SZLWV v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZLWV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2008] FMCA 1022
MIGRATION – Review of decision of RRT – where the Tribunal accepted that the applicant suffered harm in the past – whether Tribunal failed to look at the reasonably foreseeable future in assessing whether the applicant has a real chance of persecution in future – whether Tribunal considered the applicant’s position in relation to a known contingency – whether Tribunal drew its conclusions on the basis of probability rather than possibility.

SZGHS v Minister for Immigration [2007] FCA 1572
SZCOS v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCA 570
NAHI v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 10
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration (1989) 169 CLR 379
Minister for Immigration v Guo (1997) 144 ALR 567
Mok Gek Bouy v MILGEA (1993) 47 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration v Mok (1994) 55 FCR 375
Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration v Mok (1994) 55 FCR 375
Chen Ru Mei v Minister for Immigration (1995) 58 FCR 96
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 29 ALR 217
New South Wales v Fahy [2007] HCA 20
Mataka v Minister for Immigration [1996] FCA 1503
Chand v Minister for Immigration [2001] FCA 1285
Minister for Immigration v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719
S v Minister for Immigration (2000) 175 ALR 575
SBBC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCA 925
SZLNW v Minister for Immigration [2008] FMCA 85
SZLNW v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCA 910

Hathaway JC, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991)

Applicant: SZLWV
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: SYG 84 of 2008
Judgment of: Raphael FM
Hearing date: 7 July 2008
Date of last submission: 7 July 2008
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 25 July 2008

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Silva Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms V. McWilliam
Solicitors for the Respondent: DLA Phillips Fox

ORDERS

  1. A writ of certiorari be directed to the second respondent to quash the decision.

  2. A writ of prohibition be directed to the first respondent prohibiting the first respondent from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision.

  3. A writ of mandamus be directed to the second respondent compelling it to redetermine the application for a protection visa according to law.

  4. First respondent to pay the applicant’s costs assessed in the sum of $5,000.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 84 of 2008

SZLWV

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Fiji who arrived in Australia on 30 January 1990 together with her husband. In or about September 1994 the applicant’s spouse applied for a protection visa. The applicant was included in the spouse’s application but she did not make any separate claims. In January 1995 a decision was made to refuse to grant the spouse a protection visa and that…

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Details
Case
[2008] FMCA 1022
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZLWV v Minister for Immigration, the Federal Court was tasked with reviewing the decisions made by the Minister concerning the applicant's protection visa application. The applicant, SZLWV, sought to challenge the Minister's decision that there was not a real chance of persecution within the reasonably foreseeable future, which would entitle the applicant to a protection visa. The applicant contended that the Minister failed to adequately consider the reasonably foreseeable future as required by established legal principles.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Minister appropriately assessed the reasonably foreseeable future when determining the applicant's risk of persecution. The court had to determine if the Minister's decision adhered to the established legal test, which requires consideration of the reasonably foreseeable future. This involved examining whether the Minister appropriately balanced the immediacy and likelihood of potential harm against the temporal scope of the assessment, as articulated in previous cases such as Mok, Wu Shan Liang, and Shirt.

The court found that the Minister did not adequately consider the reasonably foreseeable future, thus erring in law. The court relied on the principles established in Mok, which emphasises that a delegate must look into the reasonably foreseeable future to determine if there is a real chance of persecution. The court further clarified that a foreseeable risk does not necessarily correlate with its likelihood, as articulated in Shirt. Therefore, the Minister's failure to sufficiently consider the reasonably foreseeable future constituted a legal error.

The court ordered the quashing of the Minister's decision and directed the Minister to redetermine the application for a protection visa according to law. The court also prohibited the Minister from acting on the decision and ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs in the sum of $5,000.00.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

A writ of certiorari be directed to the second respondent to quash the decision.

2.

A writ of prohibition be directed to the first respondent prohibiting the first respondent from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision.

3.

A writ of mandamus be directed to the second respondent compelling it to redetermine the application for a protection visa according to law.

4.

First respondent to pay the applicant’s costs assessed in the sum of $5,000.00.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The requirement to consider the reasonably foreseeable future was first discussed by Keely J in Mok Gek Bouy v MILGEA (1993) 47 FCR 1 (“Mok”). In that case the delegate had given evidence that in making his decision he had not considered the situation in Cambodia (the country the applicant would be returned to) two months into the future, although this information was available, because the question of when the applicant was removed was not relevant at all to the decision.At 66 his Honour outlined how the test should be formulated: “The delegate considered that a real chance of persecution of the applicant two months after her return to Cambodia “wasn’t relevant”. In my opinion, the question of whether there was a real chance of persecution necessarily required the delegate to look at the future in so far as it was reasonably foreseeable at the time when he was making his decision. On the one hand the delegate was not required to look at the possibility of something occurring in 50 years time … On the other hand a delegate errs in law, in my opinion, if he confines his attention to whether there is a real chance of persecution on the day after an applicant’s return.” [emphasis added]On appeal Sheppard J (with whom Black CJ and Lockhart J agreed) expressed the view that the proper test was that matters are “to be considered in relation to the immediately foreseeable future”: Minister for Immigration v Mok (1994) 55 FCR 375 at 403. In Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (“Wu Shan Liang”) the court did not disturb the finding of Keely J. Their Honours identified as “the correct test” that enunciated by the Tribunal in Chen Ru Mei v Minister for Immigration (1995) 58 FCR 96, which was:“Looking at the applicant’s claims overall, I am unable to find that there is a real chance that he would be persecuted for a Convention reason were he to return at this time or within the reasonably foreseeable future.” (CLR 279)Since then the test has been routinely applied by the Tribunal in its assessment of a “real chance”. There is little authority on how far into the reasonably foreseeable future the assessment of a known event is to be undertaken by the Tribunal. Generally speaking, in the realm of torts, the oft-cited test articulated by Mason J (with whom Stephen and Aickin JJ agreed on this point) in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 29 ALR 217 at 221 (“Shirt”) applies: “A risk of injury which is quite unlikely to occur, such as that which happened in Bolton v Stone, may nevertheless be plainly foreseeable. Consequently, when we speak of a risk of injury as being “foreseeable” we are not making any statement as to the probability or improbability of its occurrence, save that we are implicitly asserting that the risk is not one that is far-fetched or fanciful. Although it is true to say that in many cases the greater the degree of probability of the occurrence of the risk the more readily it will be perceived to be a risk, it certainly does not follow that a risk which is unlikely to occur is not foreseeable.”Therefore, what is “reasonably foreseeable” is not concerned with the likelihood of an event’s occurrence and distinguishes between that which is likely and that which is foreseeable (see also New South Wales v Fahy [2007] HCA 20 where the High Court concluded that Shirt should not be reconsidered).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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