SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 14 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 124

Citation: SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 124
Appeal from: SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 873
Parties: SZOSQ, SZOSR and SZOSS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 2156 of 2011
Judge: BROMBERG J
Date of judgment: 23 February 2012
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 91R(3), 474
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129
SZKCQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 578
SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 873
Date of hearing: 20 February 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person assisted by an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms B Rayment of Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2156 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOSQ
First Appellant

SZOSR
Second Appellant

SZOSS
Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 FEBRUARY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The first and second appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2156 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOSQ
First Appellant

SZOSR
Second Appellant

SZOSS
Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG J

DATE:

23 FEBRUARY 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate (SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 873) in which the Federal Magistrate dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review. The Federal Magistrate reviewed a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) not to grant the first appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (“Protection visa”).

  2. The task of the Federal Magistrates Court in dealing with the judicial review proceedings brought by the appellants was to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error: s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

  3. The task of this Court in relation to the appeal brought by the appellants is to determine whether the judgment of the Federal Magistrate is affected by appealable error: SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] FCA 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZOSQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicants, a Chinese citizen and her husband and son, sought to appeal the Federal Circuit Court's dismissal of their application for review of a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse their applications for protection visas. The applicants, who had arrived in Australia on tourist visas, applied for protection visas on the basis that the wife was a Falun Gong practitioner and feared persecution if returned to China. The Tribunal had found that the wife had fabricated her claims and was not a genuine Falun Gong practitioner, and the Federal Circuit Court had dismissed the appeal against the delegate's decision. The applicants appealed the Federal Circuit Court's decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in upholding the delegate's decision to refuse the applicants' protection visas. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the evidence before it and that the Federal Circuit Court had erred in not identifying this jurisdictional error. The court had to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court's approach in reviewing the Tribunal's decision was correct and whether the Tribunal's findings were open to it based on the evidence presented.

The court found that the Federal Circuit Court had not erred in its approach to reviewing the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal had considered all relevant evidence and was entitled to reject the wife's claims based on the inconsistencies in her evidence and the other factors noted. The court held that it was not the role of the Federal Circuit Court or the court itself to review the merits of the applicants' claim but rather to determine if there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision-making process. The court found no such error and confirmed that the Tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicants pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the high threshold for successfully appealing a Tribunal decision in refugee status cases, where the credibility and consistency of the applicant's evidence are critical.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first and second appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that no error on the part of the Federal Magistrate has been demonstrated and that the appeal should be dismissed. BACKGROUND The appellants are a wife, husband and son who are citizens of the People’s Republic of China, who arrived in Australia on Subclass 676 Tourist visas on 16 February 2010. On 30 March 2010 the first appellant lodged an application for a Protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on the grounds that she feared serious harm on account of her being a Falun Gong practitioner. The first appellant claimed she had been detained and sentenced for her Falun Gong activities. Only the first appellant made claims for refugee status. The second appellant husband and the third appellant son made applications as dependent members of the first appellant’s family unit. As it is the first appellant’s claims that form the subject of this review, it is convenient that I refer to her as “the appellant”. The appellant claimed she developed an interest in Falun Gong in 1998 through her uncle. She stopped practicing in 1999 when the Chinese government banned Falun Gong but she later resumed her Falun Gong practice in 2006 because she suffered from ill health, specifically a back injury from a car accident in 2004. The appellant practiced with her uncle and assisted him in distributing literature about the benefits of Falun Gong and criticising the government for its treatment of Falun Gong practitioners. On 22 September 2009 the appellant claimed she was arrested by the police whilst preparing some pamphlets for distribution and was subsequently sentenced to two years in a re-education camp. On 22 October 2009 she was sent to a re-education camp where she was to remain and receive re-education until 21 September 2011. However, she claimed that due to ill health she was temporarily released on 20 January 2010 on the condition that she did not practice Falun Gong and returned within six months. The appellant then fled to Australia with her husband and son. She claims that if she were to return to China she would be forced to complete her two year sentence and would be persecuted for being a Falun Gong practitioner and activist. On 26 July 2010 a delegate of the Minister (“the delegate”) made a decision refusing to grant the appellants Protection visas. On 9 August 2010 the appellants filed an application in the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. By letter dated 25 August 2010 the appellants were invited to appear at a hearing before the Tribunal scheduled for 14 September 2010. The appellants attended the hearing assisted by their migration agent. At the hearing, the first and second appellants and two further witnesses (Mr Zeng Lin, a Falun Gong leader in Sydney, and Mr Xiao Yu, a fellow Falun Gong practitioner) gave evidence. The Tribunal’s Decision Ultimately, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had provided a truthful account of her circumstances in China. The Tribunal found that she had fabricated her core claims relating to her involvement with Falun Gong in China and her associated claims of harm with the authorities to enhance her Protection visa application. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the appellant was or had been a genuine or committed practitioner of Falun Gong.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 26 July 2010 a delegate of the Minister (“the delegate”) made a decision refusing to grant the appellants Protection visas. On 9 August 2010 the appellants filed an application in the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. By letter dated 25 August 2010 the appellants were invited to appear at a hearing before the Tribunal scheduled for 14 September 2010. The appellants attended the hearing assisted by their migration agent. At the hearing, the first and second appellants and two further witnesses (Mr Zeng Lin, a Falun Gong leader in Sydney, and Mr Xiao Yu, a fellow Falun Gong practitioner) gave evidence. The Tribunal’s Decision Ultimately, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had provided a truthful account of her circumstances in China. The Tribunal found that she had fabricated her core claims relating to her involvement with Falun Gong in China and her associated claims of harm with the authorities to enhance her Protection visa application. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the appellant was or had been a genuine or committed practitioner of Falun Gong. There were a number of factors that led to the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings including:•identified inconsistencies in her evidence between what was given at the delegate’s interview and the Tribunal hearing regarding her Falun Gong activities in China; •inconsistencies between her evidence and the evidence of the second appellant and the two other witnesses, Mr Lin and Mr Zheng; and •in particular, identified inconsistencies between her and her husband’s evidence regarding when they saw each other after she had been detained. The Tribunal concluded that such inconsistencies arose because the appellant’s claims were fabricated and the appellants could not recall them accurately. The Tribunal also considered the documentary evidence provided by the appellant but concluded that this too had been fabricated or contrived to enhance her Protection visa application. The Tribunal also noted inconsistencies in the first appellant’s evidence concerning what she told her migration agent. The Tribunal was also concerned that, in the circumstances, the Chinese authorities had taken no steps to prevent the first appellant from leaving the country and potentially evading her return to re-education. If the appellant’s claims were truthful, the Tribunal questioned why the Chinese authorities had not even taken basic steps to prevent her leaving the country such as confiscating her passport. The Tribunal also considered it unusual that although she had taken a significant risk in distributing pamphlets with her uncle, once she arrived in Australia she had not attempted to contact him. The Tribunal was concerned at the six week delay after arrival in Australia before the appellants applied for Protection visas and about the credibility of the corroborating evidence of a Mr Xiao Yu. Ultimately, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the first appellant:·had provided a truthful account of her circumstances in China;·was a Falun Gong practitioner; and·had been detained and sentenced by the Chinese Authorities.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first respondent recognised that the third appellant is a minor and seeks no order for costs against the third appellant.CONSIDERATIONGround One The first ground is unparticularised and does not refer to any particular error in the decision of the Federal Magistrate or how the Tribunal’s findings constitute jurisdictional error. Taking a broad view, I will infer that the appellants are agitating the ground pressed below that the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence before it in making its decision thereby committing jurisdictional error and that the appealable error is the Federal Magistrate’s failure to identify that the Tribunal had erred in such a way. As the Federal Magistrate outlined at [14]-[32], the Tribunal properly considered all of the relevant evidence in coming to its finding that the appellant was not a genuine Falun Gong practitioner. Having reviewed the evidence, the Tribunal was not satisfied of the truthfulness of the appellant’s claim. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s key claim on the basis of adverse credibility findings made against the appellant based upon a number of factors that were open to it as the arbiter of the facts and evidence. Where the Tribunal disregarded evidence, it was entitled to disregard that evidence by virtue of s 91R(3) of the Migration Act. Consistently with that provision and after considering all of the evidence, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had engaged in Falun Gong activities in Australia otherwise than for the purpose of enhancing her refugee claim. Insofar as the first ground seeks a merits review of the Tribunal’s decision, it is neither the role of the Federal Magistrates Court nor of this Court to review the merits of the appellant’s claim: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ) and 291 (Kirby J). I can find no error in the approach taken by the Federal Magistrate in reviewing the Tribunal’s decision. Therefore, ground one must be dismissed.Ground Two The second ground is also unparticularised and does not identify any particular error in the judgment of the Federal Magistrate. It also appears that it is a new ground and therefore requires leave to be raised by the appellant. The relevant principles regarding the raising of new grounds of appeal were the subject of detailed consideration in SZKCQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 578 at [7]-[11] (Flick J). Leave should only be granted to raise new grounds on appeal where it is expedient in the interests of justice. For a ground to be argued and determined for the first time on appeal, it must at least be shown that the ground has a reasonable prospect of success. Relevantly, section 91R(3) of the Migration Act provides:Persecution (1) …(2) …(3) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person: (a) in determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless: (b) the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person's claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.