SZGWN v Minister for Immigration

Case •

[2007] FMCA 1748

•

18 October 2007

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZGWN & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2007] FMCA 1748
MIGRATION – Visa – protection visa – Refugee Review Tribunal – application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision not to grant protection visa – citizens of China claiming fear of persecution as Falun Gong practitioners – whether Tribunal failed to comply with Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.425.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R, 91X, 422B, 425
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592; [2006] HCA 63 referred to
SZILQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 942 followed
Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230 referred to
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61 referred to
SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 referred to
NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1536 referred to
NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195 referred to
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 followed.
First Applicant: SZGWN
Second Applicant: SZGWO
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 275 of 2007
Judgment of: Scarlett FM
Hearing date: 2 October 2007
Date of Last Submission: 2 October 2007
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 18 October 2007

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Kaur-Bains
Solicitors for the Applicant: Simon Jeans & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Clegg
Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

  2. The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,800.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 275 of 2007

SZGWN

First Applicant

SZGWO

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Application

  1. The applicants, who are citizens of China, ask the court to set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal handed down on


    21st December 2006. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicants protection visas.

  2. The applicants also seek an order remitting their application to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law.

  3. The applicants claim that:

    (1)The Tribunal was under an obligation to disclose, and failed to disclose, the following issues to them and/or was required to provide an opportunity to them to give evidence and make submissions:

    i)The first applicant’s motivation in being involved in Falun Gong activities in Australia and whether it was for the purpose of strengthening his claims to be a refugee; and

    ii)That there was a possibility that the Burwood study group was convened for the purpose of coaching visa applicants

    (2)The standard of interpreting at the hearing was so inadequate that the applicants were effectively prevented from giving evidence.

  4. In each case, the applicants claim that the Tribunal breached s. 425 of the Migration Act 1958 and so committed jurisdictional error.

Background

  1. The applicants are husband and wife. They are citizens of China who arrived in Australia on 13th December 2004 and applied for Protection (Class XA) visas on 23rd December. The first applicant claimed to fear persecution because he was a Falun Gong practitioner. The second applicant is a Part D applicant, who has no refugee claims of her own but is claiming as a member of the first applicant’s family unit.


    Their applications were refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs on 31st January 2005, so the applicants sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal.

Application for Review by the Refugee Review Tribunal

  1. The Refugee Review Tribunal originally affirmed the delegate’s decision, but on 17th August 2006 the Federal Magistrates Court made orders by consent, setting the decision aside and remitting the application to the Tribunal for determination according to law.

  2. The Tribunal wrote to the applicants and invited them to attend a hearing on 11th October 2006. They attended and gave evidence.


    They were accompanied by their migration adviser.

  3. After the hearing, on 27th October 2006, the applicant’s adviser forwarded a written submission to the Tribunal, which included a transcript of the hearing.

The Refugee Review Tribunal Decision

  1. The Tribunal handed down its decision on 21st December 2006. A copy of the Decision Record can be found at pages 364 to 396 of the Court Book.

  2. In its decision, the Tribunal set out independent country information about Falun Gong and the attitude of the Chinese Government at some length.[1] It also referred to the applicants’ claims to the Department when they applied for protection visas.

    [1] Court Book 367 – 375

  3. The Tribunal covered in some detail the first applicant’s evidence to the previously-constituted Tribunal on 18th May 2005.[2] It also dealt with the applicants’ evidence at the hearing on 11th October 2006 and the applicants’ post-hearing submission.[3]

    [2] Court Book 376 - 382

    [3] Court Book 382 - 390

Findings and Reasons

  1. The Tribunal’s Findings and Reasons are set out on pages 390 to 396 of the Court Book.

  2. The Tribunal accepted that the applicants are nationals of the People’s Republic of China, based on the evidence of their passports.


    The Tribunal also accepted the first applicant’s claims about his employment history, but did not accept that he had been sacked from his job at the Shenyang Pump Factory in 2000 because of his Falun Gong sympathies.

  3. The Tribunal did not accept the applicants’ Falun Gong claims.


    The Tribunal expressed the view that the first applicant’s knowledge of Falun Gong teaching and exercise practice was not acquired in China or from involvement with Falun Gong groups at Darling Harbour or Burwood Park.

  4. The Tribunal referred to the first applicant’s evidence about a Burwood study group[4], which he had presented “as evidence of serious dedication to Falun Dafa study dating back to a time that was soon after his arrival in Australia.”[5] The Tribunal did not accept that evidence as reliable, because:

    (a)The first applicant had not mentioned it to the earlier Tribunal; and

    (b)the Tribunal was seriously concerned about the description of the group as one that had been convened for asylum seekers, saying:

    It was not a practice group for practitioners but a study group for applicants for refugee status.[6]

    [4] Court Book at 393

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Ibid.

  5. The Tribunal expressed the view that the only significant exposure that the first applicant had to Falun Gong and Falun Dafa before the time of the earlier Tribunal’s decision was in the form of information-gathering and coaching for the purpose of arguing a case for a protection visa.[7] The Tribunal was not satisfied that the first applicant was “serious or genuine about Falun Gong”[8]. As the first applicant’s Falun Gong claims failed, the second applicant’s case could not succeed either. This was so:

    Whether one regards her as a Part D Applicant or, according to recent submissions, as a fellow ‘Part C’ applicant (‘membership of a particular social group’ being ‘a member of a specific family, the head of which is a known Falun Gong member’).[9]

    [7] Court Book 394

    [8] Court Book 395

    [9] Court Book 395

  6. The Tribunal also considered a submission by the applicants’ adviser that the second applicant should be regarded as a refugee in her own right because she was persecuted in China on account of her membership of a particular social group, namely “pregnant women who already have one child.” The Tribunal found that whether an applicant is a member of a particular social group is a question of fact for the Tribunal. The Tribunal found:

    Even if the Tribunal accepts that ‘pregnant women (in the PRC) who already have one child’ is a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention, and the Tribunal is not convinced that it is, the Applicant’s wife is not a member of this group as, on the evidence, she is not currently pregnant, or currently claiming to be pregnant, or currently potentially pregnant.[10]

    [10] Court Book 395

  7. The Tribunal took the view that the second applicant’s claim about fear of persecution for reasons of being a pregnant woman who has already had one child was an afterthought based in poor faith, raised by the applicants in response to a number of concerns about the credibility of the main body of their claims.

  8. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants faced a real chance of persecution in the People’s Republic of China or that their claimed fear of persecution was well-founded. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant protection visas to the applicants.

The Applicant’s Submissions

  1. The applicants’ first ground is that the Tribunal did not reveal to them that the following issues were live issues in the proceedings:

    (a)the first applicant’s motivation in being involved in Falun Gong activities in Australia and whether it was for the purpose of strengthening his claims to be a refugee; and

    (b)that there was a possibility that the Burwood study group was convened for the purpose of coaching protection visa applicants.

  2. Counsel for the applicants, Ms Kaur-Bains, submitted that the Tribunal, under s. 425 of the Migration Act, was under a mandatory statutory obligation to raise these issues with the applicants at the hearing, but did not do so. This, she submitted, was a breach of s. 425.

  3. In support of that proposition, Ms Kaur-Bains relies on the decision of the High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[11] where it was held that, upon a review of the decision of the delegate, matters not adequately notified by the decision of the delegate as reasons for refusal of a protection visa must, if they are to be used as reasons for the Tribunal to confirm the delegate’s decision, be sufficiently revealed to an applicant as live issues.

    [11] (2006) 231 ALR 592; [2006] HCA 63

  4. In particular, Ms Kaur-Bains referred the court to the High Court’s discussion of s. 425 at paragraphs [33] to [37], at [42] and [43] and also at [47]. She went on to refer to the decision in SZILQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[12], an appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court, where Buchanan J held, on the authority of SZBEL, that where a matter is one of the issues arising in relation to the decision under review, s. 425(1) requires an invitation to appear to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issue.[13]

    [12] [2007] FCA 942

    [13] [2007] FCA 942 at [32]

  5. Ms Kaur-Bains submitted that, in the light of the Tribunal’s findings, it was under an obligation to disclose to the applicants and provide an opportunity to the applicants to give evidence and make submissions about these issues:

    (a)the first applicant’s motivation in being involved in Falun Gong activities in Australia and whether it was for the purpose of strengthening his claims to be a refugee; and

    (b)that there was a possibility that the Burwood study group was convened for the purpose of coaching protection visa applicants.

  6. Ms Kaur-Bains noted, by reference to the transcript of the hearing, that the Tribunal Member asked the applicant these questions:

    I have to ask these questions because I have to consider whether or not this Falungong involvement could be conduct entered into for the purposes of strengthening your claim for refugee status.

    If I were to arrive at that view, I don’t ever do so lightly, I would be required under the law to disregard this part of your case.[14]

    [14] Transcript 307-308

  7. It is clear that the interpreter mistranslated those questions to a significant degree.

  8. Ms Kaur-Bains submitted that these questions show that the Tribunal Member intended to and thought he had raised the issue of whether the first applicant’s conduct in Australia was for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee. Putting aside whether what the Member said was in fact sufficient to raise the issue with the first applicant, she submitted that it is clear that because of the mistranslation the applicants were not made aware of the issue.

  9. Ms Kaur-Bains also submitted that in its reasons the Tribunal was aware that there had been a mistranslation but took the view that the applicants were put on notice of the Tribunal’s s. 91R(3) concerns in the presence of their adviser:

    Looking at the transcript of the 11 October 2006 hearing, obtained by the Applicant through his adviser, the Tribunal is not certain that the legal meaning of what it was disclosing to the Applicant was aptly conveyed by the interpreter. However, the Applicant was put on notice of the Tribunal’s s 91R(3) concerns in the presence of his adviser, and the Applicant, through his adviser, sought further to argue the good faith of his Falun Gong activities, and when and where those activities began, in a post-hearing submission received by the Tribunal under cover of a letter from the adviser dated 27 October 2006.[15]

    [15] Court Book 385-386

  10. Ms Kaur-Bains went on to submit that this finding was an assumption by the Tribunal and does not necessarily follow from the applicant’s adviser’s post-hearing written submission. In any event, the obligation under s. 425(1) is to give the applicants an opportunity to give oral evidence and make submissions on relevant issues. If the Tribunal becomes aware after the hearing that an issue it thought it had raised had in fact not been raised, then it was under an obligation under


    s. 425(1) to invite the applicants to a further hearing, or raise the issue in writing and ask the applicants whether they wished to attend a further hearing.

  11. Ms Kaur-Bains submitted that the obligation under s. 425(1) is not discharged because the Tribunal Member forms the view (rightly or wrongly) that the applicants have an adviser and the adviser will raise the issue with the applicants.

  12. Ms Kaur-Bains further submitted that the Tribunal did not appear to have raised the issue that there was a possibility that the Burwood study group was convened for the purpose of coaching protection visa applicants.

  13. As to the applicants’ second ground, Ms Kaur-Bains tendered a transcript of the Tribunal hearing and submitted that the standard of interpretation at the hearing was so inadequate that the applicants were effectively prevented from giving evidence (see Applicant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[16] at [15] to [18]). This, too, was a breach of s. 425(1) of the Migration Act.

    [16] [2003] FCAFC 230

The First Respondent’s Submissions

  1. Counsel for the first respondent Minister, Ms Clegg, submitted that this is a case to which s. 422B applies. The Tribunal was not required to afford the applicant common law natural justice (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat[17] and SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[18]).

    [17] (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61

    [18] [2006] FCAFC 62

  2. Ms Clegg also submitted that SZBEL is not authority for the proposition that the Tribunal’s reasoning processes must be put to an applicant during an oral hearing before the Tribunal[19]; this has been confirmed by SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[20].

    [19] (2006) 231 ALR 592; [2006] HCA 63 at [48]-[49]

    [20] (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [18]

  3. As to what she described as the Section 91R(3) motivation issue, Ms Clegg submitted that the question of whether or not the first applicant’s motivation for practising Falun Gong in Australia was for the purpose of advancing his claims to be a refugee was clearly raised by the Tribunal at the hearing.[21] This is sufficient to distinguish this case from the facts in SZBEL and SZILQ. This question was a live issue both at the hearing and in the written submissions made after the hearing by the applicants’ adviser. Thus, she submitted, there was no denial of procedural fairness.

    [21] Court Book  307-308

  4. Ms Clegg also submitted that in any event it is well established that a potential s. 91R(3) finding need not be put to an applicant during the conduct of the review (see SZIQL at [24], [25] and [31]). It was for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that the claimed conduct was not engaged in for the purpose of strengthening his refugee claims.[22]

    [22] NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1536 at [26]; NBKT v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 195 at [89].

  5. Turning to the issue of the possibility of the Burwood study group being convened for the purpose of coaching applicants for protection visas, Ms Clegg submitted that the applicants’ contention that the Tribunal’s reasoning about this issue should have been put to them for comment cannot be sustained. Again, the decisions in SZBEL at [48]-[49] and SZBYR at [18] do not support the proposition that the Tribunal’s reasoning should have been put to the applicants during the oral hearing.

  6. Ms Clegg further submitted that the information about the Burwood study group came to the Tribunal’s attention during the hearing because it was raised by the first applicant himself.

  7. In any event, Ms Clegg submitted, the Tribunal’s reasoning about the refugee study group formed part of its s. 91R(3) analysis; it did not ‘rely’ on the information:

    Rather, it was disregarded by the Tribunal in accordance with the requirements of s. 91R(3) because the refugee study group activities had not been mentioned to the previously constituted Tribunal and because the Tribunal seriously concerned about the group as one that has been convened for asylum seekers: CB 393.6 – 393.7. It was open to the Tribunal to reason in that way.[23]

    [23] First Respondent’s Outline of Submissions at [21]

  8. Turning to the ground relating to the errors in interpreting, Ms Clegg submitted that there was no merit in the claim that the standard of interpreting was inadequate at the first Tribunal hearing. The second Tribunal accepted that errors had occurred and “placed no store in them”.

  9. As to the second hearing, the applicant’s migration adviser provided the Tribunal with a copy of a transcript of the hearing and, in the letter of 27th October 2006, pointed out the mistakes in interpretation.


    The adviser did not ask for another hearing. The Tribunal relied on the written record of the transcript provided by the applicant’s adviser and, therefore, did precisely what the applicants asked it to do.

Conclusions

  1. First and foremost, this is a matter to which s. 422B of the Migration Act applies. There was no requirement to provide common law natural justice.

  2. I am not satisfied that the applicants have shown a breach of s. 425 of the Act. The delegate’s decision was based largely on the credibility of the first applicant’s claims about his involvement in Falun Gong activities in China:

    In considering the credibility of the applicant’s claims I also note that he has submitted no documentation or other evidence to support any of his claims – that he is or ever has been an adherent of Falun Gong; that he was ever detained and tortured on account of this involvement in Falun Gong; or that he departed the PRC because he feared further mistreatment by the PRC authorities.

    Given the implausibilities and omissions in the applicant’s statement, and the lack of any evidence to support his claims I have serious doubts that they are based in fact.[24]

    [24] Court Book 43

  3. The Tribunal found that the first applicant’s claims of involvement in Falun Gong in China were not credible. As to his claims of involvement in Australia, the Tribunal was equally sceptical.


    The Tribunal raised its scepticism at the hearing, saying:

    I have to ask these questions because I have to consider whether or not this Falungong involvement could be conduct entered for the purposes of strengthening your claim for refugee status.

    If I were to arrive of that view, I don’t ever do so lightly.  I would be required under the law to disregard this part of your case.[25]

    [25] Court Book 307 - 308

  1. Accepting the difficulties in interpreting, which were brought to the Tribunal’s attention by the applicants’ adviser, it is clear that the Member clearly intended to raise the issue of whether the first applicant’s conduct in Australia was for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee. Ms Kaur-Bains has queried whether what the Member said was in fact sufficient to raise the issue with the applicant.[26]

    [26] Applicants’ Written Submissions at [32]

  2. In my view, it was sufficient. Whilst the standard of interpreting left a lot to be desired, it is noteworthy that the applicants’ adviser was present at the hearing. He speaks English fluently, he is a solicitor, and any infelicities in translation from English into Mandarin would not have hampered his understanding of the Tribunal Member’s questions. He was in a position to advise the applicants that there was a s. 91R(3) issue and did, in fact, make a post-hearing submission to the Tribunal on 27th October 2006.

  3. In that submission, the applicants’ adviser said:

    There is no evidence that his involvement in the Falun Gong movement is anything other than genuine. He has been involved in a number of groups and in a variety of activities that suggests more than just participating or attending rallies or demonstrations. The Tribunal will recall that it accepted during the hearing he had a detailed knowledge of Falun Gong principles and practice.[27]

    [27] Court Book 289

  4. The applicants’ adviser clearly addressed the s. 91R(3) issue in that submission. That, in my view, is sufficient to establish that there was no breach of s. 425 as far as the issue of the first applicant’s motivation in involving himself in Falun Gong activities in Australia is concerned.

  5. In any event, the decision in SZBEL does not require a disclosure of the Tribunal’s thought processes. As their Honours said:

    Procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to give an applicant a running commentary upon what it thinks about the evidence that is given. On the contrary, such a course would be likely to run a serious risk of conveying an impression of prejudgment.[28]

    [28] [2006] HCA 63 at [48]

  6. In respect of each part of the applicants’ first ground, these issues related to a potential finding under s. 91R(3). It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that the conduct was not engaged in for the purpose of strengthening his refugee claims and there is no requirement that a potential finding under s. 91R(3) must be put to the applicant during the hearing. In SZILQ, Buchanan J held at [24]:

    I do not accept, however, that there was a positive obligation on the RRT to put the allegation to him. Ultimately the burden under s 91R(3) lay on the applicant to satisfy the RRT about his motivation before the RRT was permitted to pay any regard to his conduct in Australia, which is the issue upon which the appeal has been focussed. The second ground of appeal cannot be sustained either, having regard to the terms of s 91R(3). It was, as I have said, ultimately a matter for the appellant to satisfy the RRT about his motivation.[29]

    [29] [2007] FCA 942 at [24]

  7. At the hearing, Ms Kaur-Bains invited me to find that Buchanan J was wrong in his finding at [24], which was, with respect, a most optimistic submission. The decision in SZILQ is a decision on appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court and it is therefore binding on this court.

  8. In my view, the applicants’ first ground must fail. It was for the applicants to satisfy the Tribunal about the first applicant’s motivation in regard to Falun Gong activity in Australia. No jurisdictional error is shown.

  9. Turning to the applicants’ second ground, there is no doubt that the standard of interpreting at the second Tribunal hearing left a lot to be desired. Quite properly, the applicants’ adviser not only raised the issue of significant errors in interpreting but provided a transcript prepared by a Level 3 NAATI Mandarin interpreter.

  10. In his submission of 27th October 2006, the applicants’ adviser raised the issue of deficient interpreting at both Tribunal hearings:

    (SZGWN)[30] did not have a fair hearing before the first Tribunal, contrary to section 425 Migration Act 1958, because the quality of the interpreter was clearly deficient and the Tribunal drew adverse conclusions based on those mistakes.

    We submit that (SZGWN) did not have a fair hearing during the second Tribunal hearing, contrary to section 425 Migration Act 1958, again because of the deficiencies of the interpreter. The deficiencies of the interpreting created a negative impression, which we have sought to overcome by providing a transcript of the hearing.[31]

    [30] Name deleted to comply with s 91X of the Migration Act

    [31] Court Book 238

  11. The Tribunal considered both of those claims. As to the first Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal stated:

    However, the Applicant submitted a transcript of relevant parts of that hearing and the presently-constituted Tribunal has taken due account of the evidence in that transcript, accepting that it improves upon the consecutive interpretation provided at the hearing. The Tribunal is confident that it has addressed and removed the disadvantage the Applicant may have suffered from a decision-maker relying on the consecutive oral interpretation of the Applicant’s evidence about Falun Gong teaching, Falun Gong books and the issue of when he was charged after coming to Australia in relation to his 2002 activities involving the traffic signs.[32]

    [32] Court Book 389

  12. As to the second hearing, the Tribunal said:

    As discussed, in considering this claim the Tribunal is greatly assisted by a fresh, NAATI-accredited translation of the Applicant’s evidence given at the 11 October 2006 hearing, on which the Applicant and his adviser have relied in making the point about misunderstandings at this more recent hearing. The Applicant and his adviser have not asked for a third RRT hearing, and have said that the transcript helps to overcome deficiencies in the oral interpretation of the Applicant’s 11 October 2006 evidence.

    Guided by the concerns raised in the 27 October 2006 submission, the Tribunal is confident that it has sorted through instances where the Applicant misunderstood questions by the Tribunal that were misinterpreted or inadequately interpreted on 11 October 2006. The Tribunal has also relied, as the Applicant and adviser have indicated they would prefer it to rely, on the transcript’s written translation of the information provided by the Applicant at the 11 October hearing, rather than the oral interpretation, the occasional shortcomings of which are shown in the transcript for comparison with what the Applicant is shown to have actually said.[33]

    [33] Court Book 389-390

  13. Quite clearly, the Tribunal has given favourable consideration to the applicants’ submissions about the inadequacy of the interpreting and has taken appropriate steps to deal with the matters raised.


    The Tribunal appears to have done exactly what the applicants asked it to do. If errors in interpreting are made, then they can be rectified (see Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[34]).

    [34] (1999) 92 FCR 6 at [37] per Kenny J

  14. Whilst it appears that there were errors on the part of the interpreter at the hearing, I am satisfied that the Tribunal took appropriate action in dealing with those errors, as the applicants requested. As a result, the applicants were not deprived of their ability to give evidence due to interpreting errors and there is no breach of s. 425 of the Act. There is no jurisdictional error.

  15. As no jurisdictional error is shown, the Tribunal decision is a privative clause decision under s. 474 of the Act. It is therefore final and conclusive.

  16. The application will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM

Associate:  S.Polley

Date:  17 October 2007


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Cases Citing This Decision

1

SZGSI & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2008] FMCA 1649