SZOIV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOIV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 1314

Citation: SZOIV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 1314
Appeal from: SZOIV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2010] FMCA 556
Parties: SZOIV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1080 of 2010
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 26 November 2010
Date of hearing: 24 November 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: R Graycar
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1080 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOIV
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 NOVEMBER 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.This appeal be dismissed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1080 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOIV
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE:

26 NOVEMBER 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal against a judgment of a Federal Magistrate delivered on 4 August 2010, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).

    BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 5 August 2009.  On 4 February 2009 the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.  A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship refused that application.  The appellant then applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision.  The Tribunal subsequently affirmed the delegate’s decision.  The appellant then applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to have the Tribunal’s decision judicially reviewed. As noted above, the Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the appellant’s application.  It is this decision that is the subject of the present appeal.

    CLAIMS OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

  3. The central aspect of the appellant’s application for a protection visa is his claim that his conversion from Islam to Christianity resulted in persecution in Bangladesh and as a consequence, he was forced to flee.

  4. The appellant claimed that after leaving home in 1992 for the capital city of Dhaka he came across a man who offered him work as a salesman.  Through this work, the appellant claimed that he met a priest, Father Palmer, and started attending church.  The appellant claimed that the same priest later baptised him,…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1314
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZOIV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, sought to appeal against the decision of a Federal Magistrate who dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellant had previously lodged an application for a protection visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, a decision that was subsequently affirmed by the Tribunal. The appellant’s central claim for a protection visa was based on his assertion that his conversion from Islam to Christianity led to persecution in Bangladesh, forcing him to flee the country. The Federal Magistrate dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review, a decision that the appellant sought to appeal.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Magistrate erred in finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision and whether the Tribunal correctly assessed the appellant's claims regarding his religious conversion and its implications under the Convention. The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of his religious opinion and failed to consider the implications of his conversion on his claim for a protection visa. Additionally, the appellant claimed that the Tribunal did not consider whether people who depart Islam in Bangladesh form a "particular social group" under the Convention.

The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were unparticularised and did not identify any specific error, let alone a jurisdictional one. The court held that the Tribunal's decision to reject the appellant's credibility was well within its authority, as credibility is a matter typically assessed by the Tribunal. Furthermore, the Tribunal had comprehensively rejected the appellant's claim of conversion to Christianity, rendering any further consideration of this issue moot. The court also noted that the appellant's new claim regarding the Tribunal's obligation to contact Father Palmer could not be properly entertained as it was not included in the notice of appeal and did not constitute a new matter.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Federal Magistrate that no jurisdictional error had occurred in the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's claims. The court held that the Tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence, and the appellant's grounds of appeal were insufficient to warrant a different outcome. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the original decision of the Federal Magistrate was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. This appeal be dismissed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal against a judgment of a Federal Magistrate delivered on 4 August 2010, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 5 August 2009. On 4 February 2009 the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship refused that application. The appellant then applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision. The Tribunal subsequently affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant then applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to have the Tribunal’s decision judicially reviewed. As noted above, the Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the appellant’s application. It is this decision that is the subject of the present appeal.CLAIMS OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION The central aspect of the appellant’s application for a protection visa is his claim that his conversion from Islam to Christianity resulted in persecution in Bangladesh and as a consequence, he was forced to flee. The appellant claimed that after leaving home in 1992 for the capital city of Dhaka he came across a man who offered him work as a salesman. Through this work, the appellant claimed that he met a priest, Father Palmer, and started attending church. The appellant claimed that the same priest later baptised him, but told the appellant that he must see a Father Gomez who would finalise the baptism by issuing the appellant with a certificate. The appellant claimed that soon after the baptism he returned home. The appellant claimed that his father was angry with his decision to convert to Christianity and insisted that he must revert back to Islam. When the appellant refused, he claimed that his father, along with a local Imam, beat him with sticks. He had to be hospitalised for the treatment of the injuries he sustained. The appellant claimed that his sister visited him in hospital and provided him with enough money to escape to Malaysia, where he stayed for three years. He later met his wife in Malaysia who is an Indonesian citizen. The appellant claimed that in 1998 he travelled to Indonesia to meet his wife, and that they were married shortly afterwards. Thereafter, he remained in Indonesia as an illegal immigrant and he adopted an Indonesian name. The appellant claimed that the factory where he was working in Indonesia was raided by the police on two occasions as part of a crackdown on illegal immigrants, but he was able to avoid arrest on both occasions. The appellant claimed that he feared that he would be deported if he did not leave Indonesia, so he obtained a forged Indonesian passport and came to Australia. The appellant claimed that he would not be able to practice his religion freely if he were to return to Bangladesh and his wife and their children would not be able to remain in Bangladesh permanently and would be subject to humiliation and inhumane treatment while they were there.THE TRIBUNAL AFFIRMS THE DELEGATE’S DECISION – APPELLANT NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant claimed that he would not be able to practice his religion freely if he were to return to Bangladesh and his wife and their children would not be able to remain in Bangladesh permanently and would be subject to humiliation and inhumane treatment while they were there.THE TRIBUNAL AFFIRMS THE DELEGATE’S DECISION – APPELLANT NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was a Bangladeshi national, who had left Bangladesh for Malaysia and later entered Indonesia illegally. However, the Tribunal found the appellant to be an unreliable witness. The Tribunal found that the appellant revised his claims about the secrecy of his Christianity in Indonesia, and that he revised and changed his claims about the extent to which he was targeted in an immigration crackdown in Indonesia. The Tribunal also found that the appellant’s account of how he came to be baptised was very far-fetched, and that on the evidence it was “hard to accept that the Applicant became a Catholic in the circumstances claimed”. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the appellant did not hold a baptism certificate. The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had ever been a genuine Catholic or Christian because, although he claimed to have practiced the religion for over 18 years and claimed that his faith was very dear to him, he did not display any familiarity with Catholic beliefs and rituals when the Tribunal discussed them with him. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the appellant did not abandon Islam for Christianity or that the appellant would ever be imputed in Bangladesh to be an apostate from Islam, or a Christian. As the Tribunal disbelieved the appellant’s claims in their entirety, it affirmed the delegate’s decision.THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE FINDS NO JURISDICTIONAL ERROR The appellant’s amended application in the Federal Magistrates Court alleged:1. The Tribunal erred in law in deciding ‘religious opinion’ in the claims made by the applicant. Particulars:The applicant claimed that he departed Islam and converted himself to Christianity. The Tribunal only assessed the applicant’s claims on the basis of his Christian faith but did not consider that departing one religion (in this case, Islam), can also form religious opinion pursuant to the Convention. 2. The Tribunal erred in deciding ‘particular social group’ in the claims made by the applicant. Particulars:In addition to the particulars mentioned above, the Tribunal failed to assess that people who depart Islam in Bangladesh can also form a ‘particular social group’ pursuant to the Convention. 3. The Tribunal failed to consider all claims made by the applicant. Particulars:Grounds (1) and (2)4. The Tribunal failed to assess whether the applicant faces any real chance of persecution as a result of grounds 1 and 2 mentioned above.” With regard to grounds 1 and 2 of the amended application, her Honour held that as the Tribunal had comprehensively rejected the appellant’s claim that he had converted from Islam to Christianity, therefore any consideration as to whether conversion constituted a form of “religious opinion” or a “particular social group” was not necessary.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister relied on the outline of submissions filed with the Court. In response to the appellant’s claim in relation to Father Palmer, Ms Graycar submitted that: the appellant did not request the Tribunal to contact Father Palmer at the hearing before it; the details of the appellant’s conversion to Christianity and baptism in 1992 was not a critical matter which lead the Tribunal to decide against the appellant; given that event occurred about 18 years ago it was not clear whether Father Palmer was easily contactable and it was not obvious to the Tribunal to contact Father Palmer.CONSIDERATION The appellant’s first ground of appeal is unparticularised and in the most general of terms. No error is identified, let alone any jurisdictional error. It is therefore almost impossible to even begin to assess whether the Federal Magistrate did in fact make any error. Furthermore, by its terms, this ground is redolent of an attempt at merits review which, of course, is not open on an appeal to this Court. To compound all this, the appellant’s claims were rejected by the Tribunal on credibility grounds and, as the Federal Magistrate correctly pointed out (referring to Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J) credibility is classically a matter for the Tribunal. The appellant’s first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected. The appellant’s second ground of appeal appears to be essentially the same as the first ground of review raised before the Federal Magistrate: see at [12] above. As the Federal Magistrate correctly noted (see above at [13]), the Tribunal comprehensively rejected the credibility of the appellant’s claim that he had converted from Islam to Christianity, and therefore any consideration of whether such a conversion constituted a form of “religious opinion” is completely otiose. In relation to the Tribunal’s credibility findings, I agree with the Federal Magistrate’s conclusion that they were open to it on the evidence before it. It is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it carefully examined the appellant’s claims to have converted from Islam to Christianity. The Tribunal specifically noted that certain persons might embrace religion in an entirely individual way and that someone in a “far-flung” place might not learn what other practitioners in that religion have learned, and may not be able to answer simple questions about that religion. However, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not such a person. The Tribunal concluded that, given the appellant claimed to have been a Catholic for over 18 years, and that he was at the height of a fresh embrace of the religion, coupled with the far fetched story in relation to his baptism and his inconsistent and often revised evidence, the appellant was not in fact a Catholic as he claimed. The appellant’s second ground of appeal must also be rejected. In relation to the new claim the appellant made orally about the Tribunal’s obligation (if any) to make inquiries of Father Palmer, since this claim is not included in the appellant’s notice of appeal to this Court it can only be entertained if the appellant is given leave to raise it. However, I note that the Federal Magistrate dealt with it in her decision, so it cannot be truly characterised as a “new” matter. Furthermore, I note the Minister’s counsel did not object to it being considered, but instead made oral submission in response to it. In these circumstances I will proceed to deal with it.