SZOLO v Minister for Immigration
[2010] FMCA 740
•1 October 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZOLO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2010] FMCA 740 |
| MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – visa – protection visa – refusal – allegation that the Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that the Tribunal did not consider all of the applicant’s claims – misunderstood the evidence – failed to consider the risk of harm upon return to country of nationality – failed to address inadequacies in translation at departmental interview and recorded a fact incorrectly. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.91R, 424AA, 430, 474 |
| Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs;Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485 |
| Applicant: | SZOLO |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1244 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Cameron FM |
| Hearing date: | 17 September 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 September 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 1 October 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1244 of 2010
| SZOLO |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant is a citizen of India where, he claims, he was raised in the Islamic faith. He claims that he later converted to Christianity and as a result was attacked by Muslims. He claims to fear persecution because of his religion.
After his arrival in Australia on 15 July 2009, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa. This was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) on 1 December 2009. The applicant then applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. The applicant was unsuccessful before the Tribunal and has applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
In these judicial review proceedings the Court cannot rehear the applicant’s application for a visa. Its task is to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only basis upon which it can be set aside: s.474 Migration Act1958 (“Act”); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.
For the reasons which follow, the application will be dismissed.
Background facts
The facts alleged in support of the applicant’s claim for a protection visa are set out on pages 4 – 15 of the Tribunal’s decision (Court Book (“CB”) pages 113 – 124).
The Minister’s department
The applicant made the following claims in a statement attached to his protection visa application:
a)he was raised in the Islamic faith;
b)his family lived in what was a predominately Muslim community in Kerala;
c)his neighbour and childhood friend, JM, was a Christian and he introduced the applicant to the Christian faith. The applicant came to believe in Christianity;
d)he spent more time with JM learning about Christianity while at college and started attending prayer meetings at St George’s church. He did this without the consent of his family or the community;
e)his family “doubted” the changes that they saw in him and forced him to “keep a distance” from JM. However, when the opportunity arose, and despite his family’s disapproval, he went and visited JM to learn more about Christianity. When his family learned of this, they had him beaten;
f)the situation created problems between the Christians and Muslims in the community. As a consequence, JM’s mother begged the applicant to sever the relationship;
g)the mosque committee sent him a warning letter and subjected him to classes in an attempt to make him change his mind but the applicant could not accept the Muslim religion;
h)in March 2008 he went to Goa to attend a meeting but his family became worried and told the Muslim community who, in turn, informed the National Democratic Front (“NDF”), a Muslim terrorist group. The NDF discovered his whereabouts and “contacted their people in Goa” who then captured the applicant and sent him back to Kerala. When he arrived in Kerala, they kidnapped and tortured him;
i)JM’s father advised the applicant to apply for a student visa to come to Australia. The applicant spent the next six months following his family’s instructions and managed to convince them that he had “come back to normal”. He then sought their permission to study abroad; and
j)after he arrived in Australia he became “totally obsessed” with the thought of converting. When he contacted JM’s father, the latter advised him to apply for a protection visa and referred him to a person he knew in Sydney.
On 9 November 2009 the Minister’s department received a letter from the applicant in which he claimed, amongst other things, that he had been attending prayer meetings and Bible classes in Australia. He claimed that this information had somehow been “revealed” to the people in his community and that, as a consequence, he had been receiving threatening phone calls telling him that if he returned to India he would be killed.
The applicant was interviewed by the Minister’s delegate on 11 November 2009. In that interview the applicant said:
a)he needed to study more about Roman Catholicism before he could be baptised, although this was likely to happen before Christmas;
b)he had been interested in Christianity since childhood but started practising properly only after he came to Australia;
c)he worshipped in India secretly and did not dare go to church, although he went to St George’s church on two occasions to pray;
d)he had suffered harm three times because of his Christian beliefs; and
e)he could not relocate to another part of India because the NDF had people in every city.
At the interview with the delegate he also provided a letter dated 15 February 2008, addressed to the applicant and purportedly written by the secretary of the Muslim Committee. The letter stated that the Muslim Committee had received reports that the applicant was attending Bible classes and that he was to avoid such activity and attend Koran classes or action would be taken against him.
The department’s file also contained a copy of a psychological assessment conducted by the New South Wales Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors (“STARTTS”) on 8 October 2009. According to that document, the applicant was experiencing symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder and as a consequence was not capable of undertaking paid employment at that time.
The Tribunal
On 18 February 2010 the Tribunal received the following material from the applicant:
a)a statutory declaration declared by the applicant on 17 February 2010 detailing why he could not relocate to another part of India to avoid harm in his local area and the prevalent use of torture in India;
b)a report of a camp organised by the Auburn Salvation Army which included a picture of the applicant;
c)a leaflet promoting Christmas celebrations including a nativity play held by the Auburn Salvation Army in 2009;
d)photographs of the applicant appearing in a nativity play and the applicant at a Christmas party; and
e)photographs apparently of scars and bruises to parts of the applicant’s body.
At a hearing before the Tribunal on 9 April 2010 the applicant made the following claims:
a)he had been studying Christianity and the Bible four or five times a month since the age of 15. He was initially taught by JM but in his first year at college was also taught by JM’s relative, Anthony, who was a Bible expert;
b) he knew by the age of 16 that he wanted to follow Christianity;
c)he attended church once or twice a month while he was at college, usually at St Mary’s or St Peter’s, both of which were Catholic churches. He also went to St George’s church on two occasions. He ceased going to church in March 2008 after he was attacked;
d)he was attacked on three occasions in India although there were many other incidents which were not physical. He was attacked in March 2008 in Goa, on another occasion when he was travelling in a car with a friend and on a third occasion coming home from a mosque. He did not report these attacks to the police because the attackers had threatened to kill him if he did so;
e)he moved to Auburn in August 2009 and from that time had been attending mass every Sunday and Bible study classes every Tuesday at the Salvation Army church; and
f)Muslims in Auburn may have told Muslims in India that he was attending church in Australia. He had received about seven threatening phone calls from India. The callers did not identify themselves but said he would be killed if he returned to India because he had converted.
The Tribunal’s decision and reasons
After discussing the claims made by the applicant and the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 (“Convention”). The Tribunal’s decision was based on the following findings and reasons:
a)the applicant gave evidence at the hearing that he had studied Christianity and the Bible four or five times a month since he was 15 years old, began following the Christian religion when he was 16 years old and regularly attended church since college. In light of these claims, the Tribunal expected the applicant to be able to provide confident and detailed evidence about Christianity and how he practised the religion in India. However, his oral evidence in this regard was lacking in detail and was delivered in a hesitant manner which necessitated much questioning. In the Tribunal’s view, the cautious and general nature of the applicant’s evidence raised doubts about whether he had studied Christianity and the Bible and attended church in India as he claimed;
b)the applicant claimed at the hearing that, in addition to JM, he had also studied Christianity with Anthony, a Bible expert. However, he made no mention of Anthony is his original statement to the Minister’s department and, in the Tribunal’s view, the applicant would have done so if his claims about Anthony had been true;
c)the applicant also claimed at the Tribunal hearing that he had regularly attended St Mary’s and St Peter’s churches, a claim which he did not make in his original statement to the Minister’s department. The applicant claimed that he had mentioned the churches to the person who had prepared his written statement but that person had failed to include them in the translation. However, the Tribunal did not accept that this was a credible explanation, noting that:
i)the applicant’s statement did not just fail to mention the names of the two churches but failed to give any indication that he had regularly attended church as claimed at the hearing. Given that the basis of his claim to be a refugee rested on the assertion that he had converted to Christianity, the Tribunal found it difficult to accept that such significant information could inadvertently be omitted; and
ii)given the applicant’s English language skills, the Tribunal did not accept that he would have relied completely on another person to prepare his statement and fail to check the accuracy of the statement.
The Tribunal concluded that this claim had been invented to strengthen the applicant’s claim that he was a Christian in India;
d)according to information obtained by the Tribunal, St Thomas is a significant figure amongst the Christians in Kerala. However, when the Tribunal first questioned the applicant about St Thomas the applicant could only say that he was a prophet. He later claimed that he did know about St Thomas but had not recalled it when initially asked by the Tribunal. However, given St Thomas’s significance to Christians in Kerala and the fact that the applicant claimed that he had studied Christianity in Kerala since he was a teenager, the Tribunal believed that the applicant would have recalled who St Thomas was when asked directly if, as he later claimed, he had in fact known about St Thomas;
e)in light of the defects in his evidence, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a credible witness and consequently did not accept that while in India he had converted to Christianity, had studied Christianity or the Bible or had attended church. The Tribunal also therefore did not accept that the applicant had suffered harm as a result of having become a Christian in India;
f)in making its findings, the Tribunal considered the letter from the Muslim Committee but, given its findings concerning the applicant’s credibility and the prevalence of document fraud in India, did not accept that the letter was genuine;
g)the Tribunal also had regard to the photographs the applicant presented which appeared to show scars, marks and bruises to his body. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had sustained those scars, marks and bruises as a result of any attack related to his Christian conversion;
h)the Tribunal considered the assessment from STARTTS and noted that the symptoms described in the assessment could impact on the ability of a person to give evidence and present arguments. However, the Tribunal also noted that the assessment had been conducted six months prior to the hearing and was based on one consultation and on symptoms reported by the applicant. The applicant did not present any recent medical evidence to indicate that his ability to give evidence at the hearing was negatively affected by some condition or disorder. Thus, the Tribunal did not believe that the applicant’s ability to give evidence at the hearing was impaired; and
i)the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had engaged in various Christian activities in Australia but found that he had engaged in such activity in order to strengthen his claim to be a refugee. The Tribunal therefore disregarded that conduct pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Act.
Proceedings in this Court
The grounds of the amended application were pleaded as follows:
1.The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it did not consider all of the Applicant’s claims.
2.The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by misinforming itself as to the true nature of the Applicant’s evidence and thereby incorrectly dealt with that evidence.
In his affidavit affirmed on 24 August 2010 the applicant also raised the following grounds:
a)the Tribunal member affirmed the delegate’s decision without considering properly the test whether he would suffer serious harm as per s.91R(2)(a) of the Act; and
b)the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s evidence before the Minister’s delegate because at the departmental interview the interpreter made a mistake leading to the Tribunal misunderstanding what the applicant had said at the interview.
Failure to consider all claims
The applicant particularised the first ground of the amended application in the following terms:
The Tribunal did not deal with the Applicant’s claim that he could not safely relocate to another part of India.
As referred to earlier in these reasons, in the statutory declaration declared by the applicant on 17 February 2010 and provided to the Tribunal on 18 February 2010, the applicant detailed why he could not relocate from Kerala to another part of India to avoid harm in his local area and the alleged prevalent use of torture in India.
Although the Tribunal referred to what the applicant had said in his statutory declaration, it is correct that the Tribunal did not further consider the question of the applicant’s possible relocation within India. However, this was because of its finding that he had no well founded fear of persecution in India for the reasons he alleged. Absent such a finding, there was no need for the Tribunal to consider the question of relocation and, as a consequence, the fact that it did not do so does not amount to jurisdictional error.
Misunderstanding evidence
The second ground of the amended application was particularised as follows:
The letter from STARTTS dated 8 October 2009 (page 37 of the Court Book) was evidence that the Applicant was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Tribunal (at page 89 of the Court book) dealt with this evidence as being relevant to the Applicant’s ability to give evidence at the hearing whereas its true significance is that it was evidence that the Applicant had suffered from persecution.
At para.23 of its decision record the Tribunal referred to the STARTTS report and at para.89 considered its significance in the following terms:
Finally, the Tribunal has considered the assessment from STARTTS. The symptoms described in the assessment could impact on the ability of a person to give evidence and present arguments before the Tribunal however the assessment was conducted almost 6 months before the Tribunal hearing based on one consultation with the applicant and based on symptoms reported by the applicant. The applicant did not present any recent medical evidence to indicate that his ability to give evidence and present arguments at the hearing was negatively affected by some condition or disorder. In fact it was only at the end of the hearing when the applicant mentioned suicide if he was refused a protection visa and the Tribunal asked whether he had been receiving any medical treatment that he stated that he had difficulties concentrating. Further, he told the Tribunal he had only received help on one occasion about two months after he arrived in Australia which indicates he had not sought any treatment for the symptoms he reported to STARTTS. Thus, the Tribunal does not believe that the applicant’s ability to give evidence and present arguments at the hearing was impaired.
The applicant’s allegation proceeds on the basis that this document was proffered as evidence corroborative of his claim to have suffered persecution in India and that its significance was not appreciated by the Tribunal. The report, which is reproduced at CB 37, does appear to corroborate the applicant’s claims to have suffered harm in India; the Minister’s delegate had considered it in the following terms:
The applicant presented a letter from STARTTS … diagnosing him with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, a condition which is consistent with his claim of being abducted and assaulted. The applicant provided no other written evidence of his claims. From the detailed account of the applicant’s claim that he was abducted and assaulted, I am satisfied that he underwent a traumatic experience.
It appears that the delegate accepted that the applicant had suffered harm in India but that, nevertheless, his fear was not well founded because he could avoid that harm by relocating within his country of nationality. The Tribunal took a different view. It put to the applicant its understanding that followers of Hinduism, Christianity and Islam coexisted relatively peacefully in Kerala and that in Kerala there was a great deal of tolerance of religion and people in general were able to practise their religion without interference, prejudice or restriction (para.48). The Tribunal also queried the applicant on his lack of familiarity with St Thomas’s significance to Christians in Kerala; on his failure to have mentioned Anthony in the written statement he submitted with his protection visa application, while mentioning JM; why in his written statement and subsequent statutory declaration he made no mention of regularly attending church in India; and why after having received instruction in Christianity in India from Catholics he chose to attend a Salvation Army church in Australia notwithstanding that there were Catholic churches close by his home. The Tribunal also told the applicant that if it found that he was not a credible witness and/or that he was not a Christian and had not engaged in the activities related to Christianity in India which he claimed, it might find that he had attended church in Australia and participated in other Christian activities in Australia for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee. The possibility that the document from the Muslim Committee was fake was put to him and the Tribunal queried why people in India would continue to threaten him in Australia given that he had lived here for some time.
In those circumstances, the Tribunal clearly identified the applicant’s credibility and, in particular, the credibility of his claims to have been a Christian in India, as issues of importance to it in relation to the decision under review.
The import of the STARTTS report is clear enough and it is not credible that, when reading the report as the Tribunal clearly did, it would not have appreciated that it was a document of relevance to the applicant’s core claims, not merely his ability to give evidence at the Tribunal hearing. This conclusion is reinforced by the Tribunal’s express reference at para.20 of its decision to having before it a copy of the delegate’s decision. It being clear that the report was considered by the Tribunal, the question arises whether the Tribunal’s failure to discuss its possible corroboration of the applicant’s claims does indicate that this issue was not considered as it should have been.
The Tribunal’s decision reveals that it based its conclusion that the applicant was not a Christian as he claimed on the inconsistencies and inadequacies in his evidence concerning his religious practice in India and his knowledge of matters important and relevant to his claim to have developed a real interest in Christianity while still in India. At para.87 of its decision the Tribunal said:
The above defects in the applicant’s evidence about important aspects of his claim that he became a Christian in India lead the Tribunal to find that he was not a credible witness and that he did not become a Christian in India, did not learn or study Christianity or the Bible and did not attend church there. The Tribunal therefore does not accept the other claims that arise from those claims. Specifically, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was rejected, harmed, or attacked by his family, the Muslim community or the NDF, or ordered to attend Koran classes for converting to Christianity or engaging in any Bible study or Christian related activities.
In the next paragraph of its decision the Tribunal went on to say:
The Tribunal has also had regard to the photographs the applicant presented which appear to show scars, marks and bruises to the applicant’s body. Whilst the applicant testified at the Tribunal hearing that he had been attacked for his religious activities the photographs cannot indicate how the scars, marks and bruises on his body were sustained. Thus, they do not satisfy the Tribunal that the applicant sustained those scars, marks and bruises because he was attacked for his Christian conversion, beliefs, practices or activities in India.
The Tribunal’s discussion of the STARTTS report immediately follows these passages.
Relevantly, s.430 of the Act only obliges the Tribunal to refer in its reasons to the evidence upon which it makes factual findings which are, in turn, the foundation of its ultimate decision. The Tribunal does not err by not referring in its reasons to all the evidence before it; it may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at 641 [46] and [47]. Nor is it necessary for the Tribunal to give a line-by-line refutation of the evidence for the applicant either generally or in those respects where there is evidence that is contrary to findings of material fact made by the Tribunal: Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs;Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 [65].
In Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 it was said:
In a dispute adjudicated by adversarial procedures, it is not unknown for a party’s credibility to have been so weakened in cross-examination that the tribunal of fact may well treat what is proffered as corroborative evidence as of no weight because the well has been poisoned beyond redemption. It cannot be irrational for a decision-maker, enjoined by statute to apply inquisitorial processes (as here), to proceed on the footing that no corroboration can undo the consequences for a case put by a party of a conclusion that that case comprises lies by that party. If the critical passage in the reasons of the Tribunal be read as indicated above, the Tribunal is reasoning that, because the appellant cannot be believed, it cannot be satisfied with the alleged corroboration. (at 1174 [49] per McHugh and Gummow JJ)
It was said in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485 that Applicant S20/2002 concerns only the timing of the consideration given to corroborative evidence and establishes that the Tribunal does not act irrationally, thereby falling to jurisdiction error, by first making an assessment of the applicant’s credit and then giving attention to the corroborative evidence (at 492 [37]). North and Lander JJ, Katzmann J agreeing, said:
The RRT would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 does not sanction a practice of disregarding corroborative evidence. It still requires that the corroborative evidence be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence. (at 492 [38])
It was acceptable for the Tribunal to proceed by first considering the applicant’s evidence regarding his Christian activities in India and to reach a view on the credibility of those claims. The Tribunal concluded that those claims were not to be believed. It rejected the applicant’s claims of having converted to Christianity in India and of having been harmed there. This amounted to a rejection of the factual contentions on which the STARTTS report rested and also to the situation that its contents were contrary to the finding which the Tribunal had made concerning the applicant’s adherence to Christianity in India. The well having been poisoned, the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the STARTTS report was to be given no weight on the subject of the applicant’s essential claims and it must be inferred that in the Tribunal’s mind it did carry no weight on that question.
Evidence with no weight is evidence which is not relied on when findings of fact are made. It is to be concluded that the STARTTS report was not relied on by the Tribunal when making findings of fact, with the consequence that it did not need to be referred to in the Tribunal’s reasons in connection with the issue of the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant in India. Nevertheless, it would have been preferable for the Tribunal to have expressly stated that the STARTTS report was not accorded any weight as evidence corroborative of the harm the applicant alleged he suffered in India.
In light of the totality of the Tribunal’s reasons and the patent fact that the Tribunal had read and considered the STARTTS report, the fact that those reasons do not refer to the STARTTS report as evidence potentially corroborative of the applicant’s essential claims does not support a conclusion that that report was ignored or overlooked. Rather, it can be concluded that the Tribunal did not mention the report in that connection in its reasons because it was accorded no weight and was not part of the evidence upon which it based its ultimate findings.
Failure to consider chance of serious harm
The first of the two matters raised in the applicant’s affidavit of 24 August 2010 is that the Tribunal failed to consider the chance that he would suffer serious harm in the future.
The Tribunal’s decision records that the applicant’s allegations of conversion and consequential harm in India were rejected on credibility grounds. Having made those findings there was no logical basis upon which the Tribunal could have concluded that the applicant would suffer serious harm were he to return to India.
In para.91 of its decision it therefore stated:
… the Tribunal finds that there is not a real chance that he would be harmed for reasons of religion if he returned to India.
The Tribunal having plainly considered whether the applicant might suffer harm were he to return to India, this allegation must fail.
Translation at departmental interview
The applicant submitted that although he told the Tribunal that the interpreter at the departmental hearing had made mistakes, the Tribunal did not rectify this matter. He said that the departmental interpreter had misinterpreted his evidence concerning why he did not attend church in India. He went on to say that the Tribunal based its decision on what it understood to be his failure, at the departmental interview, to have mentioned that he attended St Mary’s and St Peter’s churches as well as St George’s church.
All these matters were dealt with in the Tribunal’s s.424AA notification to the applicant where the disparity in evidence was notified, together with the Tribunal’s concerns in relation to it. This is recorded at para.71 of the Tribunal’s decision. In his response to the s.424AA notification, the applicant said that the interpreter used by the department said he did not go to church in India whereas the applicant had said that he went to church in Australia without fear and meant that in India he did not go to church with peace of mind. He then went on to say that he did not mention the other churches as they were not famous as St George’s church is.
Consequently, to the extent that there may have been deficiencies in interpretation at the departmental interview of the sort alleged by the applicant and that, as a result, the Tribunal misunderstood why the applicant’s statements to the delegate were recorded in the terms that they were, the Tribunal gave him an opportunity to address the issue. It was not required to do more. For this reason, this allegation does not demonstrate error on the Tribunal’s part.
Tribunal’s factual inaccuracy
At the hearing, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal’s statement of his evidence in para.61 of the decision record, where it stated that he had been attacked on one occasion when he was coming home from a mosque, was an incorrect record of what he had said. The applicant submitted that both he and the interpreter had said at the Tribunal hearing that the applicant had been attacked when coming home from a church. While the Tribunal may have incorrectly noted the applicant’s evidence, nothing turns on this. The Tribunal’s finding that the applicant was not a Christian and had not suffered harm on this account did not turn upon whether he was attacked or, specifically, whether he was attacked coming home from a mosque or coming home from a church. As a consequence, this mistake of the Tribunal, if it truly was a mistake, does not support a finding of jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
Jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal has not been demonstrated.
Consequently, the application will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Cameron FM
Associate:
Date: 1 October 2010
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