SZGTA v Minister for Immigration
[2006] FMCA 648
•3 May 2006
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZGTA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 648 |
| MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – refusal to grant protection visa – denial of common law natural justice – failure to adjourn or attempt to contact applicant or agent where no material claims considered by delegate – assumption of jurisdictional error – unjustified delay of 6 years. |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.420(1); 424A; 483 |
| Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust.) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389 Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 |
| Applicant: | SZGTA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | SYG1841 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Emmett FM |
| Hearing date: | 26 April 2006 |
| Date of last submission: | 26 April 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 3 May 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant appearing in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr J.A.C. Potts |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Ms E. Warner-Knight |
ORDERS
The application before this Court is dismissed.
That the applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs in an amount of $6000.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG1841 of 2005
| SZGTA |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s.483 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) decided on 12 March 1999 to affirm the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Delegate”) not to grant a protection visa to the applicants.
The applicant is a 49 year old male who claims to be a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”) and of Han ethnicity. (“the Applicant”).
The Applicant has a wife and a daughter born 11 September 1985, who were residing in the PRC when the Applicant left the PRC.
The Applicant arrived in Australia on 7 May 1998, having legally departed from Shanghai on a passport issued in his own name.
On 25 May 1998, the Applicant lodged an application for a protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Department”) under the Act.
The Applicant claimed that he feared persecution by the Communist Party in the PRC by reason of his support and participation as a student in the demonstration at Tiennamen Square in 1989.
On 30 May 1998, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that it was not satisfied that the Applicant is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (“the Convention”). The Delegate noted that no claims or statement were received from the Applicant in support of his claims. The protection visa application form, signed by the Applicant on 22 May 1998 and received by the Department on 25 May 1998, simply stated, “I will submit my statement in three days because it is too long a story and it needs to be translated into English.”
On 29 June 1998, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
On 12 March 1999, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa after the Applicant failed to attend a hearing at the nominated time and place, having responded “Yes” to a hearing offer.
The Tribunal Decision
In an undated statement provided to the Tribunal the Applicant made the following claims and assertions:
i)That the Applicant is from a well-known intellectual Chinese family who were classified as “Ninth grade”.
ii)That the Applicant’s father was a member was a “member of right-wing-party in “anti-right-wing-struggle” movement.”
iii)That families of members of the right-wing-party were the first targets in Communist “movement”’ in the PRC.
iv)That, during the “culture revolution”, the Applicant’s family was destroyed by the Red guards and further, his parents were subjected to criticism and repudiation.
v)That, as a result of factors (i) – (iv), the Applicant feared the Communist Party in the PRC.
vi)That the Applicant was granted an Australian student visa in August 1998.
vii)That the Applicant was hindered from travelling to Australia as the local police detained the Applicant and instructed him to have his wife’s second pregnancy aborted. As a result of this detention the Applicant’s visa lapsed.
viii)That, despite the wife terminating the pregnancy, the Applicant and his wife were continually harassed. Further, the Applicant lost his job as “punishment”.
ix)That, subsequent to these events, the Applicant joined the student protest at Tiennamen Square in 1989 and as a result was identified by the authorities and the media, arrested as an “anti-revolution criminal” and sentenced to 2 years jail.
x)That, since the Applicant’s release from jail, he has been discriminated against by the government, friends and relatives. He is always suspected when something goes wrong.
xi)That, as a result of the Applicant’s life in the PRC as claimed above, he lost his will to live, his physical and mental health suffered and his mother “died of this intolerable humiliation”.
xii)That the Applicant was forced to work in the private sector where he was subject to discrimination, in that he did not receive credit for his work and was made to take responsibility for other people’s mistakes. The Applicant claimed that this discrimination resulted from him being thought of as a “political criminal” because of his activities in 1989.
xiii)That there is no political freedom in the PRC.
xiv)That the Applicant’s passport was kept by the tour group leader and the Applicant was unable to escape from his tour group on his first trip to Australia, however, he succeeded the second time. Further, that the leader of the tour group has reported his escape to the government in the PRC, and, consequently, he will be arrested and placed in jail if he were to return to the PRC.
The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s claims were “vague and general”.
The Tribunal also noted that some of the Applicant’s claims were inconsistent. The Applicant, in his protection visa application, originally claimed that he had never been convicted of an offence or crime and was unemployed for 10 years from 1988. However, in a later statement provided to the Tribunal, he claimed to have been arrested and sentenced to 2 years jail and employed as a skilled technician working in a private company.
The Tribunal observed that, because the Applicant did not attend the hearing, it had been unable to explore with the Applicant how his 1988 and 1997 passports came to have the same photograph, his involvement with the pro-democracy movement, his claims of discrimination and what they involved, his two trips to Australia in 1998 and his claims relating to employment.
The proceeding before this Court
On 13 July 2005, the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on the following grounds:
“1. The respondent refused to grant my protection visa application without any proper grounds and proper investigation.
2. I’m a citizen of China. If I go back to my country I will be risk of suffering persecuting. Within the meaning of the 1951 Convention relating to the 1967 protect (sic) relating to the status of Refugees.
3. Member of RRT failed to understand my claims and failed to consider relevant matters. Further particulars to be provided.
4. I seek relief under S38B of the judiciary Act 1903 (ch) (sic) on the grounds that the tribunal, a Exceeded jurisdiction in arrival at the decision not to grant me a protection visa in that it: I was not accorded natural justice. Further particulars to be provided.”
Ground 1
In relation to Ground 1 of the Applicant’s application, there are no particulars provided in support of this ground. There is no obligation on the Tribunal to seek to investigate the Applicant’s claim. It is for the Applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that he satisfies the relevant criteria of the Migration Act (Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 170; Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576). In its form, this ground discloses no reviewable error capable of being jurisdictional error. Accordingly, this ground is dismissed.
Ground 2
Ground 2 cavils with the finding of the Tribunal of its failure to be satisfied that the Applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations. It is an assertion without any accompanying particulars. In its form, this ground discloses no reviewable error capable of being jurisdictional error. Accordingly, this ground is dismissed.
Ground 3
Ground 3 is an allegation that the Tribunal failed to understand his claims and consider relevant matters. Again, there are no particulars of the ground.
It is apparent that the Tribunal had regard to the statement purportedly provided by the Applicant, it being the only document at all in relation to the Applicant’s claims.
In evidence before this Court, the Applicant claimed that he had never seen such a document before. Indeed, if that is the case, then the only claims at all before the Tribunal were some of the sections in the protection visa application, including the Applicant’s passport details, earlier travel to Australia, his education and employment. Other than that information, in answer to question 35 of the protection visa application, why he left the PRC, the Applicant responded, “I will submit my statement in three days time because it is a long story and it needs to be translated to English.” Certainly, nothing in that information would be capable of satisfying the statutory criteria required to be met before a protection visa can be granted. In any event, there was nothing before the Tribunal to suggest that the written statement provided to it, was provided otherwise than with the knowledge and consent of the Applicant.
No reviewable error is disclosed by this ground and, accordingly, it is dismissed.
Ground 4
Ground 4 relates to the allegation of a denial of natural justice. I note that the application states that further particulars will be provided. No further documents have been filed by the Applicant in this Court. At the heart of the Applicant’s complaint, is the fact that the Tribunal proceeded with its review in circumstances without offering him a further opportunity to attend a hearing and give evidence and make submissions in support of his claims.
Section 424A of the Act was not in existence at the time of the Tribunal decision. However, if it had been, it may be that the Tribunal would have been required to give information to the Applicant in writing, prior to a hearing and to invite comment, where the Tribunal had regard to inconsistencies in the Applicant’s information on his protection visa application and his statement provided to the Tribunal, where that information was part of the Tribunal’s reasons for affirming the decision under review. Those inconsistencies are referred to in Paragraph 12 above in these Reasons and relate to the inconsistency, in his protection visa application and his written statement to the Tribunal, of his evidence of detention and employment.
In the circumstances, it is the common law requirements of natural justice that are relevant in considering whether the Applicant has been denied procedural fairness either, (i) by the Tribunal’s decision to proceed in his absence, or, (ii) by the Tribunal having regard to inconsistencies that he was not given an opportunity to address.
In relation to (i), it is dealt with below under the relevant heading.
However, in relation to (ii), having proceeded to consider the issue of delay on the assumption of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal in denying the Applicant procedural fairness by proceeding with its review in the circumstances referred to below, it is not necessary to consider the possibility of a further denial of procedural fairness in failing to provide the Applicant an opportunity to answer adverse information that may have been the reason or part of the reasons for the Tribunal affirming the decision under review. Such obligations of the Tribunal would have been governed, at the time, by the common law notions of natural justice (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 628-629). Moreover, it is not a ground of review relied upon by the Applicant, nor addressed by the First Respondent.
(i) Tribunal’s decision to proceed with review in absence of Applicant
The Applicant contends that the reason that he did not appear is because he was not aware of the hearing because he did not receive the Tribunal’s invitation to attend a hearing and was not informed by his migration agent of the hearing.
In support of that contention, the Applicant states that the address on his application for review was written by his migration agent and is incorrect in that it refers to Kingsgrove Road, rather than King Georges Road, although the suburb was correct. There is no Kingsgrove Road located in the suburb where the Applicant claims to reside. However, there is a King Georges Road.
However, I note that the street name on the Applicant’s protection visa application, completed by the same agent, also erroneously recorded the Applicant’s address as “King George Rd”, rather that King Georges Road.
I note that the Delegate’s decision was sent to the Applicant at Kingsgrove Road and copied to the migration agent. That appears to be the first use by any person of Kingsgrove Road, according to the documents in the Court Book. Thereafter, the error appears to have been perpetuated in the Applicant’s documents by his agent, resulting in all the Tribunal’s correspondence being sent to the Applicant at the Kingsgrove Road address. Correspondence was also sent by the Tribunal to his migration agent’s address.
I accept that the Applicant did not receive correspondence at his residential address, although, clearly his agent received correspondence from the Tribunal, as borne out by the completion by the agent, and lodging with the Tribunal, of the application for review.
On 16 November 1998, the Tribunal sent to the Applicant at the Kingsgrove Road address, copied to his migration agent, a letter enclosing a Response to Hearing Offer form requesting its completion and return to the Tribunal within 21 days of the date of the letter.
On 27 November 1998, the Response to Hearing Offer form was received by the Tribunal, and purportedly signed by Applicant on 22 May 1998, confirming his desire to attend a hearing.
The Applicant gave evidence that his migration agent never told him of the inquiry by the Tribunal as to whether he wished to attend a hearing, nor that the Tribunal had set his review down for hearing on Thursday 11 March 1999.
In the course of oral evidence before this Court, the Applicant confirmed that he was in regular contact with his migration agent, at least, until May 2000. The Applicant gave evidence that he attempted to visit his agent at his office, some time in May 2000. However, when he attended, it was apparent to him that the agent was not located at those premises. He said, thereafter, he did not seek to contact his migration agent.
Given, on the Applicant’s own evidence, that he was in regular contact with his agent over this period, it does seem unlikely that the agent would not have informed him of the hearing, particularly where it would appear that the Response to Hearing Offer form was completed and returned to the Tribunal by the Applicant’s agent. However, if the Applicant was so informed by the agent, there is no reason suggested why he would not have attended. Moreover, I have regard to the careless errors made by the agent in writing the Applicant’s incorrect address on both the protection visa application form and the application for review by the Tribunal.
Having regard to his failure to ensure that the Applicant’s correct contact details were on both his protection visa application and his review application, in the circumstances, I am prepared to assume, without finding, that this migration agent did not properly discharge his obligations to the Applicant to bring relevant correspondence with the Tribunal to the Applicant’s attention.
However, the Applicant’s awareness is not something that the Tribunal knew as a matter of fact. Plainly, the Tribunal proceeded with its review on the understanding that the Applicant had, for whatever reason, chosen not attend.
On 29 January 1999, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant, at the Kingsgrove Road address, copied to his migration agent, acknowledging receipt of the Response to Hearing Offer and nominating Thursday 11 March 1999 at 10.00am as the time and date for hearing. The letter contains the following notification in bold capitals “if you do not attend a hearing and postponement has not been granted, we will assume that you no longer want to come to a hearing and the Tribunal may make a decision on your case without further notice.”
The Tribunal, in its decision dated 12 March 1999, noted the following:
“On 16 November 1998 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the papers relating to this application but it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The applicant was advised that he was entitled to come to a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence in support of his claims. The applicant advised the Tribunal that he wanted to give oral evidence and on 29 January 1999 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that the hearing would be held on 11 March 1999. The applicant was advised that if he did not attend the hearing and a postponement had not been granted, the tribunal would assume that he no longer wanted to come to a hearing and that a decision could then be made without further notice. The applicant did not attend the hearing or contact the Tribunal to explain his failure to attend. Copies of all letters were sent to the applicant’s adviser, and all letters were sent by registered post. No letters have been returned to the Tribunal. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the Tribunal has discharged its obligation to provide the applicant with the opportunity to give oral evidence before it and that he has effectively declined that opportunity. This matter has therefore been determined on the evidence before the Tribunal. That evidence comprises the Department’s and tribunal’s files relating to the application.”
The Tribunal exercised its discretion not to postpone the hearing or make any attempt to contact the Applicant or his migration agent because the Applicant did not attend the hearing or contact the Tribunal to explain his failure to attend. The Tribunal also noted that letters sent to the Applicant and his migration agent were sent by registered post and none were returned. I understand from that comment that, in those circumstances, the Tribunal drew the inference that the letters sent by the Tribunal to the Applicant and his adviser reached their destination.
The Tribunal noted that it was satisfied that its obligation to provide the Applicant with the opportunity to give oral evidence before it, had been effectively declined by the Applicant by his failure to appear.
Faced with the non attendance of the Applicant at the time and place nominated by the Tribunal for the hearing, it was open to the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to adjourn the proceeding and nominate a further date. Such a course would involve notifying the Applicant at the address, now known to be incorrect. However, there was nothing before the Tribunal to suggest that adjourning and notifying the Applicant and his adviser in writing would deliver any different result than that facing the Tribunal on 11 March 1999.
It is plain that the Tribunal was unaware of the error in the Applicant’s contact details placed on his review application by his migration agent. In those circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal not to pursue such a course.
However, the Tribunal, before exercising its discretion to proceed, could have sought to contact the Applicant’s adviser on the telephone number provided by the agent in the application for review. It would appear that such a course would certainly have been “fair, just, economical and quick”, those being the notions underpinning the operation of the relevant legislation at the time (s.420(1) of the Act)
It is obviously very sad that the Tribunal had the incorrect address of the Applicant. However, it was the Applicant’s responsibility to provide to the Tribunal accurate contact details for himself and any adviser.
Certainly, had the Applicant attended the hearing, the Tribunal would have been required to raise concerns about the Applicant’s claims that may cause the Tribunal to make adverse findings in respect of the Applicant’s claims (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 628-629). As far as the Tribunal was aware, it had informed the Applicant, by letter dated 29 January 1999, that the Applicant’s present material was insufficient to cause the Tribunal to make a decision in the Applicant’s favour.
However, it was an extremely serious and significant step for the Tribunal to decide to proceed with its review in the absence of the Applicant. The Tribunal knew that the Applicant had not had his claims of fear of persecution considered and decided on the merits by the Delegate; knew that the Delegate made its decision within 5 days of receiving the Applicant’s application, despite the Applicant stating that it would take him 3 days to prepare his statement “because it is a long story and it needs to be translated into English”; and knew that a review of the Tribunal’s decision would be to the Federal Court of Australia and would not involve a merits review.
Where the Tribunal was aware that the Applicant wished to attend a hearing and having readily available the migration agent’s telephone number, the Tribunal could have and should have attempted to contact the migration agent by telephone, at least to inquire if the agent knew if the Applicant was aware of the hearing, before making its decision to proceed with its review in the absence of the Applicant. To do otherwise, in my view in all the circumstances and based on the assumptions I have made about the Applicant’s knowledge of the hearing, was not, on balance, in the interests of justice. This is because the consequence of proceeding with its review without adjourning or taking any step to use the contact details available would be, to the knowledge of the Tribunal, to deny the Applicant any opportunity to explain fully his claims in support of his application for a protection visa at a hearing which he was offered and which he accepted. Such denial would be a breach of procedural fairness and, in the circumstances, would be jurisdictional error.
Delay
I have proceeded to consider the issue of delay on the basis that the Tribunal’s decision is not a privative clause decision. In those circumstances, the First Respondent opposes the granting of relief to the Applicant on the basis of the delay in seeking relief and the absence of any justification for that delay.
The Applicant delayed taking any steps in seeking review of the Tribunal’s decision for 6 years. No affidavit seeking to explain the delay was filed by the Applicant prior to the hearing before this Court, despite being directed to do so, on 9 August 2005, by the Registrar of this Court. By consent, leave was granted to the Applicant to give oral evidence to the Court on this issue.
One commences such consideration in the light of the proposition that, in the event that a decision of the Tribunal is invalid for want of procedural fairness, in the absence of any delay, waiver, acquiescence or unclean hands on the part of the Applicant, there is no reason to withhold discretionary relief. However, delay is certainly a ground upon which constitutional writ relief may be refused. (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24 (“SAAP”) at [84] and [211]; R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust.) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389). McHugh J in SAAP at [80] observed:
“The issuing of writs s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 39B of the Judiciary Act is discretionary. Discretionary relief may be refused under s 39B if the conduct of the party is inconsistent with the application for relief. It may be inconsistent, for example, if there is delay on the part of the applicant or the applicant has waived or acquiesced in the invalidity of the decision or does not come with clean hands.”
In considering the delay by the Applicant for 6 years in filing an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision by this Court and the importance of finality of administrative decisions, I have regard to the comments of McHugh J in Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 (“Ex parte Marks”) at 495 in which he said the following:
“Where an applicant seeks the issue of constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases.”
The Applicant’s evidence of his explanation for the delay centred on his denial of any knowledge of the Tribunal hearing or the Tribunal’s decision.
The Applicant gave evidence that he was making inquiries of his migration agent of the state of his review application up until about May 2000 when he alleges that he was unable to locate his agent.
The Applicant gave evidence that the migration agent continually told him that he simply had to wait. He stated that he thought the Department should give him a letter and that he “just had to wait for the letter”.
In response to a question by counsel for the First Respondent about what the Applicant thought was happening with his Tribunal application between 2000 and 2005, the Applicant responded that he got the impression that it was not finally decided but that his tax record was in order and he was doing business properly. The Applicant went on to confirm that he had that impression because he did not receive a letter from the Department during that time.
When asked how long he would have waited to receive such a letter, he said that he did not know because the Australian Government was not quick. When asked was he ever intending to go to the Department, the Applicant answered that he would not do so because he believed his application was still being processed. However, his evidence was also that he had changed addresses twice before being detained in Villawood in May 2005 as an illegal non-citizen.
Of particular relevance, was the Applicant’s evidence that he took no steps to seek to contact the Department or the Tribunal to inquire as to the state of his application at any stage and, significantly, since he lost contact with his migration agent in May 2000. The Applicant’s only explanation for his failure to contact the Department was that he did not know where it was or its telephone number and that his migration agent had told him simply to wait for the decision.
The Applicant’s explanation for the extraordinary length of his delay is inadequate and unreasonable in all the circumstances. He made no attempt whatsoever, once he was unable to locate his migration agent in May 2000, to make any inquiries from any source as to the state of his review application by the Tribunal. Nor did he proffer any evidence of any attempt to seek to locate his migration agent, other than turning up where the agent’s offices used to be some time in May 2000.
I do not accept as remotely reasonable, the excuse that he was waiting for the Department to contact him for 6 years. He mentioned that he conducts business and has proper tax records. His awareness of those sorts of obligations makes unbelievable his evidence that he expected the Department to contact him and that, having waited 6 years, he was still not intending to take any steps to contact the Department because “the Australian Government is not quick”.
In considering whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought, I have regard to the unjustified delay by the Applicant, albeit that there is no specific time requirement in this Court in which the Applicant should seek constitutional writ relief.
The nature of constitutional writ relief, as referred to by McHugh J in Ex parte Marks, makes it clear that one must consider the public interest in there being efficacy in public acts, decisions and judgments which cannot be allowed to become “hostage of an applicant’s search for favourable legal advice’’ (Ex parte Marks at 496).
Moreover, the Applicant has not provided any evidence of any further material he would have provided to the Tribunal at a hearing or what oral evidence he may have give, were he given an opportunity to appear at a hearing. The Tribunal’s reasons make it clear that it considered the Applicant’s claims in the light of the material before it.
At the heart of the exercise of any judicial discretion must be consideration of the overall interests of justice.
I have considered the consequences that flow to the Applicant, were I to exercise my discretion to refuse to grant the relief sought, particularly, where I have found that there was an absence of procedural fairness.
In balancing the interests of justice to the community in having such administrative decision making finalised and the interests of the Applicant in having an opportunity to have his claims heard and considered according to law, I am satisfied that the delay of 6 years in seeking constitutional writ relief from this Court, occasioned solely by the complete inactivity by the Applicant, at least since May 2000, to take any steps to seek to locate his migration agent or contact the Tribunal or the Department for 6 years, in respect of the progress his review application, is conduct amounting to undue, unreasonable, unwarrantable and unjustified delay and the relief sought should not be granted.
In the circumstances the application before this Court is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM
Deputy Associate: A. D’Addona
Date: 3 May 2006
8
2