FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZHCI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 1016 |
| MIGRATION – RRT decision – Indian claiming persecution as Congress party worker – Tribunal disbelieved claims by testing knowledge of party history – conduct of hearing – reasonable apprehension of bias – matter remitted. |
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.8
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 425, 483A, Pt.8
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), Sch.1 cl.41
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs(2004) 214 ALR 264
NALQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 121
NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 77
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte ApplicantsS134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 102
| Applicant: | SZHCI |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG2544 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 5 April 2006 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 June 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 26 July 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr C Jayawardena |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Chandra Jayawardena Solicitor |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr T Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Blake Dawson Waldron |
ORDERS
Order that a writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent handed down on 16 August 2005 in matter N05/51206.
Order that a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 12 April 2005.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG2544 of 2005
| SZHCI |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(As Corrected)
This is an application filed on 12 September 2005 under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 26 July 2005 and handed down on 16 August 2005. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate which refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant.
The Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) has repealed s.483A, but the repeal does not affect the present proceeding (see Sch.1 cl.41, and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.8).
Section 483A gives the Court the jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). This is subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration Act, which have the effect that that I cannot set aside…
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- Case
- [2006] FMCA 1016
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues the Court had to decide were whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error and whether the Tribunal's conduct during the hearing gave rise to an apprehension of bias. The Court found that the Tribunal's handling of the hearing, including its constant interruptions and challenges to the applicant's credibility, could lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to deciding the application. The Court referred to the High Court's discussion of the test for apprehended bias in Ex Parte H, which involved similar issues before the same Tribunal. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's conduct gave rise to an apprehension of bias.
The Court quashed the Tribunal's decision and ordered that the application for review be reconsidered by the Tribunal. The Court emphasised that it was not making a finding on the merits of the applicant's claims but rather that the Tribunal's handling of the hearing was flawed. The Court's orders included issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to reconsider the application for review.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Order that a writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent handed down on 16 August 2005 in matter N05/51206.
2.
Order that a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 12 April 2005.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This is an application filed on 12 September 2005 under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 26 July 2005 and handed down on 16 August 2005. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate which refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) has repealed s.483A, but the repeal does not affect the present proceeding (see Sch.1 cl.41, and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.8). Section 483A gives the Court the jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). This is subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration Act, which have the effect that that I cannot set aside the Tribunal decision and send the matter back unless I am satisfied that the decision was affected by jurisdictional error (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76], Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte ApplicantsS134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 at [15] and [76]‑[77] and subsequent cases). I do not have power myself to decide whether the applicant’s claims should be believed, nor whether he qualifies for a refugee visa. The applicant has been assisted in his visa application, his review application to the Tribunal, and in this Court, by his migration agent and solicitor, Mr Jayawardena. The present application was presented with extensive and diffuse grounds of review and submissions. At the conclusion of the hearing on 5 April 2006, I allowed the applicant a further opportunity to present a transcript of the hearing held by the Tribunal, and to attempt a further formulation of his grounds for review. The respondent was also given an opportunity to make further written submissions. The parties were given liberty to apply for the hearing to be resumed for further oral argument, but neither of them requested this. I have decided that it is unnecessary for me to attempt to explore most of Mr Jayawardena’s contentions, since I have concluded that the Tribunal’s decision should be quashed due to features of its hearing and reasons which, in my opinion, might cause a fair‑minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the member constituting the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to deciding whether the applicant’s refugee claims satisfied the Convention definition of “refugee” as adopted by s.36 of the Migration Act. This test of apprehended bias was confirmed and discussed by the High Court in the context of a similar decision by the same Tribunal, in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 (“Ex Parte H”) at [27]‑[32]. It is useful for me to quote the whole of that discussion (citations omitted): [27]The test for apprehended bias in relation to curial proceedings is whether a fair‑minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided. That formulation owes much to the fact that court proceedings are held in public. There is some incongruity in formulating a test in terms of “a fair‑minded lay observer” when, as is the case with the tribunal, proceedings are held in private. [28]Perhaps it would be better, in the case of administrative proceedings held in private, to formulate the test for apprehended bias by reference to a hypothetical fair‑minded lay person who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct which is said to give rise to an apprehension of bias. Whether or not that be the appropriate formulation, there is, in our view, no reason to depart from the objective test of possibility, as distinct from probability, as to what will be done or what might have been done. To do otherwise, would be to risk confusion of apprehended bias with actual bias by requiring substantially the same proof. [29]Though the test in administrative proceedings, as in curial proceedings, is, in our view, one of objective possibility, the non‑curial nature of the body or tribunal in question and the different character of the proceedings must, as already indicated, be taken into account. In the present case, a significant difference between curial proceedings and the proceedings of the tribunal is that the former are adversarial and the parties are usually legally represented, whereas the latter are inquisitorial in nature and the parties are not represented. [30]Where, as in the present case, credibility is in issue, the person conducting inquisitorial proceedings will necessarily have to test the evidence presented – often vigorously. Moreover, the need to ensure that the person who will be affected by the decision is accorded procedural fairness will often require that he or she be plainly confronted with matters which bear adversely on his or her credit or which bring his or her account into question. Similar questions by a judge in curial proceedings in which the parties are legally represented may more readily give rise to an apprehension of bias than in the case of inquisitorial proceedings. [31]Where, however, parties are not legally represented in inquisitorial proceedings, care must be taken to ensure that vigorous testing of the evidence and frank exposure of its weaknesses do not result in the person whose evidence is in question being overborne or intimidated. If that should happen, a fair‑minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person might readily infer that there is no evidence that the witness can give which can change the decision‑maker’s view. [32]In the present case, a fair‑minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person, in our view, might well infer, from the constant interruptions of the male prosecutor’s evidence and the constant challenges to his truthfulness and to the plausibility of his account of events, that there was nothing he could say or do to change the tribunal’s preconceived view that he had fabricated his account of the events upon which he based his application for a protection visa. In other words, a fair-minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person might well apprehend bias by the tribunal against the male prosecutor. And because the female prosecutor’s application stood or fell with his, a fair‑minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person might, in our view, form the same view in her case.