expressed its concern that the appellant’s limited knowledge of Falun Gong demonstrated that her knowledge was recently acquired and did not reflect many years of practice and commitment.
The tribunal acknowledged that none of these concerns, on its own, was determinative and some may not even be significant. In combination, however, they led the tribunal to find that the appellant had not been truthful in her evidence and that she had fabricated her claims for the purpose of her application. Accordingly, the tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims in their entirety.
The tribunal accepted that the appellant had practised Falun Gong in Australia but disregarded this conduct pursuant to s 91R(3) of the Act, as it was not satisfied that she had engaged in this conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening her claim to be a refugee.
Consequently, the tribunal also found that the appellant’s husband was not a member of the family unit to whom Australia owes protection obligations.
The proceeding before the federal magistrate
To succeed in her application before the federal magistrate the appellant had to show that the tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. This is the effect of ss 474 and 476(1) of the Act. See also Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealthof Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
The grounds of the application before the federal magistrate were in the following terms (without alteration):
1. The Tribunal failed to carry out its statutory duty.
2.The Tribunal failed to provide particulars of the information that was part of the reason for affirming the decision.
3. The Tribunal failed to explain why the information was relevant and provide the applicant with an opportunity to comment.
Her Honour rejected them all.
The appellant’s first complaint was that she had not been provided with an opportunity to comment on the thoughts the tribunal had in relation to her case. The federal magistrate dismissed the complaint, holding that it did not disclose jurisdictional error. Her Honour noted that it is well established that there is no obligation on the tribunal to put to an appellant the tribunal’s “subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations”, citing SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 (“SZBYR”) at [18]. Her Honour also noted in any event that, on a fair reading of the decision record, the tribunal discussed the appellant’s claims with her in some detail and put to her matters of concern it had arising out of her evidence. Moreover, her Honour noted the terms of the s 424A letter.
With respect to the first ground her Honour observed that there were no particulars, evidence or relevant submissions to support it. With respect to the second and third grounds her Honour inferred that the complaint was that the tribunal failed to comply with its obligations under s 424A(1) of the Act, a claim she found was also unsupported by particulars, evidence or relevant submissions and, in effect, contradicted by the s 424A letter. Her Honour went on to observe that the tribunal’s reasons were largely based on its adverse credit findings. She said at [59]:
Such information is excluded from the obligations of s.424A(1) of the Act by reason of s.424A(3)(b) and s.424A(3)(ba) of the Act, in that the information was given by the Applicant for the purposes of her review or was information given by the Applicant during the process that led to the decision under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the Applicant to the Department.
Finally, her Honour observed that the only other information to which the tribunal had regard was information that was independent country information; this was not information specifically about the appellant but about a class of persons of which she claimed to be a member (the Falun Gong). She noted that such information is also excluded from the obligations in s 424A(1) because of s 424A(3)(a).
The appeal
I turn now to consider the grounds of appeal.
Ground 1: Failing to provide the appellant with a proper opportunity to respond to some information
No particulars were given of any of the grounds of appeal and the appellant filed no written submissions.
At the hearing, through a Mandarin interpreter, I asked the appellant what the information was to which she claimed not to have had a proper opportunity to respond. She replied that “the reason the tribunal rejected my claim is that the tribunal wondered why my husband failed to turn up at the tribunal”. She said that that was because “his boss didn’t allow him to take the leave”. She also said that the tribunal stated that she did not provide “evidence about the specific day I was sick”. This was presumably a reference to the day of the interview with the Minister’s delegate. She said she told the tribunal she was born with heart disease but the tribunal said she did not have proper evidence. Finally, the appellant complained that she was not advised that certain medical certificates would be needed. She said that she told the tribunal that if documents were needed she was happy to provide them but that the tribunal did not give her any time.
It is abundantly clear that the tribunal did not reject the appellant’s claim merely because her husband did not attend the hearing. Further, there is no evidence that the appellant requested more time to provide medical evidence.
Section 424A of the Act provides that in certain circumstances the tribunal must provide information to an applicant and give her or him an opportunity to respond to it:
(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and
(c)invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.
(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:
(a)except where paragraph (b) applies—by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or
(b)if the applicant is in immigration detention—by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.
(2A)The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.
(3)This section does not apply to information:
(a)that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or
(b)that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or
(ba)that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or
(c)that is non-disclosable information.
A breach of s 424A will amount to a jurisdictional error: SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294. Here, however, I am not satisfied that there was a breach. The obligations under the section do not apply to information the appellant herself gives for the purpose of the application for review (s 424A(3)(b)), which is the only information to which the appellant referred.
Section 422B(1) of the Act provides that Division 4 (ss 422B – 429A) is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters with which it deals. The facts of this case do not engage any of the other sections. There is nothing to indicate that the tribunal failed to afford the appellant a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Ground 2: Failing to provide particulars of the information that was part of the reason for affirming the decision
Ground 3: Failing to explain why the information was relevant and to provide the appellant with an opportunity to comment
It is convenient to deal with these two grounds together as there was a degree of overlap in the appellant’s submissions.
I asked the appellant to clarify what she meant by the second ground of appeal. She replied that she was not given specific (by which, she indicated, she meant adequate) reasons. She protested:
All I said was true story. How come I still got rejected?
The appellant’s complaint that she was not given adequate reasons is unfounded. The tribunal’s reasons were detailed and cogent. The tribunal’s obligation to give reasons derives from s 430 of the Act. Section 430 is satisfied here. In any case, a breach of s 430 does not amount to a jurisdictional error: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [68]-[70]. In truth, the appellant is dissatisfied with the reasons that were given, or more accurately, the decision. That does not entitle her to have the decision set aside.
I asked the appellant to tell me to what information ground 3 was directed. Again, she declared that she did not know why her case had been rejected.
The reason her case was rejected is clear. The tribunal did not believe her account. Even if she were telling the truth, as she maintained, and the tribunal found otherwise, that finding does not give rise to jurisdictional error. Absent jurisdictional error, the federal magistrate had no option but to dismiss her application.
To the extent that the information in ground 3 is intended to refer to such matters as the inconsistencies in the appellant’s story or the tribunal’s views about her credibility, it must be remembered (as the federal magistrate noted) that the information to which s 424A refers
does not encompass the tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc …
See VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at 477, approved in SZBYR.
In SZBYR at [18] the Court also made clear that no matter how broad a meaning were to be given to “information” in the section it does not include “the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence”.
The appellant submitted that the tribunal member had “subjectively formed an opinion” and did not give her sufficient time to explain her case and “rejected [her] directly”. It is not entirely clear what she meant by that. It might be inferred that she was intimating that the tribunal had a preconceived view adverse to the appellant’s claims. If that is what she was in fact submitting, that argument is not made out. First, an allegation of actual bias would have to be “distinctly made and clearly proved”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69]. Here, not only was the allegation obtuse, no evidence was adduced to support it. Neither is there anything to indicate apprehended bias, that is, that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the tribunal might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question in the case: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [33].
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303 (special leave refused: [2011] HCATrans 135) North and Lander JJ, with whom I agreed, said at [18]:
It is a rare case in which a Court will find that a decision maker has breached the natural justice hearing rule by exhibiting bias based simply upon the decision maker’s reasons: SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 at [44]. The same is the case in relation to apprehended bias. Ordinarily a party would need to show some conduct on the part of the decision maker, apart from the decision maker’s expression of the decision maker’s reasons, which would indicate that the decision maker has been guilty of pre-judgment or was in any way biased.
The appellant pointed to no such conduct. Robust questioning in a case like this (where there is no contradictor) does not suffice. As the High Court said in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [30]:
Where, as in the present case, credibility is in issue, the person conducting inquisitorial proceedings will necessarily have to test the evidence presented — often vigorously. Moreover, the need to ensure that the person who will be affected by the decision is accorded procedural fairness will often require that he or she be plainly confronted with matters which bear adversely on his or her credit or which bring his or her account into question.
In any event, as this issue is not raised by the notice of appeal and was not raised below, leave would be required to raise it now. No application for leave to amend was made and the Minister indicated he would oppose the grant of leave.
As I have already observed, the only material before the Court about what occurred at the tribunal appears in the tribunal’s decision record. The appellant did not explain why she concluded that the tribunal member “subjectively formed an [adverse] opinion”, other than to say that the member did not allow “sufficient time to hear the case and rejected [her] outright”. The hearing record shows that the hearing went for nearly three hours. The decision record shows that the member questioned the appellant extensively about her claims and that she had a fair opportunity to present her case. The claim of bias (if that is what it truly is) has no merit and, for this reason, had an application been made for leave to amend, I would have refused it.
Conclusion
The appeal must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.
I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Katzmann. Associate:
Dated: 9 August 2011
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