SZOMZ v Minister for Immigration - [2010] FMCA 871

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOMZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2010] FMCA 871

MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – wether the Refugee Review Tribunal failed to properly consider the applicant’s claims or evidence – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision was based on probative evidence – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal decision was affected by bias.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1); 36(2); 65(1); 65(1)(b); 91R; 430(1)(d); 474; pt.8 div.2

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS 266 ALR 367
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407

Applicant:

SZOMZ

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 1474 of 2010

Judgment of:

Emmett FM

Hearing date:

12 October 2010

Date of Last Submission:

12 October 2010 and 2 November 2010

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

12 November 2010

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Mr M. Jones

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr G. Johnson SC

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Ms K. Whittemore, Sparke Helmore

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1474 of 2010

SZOMZ

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8 Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 31 May 2010 and handed down on 1 June 2010.
The applicant claims to be a citizen of Lebanon and of Muslim faith (“the Applicant”).
The issues in this case are whether the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions were based on probative evidence and material and whether the Tribunal properly exercised its jurisdiction. These issues are considered below in the context of considering whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
Prior to considering the proceeding before this Court, these Reasons provide the relevant procedural background, a summary of the legislative framework, a summary of the Applicant’s protection visa application claims and the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent (“the Delegate”) and consideration of the Tribunal’s review and decision.

Background

The Applicant arrived in Australia on 26 January 2009 having departed legally from Beirut on a passport issued in his own name and a Subclass 679 (Sponsored Family Visitor) visa issued on 5 January 2009.
On 13 March 2009, the Applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) under the Act.
On 10 June 2009, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa.
On 17 June 2009, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal.
On 31 May 2010, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa.
On 5 July 2010, the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

Legislative framework

Section 65(1) of the Act authorises the decision-maker to grant a visa if satisfied that the prescribed criteria have been met. However, if the decision-maker is not so satisfied then s.65(1)(b) mandates that the visa application is to be refused.
Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that an applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has a protection obligation under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Act defines “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” as meaning the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”).
Article 1A(2) of the Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
Section 91R of the Act expands on the notion of persecution and serious harm when considering Article 1A(2) of the Convention.

The Applicant’s application for a protection visa

The Applicant provided a statement in support of his protection visa application in which he stated that he feared persecution by his family and the Muslim society in Lebanon.
He claimed to be a Muslim of homosexual orientation and to have had a secret homosexual relationship in Lebanon in 2008 with an ex-student from his school. He claimed to have been pressured into an engagement with a woman by his family which he subsequently ended after 10 months. He claimed his parents would reject him and possibly cause him physical harm if he told them he was homosexual. He claimed that he would be rejected and forced to leave his parents house if he did not marry before the age of 25.

The Delegate’s decision

On 10 June 2009, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the Applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention.
The Delegate accepted that the Applicant was a homosexual but was not satisfied that his fear of persecution in Lebanon for that reason was well founded. The Delegate also found that the Applicant could relocate to Beirut if he genuinely feared harm from his family.

The Tribunal’s review and decision

On 17 June 2009, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
The Applicant and his migration agent provided further documents in support of his review application, including submissions dated 27 July 2009 and 26 March 2010 which were ultimately considered by the Tribunal.
On 26 June 2009, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant informing him that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. The letter invited the Applicant to attend a hearing on 28 July 2009 to give oral evidence and present arguments.
On 28 July 2009, the Applicant attended the Tribunal hearing and gave evidence.
The Tribunal wrote to the Applicant on two occasions, being 12 November 2009 and 19 February 2010, identifying information that may form part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, explaining its relevance and inviting the Applicant to comment upon it.
On 7 December 2009, the Applicant’s migration agent responded to the Tribunal’s letters.
On 25 February 2010, the Applicant requested a further hearing with the Tribunal, however this request was withdrawn by the Applicant on 26 March 2010.
The Tribunal noted that it had before it the Department’s file, the Delegate’s decision record and other materials available to it from a range of sources.
Ultimately, the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant is or ever has been a homosexual and rejected his claim of having had a homosexual relationship in Lebanon. The Tribunal based its adverse credibility findings on DFAT information which the Tribunal found to be inconsistent with the Applicant’s claims, and evidence from the Applicant that it found to be implausible and lacking in cogency.

The proceeding before this Court

The Applicant was represented before this Court by Mr Jones, solicitor.
On 23 July 2010, Mr Jones attended a directions hearing on behalf of the Applicant before me. The Applicant was granted leave to file and serve an amended application giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon, together with any further evidence by way of affidavit, including any transcript of the Tribunal hearing.
At the commencement of the hearing on 12 October 2010, the Applicant confirmed that he had not filed any amended application, evidence or submissions in support of his application and that he had no further documents to present to the Court in support of his application.
Mr Jones confirmed that the Applicant relied on the grounds contained in an application filed on 5 July 2010. At the hearing on 12 October 2010, Mr Jones made submissions in support of each of those grounds, following which Counsel for the first respondent, Mr Johnson SC, made submissions in response.
During the submissions in response, it became apparent that not all relevant documents were included in the bundle of relevant documents identified as ‘Court Book’, filed on 03 August 2010 and marked Exhibit 1R. Mr Jones also indicated that he would like to have a little time to consider whether an amended application and evidence in support should be filed. Directions were then made by consent for the first respondent to file and serve a supplementary court book containing the remaining relevant documents.
The matter was stood over until 26 October 2010 for further directions, following an opportunity for the Applicant to consider the first respondent’s supplementary documents and whether they wished to file an amended application or any further evidence. At the directions hearing on 26 October 2010, Mr Jones informed the Court that the Applicant did wish to file an amended application and to rely on further evidence. Accordingly, directions were made that the Applicant file and serve an amended application and any evidence by way of affidavit, including any transcript of the Tribunal hearing, together with submissions in support by midday 28 October 2010.
The matter was stood over for further hearing to 2 November 2010.
At the commencement of the hearing on 2 November 2010, Mr Jones sought and was granted leave to file in Court an amended application together with submissions in support. Mr Jones also tendered, without objection, a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. Mr Jones confirmed that the amended application contained the only grounds upon which the Applicant now relied. Those grounds are as follows:
“1. The Tribunal’s understanding of the nature of sexual orientation was fundamentally flawed, leading to a failure to properly consider the applicant’s claims.
Particulars
The Tribunal treated the Applicant’s fears of persecution as only arising once he became aware that he was “homosexual”. In so doing the Tribunal applied a flawed, stereotypical and one-dimensional understanding of human sexuality, emotions and psychological motivation. The Tribunal therefore could not properly understand the Applicant’s claim to be homosexual.
2. The Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to the evidence before it by not considering possible alternative explanations of what it found to be discrepancies in that evidence.
Particulars
The Tribunal made a finding of fact that the Applicant had given false oral evidence and submitted false documents to the Tribunal for the reason that it preferred the evidence of a departmental officer over that of the Applicant. The Tribunal’s reason for coming to that conclusion was that it found it difficult to accept that the departmental officer would falsely attribute statements to another person. The Tribunal failed to consider the possibility that the departmental officer may have honestly misunderstood or misinterpreted the statements made by the other person.
3. The Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Migration Act because it made a decision on a jurisdictional fact which was arbitrary, capricious or irrational.
Particulars
The Tribunal found that the following claims of the Applicant were so “implausible” as to lead to a conclusion that the Applicant was not telling the truth:
a. that he dropped his mobile phone and it was run over by a car before he realised he had dropped it;
b. that he would sit in a van for eight hours while his brother worked and could not have, at some point, made enquiries of the Department of Immigration about protection;
c. that he did not know any non-Muslim lawyers to help him and he would not have trusted a Muslim lawyer;
d. that an answer “not really” to a question about whether he had girlfriends was evidence that he was not homosexual;
e. that his ignorance of his lover’s birthday was evidence that he was not telling the truth about their relationship;
f. that the evidence given by the Applicant about his lover’s age and schooling meant the lover had attended school in his early 20s;
g. that the Applicant did not refer to his lover by name in his statement to the Department;
h. that his evidence about “delay” was implausible.
Within the context of the Applicant’s situation, these claims were not “implausible in the sense that a reasonable person could not find them credible. The Tribunal’s interpretation of them reflects an unreasonably narrow and monocultural view of reality that in the context of the Tribunal’s role in assessing refugee claims falls below a minimum standard of logic or rationality that is required for the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
4. In the alternative, the particulars set out above would give rise to an apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal.”

Ground 1

It was common ground, and I accept, that Ground 1 only arose if the Tribunal’s reasons for affirming the decision under review went beyond those identified by the Tribunal in its reasons. Ground 1 is based on the Tribunal’s consideration of the Applicant’s explanation for his delay in seeking protection by reason of his homosexuality. Whilst the Tribunal found the Applicant’s explanation implausible, the Tribunal also found that its concerns about the Applicant’s delay in seeking protection by reason of his homosexuality was not material to the Tribunal’s decision, although reinforced its findings.
The Tribunal made clear in its decision record that the only matters upon which it relied in rejecting the Applicant’s claims of being a homosexual, and having been persecuted for that reason, are contained in particular paragraphs in the Tribunal’s decision record with the headings “Investigation by DFAT”, “Lack of Cogency” and “Implausibility”. Further, at the conclusion of the Tribunal’s consideration of the Applicant’s delay in lodging his protection visa application and the Applicant’s explanation, the Tribunal repeated that its reasons for not being satisfied that the Applicant is, or has at any stage been, a homosexual are contained at those identified paragraphs in the Tribunal’s reasons under the headings referred to above.
In those circumstances, I accept the submissions of Counsel for the first respondent and the solicitor for the Applicant that the delay in the Applicant seeking protection by reason of his homosexuality and his explanation for that delay do not form part of the reasons for the Tribunal affirming the decision under review.
Accordingly Ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2

Ground 2 has been withdrawn.

Grounds 3 and 5

Ground 3 asserts that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction because it made a decision on a jurisdictional fact which was arbitrary, capricious or irrational. Mr Jones agreed that Ground 5 is more in the nature of a particular of Ground 3, in that part of the reason that the decision was arbitrary, capricious or irrational was because a key finding was not grounded in probative material.
The key finding to which Grounds 3 and 5 are intended to refer is the finding that the Applicant did not have a well founded fear of persecution in Lebanon by reason of his homosexuality.
At the heart of Mr Jones’ submissions in support of Grounds 3 and 5 is a contention that the Tribunal’s reasons, as disclosed in its decision record under the headings “Lack of Cogency” and “Implausibility”, are not grounded in probative material.
In relation to “Lack of Cogency”, Mr Jones submitted that the Tribunal relied on the fact that the Applicant did not know his friend’s telephone number. Mr Jones noted that the Tribunal said that it did not consider “this in itself particularly probative” of whether the friend existed and whether the friend was in a relationship with the Applicant. The Tribunal noted that it is not unreasonable not to be able to recall a telephone number, particularly, if it has been saved to one’s mobile telephone. Mr Jones submitted that the Tribunal’s decision record made clear that, in the circumstances, it was not possible for that material to ground a finding adverse to the Applicant’s credibility.
However, I accept the submission of counsel for the first respondent that Mr Jones’ summary of the Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding of the Applicant is not an accurate reflection of the Tribunal’s finding insofar as Mr Jones sought to confine the Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding to the Applicant’s ignorance of his friend’s telephone number.
Relevantly, the Tribunal stated as follows:
“Yet the applicant was not aware of [the friend’s] phone number. The Tribunal does not consider this is in itself particularly probative of whether [the friend] exists and whether he was in a relationship with the applicant (he stated that he only telephoned three times and it is not unreasonable not to not be able to recall a number, particularly if it had been saved onto a phone). However when combined with the other gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence it reinforces the conclusion that [the friend] does not exist or, if he exists, was not in a relationship with the applicant. Furthermore, in combination with the convoluted and implausible explanation given for his ignorance of the telephone number (see paragraph 83) the applicant’s ignorance of the phone number diminished the applicant’s credibility.” (emphasis added)
Mr Johnson SC submitted that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that it is only when combined with other gaps and inconsistencies in the Applicant’s evidence that the Applicant’s lack of knowledge of his friend’s telephone number became relevant to its adverse findings.
I accept Mr Johnson’s SC submissions that “the other gaps and inconsistencies” referred to above by the Tribunal relate to the Tribunal’s reasons under the heading “Investigation by DFAT”. It is clear from the last sentence of the Tribunal’s reasons quoted above that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Applicant’s friend did not exist or, if he did, was not in a relationship with the Applicant was further reinforced by the Applicant’s “convoluted and implausible explanation” for his lack of knowledge of the friend’s telephone number. This explanation is referred to in the Tribunal’s reasons under the heading “Implausibility”.
Similarly, under the heading “Lack of Cogency” the Tribunal found the Applicant’s evidence as to the number of times he had sex with the alleged friend to be inconsistent. The Tribunal noted:
“Again this is not, in itself, particularly probative, but when combined with the gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence it reinforces the conclusion that [the friend] does not exist, or, if he exists, was not in a relationship with the applicant”. (emphasis added)
Again, for the same reasons as referred to above, I accept that it was not the inconsistency alone in the Applicant’s evidence as to the number of times he had sex with the friend, that led to the adverse credibility findings. It was the combination of that evidence with “the other gaps and inconsistencies”, namely the Tribunal’s reasons under its heading “Investigation by DFAT”.

Under the Tribunal’s heading “Implausibility”, the Tribunal summarises the exchanges it had with the Applicant about the reasons why he was not able to tell the Tribunal his friend’s telephone number. The Tribunal stated as follows:
“83. The applicant stated that he resumed contact with [the friend] by phone after moving out of his brother’s house (where it was not safe to call) three months ago. When asked how often he calls [the friend], he stated that he had called three times in three months. Asked what [the friend’s] telephone number was, he stated that [the friend] was forced to marry a week ago and had to change his telephone number. Asked what the number had been a week ago, he stated that he could not remember because it was saved on his (the applicant’s) mobile phone but his phone was crushed by a car “yesterday”. Asked to explain, he stated that he was with a friend. The friend was in a car and he was outside the car. He (the applicant) dropped his phone without realising he had dropped it. It was only when the friend reversed the car over his phone that he realised what had happened. When pressed on whether that was yesterday, he stated Saturday (c.f.r. the hearing was on a Tuesday making “yesterday” Monday). The Tribunal finds this explanation inconsistent (Monday c.f.r. Saturday) and implausible (the likelihood of a person dropping a phone and phone being run over by a car before the person realised they had dropped it is unlikely to the extent that the Tribunal rejects it as implausible). The Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence about the destruction of his mobile phone to be false evidence given under an oath to tell the truth. This finding diminishes the applicant’s credibility.” (emphasis added)
Having been directed to the relevant parts of the transcript, being Exhibit 2A, I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s summary of that exchange, as reflected in paragraph 51 above, is accurate. Essentially, the Applicant stated that he could not remember his friend’s telephone number because it was saved on his mobile phone and his phone had been crushed by a car “yesterday”. The transcript makes clear that when the Tribunal repeated the word “yesterday” to the Applicant, following the Applicant having stated on two occasions that it was yesterday that his phone was crushed, the Applicant said that it was on “Saturday”. The Tribunal then summarised the Applicant’s evidence about how the mobile phone came to be crushed. The Tribunal found the Applicant’s evidence as to when this occurred was inconsistent (first “yesterday”, being Monday and then “Saturday”) and that his explanation was implausible. Having not accepted the Applicant’s explanation about the destruction of the Applicant’s mobile phone as truthful, the Tribunal found the evidence to be false and thereby to diminish the Applicant’s credibility.
Whilst it may be that minds may differ as to whether or not the Applicant’s explanation was plausible or satisfactory, that is a matter of degree. That is a matter for the decision maker, in this case, the Tribunal. It could not be said that there was an absence of any basis whatsoever for the Tribunal’s conclusion. As Heydon J said in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS 266 ALR 367 at paragraph 78:
“The issue was one on which minds might differ. The Federal Court evidently operated on one assumption or conclusion about that issue. The tribunal operated on another. The difference was one of degree, impression and empirical judgement. It did not stem from an error in logic by the Tribunal member. The difference could not be said to reveal an absence of any basis whatsoever for her conclusion.”
Mr Jones further submitted that, either the Tribunal had relied on its personal knowledge in rejecting the Applicant’s explanation for his ignorance of his friend’s telephone number, in which case it was bound to identify that personal knowledge; or, there was no evidence that allowed the Tribunal to reject the Applicant’s explanations.
In support of that submission, Mr Jones referred the Court to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108 at paragraph 55 where Kenny J stated as follows:
“In a case such as the present, it will always be possible to speculate that the Tribunal has relied on absent and unidentified probative material, but it will rarely be possible to establish that fact with any degree of confidence. In the ordinary course of things, a reviewing court is bound to consider, consistently with s430, that what purports to be the Tribunal’s written statement under s430 sets out what were in fact the reasons for the Tribunal reaching the decision set forth in that statement; the findings set out therein are the findings the Tribunal actually made and considered material to its decision; and the evidence and other material referred to therein is in fact the evidence and material on which the Tribunal based those findings. To do otherwise would transform judicial review into an exercise in divination of the sort s430 was designed to avoid. Considering the function of s430, a reviewing court should not depart from this approach unless there is a sound reason to do so.”
I accept the submission of counsel for the first respondent, Mr Johnson SC, that the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was considering the effect of s.430(1)(d) of the Act and that the section makes clear that a tribunal must identify the evidence and other material on from which its findings are based.
However, in rejecting the Applicant’s explanation for his ignorance of his friend’s telephone number and the loss of his own mobile, the Tribunal is doing no more than evaluating the evidence of the Applicant before it and rejecting that evidence. In those circumstances, the Tribunal is not obliged to give to an Applicant its own thought processes or to provide a running commentary on the Applicant’s evidence (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [18]).
The Tribunal was required to evaluate the Applicant’s evidence and to make findings accordingly. It did so and they were adverse to the Applicant. There was no other “material” to which the Tribunal had regard that it was required to put to the Applicant in making those findings.
Mr Jones also submitted that the Tribunal’s decision record was illogical, capricious or irrational in that it stated that some matters were not material to its decision, including the inconsistency about how many times the Applicant had sex with his friend. True it is, that the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the reasons for it not accepting that the Applicant is homosexual, is, or, ever has been, in a relationship with his friend, or faces a real chance of persecution in the future by reason of his homosexuality for any other Convention related reason are contained in its decision record under the three headings “Investigation by DFAT”, “Lack of Cogency” and “Implausibility”.
However, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the inconsistent evidence given by the Applicant as to the number of times he had sexual relations with his friend was not by itself material to the decision. As stated above, under the heading “Lack of Cogency”, it is clear that it was that finding combined with the other gaps and inconsistencies in the Applicant’s evidence that led to the Tribunal’s adverse conclusions.
It is not suggested by the Applicant that the Tribunal’s findings under the heading “Investigation by DFAT” were not open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. Those reasons include a finding by the Tribunal that the Applicant “gave false oral evidence and submitted false documents to the Tribunal”. Those are significant adverse credibility findings. Those findings, when added to the concerns the Tribunal expressed under its headings “Lack of Cogency” and “Implausibility”, are capable of grounding the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicant did not have a well founded fear of persecution in Lebanon by reason of his homosexuality. Those concerns were as follows:
a)the ignorance of the Applicant of his friend’s telephone number;
b)his explanation for that ignorance; and
c)his inconsistent evidence as to the number of times he had sex with his friend,
The Tribunal found that the cumulative effect of those concerns expressed under those headings was to diminish the Applicant’s credibility to the extent that the Tribunal rejected his claims that he is a homosexual, has ever been persecuted for homosexuality or that he faces a real chance of persecution in the future for being a homosexual.
It was open to the Tribunal to find that the cumulative effect of the concerns it expressed under the headings “Investigation by DFAT”, “Lack of Cogency” and “Implausibility” were sufficient to ground the Tribunal’s rejection of the Applicant’s claims to be a homosexual, to have been in a relationship with his friend and to face a real chance of persecution in the future by reason of his homosexuality or for any other Convention reason.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J).
Accordingly, Grounds 3 and 5 are not made out.

Ground 4

Ground 4 has been withdrawn.

Conclusion

A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal understood the claims being made by the Applicant; explored those claims with the Applicant at a hearing; and, had regard to all material provided in support. The Tribunal put to the Applicant matters of concern it had about his evidence both at the hearing and in writing and noted the Applicant’s responses. The Tribunal made clear those matters that caused it sufficient concern cumulatively to reject the Applicant’s claims of being a homosexual, of ever having been in a homosexual relationship with his friend or of facing a real chance of persecution in Lebanon in the future by reason of his homosexuality or for any other Convention related reason. The Tribunal’s findings were based on the evidence and material before it. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal reached conclusions based on the findings made by it and to which it applied the correct law.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.
The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.
The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy (70) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM

Date: 12 November 2010