SZIDC v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 577
•19 April 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZIDC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 577 |
| MIGRATION – Refugee – jurisdiction – extension of time – did Tribunal give applicant proper opportunity to appear before it – Tribunal was entitled to proceed – proper enquiry – state protection – no failure to comply with s.424A – no jurisdictional error revealed – application dismissed. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.36(2), 65, 422B, 424A, 424A(1), 424A(2), 424A(3), 425, 425A, 426A, 427, 441A, 441C, 441G, 476, 477(1), 477(2), 486A Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) Migration Regulations 1994, Regulation 4.35D. |
| Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14 SZICV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 39 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 212 SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 215 NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 VNAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 134 NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 SZFVG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1179 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 SZEZI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1195 SZFXC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 381 SZEFM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 78 | ||
| Applicant: | SZIDC | |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 157 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Nicholls FM |
| Hearing date: | 17 April 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 11 April 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 19 April 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr. M. J. O'Meara |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Blake Dawson Waldron |
ORDERS
The reference to the name of the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
The application is dismissed.
The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $2,500.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 157 of 2006
| SZIDC |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
I have before me an application filed in this Court on 17 January 2006 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) signed on 13 October 2005 and handed down on
13 November 2005 affirming the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant. The Minister’s Response filed in this Court on 31 August 2006 seeks dismissal of this application, asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”), as the application was filed outside the 28 day period of the actual notification of the Tribunal’s decision.
Background
The applicant is a citizen of India who arrived in Australia on
27 September 2004. He lodged an application with the first respondent’s Department on 5 November 2004. On 14 July 2005 a delegate of the respondent Minister refused to grant a protection visa. On 9 August 2005 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision.
Claims to protection
The applicant claimed that he feared persecution from the Hindu community and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (“RSS”), a Hindu nationalist organisation, because he promoted atheism. He claimed that “they will seek to harm him” and that they have “filed a case against him”. The applicant claimed that he had a series of problems with a local RSS leader, “Laxmanan”, namely that:
1)In local elections in which Laxmanan’s father was a candidate, the applicant supported the successful Christian candidate;
2)The suicide of Laxmanan’s sister was attributed to her thwarted relationship with the applicant’s Christian friend;
3)The applicant’s involvement in a dispute between the Hindu and Christian communities over access to burial grounds caused incitement by Laxmanan of the Hindu community against him; and
4)The Hindu community concluded that the applicant murdered Laxmanan and filed a case against him.
The applicant’s claims are set out this application for a protection visa in the Court Book (“CB”) at CB 1 to CB 26, and particularly in a handwritten statement dated 5 November 2004 in support of this application (CB 30 to CB 34). The applicant’s review application (reproduced at CB 48 to CB 51) contained no further information relevant to the applicant’s protection visa claims.
Tribunal’s findings
The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” are set out at CB 72.6 to CB 75.4. The Tribunal noted that due the applicant’s failure to take up the opportunity to attend the scheduled hearing before it, it was unable to obtain further information to determine the veracity of his claims and whether they established persecution within the meaning of the Refugees Convention and the Act. On the “limited” evidence before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that:
1)The applicant was an active promoter of atheism (CB 74.8).
2)The incidents involving him and Laxmanan occurred as described for the claimed reasons of religion and politics, or for any other Convention ground (CB 74.9).
3)The applicant was “subject to past harm of any kind”, and further that he would be subject to “any ongoing or future threats” from the Hindus or the RSS (CB 74.10).
4)The material before it did not establish that the applicant had a well founded fear of Convention related persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returns to India (CB 75.1).
On this basis it concluded it could not be satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations pursuant to the Refugees Convention.
Applicant’s Claims Before the Court
I have before me, for the applicant:
1)An originating application filed in this Court on 17 January 2006.
2)An affidavit sworn by the applicant on 17 January 2006.
3)Written submissions filed in this Court on 5 April 2007.
The applicant’s originating application raises the following grounds of complaint:
“ 1.RRT decision was affected by jurisdictional error. RRT did not give me chance to appear in the Tribunal or my oral evidence.
2.RRT decision was not supported by a proper enquiry in to the material facts related to the subject matter of the threat.
3. The state failed to provide the protection effectively as the magnitude of the issue was relied upon the social and political.”
The applicant’s written submissions, for the most part, assert matters going to the merits of the applicant’s refugee claims. There is a reference to s.424A (an issue not raised in the application). No particularity whatsoever is provided. The submissions also assert that the applicant did not seek an extension of time for the making of the application. The affidavit seeks to provided reasons for this.
Hearing before the Court
Before me today, Mr. M. O’Meara of Counsel appeared for the Minister. The applicant appeared in person and was assisted by an interpreter in the Hindi language. The applicant stated that he had problems in India, and that he cannot go back as his life will be in danger if he returns. The applicant did not say anything further in support of the proposition that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The applicant said that he did not attend the Tribunal hearing, but would like to be provided with another opportunity to present his case before the Tribunal so that he would be able to “prove” that there are problems in his country.
Judicial review – jurisdiction
The application to this Court was made on 17 January 2006. The applicant claims, on the face of his original application to this Court, to have been notified of the Tribunal’s decision on 8 November 2005. The applicant seeks review pursuant to s.476 of the Act. Section 477 imposes time limits for the making of applications seeking remedies in the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction under s.476. Sections 477(1) and (2) provide:
“SECT 477
Time limits on applications to the Federal Magistrates Court
(1) An application to the Federal Magistrates Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 28 days of the actual (as opposed to deemed) notification of the decision.
(2) The Federal Magistrates Court may, by order, extend that 28 day period by up to 56 days if:
(a) an application for that order is made within 84 days of the actual (as opposed to deemed) notification of the decision; and
(b) the Federal Magistrates Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to do so.”
I also note that amendments to the Act, made by the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) (“the reform Act”) (Act No. 137 of 2005 – s.3 and Schedule 1), apply to the circumstances of the matter before me. Irrespective of exactly when actual notification occurred, Schedule 1 Clause 42(a) to the reform Act provides for transitional provisions to apply to decisions made before the commencement day of the reform Act (1 December 2005) in the following terms:
“Where proceedings are commenced on or after the commencement day in relation to a migration decision made before the commencement day, and actual notification of the decision is given before the commencement day:
(a)section 477 of the Migration Act 1958 applies as if the actual notification of the decision took place on the commencement day; and
(b)section 477A of that Act applies as if the actual notification of the decision took place on the commencement day; and
(c)section 486A of that Act applies as if the actual notification of the decision took place on the commencement day.”
The application before the Court now concerns a Tribunal decision which, for the purposes of s.477, is a migration decision. In all therefore, where applications are made to this Court after 1 December 2005 (as in this case), and where actual notification of the migration decision occurred before 1 December 2005 (as in this case) the application must be made to the Court within 28 days of 1 December 2005. This has not occurred. On that basis the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the application.
I do note that yesterday the High Court handed down judgment in Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14 (“Bodruddaza”), which concerned s.486A of the Act and the placement of time limits on applications to the High Court seeking the exercise of the High Court’s original jurisdiction. That matter concerned s.486A. No specific mention is made in the High Court’s judgment of the time limits imposed on applications to this Court by s.477. (See also [24] of Bodruddaza and in particular footnote 5).
In light of this I take the view that I am bound by the majority of the Full Federal Court in SZICV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 39 (“SZICV”) (per Buchanan J. at [43] to [68] and particularly at [67] with whom Besanko J. agreed at [18]). In that judgment note is taken of the challenge to the validity of s.486A before the High Court in Bodruddaza at [45], but the purported limitation on the jurisdiction of the High Court (s.486A) is distinguished from the intention to limit the jurisdiction of this Court (see [48] in SZICV). Ultimately, the Court found at [67] in SZICV that there was “no doubt about the effectiveness or validity of the restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court imposed by s.477 of the Act”.
Extension of time
In any event, the provisions of s.477(2) provide discretion in the Court to extend the 28 day period by up to a further 56 days if the Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. The application form used for the purpose of making such applications to this Court contains a relevant part asking whether the applicant seeks an extension of time pursuant to s.477. In written submissions filed in this Court on 5 April 2007 the applicant asserts that:
“It was a clerical error that I have marked ‘NO’ for the question regarding extension of time. It was off my mind and could not decide about what was required to be done by me at that particular time.” (paragraph 5)
The applicant’s confusion appears to have extended to April 2007, because on the application form used to make the application to the Court the applicant has marked the “YES” box in answer to the relevant question.
In any event, I am satisfied that the applicant has sought an extension of time, within time, for the making of his application to the Court. In this regard I turn to consider the exercise of the discretion pursuant to s.477(2) and whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant such an extension. (No issue was taken by the Minister on this point).
One relevant issue to this consideration is whether the Tribunal’s decision reveals jurisdictional error on the following grounds.
The application to the Court asserts jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal’s decision:
1)The Tribunal did not give the applicant the opportunity to appear before it.
2)The Tribunal’s decision was not supported by proper enquiry.
3)A failure of state protection in India.
The applicant’s written submissions add:
4)An unparticularised assertion that the Tribunal failed to take prescribed steps pursuant to s.424A.
Failure to attend at Tribunal hearing
The date of application for review to the Tribunal and the date of the Tribunal’s decision occurred after the introduction of s.422B to the Act, which makes the provisions set out in Division 4, Part 7 of the Act the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 212 at 225 [66]; and SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 at [8]). Relevantly, s.425 provides that the Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before it. Section 425A provides for other matters relevant to the notice to appear. Section 426A provides discretion to the Tribunal to proceed to make its decision if the applicant fails to appear at the scheduled time and place for the hearing. The applicant claims that the Tribunal did not give him the opportunity to appear.
The applicant’s application for review before the Tribunal is reproduced at CB 48 to CB 51. At CB 49 the applicant notified the Tribunal that he had an adviser (a registered migration agent) to act for him. He further advised (CB 50) that correspondence was to be sent to his adviser (as well as to his residential address).
Relevantly, s.441G of the Act provides that:
“SECT 441G
Authorised recipient
(1) If:
(b) the applicant gives the Tribunal written notice of the name and address of another person (the authorised recipient ) authorised by the applicant to do things on behalf of the applicant that consist of, or include, receiving documents in connection with the review;
the Tribunal must give the authorised recipient, instead of the applicant, any document that it would otherwise have given to the applicant.
Note: If the Tribunal gives a person a document by a method specified in section 441A, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 441C in respect of that method.
(2) If the Tribunal gives a document to the authorised recipient, the Tribunal is taken to have given the document to the applicant. However, this does not prevent the Tribunal giving the applicant a copy of the document.”
On 14 September 2005 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant by letter sent to his authorised recipient, at the address notified in his application for review, advising that it had considered all the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision in the applicant’s case on that information alone. The letter made specific reference to the agent as “authorised recipient” and noted the importance to the agent of his communicating the content of the letter to the applicant.
The Tribunal invited the applicant to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 11 October 2005 (CB 55 to CB 56). The letter advised that, if the applicant did not attend the hearing and a postponement was not granted, the Tribunal may make a decision on his case without further notice. No response was received. The applicant did not appear at the date, time and place at which the hearing was scheduled. In the circumstances, pursuant to s.426A of the Act, the Tribunal made its decision without taking any further action to enable the applicant to appear before it.
The Full Federal Court case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73 is authority for the proposition that the Tribunal has the power to proceed with an application pursuant to s.426A where a hearing invitation has been properly given under the Act. In this regard, I note that with reference to s.425A(3) of the Act (the effect of which is that a period of notice is required in relation to an invitation to appear before the Tribunal, and this period is prescribed by Regulation 4.35D of the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”)) the Tribunal complied with the statutory notice periods. Pursuant to Regulation 4.35D the notice period starts when the applicant receives notice of the invitation to appear before the Tribunal and ends at the end of 14 days after the day on which the notice is received. The Tribunal’s letter of invitation to the hearing was dated 14 September 2005 (pursuant to s.425) was sent to the applicant’s migration agent. The letter complied with the requirements of ss.425A and 441A(4). By virtue of s.441C(4)(a) the agent is taken to have received the letter 7 working days after 14 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled for 11 October 2005 and therefore the Tribunal complied with the prescribed period of notice.
Nor does the fact that the letter was sent to the migration agent, and not to the applicant’s home address, assist the applicant. The provisions of s.441G(1) and (2) provide that where an “authorised recipient” is nominated (as is the case here), the Tribunal “must” send the letter to the authorised recipient (as is also the case here). The Tribunal is thereby taken to have given the letter to the applicant.
At the hearing before the Court it was unclear whether the applicant was asserting (from the Bar table) that the agent did not give him the letter or tell him of its contents. The applicant provided no evidence to the Court of this, if this was his contention. In written submissions, at paragraph 7, the applicant implied that he did know of the hearing but did not attend because of “my fear for authorities”. In any event, the issue is that for the reasons set out above the Tribunal did comply with the relevant obligations in inviting the applicant to a hearing. In all the circumstances therefore the Tribunal was entitled to proceed to making the decision pursuant to s.426A of the Act.
Basis for the Tribunal’s decision
Having decided to exercise its discretion in this regard the Tribunal proceeded to consider what was before it. Section 65 of the Act provides that a protection visa must only be granted if the decision maker is satisfied, among other things, that the applicant relevantly satisfies at least the requirement as set out in s.36(2). That is, in effect, that the applicant meets the definition of “refugee” contained in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention, as amended by the Refugees Protocol. On what was put before the Tribunal it could not be satisfied that the applicant met the requisite criterion for the grant of a protection visa. No jurisdictional error is revealed merely because the facts that were put forward by the applicant did not cause the Tribunal to be satisfied (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73). On what is before the Court any plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record reveals that the Tribunal was unable to reach, on what was before it, the requisite level of satisfaction (s.65) that the applicant met the criterion in s.36(2) (see SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 215 at [15]-[16] and NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 at [4]-[5]).
I note further that in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 the Court cited the Full Federal Court’s decision in VNAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 134 at [16], where it was said:
“Part 7 of the Act (in which ss 420, 425A, 426A, 441A and 441C appear) must be read as a whole. Sections 425A, 426A, 441A and 441C are specific provisions qualifying the general provisions of s 420. The scheme they involve expressly contemplates that, in particular circumstances, an applicant will not attend a hearing, including cases involving no fault of the applicant. Notwithstanding that, the Tribunal is authorised to proceed to decide the review in the applicant’s absence.”
The Tribunal could not reach the requisite level of satisfaction. In this regard I note that similarly, where an applicant failed to appear at a hearing before the Tribunal, having been put on notice that the Tribunal was not able to be satisfied on the material before it, that a Full Federal Court has described rejection of the application as “an inevitable consequence” of the non-attendance: NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 (“NAVX”) at [5]. The applicant was put on notice as to the Tribunal's preliminary view and given the opportunity to provide further material by way of oral submissions, or written evidence at a hearing. The applicant did not avail himself of this opportunity. In these circumstances the applicant can base no complaint on the fact that on what was before it, the Tribunal was not able to be satisfied.
In a recent decision of SZFVG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1179 Edmonds J., with reference to NAVX, stated at [11]:
“In similar circumstances, where an applicant failed to appear before the Tribunal in the face of a letter (as here) putting the applicant on notice that the Tribunal was not prepared to make a decision in his favour upon the material already available (AB 41 – 42), the rejection of the application was the ‘inevitable consequence’ of the appellant’s non-attendance: NAVX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 at [5]. As a practical matter, this must be so, unless the Tribunal changes its evaluation of the same material already presented.”
Proper enquiry by the Tribunal
The applicant’s second ground of complaint is that the Tribunal’s decision was not supported by “proper inquiry”. The respondent submitted that there is no general duty on the Tribunal to make its own enquiries into an applicant’s claims. I agree that, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the Tribunal was under no obligation to make enquiries or seek further evidence. Sections 424 and 427 of the Act confer power on the Tribunal to obtain information, but do not impose an obligation, or duty, to exercise such power: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 per Gummow and Hayne JJ. at [43].
Effect of State protection
The applicant complains that “the state” failed to provide him with effective protection (presumably this is a reference to India). The applicant’s submissions do not explain how his now claimed fear of authorities in India reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The applicant’s statement in support of his refugee claims asserts fear of harm from Hindu extremists and Laxmanan (see CB 30 to CB 34). To the extent that authorities are mentioned, the applicant’s own statement says (CB 33.3) that when Laxmanan complained to the police they took no action against him:
“Laxmanan was not able to do anything with police.” (CB 33.5)
All of this was before the Tribunal. These were part of the facts in relation to which the Tribunal concluded that it was not sufficiently satisfied of the facts which formed the basis of the applicant’s claims for protection. In these circumstances where the Tribunal was not satisfied as to the applicant’s claims it was not necessary to proceed to consider separately the issue of effective or adequate state protection. Further, and in the alternative, noting of course, that no such claim appears to have been put before the Tribunal.
Section 424A – complaint about “prescribed steps”
In written submissions to the Court, at paragraph 3, the applicant states that the Tribunal “did not take the prescribed steps required under s.424A”. No particularity is provided.
As I have already noted the Tribunal’s decision turned on its inability to be satisfied, given the applicant’s failure to attend the hearing scheduled before it, on what was before it, that, in effect, the applicant met the definition of refugee.
If the applicant’s reference to s.424A is taken to be a complaint (I note the reference to SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 (“SZEEU”) in the applicant’s “List of Authorities”) that in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal failed in its obligations pursuant to s.424A, then with reference to SZEZI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1195 (“SZEZI”) per Allsop J., particularly at [28] to [30], and followed in SZFXC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 381 by Collier J. at [13] a matter on appeal from this Court, this complaint would not succeed.
As in SZEZI, the reason for the Tribunal’s decision in the case before me is that the Tribunal was unable to reach the requisite level of satisfaction such that a protection visa must be granted on what was before it. In this case Allsop J. distinguished the situation between a Tribunal relying on information, which if not caught within the exceptions contained in s.424A(3) falls within the obligations in ss.424A(1) and (2), and the situation where a Tribunal’s decision is based on its inability to reach a requisite level of satisfaction that the applicant had a well founded fear because of inadequacies in the information where the “absence of detail and extrinsic explanation which had been invited”. In these circumstances it is not the information that is the reason for the decision, but “the lack of requested further assistance and explanation…” (SZEZI at [29]). This is what has occurred in the case before me. The Tribunal’s thought processes set out in its decision record (which were the reason for its decision) were that it could not reach the requisite level of satisfaction on the “limited” evidence before it.
In this regard I note SZEFM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 78 at [23], where Bennett J. said:
“As was said by Hely J in SZDXC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2005] FCA 1306 at [16], by Bennett J in SZBKB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2005] FCA 1811 at [17] – [19] and [28] – [33] and by Allsop J in SZEZI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1195 at [29], the Tribunal was identifying the deficiencies or inadequacies in the appellant’s case. It was not relying on information communicated to or received by the Tribunal but setting out its thought processes. There was no information that the Tribunal was obliged to give to the appellant by reason of s 424A(1) (VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at [24]).”
Consistent with the authorities above, the circumstances in the case before me do not reveal that there was failure to comply with s.424A.
In all I cannot see jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. There is no other issue before me to warrant exercise of the discretion pursuant to s.477(2). In these circumstances it is not in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time. Even if I were to grant the extension, having found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision the application would be dismissed in any event. Therefore, there is no utility in doing so. The application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty (40) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM.
Associate:
Date: 19 April 2007
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