SZGWS v Minister for Immigration
[2005] FMCA 1648
•2 November 2005
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZGWS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2005] FMCA 1648 |
| MIGRATION – Visa – protection visa – Refugee Review Tribunal – Application for review of RRT decision affirming decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant a protection visa – Applicant a citizen of Bangladesh claiming a fear of persecution by Islamic fundamentalists – denial of procedural fairness – disclosure of information. |
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424A. 474 475A
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 124 ALR 265
Applicant S256 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 170
NAIZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37
SKFV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 142
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Kalala and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 212
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553
Singh and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) FCA 73
| Applicant: | SZGWS |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File No: | SYG 2055 of 2005 |
| Delivered on: | 2 November 2005 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Hearing date: | 31 October 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Scarlett FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Zipser |
| Solicitor for the Respondent: | Ms Quinn |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Phillips Fox |
ORDERS
The Application is dismissed.
The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $3,300.00. I allow four (4) months to pay.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2055 of 2005
| SZGWS |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
And
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application
This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal that was made on 21st June 2005 and handed down on 12th July. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, not to grant a protection visa to the Applicant.
Background
The Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 10th November 2004. On 19th November he applied for a protection visa which was refused on 24th February 2005.
On 6th March 2005 the Applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for review of that decision. The Applicant attended a hearing of the Tribunal on 20th June 2005 and gave oral evidence.
The Applicant claimed to be a seaman who deserted his ship in Australia in November 2004. He claimed that in Bangladesh he had been persecuted and harassed by Muslim fanatics and religious teachers because of his reunion with his divorced wife. He claimed to be a non-practicing Muslim who had married a woman who was also a non-practicing Muslim. After members of the local community had circulated a rumour that his wife was having an affair he divorced her. Later he discovered that the rumour was false, so he reconciled with her and commenced to cohabit with her without remarrying, according to Islamic law.
The Applicant claimed that the local Mosque demanded that he regularise the situation, which he refused to do. He said he was subject to having stones and bricks thrown at him by a chanting mob. The Applicant said that he moved his family to the city of Dhaka to protect them, but he was recognised by a shop owner who told others. The local Mosque committee told him he would have to do a penance, and his children were subsequently mistreated at school. He said that the authorities did not protect him.
The Applicant moved with his family to Chittagong in March 2004, and later obtained work as a seaman. He confirmed that he had: "jumped ship" in Australia in November 2004 because he feared persecution by Islamic fundamentalists on his return to Bangladesh.
The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal
The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was a citizen of Bangladesh who had “jumped ship” in Australia in late 2004. The Tribunal was not satisfied that women in the position of his wife who did not follow religious rules to the extent explained by the Applicant would be persecuted in Bangladesh or that the Applicant would be subject to any persecution for that reason.
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant or his family faced persecution in his village of Joykrishnapur, for the reason that he had delayed his move from the village for two to three months for no apparent reason. Nor too was the Tribunal satisfied that the Applicant could not have relocated within the city of Dhaka after he moved there.
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant's wife and children were not harmed or harassed when they moved to Chittagong, even though the Applicant said that he only stayed there a short while before leaving on the ship. The Applicant said that they were not persecuted because he was not living with them. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant would have a real chance of persecution for the reasons he did in Chittagong. The Tribunal, relying on independent country information, was not satisfied that even if the Applicant were subject to some form of discrimination in and around his village, he would face a real chance of persecution in one of the big cities in Bangladesh.
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugee's Convention as amended by the Refugee's Protocol, and affirmed the decision not to grant a protection visa.
The Application for review of the RRT decision
The Applicant filed an application at this Court on 3rd August 2005, within the time limit specified by s.477(1A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In that application he seeks the following types of orders:
(a)Certiorari,
(b)Mandamus, and
(c)Costs.
The application is brought under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903.
The Applicant relied on the following grounds in his application:
a)In making the decision the Tribunal made a jurisdiction error by denying the Applicant procedural fairness.
b)The Tribunal made adverse findings as to the authenticity of the documents provided by the Applicant.
c)The Tribunal failed to make a proper disclosure of adverse information and therefore in breach of s 424A (1).
d)The Tribunal did not afford the Applicant the opportunity to put his case as required.
e)In making the decision the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by violating the duty it was under in satisfying itself as to the eligibility of the Applicant's [sic] for protection visas.
f)The Tribunal made adverse findings as to the authenticity of documents provided by the Applicant and the findings were not based on evidence.
The Amended Application
The Applicant briefed counsel at short notice, as is often the case, and sought leave to file in Court an Amended Application. In that Amended Application he seeks the same orders but provides new grounds which are totally different from those in the original application. The solicitors for the Respondent Minister did not object to the filing of those documents, notwithstanding their lateness.
The alteration to the basis upon which the application was to be argued was so great that I would have given favourable consideration to an adjournment.
The grounds set out in the Amended Application are these:
(1)The applicant made a number of claims as to events that occurred to him in Joykrishnapur between January and September 2003, and in Dhaka between September 2003 and March/April 2004.
First, the Tribunal did not make a finding as to whether many of the events occurred. In the circumstances, the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
The Tribunal did not refer to many of the events in its summary of the Applicant's evidence, and in its findings. On this basis the Tribunal ignored relevant material, giving rise to jurisdictional error.
(2)The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not have a genuine fear of persecution in Joykrishnapur, and this was a reason for not accepting 'the Applicant's claim to invoke protection obligations in Australia'. The proper question is whether the Applicant had a genuine fear of persecution at the time of the Tribunal's decision, not at the time the Applicant was in Bangladesh. On this basis the Tribunal asked the wrong question, giving rise to jurisdictional error.
(3)One reason the Tribunal found that the Applicant did not have a genuine fear of persecution in Joykrishnapur was that he: 'delayed his departure from Joykrishnapur'. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in relying on the Applicant's delay in two ways. First, the Tribunal did not put its concern to the Applicant and give him an opportunity to explain, giving rise to a denial of procedural fairness. Second, the Tribunal ignored the Applicant's explanation of events which occurred which may have explained the delay.
(4)The Tribunal, in rejecting the Applicant's claims, did not take into account the following matters:
· why he moved from Joykrishnapur to Dhaka in September 2003,
· why he moved from Dhaka to Chittagong in January 2004, and
· why he jumped ship in Australia in November 2004.
Each of these matters was relevant to the Tribunal's assessment of whether the applicant had a genuine fear of persecution, and whether fear of persecution was well founded. In the circumstances the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
In addition, counsel for the Applicant sought to rely on an additional ground by way of a challenge to the validity of the relocation finding made by the Tribunal. I allowed that late amendment as the Respondent had already identified the relocation issue as a critical one, and had addressed it in their written submissions.
The Applicant’s submissions
In his outline of submissions, counsel for the Applicant, Mr Zipser, contends that the Tribunal fell into error in these ways:
(a)The Applicant made a number of claims as to events that occurred to him in Joykrishnapur between January and September 2003, and in Dhaka between September 2003 and March/April 2004. First the Tribunal did not make a finding as to whether many of the events occurred. In the circumstances the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. Second, the Tribunal did not refer to many of the events in its summary of the Applicant's evidence and in its findings. On this basis the Tribunal ignored relevant material, giving rise to jurisdictional error.
Counsel referred to this as the "past events issue".
(b)The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not have a genuine fear of persecution in Joykrishnapur, and this was a reason for not accepting the Applicant's claim to invoke protection obligations in Australia. The proper question is whether the Applicant had a genuine fear of persecution at the time of the Tribunal's decision. Not at the time the Applicant was in Bangladesh. On this basis the Tribunal asked the wrong question, giving rise to jurisdictional error.
Counsel for the Applicant referred to this as the "well founded fear issue".
(c)One reason the Tribunal found that the Applicant did not have a genuine fear of persecution in Joykrishnapur was that he delayed his departure from Joykrishnapur. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in relying on the Applicant's delay in two ways. First, the Tribunal did not put its concern to the Applicant, and give him an opportunity to explain, giving rise to a denial of procedural fairness. Second, the Tribunal ignored the Applicant's explanation of events which occurred, which may have explained the delay.
Counsel for the Applicant refers to this as "the delay issue".
(d)The Tribunal in accepting the Applicant's claims did not take into account the following matters: why he moved from Joykrishnapur to Dhaka in September 2003, why he moved from Dhaka to Chittagong in January 2004, and why he jumped ship in Australia in November 2004. Each of these matters was relevant to the Tribunal's assessment of whether the Applicant had a genuine fear of persecution and where the fear of persecution was well founded. In the circumstances, the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
Counsel for the Applicant refers to this as the "ignored matters issue".
Past events issue
Turning first of all to the "past events" issue, counsel for the Applicant sets out a history of the Applicant's circumstances in Bangladesh relevant to his protection visa claim. This includes details of the Applicant's marriage to, divorce from, and remarriage to his wife, and events that occurred in Joykrishnapur between January and September 2003.
It also includes events that occurred in Dhaka from September 2003 to March or April 2004, and details of the move by the Applicant and his family from Dhaka to Chittagong where the family still reside, but the Applicant departed on board ship about 10 to 15 days later.
Counsel submitted that whether these events occurred is important to:
a)whether the Applicant's claimed fear of persecution was genuine;
b)whether the Applicant's claimed fear of persecution was well founded, and
c)whether the Applicant could relocate within Bangladesh.
Counsel referred the Court to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559. In particular to the passage at page 575:
Determining whether there is a real chance that something will occur requires an estimation of the likelihood that one or more events will give rise to the occurrence of that thing. In many, if not most cases, determining what is likely to occur in the future will require findings as to what has occurred in the past, because what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future. It is therefore ordinarily and integrally part of the process for making a determining concerning the chance of something occurring in the future that conclusions are formed concerning past events.
Counsel also referred the Court to Kalala and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 212 at paragraph 5.
Counsel has submitted that despite the relevance of the factual matters previously referred to the assessment of the Applicant's claims and the statement of principle in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo, the Tribunal did not make findings as to whether most of the events in paragraph 10 occurred. On this basis he submits that the Tribunal did not properly carry out its functions and fell into jurisdictional error.
He further submits that despite the relevance of the matters previously referred to the assessment of:
a)whether the Applicant's claimed fear of persecution was genuine,
b)whether the Applicant's claimed fear of persecution was well founded, and
c)whether the Applicant could relocate within Bangladesh,
the Tribunal did not refer to a number of the matters in its summary of the Applicant's claims and evidence.
Well-founded fear issue
In dealing with the well-founded fear issue, counsel for the Applicant submitted that where a decision maker is determining whether an Applicant can invoke protection obligations in Australia, the relevant question is whether the Applicant satisfies the criteria for a protection visa, at the time of the decision maker's decision, rather than at the time of application or at any other time. See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553.
In the present case the Tribunal assessed whether the Applicant had a genuine fear of persecution in Joykrishnapur, that is between January and September 2003, rather than at the time of the Tribunal's decision in June 2005. In circumstances where a number of events had occurred between those two dates, for example the serious assault on the applicant in Dhaka between September 2003 and March or April 2004, the Tribunal could not, he said, rely on the finding at page 168.10 of the Court Book, that the Tribunal was not satisfied the Applicant or his family feared persecution, at least for the reason the Applicant claimed in Joykrishnapur.
The Tribunal could not rely on that finding, it was submitted, in order to dismiss the Applicant's claims.
Delay issue
On the delay issue, counsel submitted that one reason the Tribunal found that the Applicant did not have a genuine fear of persecution in Joykrishnapur was that he delayed his departure from Joykrishnapur for a period of two to three months before he departed to Dhaka.
The objections raised by the application to this finding are twofold. First, the reasons for decision of the Tribunal indicate that the Tribunal did not put to the Applicant at the hearing its concerns about the two or three month delay between the time the Applicant was stoned and the time he left Dhaka.
In VAAD and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at paragraph 56, the Full Court stated:
The basic principal is that a person whose interests are likely to be affected by an exercise of power must be given the opportunity to deal with any matters relevantly adverse to their interests, which the decision maker proposes to take into account.
He also refers the Court to WACO and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural an Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCAFC 171, 77 ALD 1 at paragraphs 42 to 58.
In the present case he submitted that the Tribunal's failure to put these matters to the Applicant involved a denial of procedural fairness.
The other point of contention was that in any event the Applicant explained the delay in his written claims in his application for a protection visa. Specifically he had explained that for a period of time up to 10th September 2003 he was on the ship, and following his return home on 10th September 2003 the family all moved to Dhaka and started a new life. The reason that the Applicant and his family did not move from Joykrishnapur to Dhaka until two or three months after the stoning incident was because the Applicant was out of Joykrishnapur working on a ship as a steward, which was his normal job.
The Tribunal either overlooked or ignored this explanation, which gave rise to jurisdictional error. See VAAD and the Minister, to which I have previously referred.
Ignored matters issue
On the ignored matters issue, counsel submitted that the Tribunal in rejecting the Applicant's claims did not take into account first why he moved from Joykrishnapur to Dhaka in September 2003. Second, why he moved from Dhaka to Chittagong in March and April 2004. Thirdly, why he jumped ship in Australia in November 2004. He submitted that each of those matters was relevant to the Tribunal's assessment of whether the Applicant had a genuine fear of persecution and where the fear of persecution was well founded. That, he submitted, was jurisdictional error.
Relocation issue
The relocation issue was also an issue that was raised by counsel for the Applicant in his oral submissions. He referred the Court to the decision of Merkel J in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) FCA 73, also at 183 ALR 531. The issues in that case largely referred to a case where the Tribunal had had a report about counselling sessions with an applicant, and the report was not deliver to the Tribunal until the day in fact before the Applicant was notified that a decision would be handed down.
The Tribunal had taken the view that the member was functus officio after a decision was signed and dated, which had occurred in the previous month but the Federal Court held differently.
That, of course, is not the situation in this case, but it was put to me that matters referred to in paragraphs 40 through to 46 of the Court's judgment was relevant to the relocation issue.
The decision refers to the psychosocial assessment of the Applicant. The extraordinary psychological difficulties suffered by that Applicant. As an example, at his first interview the Applicant was only able to complete one sentence over the whole interview, which lasted for more than one-and-a-half hours.
The report focused on the social impact of torture and persecution on the Applicant, the Applicant's highly significant speech impediment, the fact that the RRT was not bound by the rules of evidence, even thought the report was hearsay. And further aspects in respect of what was clearly a significant report to the applicant in that case.
Paragraph 46, his Honour said:
The report was also material to the issue of relocation. The RRT's finding on the reasonableness of relocation was based in part upon its conclusion that the applicant was not being sought by reason of a perceived association with one Baba Kajlsa. As the report was relevant to that issue, the relocation finding was also capable of being affected by the information contained in the report.
The relocation issue in this case has been put to me as being flawed by the fact that the Tribunal, whilst not ignoring or refusing to accept late submitted material, as was the case in Singh, but that the Tribunal did not examine the circumstances relating to the Applicant's perceived need to leave various parts of Bangladesh, including his home village of Joykrishnapur and the capital city of Dhaka.
The First Respondent’s submissions
The solicitors for the First Respondent Minister have filed a Written Outline of Submissions. They did so on 24th October 2005, at which time they were unaware of the Amended Application or of the Submissions that were to be made by counsel for the Applicant.
They submitted that the decision is a privative clause decision as defined by s.474(2) of the Migration Act 1958. As such, by virtue of subsection 474(1) the decision:
a)is final and conclusive,
b)cannot be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed, or called in question in any Court, and
c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari.
They submitted, too, that s 474 operates the judicial review of all the decisions under the Migration Act except those vitiated by jurisdictional error.
In respect of the original application, the First Respondent's solicitor submitted that none of the grounds of review were particularised. This was so, but the Amended Application and the fresh submissions by Mr Zipser of Counsel altered the complexion of the case, so much so that Ms Quinn, the solicitor who appeared for the Respondent Minister, was obliged to make oral submissions at short notice.
It cannot be said that the Applicant, in his Amended Application or Submissions, did not particularise the grounds for review. That is in fact far from the case.
The relevant point in the Respondent's Written Submissions was that the critical finding by the Tribunal was that the Applicant could relocate outside his home village. See Randhawa and the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 124 ALR 265.The finding on relocation provides a separate and independent basis for the Refugee Review Tribunal to affirm the refusal of the grant of protection visa. (See Applicant S256 of 2002 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) FCAFC 170 at paragraph [18]).
The Respondent further submitted that the Tribunal had considered the practical realities of relocation facing the Applicant and his family in deciding whether it was reasonable for them to relocate within Bangladesh, and in doing so had relied on a number of factors from the Applicant's evidence. The Respondent submitted that this case could be distinguished from its facts from NAIZ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37.
The Respondent also submitted that the finding by the RRT that the Applicant could reasonably relocate within Bangladesh, was open to it on the material before it. It did not involve a requirement that the Applicant should modify his behaviour. A finding that someone is able to relocate within their country of nationality does not require them to modify their behaviour to avoid persecution. (See SKFV and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 142 at [10] to [13]).
Applicant’s oral submissions
Counsel for the Applicant made oral submissions in which he made it clear, as I previously indicated, that it was his intention to challenge the relocation finding and the validity of the relocation finding by the Tribunal. He said that the Applicant had explained what had happened to him in the past. People had thrown stones and bricks at him. In Dhaka the Mosque committee had served a Fatwa on him requiring him to do penance.
In respect of the Applicant's claim as to what happened to him, the Tribunal did not make any findings, and therefore the principle in Guo, to which I have previously referred, was not followed and therefore affected the Tribunal's findings, including the relocation finding.
For the Respondent, Ms Quinn submitted that the finding at page 168 of the Court Book was not a finding that the respond would not suffer persecution, but that he would not face persecution for the reason that he claimed. She said that the Tribunal had referred to independent country information about that situation.
The second finding made by the Tribunal, that it was not satisfied that the Applicant faced persecution in Joykrishnapur, that the RRT had in fact made findings in respect of the Applicant's claims in respect of Joykrishnapur. She submitted the applicant said that the RRT had made the first two findings without making specific findings on the events. Her submission was that the first finding did not need reasons.
As far as the Fatwa is concerned, Ms Quinn referred the Court to paragraph 3 at page 168 of the Court Book, saying that the Refugee Review Tribunal effectively found that the Applicant did receive a Fatwa and would suffer a religious penalty. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant might have felt pressured, but not that he had a subjective fear of persecution.
She submitted that explicit findings were not necessary, and there was no evidence the Tribunal did not consider each part of that claim.
Ms Quinn did not take exception to the extract from Guo's case relating to the determination as to what may occur in the future when determining what has happened in the past.
As to the Tribunal's obligation to notify the applicant under s.424A, she submitted that that matter came within the exception set out in section 424A(3)(b). She said that the delay in leaving for Dhaka was given by the Applicant for the purpose of the application, and therefore came within that exception.
Relating to the relocation findings, Ms Quinn submitted that even if there were a jurisdictional error as to well-founded fear of persecution, the Tribunal's findings on relocation would still stand and that whether or not the Applicant faced a fear of persecution at places within Bangladesh, the RRT had proceeded to finding that if those things were true, that the Applicant could still move within his country of nationality.
She submits the Tribunal did not depart from the principal in Randhawa's case.
Ms Quinn submitted, and I believe correctly, that the finding as to relocation is basic to the Tribunal's decision. The RRT found that the Applicant could safely relocate within the city of Dhaka, because the population is so big that he could move safely to another part of the city, and that the Tribunal did not accept that people in other parts of a large city would so readily find out.
The Tribunal found the Applicant could live safely in the city of Chittagong, because the family had been living there, and that the type of discrimination or persecution, which the Applicant said he had suffered, would be likely only to happen in rural areas.
In my view, the relocation finding is a fundamental finding in this case. There is evidence that the applicant, within Joykrishnapur, was subject to persecution by way of stoning and abuse, as a result of the marital relations and the remarriage to his wife, which was not in compliance with Muslim law.
In my view, there was evidence upon which it could be found that the Applicant suffered a well-founded fear of persecution for that reason.
Turning to the move to Dhaka, the evidence is that the Applicant had been accidentally identified by a shopkeeper who had told some of his customers, and this led to the Fatwa by the local Mosque.
In my view the evidence from the Independent Country Information entitled the Tribunal to find that it would be appropriate for the Applicant to move to another part of the city of Dhaka, without the risk of further persecution.
In my view the Tribunal correctly assessed the situation relating to the Applicant's family's move to Chittagong. Whilst the Applicant had said that his wife and children had not suffered persecution in Chittagong because he himself had been away for most of the time, it was open on the evidence for the Tribunal to conclude that Chittagong would otherwise be a safe place.
It was not required of the Tribunal that it had to accept uncritically everything that the Applicant had put to it.
To my mind, the Tribunal, in short, has applied the relocation principal as set out in Randhawa's case, and on that basis I am satisfied that the Tribunal has not fallen into jurisdictional error.
I am satisfied therefore that this is a privative clause decision under section 474 of the Migration Act, and I propose to dismiss the application.
There is an application for costs on behalf of the First Respondent. In my view it is appropriate the Applicant has been unsuccessful, and the Court would not normally depart from making an order for costs in favour of a successful party.
It has been conceded that the amount sought of $3,300.00 was in fact most reasonable. Whilst I may not go quite so far as to make that finding, it is certainly with the scale envisaged by the Schedule 1 of the Federal Magistrate Courts Rules for a case that was argued by the Respondent, without the need for briefing counsel.
I propose to order that the Applicant is to pay the First Respondent's costs, fixed in the sum of $3,300.00.
In my view this is a matter where I should allow time to pay. There is an amount of $3,300.00 sought. The Applicant has counsel's fees of his own to meet and the amount, whilst not unreasonable, is not something that I would expect a person who had jumped ship from his job as a steward to have a great deal of ready cash to meet.
I allow four months to pay.
I require a transcript of my reasons, and I will remove the application from the list of cases awaiting finalisation.
I certify that the preceding seventy-seven (77) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM
Associate: Virginia Lee
Date: 10 November 2005
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