SZHSB v Minister for Immigration - [2007] FMCA 260

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZHSB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2007] FMCA 260

MIGRATION – Refugee – Tribunal had proper consideration of claims – open to Tribunal to make findings it did – findings of fact are for Tribunal –impermissible merits review sought – Tribunal may rely on country information – no actual bias or apprehension of bias – s.424A – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958, ss.418, 424A.

Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte v Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24
Al Shamry v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1679
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2
NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195
SZDPY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 627
NADH of 2001 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZGMF [2006] FCAFC 138
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal & Ors and Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal & Ors (2002) 190 ALR 601

Applicant:

SZHSB

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:	REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number:	SYG 3506 of 2005

Judgment of:

Nicholls FM

Hearing date:

5 March 2007

Date of Last Submission:

23 February 2007

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

6 March 2007

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Nil

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Nil

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms. T. Wong

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

The reference to the name of the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $3,700.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 3506 of 2005

SZHSB

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application filed in this Court on 30 November 2005 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) signed on 20 October 2005 and handed down on 15 November 2005 to affirm the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant. The Tribunal has been joined as the second respondent in these proceedings.

Background

The applicant is a citizen of India who arrived in Australia on

27 February 2005. On 5 April 2005 he lodged an application for a protection visa with the first respondent’s Department and on 5 July 2005 a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant a protection visa. On 1 August 2005 the applicant applied for review of that decision.

Claims

The applicant’s claims to protection are set out in his application for a protection visa (reproduced in Court Book (“CB”) at CB 1 to CB 30), and in his oral evidence before the Tribunal (the Tribunal’s account is reproduced at CB 78.1 to CB 78.9). His application for review to the Tribunal contained no additional matters (at CB 45 to CB 48).
The applicant’s claims to protection in Australia derive from his assertion that as a member of a Hindu organisation in India he was at risk from Muslims in that country. Specifically, that he and his family were members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) (“VHP”) and that the “local Muslims declared money for my head after the Babri Mosque incident” with which he claimed some involvement. He claimed that Muslim groups were looking for him, and that he went into hiding in “another state”, but that the “Muslims could trace me out”. Subsequently, the applicant left for Malaysia, and some time later came to Australia. Further, the applicant claimed that in March 2002 his house was burnt down and his wife killed. Consequently he claimed to fear for his life if he returned to India.

Tribunal’s findings

The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” are reproduced at CB 78.9 to CB 80.5. The Tribunal:
1)Did not accept that there was danger for a Hindu in India merely by “virtue” of being an active member of the VHP (CB 79.1).
2)Found that the applicant did not produce any supporting evidence to support this claim (CB 79.2). Further noted that India is an “overwhelmingly Hindu country”, and that while the applicant’s home state has a substantial Christian and Muslim population, it is “almost 60% Hindu” (CB 79.3).
3)Found that the applicant’s claimed involvement with the destruction of the Babri mosque is “at best tangential”, and does not form a basis for a claim “that as result people would be looking for him 13 years later” (CB 79.4).
4)Noted that in any event the applicant did not leave India until eight years after the Babri mosque incident, and had not reported “any untoward events happening to him in the meantime” (CB 79.4).
5)Was not satisfied that the applicant’s explanation for returning to India twice during the time of his employment in Malaysia was credible, and found that it suggested that he did not have a genuine fear of persecution, as claimed (CB 79.5).
6)Also found that the applicant’s explanation for not taking his wife with him to Malaysia, or visiting her while he was in Malaysia, was not credible (CB 79.5).
7)Was not satisfied that the applicant was widowed and that his wife died as result of a fire in their house, and further that this fire was deliberately lit for political, or religious, reasons (CB 79.6).
8)Found the applicant’s claims to be based on “very general and extreme claims” regarding the dangers of “an active Hindu in India from Muslims”, and could not accept his claims as they were “unsubstantiated” (CB 79.7).
9)Did not accept that the applicant had a genuine fear of persecution in India, that his wife died as a result of religious or politically motivated arson, and that his life, or wellbeing, would be in any danger if he were to return to India in the foreseeable future.
10)Found that there were many areas in India where Hindus are in an overwhelming majority to which the applicant could reasonably relocate, given his demonstrated ability to move, and his education and skills as an engineer (CB 79.9 to CB 80.1).
For all the reasons above and having considered the applicant’s evidence as a whole, the Tribunal concluded that he did not have a well founded fear of persecution in India for a Convention reason (CB 80.2).

Amended application and written submission

The applicant put forward three grounds of review in his amended application filed on 8 March 2006:
“1. The Refugee Review Tribunal made a jurisdictional error when it concluded that the applicant has no risk of persecution despite the fact that the applicant told to the Tribunal that he had been associated with the World Hindu Council (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and because of his association extremist Muslims have made target to kill him. His activities at the time of the demolition of the Babri mosque and published photo in the newspaper brought him in the light. He became a popular leader and because of that the extremist Muslims gave threatening. He left his country because of the fear from the extremist Muslims. The Tribunal fell into a jurisdictional error inasmuch as it focused its attention on the issue of credibility and it failed to take properly into account other evidence and materials in relation to the persecution by reason of religious and political beliefs.”
The applicant has particularised this complaint by saying that at the hearing before the Tribunal he had stated that he had no protection from the Indian authorities and local police and with what he had given in answer to question 44 in his protection visa application (see CB 26).
“2. The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error when it did not apply the test with the express meaning of the term “well founded fear" and "real chance of persecution" for the Convention reason. By doing this Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in failing to correctly consider and apply the test of well founded fear of persecution for the purpose of the Convention. The Tribunal completely misunderstood and misconstrued the applicant's case. The Tribunal completely relied on the letter sent by his wife which has no base. The information supplied by the applicant wife should not be total and final base for making.”
The applicant’s written submissions filed on 19 December 2006 do not appear to address the grounds in the amended application, but raise other grounds of complaint. These will be dealt with below.

Hearing before the Court

At the hearing before the Court Ms. Wong appeared for the respondent. The applicant was unrepresented. He appeared with the assistance of an interpreter in the Malayalam language. Ms. Wong advised that the Minister had not received the applicant’s written submissions. The applicant stated that he had served these submissions. In any event, after a short adjournment Ms. Wong advised she was ready to proceed.
The applicant stated that “a friend” assisted with the drafting of his documents submitted to the Court. Despite opportunity on two occasions the applicant was unable to add to what was in his application and written submissions. His statement that conditions around his “locality” in India were such that he could not return, that it was not safe because “people were looking” for him “to take his life”, and that there had been an attack on his wife and his house had been “burned”, were all claims before the Tribunal and the applicant’s restatement of them to the Court does not reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. I could not see the applicant’s oral submissions as rising above a request for impermissible merits review.

Grounds of complaint

The applicant's complaint, in ground one of his amended application, is that the Tribunal did not take into account the applicant's responses to “question 44” in the application for a protection visa. In written submissions Ms. Wong, correctly in my view, (given the applicant’s subsequent references in his application and the commonality of the subject matter), saw the applicant's complaint as also including his response to question 42 in the protection visa application (as reproduced at CB 22).
I agree with Ms. Wong that the Tribunal made express reference to the fact that the applicant had provided “typed answers to questions as to his reasons for leaving India and seeking protection” which were attached to his application for a protection visa (CB 77.8). The applicant's answer to question 42 was that he feared harm from fundamentalist Muslims who believed that he was actively involved in organising Hindu youth, under the “banner” of the VHP, and because he was also involved in riots against Muslims. He stated that he would be “found out” and would be tortured and killed. The applicant’s answer to question 44 dealt with his claim that effective state protection was not available to protect him from attacks “by the Muslim extremists”.
The Tribunal's decision record, and in particular in its “Findings and Reasons”, reveals that the Tribunal found that the claims in the protection visa application, that is, the primary application, were consistent with the applicant's presentation at the hearing before it on 20 October 2005. A plain reading of the Tribunal's “Findings and Reasons”, generally at CB 79, reveals that the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s claim to fear persecution as a result of his being an active member of the VHP. The Tribunal dealt with this claim by saying it did not accept this because the applicant produced no supporting evidence for that proposition.
Further, in relation generally to the claims of harm from Muslims arising from his being a Hindu in India, the Tribunal found that India was an overwhelmingly Hindu country, but constitutionally secular, and that in any event even in the applicant's home state which had a substantial Christian and Muslim population, it was still almost 60% Hindu.
In relation to the applicant's claims of his involvement in the destruction of the Babri mosque, and that he therefore drew attention to himself from fundamentalist Muslims, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s claimed involvement was at best “tangential” and there was no basis for a claim that people would be looking for him 13 years later. Further, the Tribunal noted that the applicant did not leave India until eight years after this event, and reported nothing “untoward” happening to him in the meantime.
On any plain reading of the Tribunal's decision record I cannot see that the Tribunal failed to address the applicant's claims. It is plain, as the Tribunal stated, that having accepted that the applicant was a citizen of India it did not “accept much else”. The applicant's complaints now in these circumstances can only be seen as a complaint that the Tribunal did not accept his claims. The Tribunal of course is not required to do so, having given proper consideration, it was open to the Tribunal on what was before it to make the findings that it did. To the extent that these findings were reliant on the Tribunal finding his claims were not credible, then this also, as McHugh J. observed in Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte v Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 at [67], comes within the role of the Tribunal as decision maker “par excellence”. Ground one is therefore not made out.
The applicant’s second ground of complaint in the amended application is that the Tribunal did not apply the test of “well founded fear” and “real chance of persecution” and appears to particularise this by stating that the Tribunal misunderstood and misconstrued the applicant's case, and “completely relied” on a letter sent by the applicant's wife.
I cannot see that the Tribunal failed to understand the test that it was required to apply. This was unexceptionably set out at CB 75 to CB 77. Subsequently, its analysis and ultimate conclusion that it was not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine fear of persecution in India reveal that it understood the relevant question and proceeded to formulate an answer to it.
Further, I cannot see that there is any reference in the Tribunal's decision record to any letter sent by the applicant’s wife. This complaint, particularly as it alleges that the information supplied by the applicant's wife was “completely relied on” by the Tribunal, and should not be the “total and final base” for the Tribunal’s decision, is quite mysterious in the circumstances given that the applicant claimed before the Tribunal that his wife had been killed as a result of the fire in their house, and that he had been widowed. This integer of the applicant’s claim was plainly dealt with by the Tribunal. Nor did the applicant at the hearing before me provide anything further in this regard. This ground also does not succeed.
The applicant's third ground of complaint appears to be an assertion that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by relying on “other sources of available country information”. I can only agree with Ms. Wong that the Tribunal is entitled to rely upon country information, and to use such information in assessing the applicant's claims, and indeed to assess the credibility of an applicant's claims (see NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 (“NAHI”) at [11]). This ground also does not succeed.
In his written submissions the applicant:
1)Complains that the Tribunal's decision was affected by and demonstrated actual bias.
a)I cannot see that what is in the Tribunal's decision record, on its own, would satisfy the relevant test such as it could be said that the Tribunal was biased against the applicant. An allegation of actual bias carries with it the onus that it must be distinctly made, and clearly proved. Actual bias requires evidence of “prejudgement” by the decision-maker in the sense that he/she is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration or of being persuaded differently, whatever evidence or argument may be presented” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17 at [69], [71]-[72], [127]). The real question is whether the mind of the decision maker is open to persuasion.
b)The applicant has put no evidence whatsoever before the Court to show any actual bias on the part of the Tribunal, and nor is there anything else before the Court now to show that the Tribunal acted with bias. As Ms. Wong submitted, correctly in my view, the Tribunal considered what the applicant said and dealt with each of the applicant’s claims. That the Tribunal did not accept nearly all of what the applicant said does not, of itself, reveal bias. This complaint does not succeed.
2)Asserts that the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s oral evidence “in relation to major issues”.
a)The applicant provides no further particularity to this complaint. The only account before the Court now of the applicant’s “oral evidence” is that recorded by the Tribunal in its decision record (reproduced at CB 78).
b)The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” (CB 78.10 to CB 80.2) reveal that it did take into account the applicant’s oral evidence and did consider it. Simply, it did not accept much of it. No jurisdictional error is evident in this regard.
3)Complains that the Tribunal did not treat his “matter as a 424A issue”. Then, somewhat confusingly, goes on to say “as I brought the statements submitted in connection with the protection visa application to the Tribunal to ensure that it was before the Tribunal”.
a)To the extent therefore that this is a complaint that the Tribunal did not put in writing (pursuant to ss.424A(1) and 424A(2) – SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24, Al Shamry v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1679 and SZEEU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2), to the applicant, for comment, information that he had provided in his protection visa application, then the applicant's own statement confirms that he himself put this information to the Tribunal such that s.424A(3)(b) would serve to exclude the Tribunal from any obligation pursuant to s.424A(1).
b)Ms. Wong also submitted, in the alternative, that the applicant had made statements to the Tribunal at the hearing, such that the information in the protection visa application was put before the Tribunal at the hearing. She relied on NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195 (“NBKT”) (per Young J.’s consideration of the exemption in s.424A(3)(b) at [41] to [64], with whom both Gyles J. agreed at [1] and Stone J. agreed at [2]) to submit that the Tribunal asked questions of the applicant (as is evident from its account of the hearing – CB 78) and the applicant put certain matters to the Tribunal by way of his answers. To the extent therefore that the Tribunal’s decision relied on this information it fell within the exception in s.424A(3)(b).
c)In the matter before me the Tribunal’s account of the hearing shows that (CB 78):
(i)The applicant provided his passport to the Tribunal and the Tribunal confirmed his travel movements – in particular between India and Malaysia.
(ii)The applicant confirmed his wife had stayed in India.
(iii)The Tribunal asked the applicant why Muslims would target him. The applicant’s answer in response to the Tribunal was that he was an active member of the VHP, that his house had been targeted, that he was involved with the conflict in Gujarat and the demolition of the Babri Mosque and that Muslims “unite” “against Hindus”.
(iv)It noted that the applicant did not visit India once before his wife’s death, but did so twice afterwards.
(v)Discussed the “option” of relocation with the applicant.
d)Young J. in NBKT at [59] stated:
“These authorities highlight the importance of giving careful consideration to the nature of the information that is said to fall within s 424A(3)(b) and the circumstances in which it is communicated to, or elicited by, the Tribunal. There may be good reasons for requiring that the applicant affirm or actively give specific ‘information’ for the purposes of the review, in order for the exemption in s 424A(3)(b) to apply. Both SZEEU and NAZY suggest that the exception may not apply where the appellant does no more than affirm the accuracy of a statement which contains many diverse pieces of information. At the same time, the weight of authority indicates that artificial distinctions should not be drawn between information that is provided by an applicant in the course of his evidence in chief rather than in answer to questions posed by the Tribunal.”
e)I also note Kenny J. in SZDPY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 627 (“SZDPY”), a matter on appeal from this Court, at [35]:
“It is clear that the appellant specifically provided the Tribunal with his educational details. I reject the appellant’s submission that the information does not fall within s 424A(3)(b) because it was given in response to questions in the nature of ‘cross-examination’. The Tribunal’s questions were specific and arose, naturally enough, from the appellant’s visa application. The appellant gave direct answers. The relevant information was simple and could be easily given in response to such questions. Further, SZEEU provides support for the proposition that where an applicant affirms a specific fact before the Tribunal that information will be covered by the exclusion in s 424A(3)(b). At [91] Moore J, with whom Weinberg J at [173] and Allsop J at [264] agreed on this issue, said:
"While it appears that the Tribunal originally came to know that the appellant entered Australia on a business visa from sources other than the appellant (an inference which could be drawn from the way the letter of 4 February 2004 was framed) it is tolerably clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it discussed this fact (that the appellant had entered Australia on a business visa) with the appellant and he affirmed he had. Thus it was information comprehended by s 424A(3)(b) even though it was information also derived from an alternative source."
f)Giving consideration therefore to the nature of the information that the Tribunal relied on in the making of its decision and how it was communicated to, or elicited by, the Tribunal:
(i)The applicant gave the Tribunal his passport at the hearing. The travel information that the Tribunal relied on therefore was obtained from the passport (“after examining it” – CB 78.2).
(ii)The Tribunal found that what the applicant said at the hearing was consistent with what was in the protection visa application. This is not a situation of the Tribunal relying on inconsistencies between what was in the protection visa application with what was said at the hearing.
(iii)The applicant’s answers to questions about why he would be targeted (being a Hindu, a member of VHP, his claimed involvement with the attack on the Babri Mosque, his travel movements – when he left India, when he returned – and his explanation for not “bringing” his wife to Malaysia and his return to India) are all information that was provided to the Tribunal in answer to questions at the hearing before it or given to the Tribunal by the applicant during the hearing.
g)I note that in SZDPY, at [35], Kenny J. rejected the proposition that information does not fall within the exception in s.424A(3)(b) because it was given in response to questions.
h)From the only evidence before the Court now the information given by the applicant was further information provided directly by the applicant to specific questions by the Tribunal or otherwise given to the Tribunal, for example, by way of providing his passport for its examination.
i)In all therefore, I accept Ms. Wong’s submission and this complaint does not succeed
4)With reference to “NADA v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 328”, asserts that the Federal Court “accepted this position and held that it was established that the Tribunal acted with apprehended bias towards the applicant”. (It may be that the applicant's reference is to NADH of 2001 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328 (“NADH of 2001”)).
a)In any event the test for the apprehension of bias was set out recently by the Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZGMF [2006] FCAFC 138 at [14]:
“APPREHENDED BIAS
The Test
The parties accepted that the Federal Magistrate had rightly identified the test for apprehended bias in a Tribunal member by reference to the decision of the High Court in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27]-[28] and [30]-[31]. That test is whether a hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, properly informed about the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct said to give rise to an apprehension of bias, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal member might not bring an impartial mind to the question to be decided.”
b)At best the applicant's complaint in this regard is that “the Tribunal debated or argued my involvement in the Hindu organisation” and a complaint that the Tribunal did not believe his claims.
c)I cannot see that there is any similar situation in the applicant’s circumstances to what was before the Court in NADH of 2001.
d)If also the applicant is seeking to assert an apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal because the Tribunal “debated or argued” with him, then probing questions put by a Tribunal to an applicant at a hearing is consistent with the inquisitorial role expected of the Tribunal.
e)The applicant has put no evidence whatsoever before the Court of what he says happened at the hearing with the Tribunal, or anything beyond assertion, to support any claim that the relevant test can be made out. At best therefore, this can be seen as a complaint, that after questioning him at the hearing, the Tribunal did not accept the credibility of his claims. This complaint also does not succeed.
5)Makes reference to Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163. No particulars are provided. I cannot see that the Tribunal fell into error as explained by the High Court in that case.
6)Also complains that the Tribunal “acted illogically” when it concluded that he was not involved in any Muslim organisation and that he had not been tortured by Muslims, given that he had made this claim.
a)The applicant’s complaint is confused. Plainly the applicant never claimed to have been involved in any Muslim organisation. In fact quite the contrary. Nor did the Tribunal make any conclusion that he was not involved in any such organisation.
b)Ms. Wong submitted that the reference to “Muslim” should fairly be read as “Hindu” in the applicant’s complaint.
c)But even on this basis, she submitted, no error, by logic or otherwise, can be discerned. There is no conclusion by the Tribunal in its analysis (CB 79) that the applicant was not involved in a Hindu organization. What the Tribunal concluded is that he brought no evidence that he would be persecuted by reason of his membership of any such organisation. This was open to it on what was before it.
d)Nor is the complaint that the Tribunal “acted illogically” sustained in these circumstances where the Tribunal relied on independent country information available to it to support its analysis and to base its conclusions.
e)Nor in the material before the Court now can I see that the applicant ever made the claim that he had been tortured by Muslim extremists as he claims in his written submissions to the Court. The only reference to torture in his claims, is in his protection visa application (at CB 22) being his answer to “question 42”. However, this is a reference to what he fears will happen if he returns, not that it occurred in the past. The applicant makes a reference to an apprehension that he would be tortured by Muslim extremists who would find him out if he were to return to India.
This complaint is not made out.
7)Also makes reference to the “Muin/Lie case” (Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal & Ors and Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal & Ors (2002) 190 ALR 601 (“Muin and Lie”).
a)While the applicant's written submissions are not clear, and the applicant before me today was unable to provide any further understanding, it appears that what the applicant is seeking to put before the Court is that the Tribunal did not consider his documents, and that this was a failure to accord procedural fairness in the same way as he says the High Court found in Muin and Lie. It is not clear what documents the applicant is referring to, nor was the applicant able to assist at the hearing before me.
b)I cannot see that there was any failure to comply with s.418(3) of the Act or that the Tribunal did not consider any relevant material in the applicant’s “Part B” documents which were before the delegate. Nor are there any agreed facts before the Court, such as existed before the High Court. In all I cannot see that any of the elements in that case as presented before the High Court, are relevant to the circumstances now before this Court.
8)To the extent however that the applicants complaint can be read also to be that generally the Tribunal did not consider his documents (“without weighing the supporting documents – see page 3 of the submissions), it is not clear what supporting documents there could be. The only documents the applicant gave the Tribunal, or that were before the Tribunal in support of his claims, were his protection visa application and his passport. The Tribunal gave consideration to both.
9)Appears to also take issue with the Tribunal’s reliance on independent country information.
a)The Tribunal did rely on independent country information in making its decision.
b)That it chose to give weight to such information, and lesser weight to the applicant’s claims, is a matter for the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s assessment of country information is a matter of fact for it to determine (NAHI at [13]).
c)Nor, for the sake of completeness, was there any obligation on the Tribunal to put to the applicant for comment any country information on which it relied – s.424A(3)(a).

In all therefore I cannot see that any of the complaints put forward by the applicant, or otherwise in the circumstances before me, reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. Accordingly this application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding twenty (20) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM.

Associate:

Date: 06 March 2007