SZKOT v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 1738
•9 November 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZKOT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 1738 |
| MIGRATION – Bias alleged – the possibility that the Tribunal holds pre-conceived views about evidence by telephone from unidentified witnesses overseas does not establish bias. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 424A, 474 |
| Tefonu Pty Limited v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors (1986) 162 CLR 24 Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; ex parte H & Anor (2001) 179 ALR 425 |
| Applicant: | SZKOT |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | SYG 1397 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Turner FM |
| Hearing date: | 4 September 2007 |
| Date of last submission: | 4 September 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 9 November 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr P. Cutler |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr J. Smith |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Ms M. Palmer of Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application, amended application, and further amended application are dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1397 of 2007
| SZKOT |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application filed on 2 May 2007 for an order to show cause why a remedy should not be granted in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) signed on 2 February 2007, which affirmed the decision of the delegate for the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant filed an amended application on 12 July 2007 and a further amended application on 4 September 2007.
The applicant was born on 30 July 1967 and claims to be from Pakistan and of the Islamic faith (“the applicant”).
The applicant arrived in Australia on 25 May 2006 on a visitor’s visa issued in Islamabad.
On 21 June 2006 the applicant applied to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs for a protection visa. In this application he claimed that his membership in the “anti-government party Muslim league (Nawaz Sharif Goroup) (sic)” will cause him to be persecuted and if he returns to Pakistan he fears arrest and physical and mental punishment because of his party’s pro-democracy stance. The applicant claimed that the authorities would not provide him or other party members with any protection and that should he return to Pakistan he would be arrested and tried on bogus charges (Court Book “CB” 19-22).
This application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent on 29 July 2006 (CB 27).
On 22 August 2006 the applicant filed an application for review of the decision of the Minister’s delegate with the Refugee Review Tribunal (CB 37). At this stage the applicant included a statement amending his reasons for applying for a protection visa, stating that he was under pressure to arrange marriages for his three daughters under Islamic law, which he did not want to do. The applicant also claimed that he had recently become interested in Christianity through neighbours although he himself remains a Muslim (CB 52).
By decision signed on 2 February 2007 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. In considering the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal found (CB 93-95) (highlighting added):
The applicant’s evidence was confused and it was difficult to identify specific and particular claims which could be assessed against the Convention definition of persecution. Much of the evidence given by the applicant was in the nature of an explanation of his thoughts, feelings and aspirations and how he resented his unhappy childhood and the restrictions on his and his family’s life in Pakistan. However I considered that the applicant, with some exceptions, was making a genuine and honest attempt to set out his circumstances for the Tribunal and I have given a beneficial and wide consideration of all his possible claims.
I have considered the material in the application for a protection visa and the application for review, the oral evidence given at hearing, the advisor’s submissions and the documents given to the Tribunal in support of the claims.
I am required to determine whether the applicant has a well founded fear and if so whether what he fears amounts to persecution for a Convention related reason. My task is to consider all the evidence, make findings on material questions of fact and then to give reasons for my decision.
I accept that the applicant is a citizen of Pakistan.
In the evidence given to the Tribunal the applicant resiled from his earlier claims made in the protection visa that he feared harm from government authorities because he was a member of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) would be arrested for by government authorities upon return to Pakistan for anti government activities. I have therefore not assessed this claim because the applicant tells me that this is not the real reason he fears return to Pakistan.
The applicant claims that he is opposed to the conservative attitudes held by members of society in Pakistan as to the right of women to choose their husbands. He claims that the restrictions are intolerable and he does not wish to arrange a marriage for his daughters.
He also claims that he joined the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) in Lahore and that he has tried to change the views of members of his branch or group. He has provided evidence by way of a witness who gave telephone evidence and written statement by another witness that he is a member of the PML-N and that he supports a policy of allowing women the right to choose their husbands and greater freedoms generally. He also claims he was friendly with two of his neighbours who were Christians and he visited their church a number of times out of curiosity. He is a Muslim but does not himself hold sectarian views and believes that everyone should be treated equally.
He claims that if he returns he may harmed by members of society who hold conservative social and religious views and who are opposed to his ideas of greater freedom for women.
There are some matters on which I consider the applicant has given truthful evidence and others which I consider he has not.
I do accept that he is Muslim with liberal ideas on the freedom of women and that he is opposed to the strict application of traditional Islamic and socially conservative values in relation to women’s conduct and dress. He traces his attitudes to his experience of an unhappy childhood and his observation of his own mother’s unhappiness during marriage. Whilst I accept that he holds these values I do not consider that he has been threatened or mistreated by any persons because he holds these attitudes. He has been educated and worked in Pakistan and entered an arranged marriage and has 3 daughters from that marriage. Pakistan is a conservative country with many restrictions on social behaviour however there are avenues for freedom of expression as set out above in the cited country information. There is a vigorous and active press, many non government organizations which operate freely, publish reports and lobby for change and there has been a move by many groups in Pakistan to lessen restrictions on women and reduce discrimination in the justice system. Whilst the blasphemy laws prevent a certain degree of free speech regarding the fundamentals of Islamic religious belief there is no suggestion and I do not accept that the applicant would himself be at any risk of arrest for breaches of the blasphemy laws. The applicant does not have a profile where he has published or voiced his liberal views and I do not accept that he would face harm from either government authorities or members of the community for his private views. I also do not accept that he will publish or voice such views publicly if he returns to Pakistan.
I accept the country information that women are free to marry without family consent. I also consider that arranged marriages are a social convention and those marrying against the wishes of their family may be ostracized by family members. However I do not accept that the applicant and his wife are obliged by law or convention to arrange a marriage against their daughter’s express consent. As the applicant’s children are still quite young the prospect of marriage is a matter in the future and I find that the conduct of this issue is very much in the hands of the applicant.
I accept that the applicant has been friendly with two of his neighbours who are Christians and that he has attended a Christian church out of curiosity. . He agreed that he had not been harmed or threatened before he left Pakistan for these actions. He does not claim to have converted to Christianity or to have any intention of doing so even though he has visited a church in Sydney and had discussions on welfare matters with a volunteer working at the church. There is no country evidence to suggest that his conduct either in Pakistan or Australia would cause the applicant to be mistreated by either government authorities or conservative members of the community if he returned to Pakistan. He claims that his attitudes and views are not accepted by the mainstream Islamic community in Pakistan and Australia and this may be so but he has not been harmed and I do not accept that he would be subject to such harm if he returned to Pakistan now or in the foreseeable future.
I consider that the applicant is experiencing significant personal problems arising from his resentment as to the social and religious restrictions imposed upon him by the place of his birth. I accept that he has aspirations and a desire to live a life with fewer social restrictions in Australia however I do not accept that this falls within the Convention definition of persecution.
The applicant has also claimed that he joined a PML-N branch in Lahore in 1999 and that he tried to make members of the party change their mind on matters of women’s rights. I do not accept that he has joined the PML N and I consider that he has fabricated this evidence. The applicant displayed a significant and fundamental lack of knowledge about the PML-N and political matters in general. Further as I put to him at hearing it is not plausible that if he held strong views on women’s rights in Pakistan that he would join a political party which holds fairly conservative views on religion and had been responsible for introducing a limited form of sharia. He stated in the hearing he was not interested in politics only in getting his mother’s message across. His lack of knowledge was so fundamental that I also cannot accept the evidence given by his witnesses as corroborating his claim that he was a member of the party. The witness who gave evidence by telephone also knew very little about the organization and policies of the PML-N despite claiming to be an office holder in the branch of the PML-N. Accordingly I have not place any weight on the letter, membership card or oral evidence corroborating his claim that he was a member of the PML-N.
Accordingly I do not accept that there is a real chance that the applicant would face persecution if he returned to Pakistan now or in the foreseeable future for reasons of religion or any other Convention based reason. I am not satisfied that the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution for any Convention related reason.
Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2) for a protection visa.
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The applicant then filed the application in this Court, seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The application
In his application, the applicant set out two grounds as follows:
(1)The Tribunal failed to comply with s.424A Migration Act.
(2)PARTICULARS: In reaching its decision the Tribunal placed no weight on the oral evidence of a corroborating witness (p16 of Tribunal’s decision). The Applicant was not given the opportunity to comment on this adverse finding.
The applicant filed an amended application on 12 July 2007 setting out the following grounds and particulars:
The Tribunal failed to provide particulars of information which was the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review in contravention of s.424A Migraiton Act.
Particulars
(1)In reaching its decision the Tribunal places no weight on the letter, membership card or oral evidence of a corroborating witness (p16 of the Tribunal’s decision);
(2)In reaching its decision the Tribunal indicated that evidence from a person in another country where their identity and background can’t be verified has less value (transcript page 13).
(3)The Applicant was not given the opportunity to comment on these matters and was not provided with notice of them.
The applicant filed further amended grounds of review, by leave, at the hearing on 4 September 2007.
[Ground one is the same as ground one in the amended application]
[Particular (a) is the same as particular (1) in the amended application]
[Particular (b) is the same as particular (2) in the amended application]
[Particular (c) is the same as particular (3) in the amended application]
Ground two claims that “in reaching its decision the Tribunal acted with a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of” it placing no weight on the letter, membership card, or oral evidence of a corroborating witness, and in indicating in reaching its decision that evidence from a person in another country has less value where their identity and background cannot be verified (particulars (a) and (b)).
Findings of the Court in relation to the grounds in the application
Ground one and the particular that is ground two, allege a breach of s.424A in the Tribunal placing no weight on the oral evidence of witnesses, and not giving the applicant an opportunity to comment on its adverse finding. As stated in Tefonu Pty Limited v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 per Beazley J at [54]:
The weight which is to be given to a relevant factor is a matter for the Tribunal, unless it can be said that the Tribunal's decision is manifestly unreasonable. (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor. v. Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41; Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223 at 230, 233-234).
The decision must be so unreasonable “that no reasonable body could have come to it”: Ibid at [41]. Also, as stated by the Federal Court of Australia in Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27]:
The Tribunal is entitled to accept or reject or give such weight to the evidence proffered as it thinks appropriate in all the circumstances.
The finding of fact as to weight is a subjective appraisial of the Tribunal that is not “information” for the purposes of s.424A. The Court refers to the decision in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 where the High Court quoted with approval the following statement in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 that the word “information”
does not encompass the Tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations ... nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc.
As to the complaint that the applicant was not given an opportunity to comment on the weight given to evidence, the Court refers to SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigneous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 at [48], where the joint judgment approved a statement by Lord Diplock in F Hoffmann-La Roche and Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 at 369 that
the rules of natural justice do not require the decision maker to disclose what he is minded to decide so that the parties may have a further opportunity of criticising his mental processes before he reaches a final decision. If this were a rule of natural justice only the most talkative of judges would satisfy it and trial by jury would have to be abolished....
Procedural fairness does not require the tribunal to give an applicant a running commentary upon what it thinks about the evidence that is given. On the contrary, to adopt such a course would be likely to run a serious risk of conveying an impression of prejudgment.
A breach of s.424A has not been established. Grounds one and two are rejected.
Findings of the Court in relation to the grounds in the amended application
A breach of s.424A is alleged for the reasons set out in the particulars. This ground is rejected for the reasons set out above.
Particular one complains about the Tribunal placing no weight on the evidence of a witness, and on a letter and membership card. The Court repeats its comments for rejecting grounds one and two of the application: Weight is a matter for the Tribunal: It can accept or reject evidence as it thinks appropriate in the circumstances: The Tribunal considered the evidence from the witnesses (CB 94.1, 95.5) and was entitled to place no weight “on the letter, membership card or oral evidence” of a corroborating witness (CB 95.5). Particular one is rejected.
Particular two complains about the Tribunal finding that “evidence from a person in another country where their identity and background can’t be identified has less value.” This particular is dealt with when considering the further amended application.
Particular three is a rewording of grounds one and two of the application. It is rejected for the reasons expressed under those grounds.
Findings of the Court in relation to the grounds in the further amended application
Ground one is the same as ground one in the amended application and is rejected for the reasons set out thereunder.
Particular 1(a) is the same as particular one in the application and is rejected for the reasons set out thereunder. However, the particular adds the new claim that placing no weight on the evidence was a breach of s.424A. The decision as to weight was a subjective appraisal by the Tribunal, and is not information covered by s.424A: SZBYR (ante) at [18].
Particular 1(b) is the same as particular two in the application, being an alleged breach of s.424A because the Tribunal indicated that “evidence from a person in another country where their identity and background can’t be verified has less value”. That conclusion by the Tribunal is a subjective appraisal by it and is not information covered by s.424A: SZBYR (ante) at [18].
Ground two alleges bias by reason of particulars 1(a) and (b). In oral submissions for the applicant, it is alleged that a failure to interview witnesses from overseas contributed to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The following passages in the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal demonstrate a willingness by the Tribunal to hear the evidence from the witnesses, and to facilitate the giving of that evidence.
(Transcript 2)
Member:
I note from your adviser’s recent submissions that you have a number of witnesses that you would like to be heard. The only difficulty with that today is that because that the hearing is only for a particular period of time, we may not have time to contact those people in Pakistan. But if necessary we can adjourn the hearing at the end for another time and make a special time to contact people if that is necessary and we had discussed that at the end of the hearing.
…………
(Transcript 13-14)
Member:
I can see his attitude and opinions but is that mainly what all of these witnesses will attest to?
Adviser:
And also to his activity. He was collecting people. He was actually collecting people in his own what you called branch. He calls it a group not a branch. There was a misunderstanding, that I observed, as he refers to other members as a group of people and there are people that are likeminded like him but he was actually actively involved in spreading this and they were thinking of the ways how to plan to develop the policy to actually start work in a safer areas, safer zones for themselves and to attract more members of the same mind.
Member:
Alright well look. I don’t know what the best way to go with that. Whether we should try and get some statements from them or whether we should just adjourn and see if we can get them on the phone.
Adviser:
That would be lovely and we would be grateful for it.
Member:
It may be easier and quicker to get them on the phone. What’s the time difference between here and Pakistan.
Interpreter:
It is 6.5 hours behind Australian time.
Member:
So Pakistan is 6.5 hours behind Australian time. Is that with daylight saving time.
Interpreter:
In daylight saving it could be later?? 6 hours behind at the moment.
Member:
Now if I do this. You’ve also got to realise that the value of evidence from people on the telephone from another country where the identity can’t be verified, anything that their background can’t be verified has less value. Unfortunately it’s just the way the system is. It can certainly and should be taken into account but it may not have the same value as other more independent and reliable evidence. But if you would like me to make an attempt to contact these people and speak to them, then I will see what I can do.
Applicant:
What about the statements in writing?
Member:
Well it’s the same issue. But they’re in another country and unless they go into the Australian Embassy and questioned by a consular officer…Okay now I’m not going to say any more because the alarm on the tape has gone which means there’s 3 minutes more, so I’ll just get them to come and…
[on phone] ? the alarm the tape is going again. Thank you, bye.
Hearing Officer:
Yep, the tape is okay now.
Member:
Okay, thank you. Alright, so I think what we’ll do is adjourn this hearing now. I will get my case officer to contact you about a particular time we can have an adjourned hearing where we have our telephone and we make contact with one or all of these people and you might nominate to me whether you want me to call them or just some of them.
Applicant:
It’s up to you, you can call all of them or any one of them.
Member:
Well it’s your application and you are the one that’s giving me the information so it’s your…I’m listening to what you’re saying. If you want me to call them all I will call them all.
Applicant:
Let’s call them.
Member:
So what we’ll do is adjourn the hearing now. I will try to book you for the next hearing because you are with the parties. So are you happy to proceed that way?
Adviser:
Yes quite happy. Thank you so much.
These passages indicate a willingness to facilitate the receipt of the evidence, and a willingness to consider it. The fact that the Tribunal stated a view that evidence from witnesses overseas may have less value, does not establish bias, as the possibility that the Tribunal might have some preconceived ideas does not constitute bias: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairsv Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J at 532 [72]; see also R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 116 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ.
To establish bias the applicant would have to show that the Tribunal “acted dishonestly or arbitrarily or capriciously”: SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ at [56-59].
“The test for apprehended bias in relation to curial proceedings is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided”: Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; ex parte H & Anor (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27]. A fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend from the above passages by the Tribunal that an impartial mind would not be brought to the resolution of the matter.
The applicant alleges that the Tribunal not placing any weight on the letter, membership card and oral evidence of the corroborating witness, is the second factual matter showing a reason for apprehending bias (Transcript 6, line 20). The Tribunal set out is reasons for not placing weight on that evidence at CB 95.3, when it stated:
The applicant has also claimed that he joined a PML-N branch in Lahore in 1999 and that he tried to make members of the party change their mind on matters of women’s rights. I do not accept that he has joined the PML N and I consider that he has fabricated this evidence. The applicant displayed a significant and fundamental lack of knowledge about the PML-N and political matters in general. Further as I put to him at hearing it is not plausible that if he held strong views on women’s rights in Pakistan that he would join a political party which holds fairly conservative views on religion and had been responsible for introducing a limited form of sharia. He stated in the hearing he was not interested in politics only in getting his mother’s message across. His lack of knowledge was so fundamental that I also cannot accept the evidence given by his witnesses as corroborating his claim that he was a member of the party. The witness who gave evidence by telephone also knew very little about the organization and policies of the PML-N despite claiming to be an office holder in the branch of the PML-N. Accordingly I have not place any weight on the letter, membership card or oral evidence corroborating his claim that he was a member of the PML-N.
Again, a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend bias.
It is submitted for the applicant that the decision not to place weight on that evidence is a part of the reason for decision, and that it should have been disclosed under s.424A. However, it was conceded correctly that the decision as to weight is a subjective appraisal by the Tribunal (Transcript 6, line 46). As such, it is not “information” for the purposes of s.424A: SZBYR (ante) at [17].
It is alleged also that the conclusion as to the weight to be given to evidence from witnesses was information that should have been provided under s.424A. This assertion has been rejected above. It is asserted for the applicant that the conclusion as to evidence from witnesses overseas is not a subjective appraisal as it was reached before the evidence was given. The Court rejects this contention. The conclusion of the Tribunal was a subjective appraisal about the weight to be given to evidence from witnesses by telephone from another country where their identity and background cannot be identified. The fact that the appraisal was reached before hearing the evidence does not mean that it is not a subjective appraisal or conclusion reached by the Tribunal. As such, there was no obligation to give notice of it to the applicant under s.424A: SZBYR (ante).
Counsel for the applicant took the Court to the decision in Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H (ante) to argue that the test for apprehended bias by the Tribunal is the objective test of “possibility”, as distinct from “probability”. The Court refers to the passage quoted above from [27] of Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H (ante) and accepts that as the test to be applied. Counsel for the applicant agreed that that is the appropriate test (Transcript 10, line 19).
Counsel for the first respondent referred to the decision in SZBYR (ante) and said that s.424A required the provision of information that “would be” the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. Counsel continued that only information that on its face was adverse to the applicant’s claim to be a refugee was required to be provided under s.424A. Further, it was submitted that as the corroborating oral evidence, letter and identity card were not on their face inconsistent with the applicant’s claims to be a refugee, they were not covered by s.424A. The Court accepts those submissions. What was adverse to the applicant was not the corroborative evidence, the letter and identity card, but the Tribunal’s subjective appraisal of that evidence. As such, it was not covered by s.424A: SZBYR (ante).
Counsel for the first respondent referred to Ex parte H and to the following passages in [32]:
In the present case, a fair-minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person, in our view, might well infer, from the constant interruptions of the male prosecutor's evidence and the constant challenges to his truthfulness and to the plausibility of his account of events, that there was nothing he could say or do to change the tribunal's preconceived view that he had fabricated his account of the events upon which he based his application for a protection visa. In other words, a fair-minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person might well apprehend bias by the tribunal against the male prosecutor. And because the female prosecutor's application stood or fell with his, a fair-minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person might, in our view, form the same view in her case.
The procedure of the Tribunal in the matter before this Court was entirely different from Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H (ante); there were not constant interruptions of the applicant or his evidence (as conceded by counsel at Transcript 20, line 16), and nothing was said to indicate that there was nothing that the applicant could do or say to change the Tribunal’s preconceived view on evidence from witnesses over the telephone from other countries. To the contrary, the Tribunal said that the evidence “can certainly and should be taken into account” and facilitated the presentation of that evidence. The decision in Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H (ante) therefore does not lead the Court to conclude that here there were grounds for a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would be at any risk of arrest for breaches of blasphemy laws, or that he and his wife are obliged by law or convention to arrange a marriage against their daughters’ express consent, or that he joined the PML-N. The Tribunal was entitled to make those findings as it thought appropriate: Lee (ante) at [27]. No error by the Tribunal has been established.
The written submissions by the applicant allege an apprehension of bias. The applicant refers to passages in the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. The issue of bias has been considered and rejected above.
Conclusion
The Court finds that the Tribunal’s decision is a privative clause decision, and has not been infected with jurisdictional error. In such circumstances, and pursuant to s.474 of the Act, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to interfere.
Accordingly, the application, amended application, and further amended application are dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Turner FM
Acting Associate: M Giang
Date: 9 November 2007
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