SZNCN v Minister for Immigration - [2009] FMCA 457

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNCN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2009] FMCA 457

MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal acted in good faith – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal was obliged to investigate the applicant’s claims and documents.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1), 36(2), 65(1), 91R, 91S, 427(1)(d), 474, pt.8 div.2

SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Another v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Others (1985) 162 CLR 24
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) (2004) 219 ALR 27
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73
VCAK of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 459
WAGJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277
W389/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) FCR 407
NAYU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 528
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155

Applicant:

SZNCN

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File number:

SYG 3452 of 2008

Judgment of:

Emmett FM

Hearing date:

14 May 2009

Date of last submission:

14 May 2009

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

14 May 2009

REPRESENTATION

Applicant appeared in person assisted by a Bengali interpreter

Counsel for the Respondent:

Ms T. Wong

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Ms Z. McDonald, DLA Phillips Fox

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 3452 of 2008

SZNCN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8 Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 3 December 2008 and handed down on 4 December 2008.
The applicant claims to be a citizen of Bangladesh and of Moslem faith and a member of the Awami League (“AL”) in Bangladesh (“the Applicant”).
The Applicant arrived in Australia on 30 April 2009 as a ship deserter on a Bangladesh seaman’s book having departed legally on a passport issued in his own name and a special purpose visa issued on 30 April 2008.
On 8 May 2008, the Applicant lodged an application for a protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) under the Act.
On 6 August 2008, a delegate of the First Respondent (“the Delegate”) refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa.
On 1 September 2008, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
On 3 December 2008, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa.
On 31 December 2008, the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

Legislative framework

Section 65(1) of the Act authorises the decision-maker to grant a visa if satisfied that the prescribed criteria have been met. However, if the decision-maker is not so satisfied then the visa application is to be refused.
Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that an applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has a protection obligation under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Act defines “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” as meaning the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”).
Australia has protection obligations to a refugee on Australian territory.
Article 1A(2) of the Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
Section 91R and s.91S of the Act refer to persecution and membership of a particular social group when considering Article 1A(2) of the Convention.

The Applicant’s application for a protection visa

The Applicant provided a statement in support of his protection visa application in which he stated that he feared persecution by Jamaat-BNP activists and the caretaker government by reason of his involvement with the Bangladesh AL. The claims made by the Applicant in that statement are accurately summarised by counsel for the First Respondent, Ms Wong, as follows:
“The Applicant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution arising from his membership in the Awami League. The Applicant made the following claims in a statement annexed to his protection visa application (CB 31-32):
the Applicant was actively involved in the Awami League and was elected in 1996 to the position of no. 2 Jalalabad ward Chattra League Vice President;
in 1997, BNP activists filed a false case against the Applicant and destroyed the Applicant's home. He was then arrested by the police on 28 June 1997 and beaten and tortured by the police. The Applicant was placed in jail for one month and twenty-three days, but was subsequently acquitted by the court;
in December 2007, the Applicant was kidnapped by members of Jamat-BNP, who beat the Applicant and demanded a ransom from his family. After he was released, the Applicant went to the police to make a formal complaint, but the police refused to take the Applicant's case.”

The Delegate’s decision

On 21 July 2008, the Applicant attended an interview with the Delegate.
The Delegate did not accept the Applicant’s claims as credible.
On 6 August 2008, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the Applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention.

The Tribunal’s review and decision

On 1 September 2008, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. The Applicant provided further material in support of his review application.
On 10 September 2008, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant informing him that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. The letter invited the Applicant to attend a hearing on 16 October 2008 to give oral evidence and present arguments.
On 16 October 2008 and 21 October 2008, the Applicant gave evidence at hearing sessions before the Tribunal at which the Applicant expanded upon his written claims.
The Tribunal noted that it had before it the Department’s file, the Delegate’s decision record and other materials available to it from a range of sources.
The Tribunal found the Applicant was not a witness of truth.
The decision of the Tribunal is accurately summarised by counsel for the First Respondent in her written submissions as follows:
“The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant had held any Awami League (“AL”) office, that he was an AL activist or local leader or that he had any related profile: CB 231 at [87]. The Tribunal found the Applicant's evidence as to his political activities was vague and generalised and that it was unsupported by detail or independent corroboration: CB 231-232.
The Tribunal placed no weight on documents submitted by the Applicant which supported his claim to have been an AL activist, having regard to the high prevalence of false documentation in Bangladesh and the lack of detail or examples in the documents: CB 232 at [87(f)].
The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant had been involved in some activities of the AL's Bangabandhu Society in Australia and considered that the Applicant may have become involved in these activities in part because he supported the AL and wished to meet like-minded compatriots in Australia: CB 233 at [87(h)]. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the Applicant engaged in this conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee and that the conduct did not fall within the scope of s.91R(3). However, the Tribunal considered that the Applicant's conduct in Australia did not indicate that he was an AL activist or local leader in Bangladesh, as it did not displace the concerns already identified by the Tribunal: CB 233 at [87(h)].
The Tribunal did not accept the Applicant's claims to have suffered any politically motivated harm in Bangladesh and rejected the Applicant's claims to have been detained, subject to false charges and kidnapped: CB 233-5. Although the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant had been and was an AL supporter, it did not accept that the Applicant was an office holder or activist or that he had any other political profile or identity: CB 236 at [89].
The Tribunal did not accept the Applicant's claims that the caretaker government was targeting the AL almost exclusively, nor that persons such as the Applicant who support the AL but do not have any greater profile or role were at risk of persecution: CB 237 at [91].
The Tribunal also held that the Applicant faced no real risk of persecution for reason of his political opinion, actual or perceived, arising from his stay in Australia, including his limited involvement in AL activities: CB 237 at [92].
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to Bangladesh and affirmed the decision of the Minister's delegate not to grant a protection visa to the Applicant: CB 238 at [94]-[95].”

The proceeding before this Court

The Applicant was unrepresented before this Court, although had the assistance of a Bengali interpreter.
On 25 February 2009, the Applicant attended a directions hearing, pursuant to which he filed an amended application on 28 April 2009.
The Applicant has participated in the Court’s legal advice scheme and received advice from Mr R. Turner, solicitor.
At the commencement of the hearing, the Applicant confirmed that he relied on the grounds contained in the amended application filed on 28 April 2009, and only those grounds. In any event, I note that the grounds of the initiating application filed on 31 December 2008, make bare assertions that do not disclose any error capable of review by this Court.
The grounds of the amended application are expressed as follows:
“1. The Refugee Review Tribunal made the decision in bad faith:
Particulars:
A. The Tribunal made the decision in bad faith that proves in the following comment that:
i) The applicant’s evidence as to his political activities was vague and generalized; and
ii) He engaged in his conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee.
2. The Refugee Review Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction:
Particulars:
A. The Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction by the following comment that:
i) The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, if he returns to Bangladesh.
3. The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Act:
Particulars:
A. The Tribunal did not put weight to the document which I submitted before the Tribunal to support my claim. The Tribunal made a comment that:
i) The Tribunal places no weight on these statements as evidence that the applicant is an AL activist or local leader.”
Each of the grounds was interpreted for the assistance of the Applicant and the Applicant was invited to make submissions in support of each of the grounds and in support of his application generally.

Ground 1

In support of Ground 1, the Applicant stated that the Tribunal had not believed him and had told him that if he went back to his home country he would not face persecution. The Applicant also stated that the Tribunal had not investigated his claims or the documents that he had provided to the Tribunal in support of his application. In relation to the Applicant’s allegation that the Tribunal failed to investigate his claims and documents, this allegation is considered in these Reasons at Ground 3.
Otherwise, Ground 1 of the amended application alleges that the Tribunal made its decision in bad faith by finding that the Applicant’s evidence of his political activities was vague and generalised and that he had engaged in conduct in Australia otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his refugee claims.
In relation to the Applicant’s claim of bad faith, such an allegation is serious and rare. This is particularly so where the Applicant has not provided any evidence to support such an allegation (SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 at [44]).
There was no transcript of the Tribunal hearing provided to this Court, nor did the Applicant provide any evidence to this Court to suggest that the Tribunal’s decision record is not accurate. At the directions hearing on 25 February 2009 the Applicant was given an opportunity to file a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The Applicant was directed to ensure than any such transcript was verified by affidavit. The Applicant was also directed to give notice if he wished to rely on tapes of the hearing, however, no step was taken by the Applicant to file or tender any such evidence. In the circumstances, the Court accepts as accurate the Tribunal’s summary in its decision record of what transpired at the hearing sessions, including the oral evidence given by the Applicant and exchanges the Tribunal had with the Applicant and his migration agent at the hearing sessions.
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal accurately summarised the Applicant’s written claims, including further information provided by the Applicant to the Tribunal about his claims, as well as documents in support.
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant was accompanied at hearings held over two sessions by his migration agent and presented further documents to the Tribunal during hearing. The Tribunal also heard submissions from the Applicant’s migration agent at the hearing sessions in support of the Applicant’s claims.
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal explored the Applicant’s claims with him in some detail, noted matters of concern that it put to the Applicant about his evidence and noted the Applicant’s responses. The Tribunal noted that it discussed with the Applicant in detail the documents provided by him and put to the Applicant information about the high incidence of document fraud in Bangladesh.
In particular, the Tribunal noted that in relation to the purported court documents, the Applicant said he had the originals at home in Bangladesh. The Tribunal noted that, at the second hearing session, the Applicant gave the Tribunal photocopies of the handwritten Bengali language texts that had been sent by his family in Bangladesh at the Applicant’s request following the first hearing session. The Tribunal referred the Applicant to the purported charge sheet and court order and told him there were no complaints or charges against him disclosed in those documents. The Tribunal noted the concerns that it expressed to the Applicant about “the integrity of the documents” and noted the Applicant’s “unsubstantive”, “somewhat confused response”.
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant’s migration agent “expressed interest in “revisiting” these documents and enquiring about the current status of the case against the applicant”. However, the Tribunal found that the Applicant had had considerable time to investigate his status with the courts in Bangladesh and to present relevant documents to the Department and the Tribunal.
The Tribunal noted that it put to the Applicant information that mitigated against the Applicant’s claims and noted that it explained the relevance of the information to the Applicant. The information included country information that “indicated that there were high levels of document fraud in Bangladesh, including documents that were non-genuine and others that were genuine but had been made to order, and contain false information”. The Applicant responded both orally to the Tribunal’s concerns and in writing post-hearing in a letter dated 29 October 2008 from the Applicant’s migration agent. Both the oral and written response asserted that the Applicant’s documents were genuine. The written response suggested that the Tribunal “verify them if it wishes”.
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal identified with specificity the country information to which it had regard, including citing the information relating to the prevalence of fraudulent or false documents in Bangladesh.
The Tribunal found that the Applicant was a witness of “variable credibility”. At the heart of the Applicant’s claims was his assertion that he had held office in the AL in Bangladesh and that he was an AL activist or local leader with a profile in Bangladesh. The Tribunal found the Applicant’s evidence as to his political activities to be “vague and generalised”. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was unable to give detail beyond general descriptions of organising and participating in meetings, contacting people, door-knocking and assisting political leaders. The Tribunal expressed particular concern about the Applicant’s “uncertain account of his activities from 1996 to 2001, when the AL held a majority in the national parliament”. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was not speaking from personal experience and that his descriptions did not fit the role or familiarity that an activist or local leader would have.
In relation to the Applicant’s claims of having “drawn huge popular support” after his release from detention in 1997 and again in 2007, the Tribunal found such claims to be “vague, and unsupported by the kind of detail or independent corroboration that such a profile might be expected to generate”. The Tribunal found that the Applicant had “exaggerated his claims significantly”.
The Tribunal rejected the Applicant’s claims of past harm in Bangladesh and found that the Applicant is not an AL activist or otherwise politically active. Neither did the Tribunal accept that the Applicant had ever been kidnapped nor denied state protection. Further, the Triubnal rejected the Applicant’s claims of any harassment of his family. However, the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the Applicant has been and is an AL supporter and noted that the AL is one of Bangladesh’s largest political parties. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant followed Bangladesh politics and “would continue to keep abreast of politics and lend support to local candidates, in the low key and intermittent manner that he has in the past.”
The Tribunal considered but did not accept the Applicant’s assertions that the caretaker government was targeting the AL and found that information before it did not indicate that supporters of the AL who have no greater role or profile, such as the Applicant, are at risk of persecution. For that reason, the Tribunal also rejected the Applicant’s post-hearing claim that the caretaker government “could persecute anyone who agitates against it abroad”. The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not face a real chance of persecution for reason of his political opinion or imputed political opinion arising from his stay in Australia, including his limited involvement in AL activities. The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not have a political profile that would result in a real chance of persecution for a Convention-related reason under any government in Bangladesh in the reasonably foreseeable future.

A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal carefully and comprehensively evaluated all the Applicant’s claims and considered in detail the Applicant’s documents provided in support.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J).
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision in no way supports the Applicant’s allegation that the Tribunal made its decision in bad faith. The Tribunal’s findings referred to in the particulars in support of Ground 1 were clearly open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave.
Otherwise, Ground 1 is no more than a disagreement with the findings of the Tribunal. Such a complaint invites merits review which this Court cannot undertake (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Another v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Others (1985) 162 CLR 24 at 41 per Mason J).
Accordingly, Ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2

The Applicant made no meaningful submission in support of Ground 2 other than to repeat his complaints in respect of Ground 1.
Ground 2 makes a bare assertion that the Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction because it was not satisfied that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, if he were to return to Bangladesh.
In his written submission in support of his amended application, the Applicant alleged that the Tribunal did not consider his chance of persecution by reason of his political opinion if the caretaker government was reinstated following the elections that were scheduled for 29 December 2008 after the Tribunal hearing.
However, as referred to above in these Reasons in consideration of Ground 1, the Tribunal rejected the Applicant’s claims to be an AL office holder or activist or have any other political profile or identity in Bangladesh that would make him a target of “any government in the reasonably future”.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal rejected the factual premise upon which all of the Applicant’s claims were founded, making unnecessary, any further consideration by the Tribunal of the Applicant’s claim of a fear of persecution if the caretaker government was duly elected, if he were to return to Bangladesh (Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47]).
Further, I accept the submission of counsel for the First Respondent that the Applicant made no such express claim, neither does such a claim squarely arise from the materials before the Tribunal (NABEv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) (2004) 219 ALR 27 at [60]).
Accordingly, Ground 2 is not made out.

Ground 3

Ground 3 alleges that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Act because it placed no weight on documents submitted by the Applicant in support of his claims.
The Applicant confirmed to the Court that he was not asserting that there was any document given by him to the Tribunal which it had failed to consider. Rather, his complaint was with the Tribunal’s finding that it placed no weight on the documents and did not investigate them.
When the Court asked the Applicant which documents he says the Tribunal should have investigated, the Applicant referred to the documents in support of his conduct in Australia. However, such a complaint is not made out as the Tribunal did accept those documents as supporting the Applicant’s claims to have become involved in AL activities in Australia.
In relation to the Applicant’s general complaint about the Tribunal’s findings, as referred to above, the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence and materials and for the reasons it gave.
In relation to the Applicant’s allegation that the Tribunal did not investigate the Applicant’s claims, there is no positive duty to investigate claims imposed upon the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 (“SGLB”) at [43] and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 at [20].
As their Honours Gummow and Hayne JJ made clear in SGLB, whilst the Tribunal has the power to obtain further information, it does not have a duty to investigate the applicants claims, nor is it under a duty to consider utilising such permissive statutory powers which might enable it to do so (for example, see s.427(1)(d) of the Act; VCAK of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 459 at [27]; WAGJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277 at [21] and [24]-[25]; W389/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) FCR 407 at [74]-[78]).
In NAYU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 528 at [18] to [21] per Jacobson J (upheld on appeal) stated:
“There was no obligation on the RRT to make any further investigation of the claim over and above the material submitted by the applicant. The High Court has made it clear on a number of occasions that proceedings before the RRT are inquisitorial and that it is for an applicant to advance whatever evidence he or she wishes to put forward in support of the application; see eg Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187] (per Gummow and Hayne JJ).
The authorities make it clear that the RRT is not obliged to embark upon its own inquiries except in limited circumstances.
In Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 [(“Prasad”)] at 169 — 170, Wilcox J pointed out that the circumstances under which a decision will be invalid for failure to make independent inquiries are strictly limited. His Honour observed that it is no part of the duty of the decision-maker to make the applicant’s case for him. His Honour said that it is not enough that the Court may find that the sounder course would have been to make more inquiries. The exception is, as his Honour said, in a case where it is obvious that material is readily available and is centrally relevant to the decision to be made. In those circumstances, it would be an unreasonable exercise of the decision making power for the decision maker to proceed without making an attempt to obtain that information.” [Emphasis added]
There was nothing in the instant case to suggest that there was cogent material readily available and centrally relevant to the decision such that it was unreasonable for the Tribunal not to have attempted to obtain that information.
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal considered all the material provided by the Applicant in support of his claims and evaluated that material. In finding that it placed no weight on the facts asserted in the Applicant’s documents in support of his difficulties in Bangladesh, the Tribunal had regard to, and preferred, the country information that disclosed the prevalence of false and fraudulent documents in Bangladesh and the ease with which they could be obtained. As stated above, the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the documents were open to it on the evidence and materials before it and for the reasons it gave.
It is for the Applicant to satisfy the Tribunal, being the relevant decision-maker, that he meets the criteria for being a refugee. If the Tribunal, as the relevant decision-maker is not so satisfied, pursuant to s.65(1) of the Act, the Applicant must be refused a protection visa.
Otherwise, the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s migration agent’s request to “revisit” the documents to enquire about the current status of the case against the Applicant in Bangladesh. However, as stated above in these Reasons, the Tribunal found that the Applicant had had considerable time to investigate his status with the Courts in Bangladesh and to obtain and present any relevant documents in support of his claims to the Department and the Tribunal. That finding by the Tribunal was open to it on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave.
Accordingly, Ground 3 is not made out.

Conclusion

A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal understood the claims being made by the Applicant; explored those claims with the Applicant at a hearing; and, had regard to all material provided in support. The Tribunal put to the Applicant matters of concern it had about his evidence and noted the Applicant’s responses. The Tribunal also put to the Applicant independent country information before it and invited the Applicant to comment upon it. The Tribunal then made findings based on the evidence and material before it. Those findings of fact were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal reached conclusions based on the findings made by it to which it applied the correct law in reaching those conclusions.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.
The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.
The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM

Deputy Associate: E. Maconachie

Date: 14 May 2009