FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZHBP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1299
MIGRATION – claim that apprehended bias infected a Tribunal decision – correct test – relevance of factors that actually influenced the outcome – application of test to the facts
NATURAL JUSTICE – apprehended bias
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 45, 46, 47(1), 65, 91R(1), s 411(1)(c), 412, 414(1) and 415
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1 referred to
Re RUDDOCK (in his capacity as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs); Ex parte APPLICANT S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 437 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 referred to
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 cited
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 cited
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 followed
Hot Holdings Pty Limited v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438 cited
SZHBP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 97 ALD 84 referred to
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 cited
SZHBP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FMCA 699 referred toSZHBP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 867 OF 2008
GRAHAM J
21 AUGUST 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 867 OF 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZHBP
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 AUGUST 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 867 OF 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZHBP
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRAHAM J
DATE:
21 AUGUST 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The requirements for the grant of a protection visa
Under s 45 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) a person who is not an Australian citizen who wants a visa must apply for a visa of a particular class. An application for a visa is a valid application if it complies with the requirements of s 46 of the Act. Section 47(1) of the Act requires the Minister to consider valid applications for visas.
Section 65 of the Act makes provision for the grant or refusal of visas. It relevantly provides:
‘65(1) After considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister:
(a) if satisfied that:
…
(ii)the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 1299
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Federal Magistrate had applied the correct legal test for apprehended bias but had erred in its application. The court emphasised that the test for apprehended bias concerns the possibility of bias, not the actuality, and requires consideration of whether a hypothetical fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend bias. The court noted that the Federal Magistrate had incorrectly considered the actual findings of the Tribunal, which was relevant only to claims of actual bias, not apprehended bias. The court concluded that the apprehension of bias alleged by the appellant was not substantiated by the Tribunal's findings.
In its reasoning, the court held that the hypothetical lay observer might disagree with some of the Tribunal's conclusions but that this alone did not indicate a closed mind or apprehended bias. The court stressed that the apprehension of bias must be considered from the perspective of a lay observer before the actual decision was made, not in hindsight. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not influenced by apprehended bias and that the appellant's claims were adequately assessed based on the evidence provided.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court's decision upheld the Tribunal's findings that the appellant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa due to his lack of credibility and the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAHAM J
His Honour proceeded at [26]:‘… I do not see in its findings [those of the Tribunal constituted by Mr Giles Short] a pattern which would suggest to the hypothetical lay observer a closed mind. A hypothetical lay observer may well agree with some of the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, for example, the concerns expressed about the ticket and the method of coming into Australia, or may not be convinced by the applicant’s explanation of why he did not reveal the existence of his brother living in Australia in the initial application. One hypothetical lay observer might agree with the Tribunal that the difference in the stories about the motor vehicle accident itself were serious inconsistencies which cast doubt upon the applicant’s claims, whereas another might say that the explanation given was plausible enough to negate such concerns. Once this situation occurs, where a court cannot be sure of the reaction of the hypothetical lay observer, it would not be safe to make a finding that the Tribunal was infected by apprehended bias. …’Consideration and conclusions Whilst the learned Federal Magistrate may have been seized of the correct test as advanced by the appellant and accepted by the respondent Minister, it would appear that when he came to considering its application, he departed from it. He was criticised for describing the test as being a strict one. In my opinion that criticism was unwarranted. The test is certainly expressed in strict terms as his Honour recognised. In relation to the application of the apprehended bias test to the facts, it must be remembered that his Honour was not concerned with an allegation of actual bias. In a case of alleged apprehended bias, possibility is the primary concern not actuality, viewing the matter with the benefit of hindsight (see Ebner at [7] as quoted at [15] above). What his Honour appears to have done at [26], in my view impermissibly, was to have regard to the conclusions actually reached by the third Tribunal member with a view to considering whether a hypothetical lay observer would or might reach the same conclusions. The observation ‘I do not see in [the Tribunal’s] findings a pattern which would suggest to the hypothetical lay observer a closed mind’ could only be relevant to a claim of actual bias and no such claim is advanced here. The apprehended bias test requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. What his Honour should have focussed upon was whether a hypothetical fair-minded lay person, properly informed as to the nature of the application for review and the processes of the Tribunal, might have reasonably apprehended, either as at 17 September 2007 or at some stage thereafter, but before 7 November 2007 that the third Tribunal member might not bring an impartial mind to the questions which he had to decide. Insofar as the appellant sought to place reliance upon findings actually made by the third Tribunal member, he, in my opinion, approached the matter the wrong way given that the issue which he had tendered was one of apprehended bias.