SZNTO v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNTO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2009] FMCA 1156
MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – visa – protection visa – refusal – s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 does not require the Tribunal to advise an applicant of issues first raised by that applicant when before the Tribunal.

The Constitution, s.75
Migration Act 1958, ss.425, 430, 476, 474

Federal Magistrates Act 1999, s.18

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZHBX v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1169
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212
Applicant: SZNTO
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1733 of 2009
Judgment of: Cameron FM
Hearing date: 11 November 2009
Date of Last Submission: 11 November 2009
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 25 November 2009

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr L. Karp
Solicitors for the Applicant: Micah Legal Services
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J. Smith
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Phillips Fox

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1733 of 2009

SZNTO

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant is a citizen of China. He claims that following his arrival in Australia on 23 November 2008 he converted to Christianity.

  2. The applicant claims to fear persecution in China because of his religion. He alleges that if he were to return to China, he would evangelise.

  3. The applicant lodged an application for a protection visa which was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) on 17 March 2009. He then applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. The applicant was unsuccessful before the Tribunal and has applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

  4. In these judicial review proceedings the Court’s task is to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only basis upon which it can be set aside: s.474 Migration Act1958 (“Act”); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

  5. For the reasons which follow, the application will be dismissed.

Background facts

  1. The facts alleged in support of the applicant’s claim for a protection visa are set out on page 4 of the Tribunal’s decision (Court Book (“CB”) page 65) and in the applicant’s visa application (CB1ff). Relevant factual allegations are summarised below.

Primary application

  1. In his visa application, the applicant claimed the following:

    a)he was a practitioner of Falun Gong;

    b)in 2003 he was detained for four months by the Shandong Liaison Office and an officer extorted 15,000 yuan from him;

    c)in December 2005 he was arrested and detained for two months by the Shandong Police Station and the police extorted…

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Details
Case
[2009] FMCA 1156
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZNTO v Minister for Immigration, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal concerning their visa application. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal’s failure to reference specific evidence in its decision-making process constituted a legal error that should be reviewed. The applicant argued that the omission of particular evidence from the Tribunal’s reasons was a procedural defect that undermined the fairness of the decision-making process.

The court examined the scope of s.474 of the relevant Act, which stipulates that certain decisions are final and not subject to judicial review. The Minister argued that the Tribunal’s decision, which did not reference certain evidence, was an act or omission that fell under the purview of s.474. However, the court found that the omission of evidence from the Tribunal’s reasons did not constitute an act or omission as defined by the statute. The court held that unless the omitted evidence was essential to the Tribunal’s findings of fact, the failure to reference it did not necessarily amount to a reviewable error. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s finding of fact was based on the absence of substantiated evidence, rather than on the information available to the Tribunal.

Given this reasoning, the court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review, affirming that the Tribunal's decision was not subject to review under the statute. The court did not find any legal basis to overturn the Tribunal’s decision based on the failure to reference certain evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In response, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons are a privative clause decision under the Act. Section 474 relevantly provides:474 Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:(a) granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination;(b) granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa);(c) granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument;(d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction;(e) making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement;(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article;(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing;(h) conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation;(i) a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act;(j) a failure or refusal to make a decision. The Minister submitted that s.474(3)(g) was applicable to this case. For the reasons set out below, it is not necessary to deal with this argument. However, that said, it is difficult to see how the failure of a Tribunal decision to refer to particular evidence would, without more, amount to “doing or refusing to do” an act or thing or would be anything more than an omission. Although omissions can be deemed by statute to amount to acts, s.474 is not drawn in such a way as to achieve that outcome. Nor is an omission a refusal, which is a definite act even if in a negative sense. Unless the “information available to the Tribunal” referred to in the Tribunal’s decision was evidence on which the Tribunal’s “findings of fact were based”, s.430(1)(d) imposes no obligation on the Tribunal to refer to it in its reasons. To determine whether the “information available to the Tribunal” had to be cited in the Tribunal’s reasons, it is necessary first to identify any relevant findings of fact. The only relevant finding of fact is that set out in para.33 of the Tribunal’s Decision Record where it said:I find that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in China for a Convention reason.This finding was not based on “information available to the Tribunal” but on the absence of such information. This is revealed by the Tribunal’s statement in the preceding paragraph:… I have no substantiated evidence before me to enable me to conclude that there is a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for reason of his religion or for any other Convention reason should he return to China in the foreseeable future.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established