SZIQD v Minister for Immigration
[2006] FMCA 1467
•19 October 2006
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZIQD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 1467 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant making sur place claim – application of s.91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) considered – whether s.424A was breached considered – RRT obliged to invite comment on protection visa information relied upon and to explain the significance of it in the light of s.91R(3). |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R, 424A |
| Minister for Immigration v SZGMF [2006] FCAFC 138 Singh v Minister for Immigration [2001] FCA 1679 SAAP v Minister for Immigration (2005) 215 ALR 162 SZDPY v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCA 627 SZEEU v Minister for Immigration (2006) 150 FCR 214 Tin v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1109 VAF v Minister for Immigration (2004) 206 ALR 471 VWFP & Anor v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCA 231 WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration (2002) 124 FCR 276 Win v Minister for Immigration (2001) 105 FCR 212 |
| Applicant: | SZIQD |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG1028 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Driver FM |
| Hearing date: | 4 October 2006 |
| Delivered on: | 19 October 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr D J Hand, pro bono publico |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr M Cleary |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari shall issue, quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 7 February 2006 and handed down on 28 February 2006.
A writ of mandamus shall issue, requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to redetermine the review application before it, according to law.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG1028 of 2006
| SZIQD |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and background
The applicant seeks review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) dated 7 February 2006 and handed down on 28 February 2006. That decision found that the applicant was not a refugee and was not entitled to a protection visa. The RRT’s decision resulted from an application to review a decision of a delegate of the Minister, refusing the applicant’s application for a protection visa.
The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). He arrived in Australia on 14 July 2005. On 29 July 2005 he lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“Department”). Appended to the application for a protection visa was a statement dated 25 July 2005 by the applicant.
On 8 October 2005 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs refused to grant a protection visa.
On 11 November 2005 the applicant applied for review of the delegate’s decision in the RRT.
The applicant sought review of the RRT decision by an application for an order to show cause filed on 5 April 2006. That application asserted notification of the RRT decision on 9 March 2006. That assertion was not disputed. I find that the application was filed within time.
The application first came before me on 27 April 2006. On that day I made orders for the filing of material and directed that there be a preliminary hearing pursuant to rule 44.12 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Federal Magistrates Court Rules”) on 10 July 2006. On that day I gave the applicant leave to file and serve an amended application asserting a breach of s.424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) in relation to the applicant’s sole claim for a protection visa and the impact on that claim of s.91R(3) of the Migration Act[1].
[1] An amended application was filed on 31 August 2006.
The protection visa claims
In a statement (dated 25 July 2005) appended to his original application for a protection visa the applicant claimed to be a member of the Chinese Communist Party since 1970. The applicant claimed in the statement that since arriving in Australia (on 14 July 2005) he had changed his political opinion[2].
[2] Court Book (“CB”) at page 27.
The applicant claimed that as a consequence of accessing information that he could not obtain in China, which revealed the Chinese government’s persecution of Falun Gong and democratic people, he discovered the nature of the Communist Party[3].
[3] Ibid.
The applicant claimed that in the week preceding his application he publicly renounced his affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party in Sydney’s Chinatown[4].
[4] Ibid.
In the statement appended to the protection visa application, the applicant claimed if he returned to China he would (possibly) be persecuted because the Chinese Government may find out that the applicant had publicly renounced his Chinese Communist Party membership.
The RRT hearing
At the hearing of the applicant’s review application in the RRT on 21 December 2005 the applicant gave oral evidence[5].
[5] CB at page 87.
The decision of the RRT reveals that after the presiding member made some introductory remarks[6], and after the applicant advised that he had submitted his protection visa with the assistance of a friend with whom he was sharing a flat[7], and detailed his travel to Australia and his intention to only stay two weeks[8], the RRT asked the applicant to summarise his fears of returning to China[9].
[6] CB at page 87.
[7] CB at page 87.
[8] CB at page 88.
[9] CB at page 88.
He said that on his arrival in Australia he went to Chinatown in Sydney. He saw Falun Gong material which set out the PRC government’s persecution of practitioners of Falun Gong. He read Chinese-Australian media about the PRC government and this stirred antipathy towards the authorities in China. The decision of the RRT then records the following as a summary of what the applicant told the RRT member[10]:
Because of those feelings, one day he declared publicly, in Chinatown, his withdrawal from the Communist party. He feared persecution as a result of this action.
[10] CB at page 88.
The applicant also confirmed that he did not leave China to escape persecution[11].
[11] CB at 88.
The RRT’s decision
The RRT reviewed at length the claims and evidence. First, it reviewed the applicable law. It then set out the claims and evidence.
The RRT records in its decision that at the hearing on 21 December 2005 the applicant was given the opportunity to “summarise his fears of returning to China”[12]. At that point, according to the RRT’s decision, the applicant detailed his claims concerning his renunciation of the Chinese Communist Party while at Chinatown in Sydney[13].
[12] CB at 88.
[13] CB at 88.
Finally, the RRT set out its findings and reasons for finding the applicant was not a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
The RRT accepted that the applicant had PRC nationality.
Despite having grave doubts about the veracity of the applicant’s account of his act of public renunciation of his Chinese Communist Party membership in Sydney, the RRT assessed the applicant’s claim on the basis that the applicant did make such a public announcement[14].
[14] CB at 90.
The RRT found that the single act identified by the applicant as giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecution was not done simply to strengthen his claim he was a refugee[15], but to actually establish a basis upon which to claim to be a refugee[16]. The applicant could point to no other act outside Australia (i.e. in China) to support his claims that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
[15] CB at 90-91.
[16] CB at 91.
As the applicant could not satisfy the RRT that the act or conduct engaged in by the applicant in Sydney was not ‘other than for the purpose of strengthening [his] claim to be a refugee’, the RRT disregarded the identified act in its assessment of whether the applicant was a refugee: s.91R (3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”).
For this reason the RRT found the applicant was not a refugee and affirmed the delegate’s decision[17].
[17] CB at 92.
The judicial review application
The applicant now relies upon an amended application filed on 31 August 2006 pursuant to the leave granted by me. Although that application asserts four grounds of review, only the last ground is pressed. That ground is that the RRT failed to comply with the obligation created by s.424A of the Migration Act to inform the applicant that, pursuant to s.91R, it would disregard any conduct engaged in by him in Australia unless he could satisfy the RRT that he engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee. The following particulars are provided:
The Tribunal disregarded the applicant’s conduct in publicly renouncing his membership of the Chinese Communist Party in Sydney’s Chinatown in its assessment of whether he had a well‑founded fear of Convention-related persecution if he returned to China. The Tribunal did not disclose to the applicant that it would disregard such conduct unless the applicant could satisfy it that he engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim.
Submissions
The applicant was represented at the trial of this matter by Mr Derek Hand who also prepared written submissions which were filed on 22 September 2006. Mr Hand appeared pro bono publico. The Court appreciates the willingness of counsel to appear on this basis. In his submissions Mr Hand notes the operation of s.91R(3) of the Migration Act and the impact of that section upon the sole ground for protection relied upon by the applicant.
At the hearing, the RRT explained to the applicant the effect of s.91R(3)[18]. The RRT, in its decision, also says it invited the applicant “to provide further detail of his experiences in Sydney.” Later in the RRT’s decision, it states in relation to section 91R(3):[19]
The Tribunal explained to the applicant the operation of this provision. Taking into account that he was not accompanied by an adviser, the Tribunal asked him to explain the circumstances which led him to make the announcement, thus providing him with an opportunity to demonstrate the relevant purpose of his act.
[18] CB at 88
[19] CB at 90
The RRT concluded:[20]
… the Tribunal finds that the applicant’s act was for the express purpose of not simply ‘strengthening’ but actually establishing a basis upon which to claim refugee status. It follows that the appellant has not satisfied the Tribunal that his conduct in Sydney in July 2005 was ‘other than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee’. The Tribunal therefore disregards it in its assessment of whether he has a well founded fear of persecution if he returns to China, as required by s 91R(3) of the Act.
[20] CB at 91, paras 3 and 4
Mr Hand therefore submits that s.91R(3) was the reason, or part of the reason, for the RRT’s decision to affirm the decision under review. Mr Hand submits that, in the circumstances, the RRT was obliged, pursuant to s.424A, to provide to the applicant information concerning the operation of s.91R(3) in writing. That obligation was not met.
The applicant thus asserts jurisdictional error.
The Minister contends as follows:
The only “information” that could be identified as being information to which the obligation in s424A (1) might apply is the information that the applicant publicly renounced his membership of the Chinese Communist Party in Sydney’s Chinatown;
That the Tribunal concluded that this information should be disregarded by reason of s91R (3) unless the applicant could satisfy the Tribunal that he engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his refugee claim, was not “information” within the meaning of s424A (1); and,
The “information” … to which the obligation in s424A (1) might otherwise apply, was in the circumstances of this case, information ‘that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application’, and by reason of s424A (3)(b) the obligation in s424A (1) did not apply to that information.
By reference to authority to what is “information” for the purposes of s.424A the Minister contends that the only “information” that could be identified as being information to which the obligation in s.424A might apply is the information concerning the applicant’s conduct in publicly renouncing his membership of the Chinese Communist Party at Sydney’s Chinatown. Whilst that information was contained in the applicant’s protection visa statement, it was repeated orally at the hearing conducted by the RRT. The Minister contends that it is open to the Court to conclude that it was the information provided orally by the applicant at the hearing which the RRT relied upon and that s.424A(3)(b) applies to that information. The Minister further contends that there was no obligation under s.424A to explain the RRT’s thinking processes or the operation of the Migration Act.
Reasoning
I accept that s.91R(3) was not “information” for the purposes of s.424A and neither was the reasoning process adopted by the RRT in relation to the application of that section. I accept the Minister’s submissions in that regard:
It is now accepted by the Full Federal Court that “information” in s424A (1) is used in its ordinary sense of “knowledge communicated or received concerning some fact or circumstance”: see VAF v MIMIA (2004) 206 ALR 471 at 476-477 at [24], see also VWFP & Anor v MIMIA at [35] and Tin v MIMIA [2000] FCA 1109 at [53].
In VAF v MIMIA Finn and Stone JJ accepted (at [24]) that (amongst other things):
…
(ii) the word "information" in s424A (1) has the same meaning as in s424: Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 105 FCR 212 at [20]; and in this setting it refers to knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to or received by the Tribunal: Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [3]; irrespective of whether it is reliable or has a sound factual basis: Win, at [19] – [22]; and
(iii) the word does not encompass the Tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations: Tin at [54]; Paul at [95]; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; appr [2002] FCAFC 120; nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc: WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at [26] – [29].
The above passage was approved by the Full Court in SZEEU v MIMIA (2006) 150 FCR 214 at [20], [157] and [219] – a decision made after the High Court decision in SAAP v MIMIA (2005) 215 ALR 162.
There is no doubt that the applicant had only one ground upon which he claimed to be a refugee. That is the claim that he publicly denounced the Chinese Communist Party in Chinatown in Sydney. The claim is reproduced in the applicant’s statement at page 27 of the court book and was relevantly quoted in full by the RRT at page 87 of the court book. That statement, as reproduced by the RRT is as follows:
… I came to Australia on a visitor visa on 14 July 2005. My original intention was to visit Australia for half a month. But during the past 10 days something important happened and that changed my mind. So now I want to apply for a protection visa.
I became a member of the Chinese communist party in 1970, when I was working for a factory producing agricultural machines. In those years, people respected the communist party very much, and I was very proud of becoming a communist. I thought all the Chinese people should thank the communist party for bringing a new life in a new communist society. Then we experienced the 10-year cultural revolution, which partly changed my attitude toward communism and the communist party. I saw innocent people suffering a lot during the chaos. When the reform and opening-up began, people thought their lives would be better. But in 1993 I lost my job and became unemployed. I started to feel that there was something wrong with communism or socialism. I was lucky that I got a new job immediately in a privately owned company and after years of hard work, I became a manager.
During the last few days, I have accessed some information that I could never know in China, mostly from the newspaper named ‘the Epoch Times’. The newspaper reveals the Chinese government’s persecution of Falun Gong and democratic people, it also reveals the nature of the Communist Party, of which I was a member. Last week in Chinatown, I publicly renounced my affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party. Mr Yonglin Chen’s brave behaviour also encouraged me to do that. I believe that China will have a better future without the Communist Party’s dictatorship.
If I return to China, I will possibly be persecuted because the government may have [come to know of] my renouncement of my CCP membership.
The presiding member then describes what occurred at the RRT hearing on 1 December 2005. Relevantly, the presiding member says:
Asked to summarise his fears of returning to China, the Applicant said that on arrival in Australia he went to (Sydney’s) Chinatown and saw Falun Gong material which set out the PRC Government’s persecution of practitioners. He read in the Chinese-Australian media more about the PRC Government, and this stirred in him his own antipathy towards the authorities. Because of those feelings, one day he declared in public, in Chinatown, his withdrawal from the Communist Party. He now feared persecution as a result of this action.
The applicant thus restated in summary form what he had put in his protection visa application.
Under the heading “Findings and Reasons” the presiding member said:
Essentially, it is the Applicant’s claim that he fears persecution from the PRC authorities, for reason of his political opinion, actual and imputed. They will target him because they will have come to know of his public renunciation of his Communist Party membership in Sydney in July 2005. He did this because, since arriving in Australia, he became aware of the Communist Party’s dictatorial style and of its human rights abuses.
The Applicant’s evidence at hearing indicates that he did not leave China for fear of persecution, or that there were any incidents of past harm which might contribute to a real chance assessment of prospective persecution.
The Applicant identified a single act which, he claimed, gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution, namely his public renunciation of his Communist Party membership in Sydney’s Chinatown in July 2005. The Tribunal has before it only the Applicant’s bare assertion that this happened. He states that he did so in a busy city location, with some 10 to 20 unidentified persons looking on. The account was extremely vague, and his evidence (such as the lack of any repercussions for his family in China) did not suggest that his act attracted adverse attention from anyone. The Tribunal has grave doubts about the veracity of this account, but is unable to find with confidence that it did not take place. It therefore assesses his claims on the basis that he did make such a public announcement: see Guo, referred to above; Rajasundaram v Minister for Immigration and Multicualtral Affairs (1999) 51 ALD 682; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FRC [sic] 220.
The presiding member then considered the applicant’s claim in the context of s.91R(3) of the Migration Act. The presiding member said:
Sub-section 91R(3) of the Act requires the decision-maker to ‘disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless […] the person satisfies [him or her] that the person engaged in the conduct other than for the purpose of strengthening [his or her] claim to be a refugee […]’. The Tribunal explained to the Applicant the operation of this provision. Taking into account that he was not accompanied by an adviser, the Tribunal asked him to explain the circumstances which led him to make the announcement, thus providing him with an opportunity to demonstrate the relevant purpose of his act.
The Applicant referred to two relevant circumstances: (a) his political awakening, after reading in Australia about China’s political and human rights situation, and (b) his wish to follow the path taken by Chen Yonglin.
Regarding (a) his political opinion, the Tribunal accepts that the Applicant, like many compatriots, has opinions on China’s management, coloured of course by his own life experiences. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant has some negative views on aspects of China’s social and economic development. The Applicant hinted in his protection visa application that in 1993, when he was unemployed, he came to link these problems with ‘communism or socialism’, i.e. with the political and economic system. However, the Applicant’s oral evidence indicated that any such view was highly generalised, and did not form the basis for any political interest or engagement. Indeed, in stating that he did not leave China to flee persecution or with the intention of seeking refugee status, he was in effect indicating that he did not have any political opinion which might give him reason to even contemplate future problems with the authorities.
The Applicant invites the Tribunal to accept that after arriving in Australia, his political opinion changed within a very short period. The essential elements of this are that he found written materials critical of China’s political system and human rights record (such as the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners); that he read and accepted their contents; that this new information reinforced his earlier dissatisfaction with China’s political and economic course; and that – on the strength of these materials alone, without any political discourse or exchange with others – he was suddenly motivated to withdraw his long-term membership of the Communist Party as a genuine act of political self-expression. This claim lacks credibility. The Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant’s thoughts or reservations about China’s politics formed the genesis or trigger for a sudden change of political views or profile in Australia. It does not accept that a long-standing Communist Party member would suddenly, and without reflection or consultation, do a complete political turnaround. It also does not accept that a genuine political awakening would manifest itself in a momentary public announcement, followed by a retreat into inactivity. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the Applicant developed a genuine new political opinion in less than two weeks in Australia, and is therefore not satisfied that this was the reason for his public action.
Regarding (b) the Applicant’s knowledge of Chen Yonglin, the Applicant also claimed that he had heard about Chen Yonglin after arriving in Australia, considered him brave, and decided to follow his course. The critical elements of the Applicant’s knowledge of Chen Yonglin were: (i) that the Chinese consular official had denounced the PRC Government, and (ii) that he had been permitted to remain in Australia. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant may admire Chen Yonglin’s boldness, from both a political perspective and the practical outcomes he achieved for him and his family. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant was motivated by Chen Yonglin’s political opinion and actions, or by the combined effect of Chen Yonglin’s actions and the printed materials he read, to announce publicly his withdrawal from the Communist Party.
The material before the Tribunal does not reveal any further factors suggesting that the Applicant’s conduct was ‘other than for the purpose of strengthening [his] claim to be a refugee’. What the Tribunal is left with are, first, the Applicant’s awareness that Chen Yonglin was permitted to remain in Australia following public criticism of the PRC Government, and, second, the Applicant’s perhaps naïve or ill-informed expectation that he, too, might be able to remain in Australia if he followed Chen Yonglin’s example. In other words, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant’s act was for the express purpose of not simply ‘strengthening’, but actually establishing a basis upon which to claim refugee status.
It follows that the Applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that his conduct in Sydney in July 2005 was ‘other than for the purpose of strengthening [his] claim to be a refugee’. The Tribunal therefore disregards it in its assessment of whether he has a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution if he returns to China, as required by s. 91R(3) of the Act.
I conclude that the RRT decision was based upon the following considerations:
a)the applicant had made a sur place claim of a well-founded fear of persecution;
b)that was the only basis upon which the applicant claimed protection;
c)notwithstanding its doubts, the RRT accepted that the asserted conduct in Australia occurred;
d)the applicant failed to persuade the RRT that the conduct was engaged in other than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee; and
e)the conduct therefore had to be disregarded and it necessarily followed that the decision of the delegate had to be affirmed.
There may be a question whether s.91R(3) operated in this case.
That is because the applicant’s asserted conduct was (as was recognised by the presiding member) not engaged in simply for the purposes of strengthening his claim to be a refugee: it was, rather, the sole basis for his claim to be refugee. It is not entirely clear to me whether s.91R(3) has any application in a case where the relevant conduct forms the sole basis of a claim for protection rather than is engaged in for the purposes of strengthening a claim for protection. The issue was, however, not argued before me and it is not appropriate that I should express any concluded view about it.
There is no doubt that the information concerning the applicant’s conduct in Australia was substantially determinative of the outcome of the review before the RRT. The question is whether that information was what the applicant said in writing in his protection visa application or what he said orally at the RRT hearing or both. If it was what the applicant said orally at the hearing that the RRT relied upon, then it is at least arguable that no disclosure was required because of the operation of s.424A(3)(b) of the Migration Act: see SZDPY v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCA 627.
In my view, it is apparent from the decision and reasons of the RRT that it relied both upon the protection visa statement and the applicant’s oral evidence. The protection visa statement is relevantly reproduced in full and the RRT regarded it as important in identifying the basis for the applicant’s claim to be a refugee. It would have been apparent before the hearing that s.91R(3) presented a potential obstacle to the applicant’s claim. However, the RRT could not be sure about that unless satisfied that the applicant had only one claim to be a refugee, being a sur place claim, that the conduct asserted actually happened and that the conduct was not engaged in for a purpose other than supporting his claim to be a refugee. That is presumably why the applicant was invited to a hearing and why he was asked about his fears of returning to China. The RRT did not need to be told twice what the conduct was. The RRT did need to satisfy itself whether there was any other basis upon which the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in China. I find that it was for that reason that the applicant was asked to summarise his fears of returning to China.
I find that the RRT relied upon the applicant’s protection visa application to identify his relevant conduct in Australia and relied upon his oral evidence to confirm that there was no other basis upon which he claimed to be a refugee. The RRT also relied upon the applicant’s oral evidence in order to satisfy itself that the asserted conduct in Australia in fact occurred and in order to assess the reason for that conduct.
I conclude that the information contained in the applicant’s protection visa application was a part of the reason for affirming the decision of the delegate. Although the applicant provided a short summary of that information in response to a general question from the RRT at the hearing, it was not so detailed as to amount to a complete restatement of that information. Neither could it be said to be information volunteered “in chief”[21]. The information was given in response to a question from the RRT which was, in my view, seeking to explore whether there were any alternative bases for the applicant’s fear.
For those reasons I distinguish this case from SZDPY.
[21] NAZY v Minister for Immigration (2005) 87 ALD 357
It follows, and I find, that the RRT was obliged to give the applicant the opportunity to comment upon information contained in his protection visa statement pursuant to s.424A(1). In addition, the RRT was obliged to explain why that information was significant to the outcome of the review[22]. The significance here was that the applicant’s review application must fail if that was his only claim, if the conduct actually occurred and if the conduct was engaged in for the purpose of supporting his claim to be a refugee. Section 424A(1)(b) required in this instance that the RRT explain in writing the impact of s.91R(3) so as to give an effective opportunity for the applicant to comment. The obligation arose after the hearing when (as it apparent from the RRT reasons) the presiding member had formed the relevant views enlivening the operation of s.91R(3).
[22] Minister for Immigration v SZGMF [2006] FCAFC 138
The failure by the RRT to meet its obligations under s.424A constitutes jurisdictional error[23]. The applicant is therefore entitled to relief in the form of the constitutional writs of certiorari and mandamus.
[23] SZEEU v Minister for Immigration (2006) 150 FCR 214
I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Driver FM
Associate:
Date: 19 October 2006
2
13
1