SZOIG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOIG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1250

Citation: SZOIG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1250
Appeal from: SZOIG v Minister for Immigration [2012] FMCA 600
Parties: SZOIG and SZOIH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1018 of 2012
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 8 November 2012
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Div 4
Cases cited: SZOIG v Minister for Immigration [2012] FMCA 600 related
Date of hearing: 8 November 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Solicitor for the Appellants: The First Appellant appeared in person by telephone (by leave) with the aid of an interpreter
The Second Appellant did not appear
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Baggett of DLA Piper Australia
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1018 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOIG
First Appellant

SZOIH
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 NOVEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1018 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOIG
First Appellant

SZOIH
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

8 NOVEMBER 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This appeal was commenced by the filing of a Notice of Appeal on 20 July 2012.  In circumstances which I shall shortly explain, the parties were notified some months ago that the hearing of the appeal would take place at 10.15 am this morning before me at the Court in Sydney. 

  2. On Monday of this week, the first appellant initiated an exchange of correspondence with staff in the Registry of the Court which appeared to be designed to secure an adjournment of this morning’s hearing.  Towards the end of that exchange of correspondence, the first appellant was informed that he might make application to the Court to appear at the hearing of the appellants’ appeal by telephone.  That is to say, that he might apply to appear before the Court today by telephone although the legal representative of the other active party to the appeal would be present in Court in Sydney. 

  3. In the circumstances which obtained as at the close of business yesterday, I instructed Court staff to telephone the first appellant this morning at 10.15 am in order to ascertain whether he had any applications to make.  In particular, I wanted to…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1250
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZOIG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involves two appellants, who are husband and wife, appealing against the decision of the Federal Magistrate to dismiss their application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse the appellants’ application for a protection visa. The first appellant, a citizen of India, claimed persecution due to his political activities and religion, but these claims were largely recanted at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal found that the appellants' fears of persecution were not well-founded and that they could safely relocate within India.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Magistrate erred in not considering that the Tribunal's decision was manifestly unreasonable and whether the Federal Magistrate dismissed the case without considering the legal and factual errors in the Tribunal's decision. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal had applied the correct legal standards and if the Federal Magistrate properly reviewed the Tribunal's decision. The court held that the appellants' grounds of appeal were misconceived, as they improperly sought to apply administrative law principles to a judicial review decision and attempted a merits review, which is not permissible.

The court reasoned that the Federal Magistrate had correctly interpreted the Tribunal's decision and did not err in dismissing the judicial review application. The Tribunal's findings that the appellants' claims of persecution did not amount to serious harm under the Migration Act and that they could safely relocate within India were supported by the evidence. The court rejected the appellants' contentions, finding that there was no manifest unreasonableness in the Tribunal's decision and that the Federal Magistrate properly exercised his judicial review jurisdiction.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I invited the first appellant to support the appellants’ appeal with submissions but he has declined to do so, pleading that he is too ill. The Court is therefore left to do its best to understand what it is that the first appellant considers justifies upholding the appeal that has been lodged on behalf of him and his wife. BACKGROUND There are two appellants in this case. The first appellant is the husband of the second appellant. The second appellant did not make an independent application for a protection visa and does not mount an appeal independently of her husband. Her entire case depends upon the outcome in his. The appellants appeal from a decision of a Federal Magistrate delivered on 3 July 2012 (SZOIG v Minister for Immigration [2012] FMCA 600). By that decision, his Honour dismissed an application for judicial review from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refusing to grant a protection visa to either of the appellants. The first appellant is a citizen of India born on 15 September 1967 who arrived in Australia on 4 July 2009 with his wife, who is the second appellant. On 17 August 2009, the appellants applied for protection visas. A delegate of the Minister made a decision to refuse the appellants’ application for protection visas on 25 November 2009. The appellants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision on 21 December 2009. THE APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS The first appellant claimed that he is a Sikh from Haryana province. At the Tribunal hearing, he claimed that he worked as a truck driver in India, operating his own truck. He claimed that he participated in political rallies once or twice in support of the political party known as Lok Dal. He claimed that, once trouble arose between Lok Dal and the Congress Party, he ceased participation in political activities. He stated that he did nothing in any political rallies and simply walked around with others who were involved in such rallies. He said that his involvement had been quite limited and had been for what he described as “the MLA election”. He claimed that members of the Congress Party had swerved their cars in front of him in order to run him off the road. He claimed that he had avoided the accident and that his truck had not been damaged, although he was afraid. He also claimed that members of the Congress Party had threatened his wife and children but had not actually carried out any threats against them. The first appellant also stated that he had not suffered any problems because of his religion. In a written statement attached to his application for a protection visa, the first appellant had made more detailed and substantial claims for persecution. In that statement, he said that he had been attacked and injured by Hindus when they attacked a Sikh religious congregation. In that statement, he also claimed that Congress Party operatives had believed that he had led the attack on behalf of the Lok Dal Party and that they had substantially damaged his truck while it was parked in the market place. At the Tribunal hearing, the first appellant recanted these latter claims. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At [78]–[82] of its Reasons, the Tribunal said: 78.It is a well-known fact that India is a longstanding multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy where members and activists of all political parties can freely engage in political activity. While it is not up to the Tribunal to recommend appropriate destinations for internal relocation, it notes that in the neighbouring state of Punjab Sikhs are the majority community, making up around two thirds of the population. A 2006 article in The Hindu notes that the Punjab police force is largely Sikh (Swami, Praveen 2006, ‘Bias and the Police’, Frontline, 2 December In addition, Punjab is governed by a coalition consisting of the BJP and Akali Dal (Badal) (often referred to as SAD) “a moderate Sikh party controlled by the dominant Jat Sikh farming community of Punjab” (UK Home Office 2002, India Assessment, April – Link; ‘Badal sworn in as Punjab CM’ 2007, Rediff com website, The Tribunal has found no information to suggest that ordinary members and supporters of Lok Dal who are engaged in politics at the level the applicant was in his home state are being targeted for harm by members and supporters of the Congress.79.The Tribunal is satisfied that if the applicant relocated to a different part of India and continued to engage in political activity at the same level as he has in the past there is no real chance that he would face harm from the Congress Party for the reason of his political opinion. On the basis of the evidence before it and having regard to the applicant’s circumstances overall, the Tribunal finds that it would be reasonable and practicable for the applicant to safely relocate to a different part of India.80.At the hearing, the applicant expressly denied having experienced any difficulties in India for the reason of his Sikh religion and did not claim to fear harm for that reason. The Tribunal finds that there is no real chance that the applicant will face serious harm in India for the reason of his religion.81.For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant’s fear of persecution in India for the reason of his political opinion, religion or any other Convention reason is not well-founded. He is not a refugee.CONCLUSIONS82.The Tribunal is not satisfied that any of the applicants is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicants do not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) for a protection visa. It follows that they are also unable to satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(b). As they do not satisfy the criteria for a protection visa, they cannot be granted the visa.THE PROCEEDING IN THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT On 12 April 2010, the appellants made application to the Federal Magistrates Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The grounds of review advanced by the appellants in their application were in the following terms:1.The Tribunal made jurisdictional errors to find that I, the first named applicant was not persecuted for my political belief and my fear of persecution in India for the reason of my political belief, religion, or any other Convention reason is not well-founded. I shall not be persecuted if I return back to India2.The Tribunal did not consider me as a credible witness and decided not to approve our claim for a protection visa and made errors of jurisdiction.3.The Tribunal did not give me opportunity to place my explation [sic] before the Tribunal of the adverse information and also the country informaiton [sic] which suggested the Tribunal that a person like me was not persecuted or discriminated for his political or religious belief and all othre [sic] related informaiton [sic] the Tribunal considered at the time of refusing my application for a protection visa and the Tribunal made jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [1]–[8] of his Reasons for Judgment, the Federal Magistrate summarised the history and background of the appellants’ claims. As far as ground 1 was concerned, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the appellants were unable to identify the jurisdictional error that they claimed had caused the Tribunal to make the findings to which the appellants referred in respect of ground 1. His Honour noted that the Tribunal had found that, whatever persecution had been suffered by the appellants, it did not amount to serious harm under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act). As far as the second ground was concerned, the Federal Magistrate correctly concluded that the first appellant has misunderstood the finding of the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not ultimately make an adverse credibility finding against the first appellant, but nonetheless considered that his concerns were not sufficient to justify a conclusion that he was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. As far as ground 3 was concerned, the Federal Magistrate found that there was no evidence at all that the first appellant had been prevented from giving a full explanation of his claims. The appellants did not produce a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal or any other evidence that could conceivably support the general allegation made under the rubric of ground 3. The Federal Magistrate found that the Tribunal had complied with Div 4 of the Migration Act in relation to the natural justice hearing rule. At the hearing before the Federal Magistrate, the first appellant took issue with the Tribunal’s conclusion on relocation within India. His Honour found that the Tribunal had applied the correct test and that, in any event, the question of relocation would only arise if the Tribunal were to make the assumption that the Tribunal’s fundamental finding that the alleged persecution did not amount to serious harm were regarded as incorrect.THE APPEAL IN THIS COURT In the Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants in this Court, the following grounds of appeal are relied upon: 1.The FM failed to consider that the Tribunal acted in a manifestly unreasonable way when dealing with the applicants claim and ignoring the aspect of persecution and harm in terms of Sec.91R of the Act. The Tribunal failed to observe the obligation amounted to a breach of Statutory Obligation.2.The learned Federal Magistrate has dismissed the case without considering the legal and factual errors contained in the decision of the RRT. As far as ground 1 is concerned, it is very difficult to understand what contention is being advanced as part of ground 1. It appears to be attempting to pray in aid some doctrine akin to Wednesbury unreasonableness. That principle is a principle applicable to administrative decisions, not to judicial review decisions made by a Federal Magistrate. Ground 1 is misconceived and I reject it. Ground 2 is impossible to come to grips with. Taking the kindest view of ground 2, it seems to require a wholesale merits review of the Tribunal decision. Such an approach is not permissible in a judicial review proceeding in the Federal Magistrates Court nor is it permissible in an appeal from such a proceeding in this Court.