SZOWH v Minister for Immigration
[2011] FMCA 192
•23 March 2011
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZOWH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2011] FMCA 192 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming religious persecution in China – applicant not believed – applicant supplying through her agent self-serving and fabricated documents after the hearing – no reviewable error found – application dismissed. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Referral of migration agent’s conduct to the OMARA. |
| Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R, 424A, 424AA, 425 |
| Minister for Immigration v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 SZOUS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 166 |
| Applicant: | SZOWH |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2738 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Driver FM |
| Hearing date: | 23 March 2011 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 23 March 2011 |
REPRESENTATION
The Applicant appeared in person
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms R Graycar |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
A copy of the Court’s decision and reasons be provided to the OMARA for whatever action it deems appropriate.
The application is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application in the sum of $5,865 in accordance with rule 44.15(1) and item 1(c) of part 2 of schedule 1 to the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2738 of 2010
| SZOWH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The decision was made on 6 December 2010. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant is from China and had made claims of religious persecution. The following statement of background facts is derived from the Minister’s written submissions filed on 18 March 2011.
The applicant, a citizen of China, arrived in Australia on 16 January 2010 (see court book (CB) 12). On 13 May 2010, she completed an application for a protection (Class XA) visa (stamped as received by the Minister’s Department (the Department) on 14 May 2010) which was accompanied by a number of other documents (CB 1-36). This application was refused by a delegate of the Minister (the delegate) on 6 August 2010. (CB 66-87).
The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 13 April 2010 (CB 89-92). On 16 September 2010, she was invited to attend a hearing at the Tribunal on 19 October 2010 (CB 97-98) and as she had notified that she was being assisted by a registered migration agent (Harry Huang of Pricilla International Co Pty Ltd (CB 90), the migration agent was also contacted and informed of the invitation, as the “authorised recipient” of the applicant for review. (CB 96)
The applicant attended the hearing on 19 October to give evidence and present arguments in relation to her claim and she was assisted there by a Mandarin speaking interpreter. Her agent did not attend. At the hearing, she was given the opportunity to respond to some matters raised by the member with her. Shortly after the hearing, by facsimile dated 20 0ctober 2010, the applicant’s agent wrote to the Tribunal seeking a copy of the hearing tape and this was provided to the applicant (and her agent) on 21 October 2010 (CB 105-107).
On 2 November 2010, the applicant’s agent supplied the Tribunal with a statutory declaration of the applicant affirmed on 2 November 2010 together with a number of other documents described as “appendices”. (CB 108-137)
By a decision dated 6 December 2010, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) Visa. On 20 December 2010 the applicant sought review of that decision by this Court.
Factual background and claims
In her visa application the applicant claimed to fear persecution in China and made the following claims:
a)in October 2000, the applicant married her husband, and in January 2001, she and her husband moved to Fuzhou, Fujian Province where they worked in a food store owned by the husband’s family;
b)in 2006, the applicant's husband and 20 other businessmen invested in a project for the manufacture of health food products. That project was a fraud as a result of which the applicant and her husband lost a substantial amount of money. The applicant's husband turned to alcohol and became irritable and the applicant considered divorcing him;
c)in May 2007, the applicant was approached by a distant relative and introduced to the Local Church. She subsequently began attending secret gatherings of that Church. Gradually her husband joined her at those gatherings following which the applicant claims that her husband’s behaviour improved.
d)in January 2008, the applicant and her husband were baptised in the Local Church;
e)as many of the patrons of the applicant's food shop were students from local schools, the applicant was commissioned by the Local Church to liaise between the Local Church and those students to receive and disseminate the teaching materials of the Local Church to the students participating in secret gatherings;
f)in September 2009, whilst at work, the applicant was arrested and detained for 20 days on the basis that she had distributed illegal propaganda;
g)the applicant was released from detention after her husband bribed the police;
h)following her release from detention on 28 October 2009, the applicant's home and shop was regularly raided by the police;
i)in December 2009, on the advice of members of the Local Church, the applicant went into hiding and, on 13 January 2010, departed China using a passport in a false name;
j)after arriving in Australia on 16 January 2010, the applicant “continually attended the Local Church”;
k)the applicant fears persecution if she were to return to China.
The delegate’s decision
On 6 August 2010, the delegate informed the applicant that her claim for a protection visa had been refused. In the decision record (CB 70-86), the delegate first set out the applicant’s claims for protection and then reviewed country information in some detail. After doing so, and noting that the country information was “not consistent”, the delegate indicated that he was “not satisfied that the applicant has been an active member and organizer of the Local Church in China, had been detained as a suspected member of the Local Church, and is now wanted by the local authorities in Fujian province as a Local Church organizer and would be subject to arrest and imprisonment because of her claimed activities” (CB 84).
The delegate concluded that there was not a real chance of the applicant suffering persecution for a Convention reason in the foreseeable future and on that basis, he was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations. (CB 86).
The Tribunal’s decision
The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The main basis for so doing was that the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant is a truthful witness and considered that she had “fabricated a set of claims in an attempt to provide a basis for refugee status in Australia” (CB 159 at [52]; see also CB 163 at [63]).
The Tribunal also found that, to the extent that the applicant had attended Local Church meetings in Australia, that attendance was for the purpose of strengthening her refugee claims and the Tribunal was therefore bound to disregard that conduct pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”). (CB 163 at [63]).
The Tribunal made a number of findings that were adverse to the applicant’s credibility. These included:
a)The Tribunal did not accept, as claimed in the post hearing statutory declaration, that the applicant’s answers to questions about her attendance at the Local Church in Australia were adversely affected by problems with the interpreter. (CB 160; [54])
b)The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had attended any Local Church meetings in any of the Local Church meeting halls in Sydney, and found the fact that she had not done so “highly adverse to her claim to have been a member of the Local Church in China who fled China for that reason”. (CB 160; [55])
c)The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claim that she provided a letter from her Local Church, dated July 2010, to the Department prior to her interview. This was because first, the Tribunal considered it problematic that such a document was not provided with her application, lodged in May 2010, given her claim that she had attended that church since January 2010. Secondly, there was no evidence of that letter on the Departmental file and the decision record clearly stated that no documentary evidence had been provided. (CB 161, [56]-[57])
d)The Tribunal also rejected the applicant’s claim to have been confused when asked about a Ms Yu and her claim to have mixed her up, when answering questions, with her landlady, Ms Sun. (CB 161, [58])
e)The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s delay (from January to May 2010) in lodging her application for protection was not consistent with her claims about the harms she experienced in China, and the Tribunal did not find convincing the reasons given by the applicant for that delay (CB 162; [59]-[60]).
f)The Tribunal also found the applicant’s claims of how she located members of the Local Church in Australia to be “lacking in credibility”. (CB 162; [61])
g)Nor did the Tribunal accept the applicant’s evidence about how she left China, particularly in light of the difficulty she had in answering questions about it. (CB 163, [62])
h)Overall, the Tribunal considered that the applicant was not a witness of truth and had “fabricated the entirety of her evidence to fear harm in China”. (CB 163; [63]).
i)The Tribunal gave no weight to the statutory declarations provided by the applicant after the hearing (the documents that accompanied her statement of 2 November 2010), noting that they were all “pro forma documents with the typed information in identical terms”. (CB 163; [63])
j)The Tribunal also found that “any knowledge of Christian concepts and of the Local Church has been acquired by the applicant for the purposes of providing evidence at the Departmental interview and the hearing and that any belated attendance after the hearing at Local Church meetings was only for the purposes of addressing the concerns raised at the Tribunal hearing and that it was, therefore, only for the purposes of strengthening her claim to be a refugee”. On that basis, the Tribunal disregarded that attendance pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Migration Act (CB 163, [63]).
k)In summary, the Tribunal rejected the following claims made by the applicant:
i)that she was baptised;
ii)that she was at any time involved with the Local Church in China;
iii)that she was a liaison person assisting to distribute Church materials;
iv)that she had any association with students or other persons arrested due to their involvement with the Church;
v)that her home was searched;
vi)that the applicant was arrested and detained;
vii)that the applicant’s husband bribed the police to secure her release;
viii)that the applicant was in hiding, or was on a “black list”;
ix)that the applicant’s family business suffered in China due to her association with the Local Church;
x)that the applicant would face any difficulties upon her return to China for the reasons she claims. (CB 163-164; [64])
For these reasons, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
These proceedings began with a show cause application filed on 20 December 2010. The applicant continues to rely on that application. It is plain that the applicant has received assistance in preparing that application. The applicant says that she was assisted by a friend. The applicant told me from the bar table that the friend was not Mr Harry Huang, the registered migration agent who represented her both before the Minister’s Department and the Tribunal. The application contains three grounds:
1. The Tribunal failed to comply with her obligation under s.424A(1) of the Act, and the Tribunal failed to provide me clearly the information, which the Tribunal considered as a reason or part of reason to affirm the decision under the review;
2. The Tribunal failed to consider the evidence, including my written and oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence from the Local Church in Australia, fairly and independently. The Tribunal’s decision has included a reasonable apprehension of bias; and the Tribunal made its finding based on its unwarranted assumption.
3. The Tribunal failed to comply with her obligation under s.425 of the Act.
The application is supported by a short affidavit which was witnessed by Mr Huang. The applicant told me from the bar table that, although Mr Huang witnessed the affidavit in his capacity as a justice of the peace, he did not assist her in preparing it. I received the affidavit. I also received as evidence the court book filed on 8 February 2011. Both parties also took the opportunity to file written submissions. Those of the applicant were filed on 17 March 2011. Although purportedly being the applicant’s own submissions, it is obvious that she has received assistance in preparing it. The applicant told me from the bar table that she was assisted in preparing those submissions by a friend who, once again, was not Mr Harry Huang. The parties also made oral submissions.
The first issue raised by the applicant is an asserted breach of s.424A of the Migration Act. The ground in the application is not particularised but the applicant’s submissions contain particulars. Those submissions assert that the information that should have been disclosed to the applicant pursuant to s.424A is information contained in documents submitted to the Tribunal after the Tribunal hearing. Those documents are reproduced at CB 108-137. They were submitted under cover of a letter from Mr Huang dated 2 November 2010 (CB 108). In that letter Mr Huang relevantly states that his firm, Priscilla International Co Pty Ltd, was instructed to provide the documents for consideration by the Tribunal. The applicant confirmed from the bar table that she had instructed Mr Huang to provide those documents. In the circumstances, no obligation of disclosure could arise pursuant to s.424A because the information in those documents was provided by the applicant to the Tribunal for the purposes of the review. I see no other information bearing upon the Tribunal’s decision which required disclosure pursuant to s.424A. The Tribunal’s decision turned essentially on information provided by the applicant herself.
The third ground in the application is an asserted breach of s.425 of the Migration Act. The applicant’s submissions assert that the hearing opportunity was inadequate because of defective interpretation at the hearing. The applicant asserts that the interpreter made a significant mistake in interpreting the words “church buildings”. The applicant says that the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing used the Chinese word “jiao-tang” which means “a formal and special religious building of significance” whereas the applicant did not understand the Local Church in Sydney to have such a formal and special religious building. She accordingly told the Tribunal that she did not know of any Local Church buildings in Sydney.
Apart from the applicant’s assertion, the applicant has not produced any evidence to support her claim of interpretation problems at the Tribunal hearing. In directions I made on 1 February 2011 I gave the applicant the opportunity to file and serve affidavit evidence. In order to deal in a meaningful way with the assertion it would have been necessary to receive either a transcript of the hearing or the sound recording and evidence from a person expert in the Mandarin and English languages as to both the meaning of the words used in Chinese and English and any apparent confusion. I do not have that evidence. It would have been open to me to obtain from the applicant or the Minister the sound recording of the Tribunal hearing but neither party sought to tender it.
In addition, I note that the allegation made to the Court was previously made to the Tribunal in the post hearing statutory declaration signed by the applicant on 2 November 2010. The Tribunal considered that allegation in its reasons. The Tribunal’s conclusion, after having listened to the sound recording of the hearing, is set out at CB 159 [54]:
The Tribunal has re-listened to the hearing recording after receiving the applicant’s statutory declaration. The Tribunal is satisfied on the basis of the evidence set out above that the applicant was asked a series of questions about her attendance at the Local church in Australia and that she responded appropriately to the Tribunal’s questions. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant understood that she was being asked whether she attended any formal Local church meetings or congregations of the Local church and that she responded that she only met in people’s homes and although she knew that there were Local churches she did not know where they were located and did not have time to go to them. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s assertions that she was confused as to the meaning of church “buildings” and the use by the interpreter of the word “Jing-tao” and that she believed that she was being asked about Westminster Abbey or similar buildings. The Tribunal does not accept that there is any evidence of any confusion during the Tribunal hearing as to the terminology that was employed by the interpreter and does not accept that the applicant became confused because of the use of particular terminology. The Tribunal does not accept that the qualified interpreter relied upon to interpret during the hearing would have failed to use the most appropriate word or form of words in order to interpret the questions posed by the Tribunal. The applicant has provided no indication in her statutory declaration as to why she believes that she is more qualified than the interpreter to determine the most appropriate words to be used to describe church meetings or congregations. Nor has she provided any alternative words which she considers would have been more appropriate for use by the interpreter. The Tribunal finds that the applicant’s claims that she was confused and believed that she was being asked about a place such as Westminster Abbey or specific church buildings have been fabricated after the hearing in an attempt to overcome the Tribunal’s considerable concerns expressed during the hearing and pursuant to s.424AA that the applicant had not attended any Local church meetings or congregations, and the problematic nature of that evidence in view of the fact that she is living with a person who is a member of the Local church. The Tribunal does not accept that, had the applicant genuinely been attending Local church meetings, she would not, at some time during the course of a reasonably lengthy hearing, alert the Tribunal to the fact that she was attending church meetings other than those at people’s homes. The Tribunal is satisfied that it would have been apparent to the applicant that the Tribunal had serious concerns that she was not a genuine member of the Local church and that it had serious concerns in relation to her failure to attend Local church meetings or congregations in Australia.
In my view, the Tribunal has already dealt adequately with the assertion of inadequate interpretation and there is no reason to look behind the Tribunal’s conclusion.
The third ground in the application is an allegation of bias. Such an allegation should not be lightly made and should be properly particularised and supported by evidence. The applicant provides the following particulars:
After the Tribunal’s hearing, I have provided further written evidence in my Statutory Declaration submitted to the Tribunal. However, having fairly read the Tribunal’s decision, there is no evidence that the Tribunal has considered my evidence properly and independently. On the contrary, the Tribunal made its finding completely based on its unwarranted assumption. So, the Tribunal’s decision has included a reasonable apprehension of bias.
As the Minister’s submissions note, it will be a rare case where bias can be established simply on the basis of a decision maker’s reasons. It is noteworthy in this case that the Tribunal made comprehensive findings of untruthfulness against the applicant. It is also noteworthy that the Tribunal rejected, essentially as fabrications, documents submitted after the Tribunal hearing and after the Tribunal had observed at the hearing that the applicant’s claims were not supported by documentary evidence. An issue in the review was whether the applicant had been a genuine practising Christian in Australia. The applicant had submitted a number of statutory declarations from apparent supporters who made statements that they knew her to be a genuine Christian.
The documents the applicant provided also included a letter from a Mr David Foley and Mr Tony Cheah (CB 134). That letter is headed “To Whom It May Concern” and is in template form with the applicant’s name and the words “six months” inserted in handwriting. There is a handwritten date of the letter of 31 July 2010. The Tribunal dealt specifically with that letter in its reasons at [56] and [57] (CB 160‑ 161):
The Tribunal has also considered the applicant’s claim in her post hearing letter that she had provided the letter from Tony Cheah of the Local church, dated July 2010, to the Department prior to the interview. The Tribunal firstly considers it problematic that such a document was not provided to the Department at the time the application was lodged, given that the application was lodged in May 2010 and she has since claimed to have been attending Local church meetings in Sydney since her arrival in Australia in January 2010. The Tribunal also considers it problematic that there is no evidence on the Departmental file that the letter was provided to the Department at the interview. The delegate’s record of decision specifically indicates that the applicant did not provide any documentation of any kind to show she was a Christian. The applicant was, therefore, on notice from a least the date of the delegate’s decision in August 2010 that the Department considered that no documentation had been provided by the applicant to support her claims to be a member of the Local church. The Tribunal would, therefore, have expected that the applicant’s experienced and registered migration agent would have addressed this issue by providing such documentation to the Tribunal and alerting the Tribunal of its existence had it been in existence at that time. However, when the application was lodged with the Tribunal in September 2010, no documentation was provided. Nor, was any documentation provided when the Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 3 September 2010 acknowledging her application and in response to the Tribunal’s advice in that letter that she should provide any “material or written arguments for the Tribunal to consider … as soon as possible”. Nor was anything provided in response to the Tribunal’s invitation of 16 September 2010 when the applicant was specifically advised that although the Tribunal had considered all the information before it is unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. Nor was any documentation provided immediately prior to the commencement of the Tribunal hearing. Although the applicant’s representative did not attend the Tribunal hearing, the applicant herself did not alert the Tribunal to the existence of any documentation from the Local church, despite the fact that it was evidence during that the Tribunal had considerable concerns relating to her claimed involvement with the Local church. The applicant instead waited until after the Tribunal hearing, to provide such documentation.
On the basis of the above, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant provided the letter from Tony Cheah and David Foley to the Department. The Tribunal does not accept that the letter was in existence at the time of the Department’s interview and also does not accept that it was in existence at the time of the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal finds that the letter has been backdated to July 2010 to give the appearance that the letter was before the Department and in an attempt to establish that it was provided at the interview. Although the document is a proforma document and the signatures are in a different pen than the date and the applicant’s name and the length of her attendance, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the document is signed by Tony Cheah and David Foley. However, for the above reasons, the Tribunal does not accept that it was in existence in July 2010, the date written on the letter, and does not accept that it was in existence at either the time of the delegate’s interview or at the time of the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal finds that the document from the Local church has been produced after the Tribunal hearing in an attempt to address the concerns raised by the Tribunal at the hearing in relation to the applicant’s non-attendance in Australia at any Local church congregations or meetings. The Tribunal does not, therefore, give the document any weight.
There is a question whether the Tribunal ought to have contacted Mr Cheah or Mr Foley on one of three telephone numbers provided for them in the letter or in the document in order to clarify the statements made in the document. It does not appear that the Tribunal did so. There may be circumstances in which the Tribunal is under a duty to inquire where a straightforward inquiry can be readily made on an issue of substance. Generally, however, there is no duty to inquire[1]. It is a matter of speculation whether the Tribunal may have obtained any useful information from Mr Foley or Mr Cheah had it contacted them or if it had, whether that information would have been credible. In my view, the Tribunal did not err in a jurisdictional sense in failing to make inquiries of Mr Foley or Mr Cheah.
[1] Minister for Immigration v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429
However, the failure by the Tribunal to make any inquiry and to reject the numerous statutory declarations in support of the applicant lends support to the proposition that by the time the Tribunal had received those documents the Tribunal had already formed an adverse view about the merits of the review application. That in itself is not necessarily indicative of bias. The Tribunal may form an adverse view after having considered initial claims and conducted a hearing.
In the present case, it is apparent from the hearing that the Tribunal entertained serious credibility concerns. It is also apparent that the post hearing submission, far from allaying those concerns, increased them. In my view, the adverse conclusions drawn by the Tribunal about the documents provided after the hearing were open to the Tribunal and do not support the assertion of bias. Likewise, the adverse credibility conclusions drawn by the Tribunal generally were open to it on the material before it.
Having said that, I do entertain some disquiet concerning the intensity of the adverse views formed about this review application. The Tribunal comes to see many applications in which a variety of migration agents provide assistance. Some agents have a good reputation; some agents have a poor reputation. A small number of agents have a terrible reputation. This Court has itself drawn attention in recent decisions[2] to misconduct or apparent misconduct by registered migration agents and has referred those issues to the Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority. In a recent judgment I stated that applicants should not be demonised because they employ the services of unscrupulous people[3]. Applicants are often in a vulnerable position and may be completely unaware of poor professional practices of particular individuals. The obligation on the Tribunal is to consider review applications on their merits and not to permit that consideration to be coloured by views the Tribunal may hold about the integrity of particular agents.
[2] SZOUS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 166, SZOVJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 173; SZOVTv Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 162
[3] SZOUS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 166 at [22]
At the same time the OMARA has a responsibility to ensure that incompetent or dishonest migration agents are dealt with. In my view, it is too easy to become a registered migration agent and too hard to be struck off. Where the Tribunal believes that an agent has been guilty of misconduct the appropriate course is to refer that misconduct to the OMARA and to not permit concern over such misconduct to disadvantage an applicant unless the applicant has been a party to the misconduct. In the present case, it is a matter of concern to me that the Response to Hearing Invitation, reproduced at CB 101 did not contain an answer to the question whether the applicant’s migration agent would attend the Tribunal hearing. A migration agent has a responsibility when assisting an applicant on a review to at least consider the hearing invitation and to decide whether he or she will attend and to indicate that decision. In my view, a migration agent who habitually fails to attend Tribunal hearings in support of their clients does not behave reputably.
It is a matter of pure speculation whether it was the applicant or her migration agent who was responsible for the documents submitted to the Tribunal after the hearing. Mr Huang, in his letter to the Tribunal, made clear that he was acting on instructions. While that may be so it is, in my view, not open to an agent to submit documents on instructions which the agent knows to be fabrications. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the document signed by Mr Foley and Mr Cheah had been tampered with in order to give the appearance that it was signed much earlier than it in fact was is tantamount to a finding of fraud. The Tribunal noted in its reasons at [56] (CB 160-161) that it would have expected the applicant’s experienced and registered migration agent to have provided any supportive documentation to the Tribunal, if it had existed, at the time of the Tribunal hearing. In the same paragraph the Tribunal also noted the agent’s non-attendance at the hearing.
In my view, these are issues that should properly be considered by the OMARA. I will therefore direct that a copy of the Court’s decision and reasons be provided to the OMARA for whatever action it considers appropriate.
I conclude that the decision of the Tribunal is free from jurisdictional error. The decision is therefore a privative clause decision and the application must be dismissed. I will so order.
The application having been dismissed, costs in this case should follow the event. The Minister seeks an order for costs, fixed in the sum of $5,865, in accordance with the court scale. The applicant did not make any submissions on costs. I will order that the applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application in the sum of $5,865 in accordance with rule 44.15(1) and item 1(c) of part 2 of schedule 1 to the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Driver FM
Date: 1 April 2011
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