SZNYF v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNYF & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2012] FMCA 1034

MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision – visa – protection visa – refusal.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Allegation that the Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that it had failed to give effect to antecedent orders of the Federal Court of Australia, had failed to consider an alternative claim which the applicant could have made and by reason that a reasonable observer might have apprehended it to have been biased.

Migration Act 1958, ss.91R, 424A, 430, 474
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney [2012] FCAFC 146
First Applicant: SZNYF
Second Applicant: SZNYG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2963 of 2011
Judgment of: Cameron FM
Hearing date: 1 November 2012
Date of Last Submission: 1 November 2012
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 16 November 2012

REPRESENTATION

The Applicants appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P. Knowles
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2963 of 2011

SZNYF

First Applicant

SZNYG

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicants are citizens of China and are husband and wife. The first applicant arrived in Australia on 13 December 2008, the second applicant having arrived on 22 November 2007 as guardian of the applicants’ second son who had come to Australia to study. On 20 January 2009 the first applicant lodged an application for a protection visa alleging that she feared persecution in China because of her religion. The second applicant, who is the first applicant’s husband, was included in that application as a member of her family unit. On 29 April 2009 a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refused the applicants’ applications for protection visas. The applicants then applied to the second respondent (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision.

  2. The Tribunal decision the subject of these proceedings is the second such decision relating to the applicants. A previous Tribunal decision dated 25 August 2009 was quashed by order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 10 August 2010.

  3. In these judicial review proceedings the Court cannot rehear the applicants’ applications for visas. Its task is to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only basis upon which it can be set aside: s.474 Migration Act1958 (“Act”); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

  4. For the reasons which follow, the application will be dismissed.

Background facts

  1. The facts alleged in support of the applicants’ claims for protection visas are set out on pages 4-51 of the Tribunal’s decision. Relevant factual allegations are summarised below.

Protection visa application

  1. The first applicant made the following claims in a statement lodged with her…

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Details
Case
[2012] FMCA 1034
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZNYF v Minister for Immigration involved the applicants, SZNYF, challenging the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to refuse their application for a protection visa. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional errors by not adhering to certain legal obligations. These included failing to consider an alternative claim, not giving reasons for its decision, and acting in a manner that might lead a reasonable observer to believe it was biased. The case was brought before the court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

The primary legal issues that the court needed to address were whether the Tribunal had indeed made a jurisdictional error by not giving reasons for its decision, by not considering an alternative claim, and by potentially exhibiting bias. The court examined the statutory provisions, particularly section 430 of the Act, which mandates that the Tribunal must provide a written statement detailing its decision, the reasons for the decision, and the findings on material questions of fact. Additionally, the court scrutinized the nature and context of the Tribunal's omissions and whether these could be considered as jurisdictional errors.

The court found that the failure to provide full reasons for the decision, as alleged, did not constitute a jurisdictional error. It was determined that the omission in the Tribunal's reasons was an oversight and did not indicate an absence of reasoning or consideration of the issue. The court further held that the Tribunal's overall reasons demonstrated a thoughtful and thorough examination of the applicants' claims, which was inconsistent with arbitrary decision-making. Regarding the allegation of bias, the court concluded that a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal was biased due to the oversight in the reasoning. The omission in the Tribunal’s reasoning was seen as an inadvertent failure to express reasoning that had already been decided on.

ORDERS:
1.
The application be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the last point, there is no general rule at common law that an administrative decision-maker must give reasons for a decision, although in certain circumstances such a requirement might be implied: Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney [2012] FCAFC 146 at [42]ff. Given that the Act provides for judicial review of Tribunal decisions, it may well be that the common law would require the Tribunal to give reasons for its decisions were it not for s.430 of the Act which makes such provision. It may therefore be that the applicants allege that the obligation to give reasons arose out of s.430(1) of the Act which provides: 430 Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions etc. (1) Where the Tribunal makes its decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written statement that: (a) sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and (b) sets out the reasons for the decision; and (c) sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and (d) refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based. However, a failure to comply with s.430 does not amount to jurisdictional error which, as noted earlier, is the only basis on which the Court may set the Tribunal’s decision aside. Nor am I persuaded that the failure to complete the paragraph indicates that the Tribunal had no reason for the conclusion it expressed or that the omission reveals a failure to consider the issue in question. A consideration of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole reveals a thoughtful examination of the applicants’ claims, inconsistent with arbitrary decision-making. Seen in context, I do not conclude that the Tribunal’s failure to complete para.300 of the reasons represents a failure to consider the relevant issue. I accept the Minister’s submission that its failure to express its reasoning was an oversight. The significance of the applicants’ submission that the Tribunal’s finding in para.300 of its reasons was based on material discussed in para.301 is unclear. However, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal rejected the applicants’ allegations concerning the June 2008 incident because the first applicant’s mother had died shortly before its first hearing session. As to the allegation of bias, it is difficult to conclude that a fair-minded lay observer, properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the way in which para.300 is expressed, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal was not bringing an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the determination of the review. The omission of the conclusion to that paragraph is obvious and just as obviously a mistake. If there had been other aspects of the Tribunal’s decision which suggested the possibility of bias then its failure to complete para.300 might be evidence supportive of such a conclusion. However, the Tribunal’s thorough consideration of the applicants’ claims and the reasonable and logical conclusions which it reached are persuasive evidence that the Tribunal approached the review with an unprejudiced mind and that the omission of the reasons for the Tribunal’s conclusion expressed in para.300 should, in context, be seen as no more than an inadvertent failure to express reasoning which had been decided on. As a result, I conclude that the fair-minded lay observer would not apprehend the possibility of bias in this case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established