SZILQ v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZILQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2007] FMCA 483
MIGRATION – RRT decision – Chinese applicant claiming persecution for Christian religion – previous Tribunal decision quashed – no obligation to invite to second hearing – s.424A letter sufficiently sent to agent’s facsimile number – no warning required of s.91R(3) issue concerning religious activities in Australia – interpreter at hearing not inadequate – application for judicial review dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 91R, 91R(3), 412, 414A, 414A(1)(b), 415(2), 418(2), 422, 424A, 424A(1), 424A(2), 425, 425(1), 425(2), 430, 430(1), 441AA, 441A(5), 441G(1), 474(1), 476(1), 477(1), 477(2), 494B(5)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.5.02

Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Le v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 20
Liu & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZFML & Anor (2006) 154 FCR 572
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162
Song & Anor v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 685
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63
SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2005] FMCA 1614
SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 107
SZFAS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1029
SZGNY v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1142
SZGNY v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 384
VWFY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1723

Applicant: SZILQ
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG3769 of 2006
Judgment of: Smith FM
Hearing date: 26 March 2007
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 16 April 2007

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Jones
Solicitors for the Applicant: Michael Jones, Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Smith
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The time for making the application provided by s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is extended so as to include 15 December 2006.

  2. The application is dismissed. 

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG3769 of 2006

SZILQ

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application filed on 15 December 2006 under s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”), which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated and handed down on 14 November 2006. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 16 December 2005, which refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant.

  2. Under s.476(1) the Court has “the same original jurisdiction in…

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Details
Case
[2007] FMCA 483
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZILQ v Minister for Immigration & Anor, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in relation to their application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the RRT had not properly considered certain evidence and that the decision was flawed. The applicant also sought to distinguish the case from SZEPZ by referencing a provision in the Migration Act that imposes a 90-day target for the determination of a proceeding before the RRT. The court was required to decide whether the RRT was required to repeat any procedural steps in the proceedings on a review that occurred prior to the remission of a matter. The court found that the provision did not indicate that the review proceeding was to be deemed to have been initiated afresh and that the resumed proceeding was to be conducted in disregard of all the proceedings leading to the decision which was quashed.

The court held that the only intention of the amending provision was that a 90-day target was to continue to run in such a case. The court further held that even if the implications were not open, and even if it might appear unlikely in many cases that the resumed review could be concluded within the literally described 90-day period, the court was unable to find in the provision an indication that the review proceeding which the Tribunal was required to continue by reason of a court order was to be deemed to have been initiated afresh. The court also held that the terms of the order for a writ of mandamus did not give rise to any duty to perform duties which had previously been validly performed in the review proceeding. The court found that the RRT was not required to repeat any procedural steps in the proceedings on a review that occurred prior to the remission of a matter.

In the present case, the method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to a person in immigration detention was found in reg.5.02 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The court held that the Tribunal had discretion to choose any appropriate method of communicating to the applicant's agent, including by facsimile to the number shown on her letterhead, if it thought that this was "appropriate". The court accepted the submission that in the present case, the repeated tendering to the Tribunal by the applicant's agent of her office facsimile number, and her failure to voice any objection to its communicating with her at that number, amounted to that number being "provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review".

The court dismissed the application and extended the time for making the application so as to include 15 December 2006.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The time for making the application provided by s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is extended so as to include 15 December 2006.

2.

The application is dismissed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The solicitor for the applicant also sought to distinguish SZEPZ, by reference to a provision which was inserted into the Migration Act by recent amendments. This imposes a 90 day target for the determination of a proceeding before the Tribunal. Section 414A now provides: Period within which Refugee Review Tribunal must review decision on protection visas (1)If an application for review of an RRT‑reviewable decision: (a)was validly made under section 412; or (b)was remitted by any court to the Refugee Review Tribunal for reconsideration; then the Refugee Review Tribunal must review the decision under section 414 and record its decision under section 430 within 90 days starting on the day on which the Secretary gave the Registrar the documents that subsection 418(2) requires the Secretary to give to the Registrar. (2)Failure to comply with this section does not affect the validity of a decision made under section 415 on an application for review of an RRT‑reviewable decision. I can find nothing in the language of this provision which requires a reconsideration of the analysis of a review proceeding provided by SZEPZ. I cannot read s.414A as raising a new obligation on the Secretary under s.418(2) in cases where the Secretary has already performed that obligation prior to a remittal by a Court, nor an implication that any other procedural step in the proceedings on a review which occurred prior to the remission of a matter must be repeated after the remission. The only intention of the amending provision which I can perceive in paragraph (b) of s.414A(1) is that a 90 day target is to continue to run in such a case. Section 414A appears poorly drafted, and to give reasonable effect to its intention it may be necessary to find an implication in s.414A that the 90 day period arising under (b) is to be calculated without reference to the period before the remitting order or without reference to the period of judicial review. However, even if these implications are not open, and even if it might appear unlikely in many cases that the resumed review could be concluded within the literally described 90 day period, I am unable to find in s.414A an indication that the review proceeding which the Tribunal is required to continue by reason of a court order is to be deemed to have been initiated afresh, and that the resumed proceeding is to be conducted in disregard of all the proceedings leading to the decision which was quashed. Nor, in my opinion, did the terms of the court’s order for remission in the present case give rise to any duty to perform duties which had previously been validly performed in the review proceeding. In the present case, the terms of the order for a writ of mandamus were that the Tribunal “redetermine the matter according to law”. This required only that the Tribunal should make a decision on the review under ss.415(2) and 430(1) which validly determined the matter. It made no requirement which is not otherwise found in the legislation as to any procedure to be followed, or repeated, before the ordered redetermination was to be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the present case, the “method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents” to a person in immigration detention, was found in reg.5.02 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), which provided: Service of document on person in immigration detention For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations, a document to be served on a person in immigration detention may be served by giving it to the person himself or herself, or to another person authorised by him or her to receive documents on his or her behalf. In the absence of any specific procedure defining how the Tribunal was to “give” the s.424A invitation to the applicant’s authorised recipient, s.441AA gave a general discretion: Giving documents by Tribunal where no requirement to do so by section 441A or 441B method If: (a)a provision of this Act or the regulations requires or permits the Tribunal to give a document to a person; and (b)the provision does not state that the document must be given: (i) by one of the methods specified in section 441A or 441B; or (ii) by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to a person in immigration detention; the Tribunal may give the document to the person by any method that it considers appropriate (which may be one of the methods mentioned in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section). Note:Under section 441G an applicant may give the Tribunal the name of an authorised recipient who is to receive documents on the applicant’s behalf. This provision for “giving” communications to the applicant, applied also to giving them to an authorised recipient “instead of the applicant” under s.441G(1) (see Le v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 20 at [19], and Song & Anor v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 685 at [33]). Counsel for the Minister submitted that s.441AA gave the Tribunal power to choose any appropriate method of communicating to the applicant’s agent, including by facsimile to the number shown on her letterhead, if it thought that this was “appropriate”. In circumstances where this had become the usual and apparently reliable mode of communication, it was clearly open to the Tribunal to adopt that opinion. I accept this submission. I also accept his alternative submission, which assumed that the Tribunal might have considered it appropriate to adopt the method set out in s.441A(5) (cf. Le v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 20 at [22]). This provided: Transmission by fax, e‑mail or other electronic means (5)Another method consists of a member, the Registrar or an officer of the Tribunal, transmitting the document by: (a)fax; or (b)e‑mail; or (c)other electronic means; to the last fax number, e‑mail address or other electronic address, as the case may be, provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review. Counsel for the Minister argued that in the present case, the repeated tendering to the Tribunal by the applicant’s agent of her office facsimile number, and her failure to voice any objection to its communicating with her at that number, amounted to that number being “provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review”. I accept that submission. The words “provided … in connection with the review” are broad, and do not carry the implication of an agreed or designated address for receiving documents, which is found, for example, in another service provision of the Migration Act, s.494B(5) which refers to a facsimile number “provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents”.