SZLWB v Minister for Immigration
[2008] FMCA 1580
•21 November 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZLWB & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2008] FMCA 1580 |
| MIGRATION – Visa – protection visa – Refugee Review Tribunal – application for review of RRT decision affirming decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant a protection visa – applicants are nationals of the Republic of India – where Tribunal found applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution – where Tribunal found applicant was a person who could reasonably relocate to another state – whether Tribunal correctly addressed the question of relocation – State protection – availability of State protection – whether Tribunal failed to record its reasons as required by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s.430 – no jurisdictional error. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.424A, 425, 430, 474 |
| SZATV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 40 SZFDV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 41 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 NAFT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 254 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 |
| First Applicant: | SZLWB |
| Second Applicant: | SZLWC |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 19 of 2008 |
| Judgment of: | Scarlett FM |
| Hearing date: | 21 November 2008 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 November 2008 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 21 November 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | Appeared in Person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Potts |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The Application is dismissed.
The Applicants are to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,500.00.
I allow six (6) months to pay.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 19 of 2008
| SZLWB |
First Applicant
| SZLWC |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application
This is an application for a review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. It has aptly been described by Counsel for the Minister, Mr Potts, as an unusual case. It is unusual because the Tribunal has accepted the Applicants' primary claims. However, the Tribunal found that the Applicants did not have a well founded fear of persecution for Convention reasons because:
a)The Tribunal was satisfied that state protection was available in the Applicants’ home country; and
b)That it would be reasonable for the Applicants to relocate within their home country to avoid the harm which they fear.
It is in that context that this case needs to be considered. The Tribunal signed its decision on 21st November 2007 and handed that decision down on 11th December 2007. The Tribunal affirmed the decisions of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the Applicants Protection (Class XA) visas.
The Applicants in their amended application filed on 19th May 2008 ask the Court to issue:
a)A writ of certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s decision;
b)A write of prohibition or an injunction directed to the Minister restraining the Minister, or the Minister’s servants and agents, from acting upon the Tribunal’s decision; and
c)A writ of mandamus remitting the Applicants’ applications for visas back to the Tribunal for reconsideration and redetermination according to law.
They claim that the decision is affected by jurisdictional error:
a)Because the Tribunal failed to record its decision in accordance with s.430 of the Migration Act; and
b)Because the Tribunal failed to analyse, or to analyse properly, the future harm that the Applicants might face if they were to return to India.
Background
The background to this matter is that the Applicants, who are husband and wife, arrived in Australia on 7th April 2007. On 21st May 2007 they applied to the Department of Immigration & Citizenship for Protection (Class XA) visas. The First Applicant, the husband, is the primary Applicant for a visa. His wife, the Second Applicant, makes no specific refugee claims of her own but applies as a member of her husband’s family unit. She is a Part D Applicant and completed a Part D application form.
The basis of the application was set out in a three page typed statement, signed by the First Applicant, which accompanied the application for a Protection visa. The First Applicant applied on the basis of a fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion. His parents were members of the CPI(M)[1], and the Applicant described them as having sacrificed their life for the ideology of communism. He claimed that he was taught that ideology by his parents; however in 2004 his father left the CPI(M) and joined another party called the TMC, which stands for Trina Mul Congress. The First Applicant claimed that he followed his father and joined the TMC also.
[1] Communist Party of India (Marxist)
It was whilst the First Applicant was campaigning for a TMC candidate in 2006 that he claims that he was approached by people from the CPI(M) and asked for a donation, which he refused. He then claimed to have been threatened, and indeed on 10th June 2006 to have been attacked and assaulted to the extent that he suffered a wound from a weapon like a sword. The First Applicant complained also that in early January 2007 whilst shopping he was followed and feared that there was to be another attempt on his safety.
He claimed that he had a successful business in India, but he and his wife were obliged to leave India as a result of their fears for their safety. The Second Applicant, the wife, in fact suffered such distress over the threats that she suffered a miscarriage and lost the parties’ child.
Shortly after those incidents in April 2007 the Applicants left India for Australia and applied for protection visas. A delegate of the Minister refused their applications for visas on 29th June 2007. The delegate considered that the First Applicant had made a number of generalised and unsubstantiated claims and referred to certain inconsistencies. However, the delegate considered that the Applicants could relocate within India, and it would be reasonable for them to do so.
Application to the Refugee Review Tribunal
After the application for protection visas was refused by the delegate, the Applicants applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for a review of that decision. The Tribunal received their application on 25th July 2007. The Applicants did not provide any additional documentary evidence to the Tribunal at that stage.
The Tribunal wrote to the Applicants on 7th August 2007 and invited them to attend a hearing to take place on 4th October 2007. The Applicants replied, indicating they would wish to attend the hearing and would need an interpreter in the Bengali language.
The Applicants provided to the Tribunal their Indian passports. They also provided other documents, including handwritten statements and a discharge certificate from a nursing home giving details of the Second Applicant’s medical history in relation to the unfortunate miscarriage. Both Applicants attended the hearing and both Applicants gave evidence with the assistance of the Bengali interpreter.
The Tribunal’s Decision
The Tribunal signed its decision on 21st November 2007, and handed that decision down on 11th December 2007 affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the Applicants Protection (Class XA) visas. A copy of the Tribunal decision record can be found in the Court Book at pages 106 through to 118.
In the decision record the Tribunal set out the Applicants’ claims taken from the protection visa application, it set out Independent Country Information about movement throughout India, and it then set out a summary of the two Applicants’ evidence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that with the agreement of the Applicants the Tribunal spoke to the Primary Applicant, the husband, alone first of all and then to the Secondary Applicant, the wife, in the presence of the Primary Applicant. The Tribunal noted:
“He (meaning the first applicant) remained during the secondary applicant’s evidence as she was very upset and appeared to need the moral support of the primary applicant. The primary applicant was then given an opportunity to raise any further issues with the Tribunal before the hearing concluded.”[2]
[2] See Court Book at page 111.
The Tribunal’s Findings and Reasons
The Tribunal’s findings and reasons can be found in the Court Book at pages 113 to 118. I indicated at the commencement of these reasons that this is a somewhat unusual case, as Mr Potts submitted. It is unusual because the Tribunal largely accepted the claims that the Applicants made about the harm that they feared in India. The Tribunal said:
“Consequently, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the primary applicant’s political involvement and business success are reasons for the harm which he has suffered in India. The Tribunal is satisfied that the harm amounts to serious harm, as the applicants have been threatened with death and assaulted. The Tribunal is therefore prepared to accept that the applicants have been persecuted for Convention related reasons, specifically political opinion and membership of a particular social group by the primary applicant.”[3]
[3] See Court Book at page 115.
What the Tribunal then did is consider whether the first applicant would be able to access adequate state protection if he returned and faced persecution in his home area of Calcutta in India. The Tribunal noted:
The applicant himself told the Tribunal that the police had in fact responded to both incidents which he reported, and the police reports provided by the applicant indicate this. The police had not proceeded because of the difficulty in tracing the actual unidentified perpetrators of the crimes. This indicates that the authorities would be willing and able to provide adequate protection if the applicants were threatened or harmed in the future. The applicant has not provided any independent information as to any lack of state protection in his area or in India generally in relation to TMC members, and the Tribunal itself has not found any information to indicate that state protection would be withheld if the applicant faced harm for a convention reason.
The Tribunal then went on to consider the Applicants’ claim that the CPI(M) has a good relationship with the police and that the police would not pursue members of the CPI(M) for that reason. The Tribunal also noted that the relevant standard of state protection is not a perfect standard, and the state is not required to provide a guarantee of protection but is required to provide an appropriate standard of protection, including a reasonably effective and impartial police force.
The Tribunal found from the evidence of the Applicants and from the independent information that the Applicants would be afforded adequate state protection in relation to any harm feared from members of the CPIM and from business rivals in India.
The Tribunal also considered for the sake of completeness the issue of whether the Applicants could relocate to another part of India to avoid persecution. The Tribunal considered the Independent Country Information about freedom of movement within India. The Tribunal considered the First Applicant’s claim that he could not live elsewhere in India and that the CPIM would find him wherever he relocated, but did not accept that claim. The Tribunal said:
“The evidence provided to the Tribunal by the primary visa applicant indicates that the harm he suffered was closely related to his business activities in Calcutta, in particular his contracts with BSNL, Kolkata Telephones; and his support for the TCM in the local elections in April 2006. This leads the Tribunal to conclude that there is a very strong local element to any harm which the applicants have suffered. Should he relocate to another part of India, this local element would be removed and the antagonism and persecution from political and business opponents would not exist.”[4]
[4] See Court Book at pages 116 -117.
On the basis of its state protection finding and its relocation finding, the Tribunal found that the First Applicant did not have a well founded fear of being persecuted for Convention reasons if he were to return to India. Therefore, the First Applicant did not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) for a protection visa.
The Tribunal noted that the Second Applicant, the wife, had not made any specific Convention claims and that the fate of her application depended on that of her husband. Because the First Applicant could not be granted a protection visa, the Second Applicant could not satisfy the alternative criterion set out in s.36(2)(b) and therefore could not be granted a protection visa.
It was for those reasons that the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the Applicants Protection (Class XA) visas.
Application for Judicial Review
The Applicants commenced proceedings in this Court by means of an application and an affidavit by the First Applicant filed on 4th January 2008.
Grounds of Review
The Applicants filed an amended application on 19th May 2008 in which they set out the two grounds upon which they rely.
Ground 1
The first ground is that the Tribunal failed to record its decision in accordance with s.430 of the Migration Act. The particulars of that claim I can summarise as:
a)The Tribunal made no finding as to the extent or nature of persecution suffered by the Applicants.
b)The Tribunal accepted the Applicants had been persecuted for Convention related reasons but despite this the Tribunal was not satisfied that the First Applicant would be active in the TMC or in politics if he returned to India, but did not give the reasons for that finding.
c)The Tribunal failed to record the material facts.
d)The Tribunal, in finding that the Applicants could have recourse to the Indian legal system, failed to record whether having regard to the problems that the Applicants had complained about the Tribunal did not make any finding that it was reasonable for the Applicants to fear these problems in the future if they should return to India.
Ground 2
The Applicants’ second ground is that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal failed to analyse properly the future harm that the Applicants may face if they have to return to India.
The Applicants claimed that the Tribunal accepted that they had been persecuted for Convention related reasons in India, and specifically political opinion and membership of a particular social group.
Submissions
The Applicants did not file any written outline of submissions, but they have attended Court today and each one of them has made an oral submission to the Court with the assistance of the Court’s interpreter in the Bengali language. The First Applicant told the Court that he was a good businessman in India and the only reason that he came to Australia was for the protection of himself and his wife. He referred to the fact that the parties had lost their unborn child through miscarriage as a result of the difficulties they had faced in India. He pointed out that he was the only child of his parents and that whilst his parents were sad that he and his wife had left India, the parents were pleased that they had left because the parents feared for the parties’ safety in India.
The Second Applicant, the wife, told the Court that they had come to Australia because of the fear for their lives in India and wished to reside in a country where they did not have to live in fear for their life.
The First Applicant told the Court that in relation to the Tribunal’s finding of the availability of state protection, the police were of no help to them at all. He said that he and his wife had received threats at home and that his parents still receive threats.
As to the Tribunal’s relocation finding, the First Applicant said that people had removed from one place to another to avoid harm but were not able to avoid harm. He said that the CPI(M) had been in power for 30 years and were very powerful, and that he feared that if he and his wife were to return to India they would again face harm.
The Second Applicant told the Court in her submission in reply that she feared that she and her husband’s lives would be threatened if they returned to India and that their parents were still receiving threats.
Mr Potts of Counsel, who appeared for the Minister, told the Court that this was an unusual claim because the bulk of the Applicants’ claim had been accepted by the Tribunal, and it was only the Tribunal’s finding about the availability of state protection and about the reasonableness of relocation that led the Tribunal to the conclusion that it made. Mr Potts submitted that no legal error had been shown in respect of either finding.
Considerations
Quite clearly this is a case where the Tribunal accepted the Applicants’ claim as to what had occurred to them in India. This is not a case, unlike many cases that this Court sees, where the Tribunal has made adverse findings as to the credibility of the Applicants as witnesses; far from it. The Tribunal accepted that the First Applicant in particular had suffered harm arising out of political belief and his situation as a businessman, and that harm had included actual bodily harm. What the Tribunal did, of course, though was to then consider whether state protection would be available and whether the parties could relocate within India.
The Tribunal, in my view, made a finding on the availability of state protection that was open to it on the evidence. The Tribunal considered the evidence of the First Applicant that the matters had been reported to the police but that the police had been unable to arrest any parties because the perpetrators had not been identified. The Tribunal did not accept that part of the Applicants’ evidence that the police would not help them, but rather found that the police were unable to help them.
The Tribunal in considering state protection referred to matters set out in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152 of 2003[5] in regarding the relevant standard of state protection, noting that it was not a perfect standard. Indeed, in many countries where the police have a willingness to assist their inability, for a variety of reasons, may be such that they cannot provide assistance.
[5] [2004] HCA 18
The Tribunal said that for the sake of completeness it also considered the issue of whether the Applicants could relocate to another part of India. In my view, having found that the circumstances related by the Applicants had amounted to persecution for a Convention reason, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to consider relocation within India. It would have been unwise, in my view, for the Tribunal to have relied solely on its finding of the availability of state protection.
The High Court of Australia has recently considered the law relating to internal relocation. In SZATV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship[6] and SZFDV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship[7]. As can be seen, both of those decisions were appeals from the Full Court, the Federal Court, dealing with, in their turn, appeals from the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia. The Counsel for the Minister, Mr Potts, submitted that the thrust of those two decisions were that the High Court accepted that it may be reasonable for an applicant for a protection visa to relocate in the country of nationality to a region where objectively thee is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. In such circumstances there would be an absence of the essential objectively well founded fear.
[6] [2007] HCA 40
[7] [2007] HCA 41
In SZATV, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ said at [23]:
“The Minister framed the issue, for a situation such as that presented by this appeal, as being whether it be reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the appellant to relocate to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. This formulation does not suffer from the defects urged by the appellant. It does not turn upon a "hypothetical assumption", nor does it prevent account being taken of the presence of a subjective fear of persecution, nor does it treat the presence of a "safe area" within the country of nationality as determinative of the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution.”
Their Honours went on to say at [24]:
“However, that does not mean that, without more, the formulation by the Minister is sufficient and satisfactory. What is "reasonable", in the sense of "practicable", must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality.”[8]
[8] See SZATV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 40 at [23] – [24]
Their Honours in SZFDV essentially reaffirmed that view.
In the case before me the Tribunal considered the Independent Country Information about relocation within India, showing that Indians are free to move within the country with the exceptions of the states of Jammu and Kashmir. The Tribunal considered the First Applicant’s evidence. It considered the First Applicant’s business ability, and considered the fact that the fear that the Applicants claimed had a localised aspect about it, and that if the Applicants were to relocate to another part of India that local element would be removed.
The Applicants, of course, have pointed out that the CPIM is a national organization and the First Applicant told the Court today that it is very powerful and had been in force for 30 years. Of course this Court cannot reconsider the factual basis of the Tribunal’s decision, as merits review is not available, but the First Applicant was essentially saying to the Court today what he had said to the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal considered the First Applicant’s claim and was satisfied that relocation within India was reasonable in their circumstances, based on the facts of their case. In my view that is not indicative of jurisdictional error.
I am mindful of the fact that the Applicants have claimed a failure to comply with s.430 of the Migration Act. Section 430(1) is relevant because it imposes a requirement on the Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions. The appropriate sub-section says:
Section 430 - Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions etc.
(1) Where the Tribunal makes its decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written statement that:
(a)sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and
(b)sets out the reasons for the decision; and
(c)sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and
(d)refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based.
In my view a fair reading of the Tribunal decision record, and in particular the Tribunal’s findings and reasons, shows that the Tribunal has complied with the requirement of s.430(1) of the Migration Act.
The Tribunal accepted the Applicants’ claims of the harm that they had suffered in India and accepted that that harm had a Convention nexus. The Tribunal then went on to make the findings that it did about state protection and relocation. It set out the evidence upon which it relied for making those findings. In my view there is no breach of s.430. Even if there were, it is well established that this would not constitute jurisdictional error.
A failure to comply with s.430 does not amount to jurisdictional error and is not capable of doing so. (See Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham[9]; NAFT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[10]; and also Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [11]).
[9] (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [7
[10] [2003] FCAFC 254 at [7]
[11] (2001) 206 CLR 323
I am not satisfied that the Tribunal failed to comply with s.430, and even if it did that would not amount to jurisdictional error.
Dealing with the second ground of review, which complains of a failure to analyse properly the future harm that the Applicants may face if they have to return to India, the Applicants claim that this of itself is a serious jurisdictional error. The Applicants say in their ground:
“The decision of the second respondent is affected by jurisdiction error in that the second respondent finds that the applicant does not have a well founded fear of being persecuted for Convention reasons if they return to India despite the Tribunal is satisfied that the harm amounts to serious harm, as the applicants have been threatened with death and assaulted, therefore the Tribunal accepted that the applicants have been persecuted for Convention related reasons, specifically political opinion and membership of a particular social group by the primary applicant in its own findings.”
That is so. The Tribunal did accept that, but its finding was that even having accepted that because of the finding of availability of state protection, and because of its finding as to the reasonableness of relocation, there was not a well founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal was not saying that the Applicants did not suffer serious harm in India. It was not saying that they did not have cause to fear the threats that had been made. The Tribunal accepted that, but the Tribunal went on to say that for the two reasons that it gave the Applicants in considering their circumstances as a whole did not therefore have a well founded fear of being persecuted for Convention reasons upon their return to India because they could access state protection, imperfect though it may be, and because it was reasonable for them to relocate within India. That is not a jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
I am mindful of the fact that the Applicants are not legally represented. It is open to the Court, and in my view incumbent upon the Court, to make its own independent assessment by reading the Tribunal decision record and all the supporting material as to whether there is an arguable case for jurisdictional error.
In my view the Tribunal has complied with ss.425 and 425A of the Migration Act in inviting the Applicants to attend a hearing to give evidence and present arguments; in giving them sufficient time to attend the hearing; in providing them with an interpreter in Bengali, the language of their choice; and in dealing with the issues, including the issue of internal relocation, that had been raised by the delegate. Indeed, the delegate’s decision was in some ways harsher than that of the Tribunal because the delegate tended to form the view that the evidence of the Primary Applicant was in some ways inconsistent and did not adequately establish serious harm for Convention related reasons within India, but the Tribunal accepted that that was the case. In my view there is no error shown in that regard.
There is no breach of s.424A of the Migration Act. The Tribunal’s decision was based on Independent Country Information and the evidence of the two Applicants, particularly the Primary Applicant. In short, there is no jurisdictional error.
This is a situation where it is hard not to have some sympathy for the Applicants. They have certainly suffered threats and, in the case of the Primary Applicant, injury caused by assault in India and they have suffered a personal tragedy within their family. The Tribunal considered their evidence favourably as to the harm that had been suffered in India, and certainly found that that serious harm amounted to persecution for a Convention reason.
It may well be that once the Applicants have completed going through the Court system and if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful, that then upon having exhausted those avenues of relief they may consider an application to the Minister under the provisions of s.417 of the Migration Act. That is not a matter upon which the Court can make any recommendation to the Minister because that is a matter entirely within the Minister’s discretion. It is not for this Court to express any view as to the success or otherwise of such a claim.
The decision that this Court much reach, after having considered the evidence and having considered the submissions, is that no jurisdictional error has been made out. In the absence of jurisdictional error, the Tribunal decision is a privative clause decision as defined by s.474(2) of the Migration Act. Under s.474(1) of the Act, privative clause decisions are final and conclusive. They are not open to orders in the nature of certiorari or mandamus or prohibition which are the orders that the Applicants seek. It follows therefore that the application must be dismissed.
Costs
There is an application for costs on behalf of the First Respondent Minister. The Applicants have not been successful in their claim, and in this jurisdiction costs follow the event. The Minister has been represented by solicitors and Counsel on two occasions to my knowledge. On the other two occasions a solicitor from the office of the Minister’s solicitors has appeared.
When the matter came before the Court on 17th June 2008, Orchiston FM adjourned the matter because the Applicants had not obtained the legal advice from a lawyer on the Refugee Review Tribunal legal advice panel for which they had applied. True it is that there is no right to free legal advice. However, on that occasion the Federal Magistrate decided that it would be inappropriate to proceed to the hearing, and I understand that the lawyers for the Minister raised no objection to that course. Her Honour listed the matter for hearing on 30th September 2008.
On that occasion the matter came before me. The reason for that, as the First Applicant has said, was that there was not an interpreter in the Bengali language available. My notes indicate that that contention is in fact correct. Whether or not the matter could have proceeded on that day is another issue. My recollection is that the matter was transferred into my docket because the Federal Magistrate in whose docket the matter previously had been was moving to another registry of the Court to conduct hearings in another jurisdiction, and several matters were in fact transferred out of her docket.
Unfortunately those circumstances have led to two more Court events than would otherwise have been necessary. The matter was certainly listed for final hearing before me today and it was heard, and there was certainly a capable interpreter in the Bengali language. Mr Potts of Counsel has quite properly conceded that these particular events could hardly be seen as faults on the part of the Applicants, although he submits that they could perhaps have raised some issue earlier about not having received advice from a lawyer on the panel. He also submitted that they are part of the circumstances of litigation generally.
The Applicants, I also note, are not working at present and it is reasonable to infer that they do not have the funds to meet an amount of $6,400.00, certainly within the 28 days which the Rules provide unless the Court were to make some different order.
In all the circumstances, and I note that costs are at the discretion of the Court, whilst I am of the view that this is an appropriate matter to make an order for costs in favour of the Respondent Minister, I am not satisfied that I should make an order for costs in the sum of $6,400.00 which is sought. I am of the view that it has been unfortunate that on at least one occasion the application was not able to proceed and this is not a case where the Applicants themselves have not attended court ready to have their case heard. The Court records show that they have attended on each occasion, as they have today.
I am prepared to make an order that the Applicants should pay the First Respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,500.00, which represents a substantial discount on the amount sought by the lawyers for the Minister, but is still higher than the amount provided by the scale.
I also take into account the fact that the Applicants do not have the funds, as I understand it, to meet such an amount in the near future and I consider that it is appropriate that I should allow six months to pay.
I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM.
Associate: V. Lee
Date: 25 November 2008
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