SZGRK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZGRK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

[2010] FCA 153

Citation: SZGRK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 153
Parties: SZGRK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1049 of 2009
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 10 February 2010
Date of hearing: 10 February 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Appellant: Appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Phillips Fox

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1049 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZGRK
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1049 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZGRK
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

10 FEBRUARY 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court refusing the appellant’s amended application for constitutional writ relief:  SZGRK v The Minister for Immigration [2009] FMCA 828. Before her Honour the appellant was represented by counsel, but he appears himself before me. There were two grounds of the application that were argued before her Honour. These dealt with a challenge to the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision to refuse to grant a protection visa pursuant to s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the appellant. The proceedings have had a long and unfortunate history through no fault of the appellant.

  2. The appellant arrived in Australia in June 2004 and shortly afterwards lodged an application for a protection visa.  He came using what the tribunal accepted was a false Indian passport, he being a citizen of Bangladesh, of the Buddhist faith.  In February 2005 the delegate refused the application.  The Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed that decision for the first time in May 2005, but its decision was set aside in June 2006.  In August 2006 the tribunal, differently constituted, affirmed the decision of the delegate, but in February 2008 the Federal Magistrates Court again set that decision aside and remitted the matter to the tribunal to be heard and determined once more.  On the third occasion the tribunal was differently constituted again, and conducted two hearings.

    NEW ARGUMENT ABOUT THE APPELLANT GIVING EVIDENCE TO THE TRIBUNAL BY TELEPHONE

  3. During the course of his submissions…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZGRK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship concerns the appellant's application for a protection visa, which was ultimately denied by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia in 2004 using a false Indian passport, faced several hearings before the tribunal, which consistently upheld the delegate's refusal of his visa application. The Federal Magistrates Court, however, set aside the tribunal's decision in February 2008, leading to a further review by the tribunal. The appellant's appeal to the Federal Court challenges the tribunal's handling of certain evidence, particularly three letters from Bangladesh that the tribunal deemed unreliable.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the tribunal erred in not giving weight to three letters from Bangladesh and in not verifying their authenticity. The appellant argued that the tribunal should have contacted the authors of these letters to confirm their reliability. The court had to determine if the tribunal was obligated to make such inquiries and if the tribunal's decision was legally sound in dismissing the appellant's claims based on the letters.

The Federal Court found that the tribunal was not under a duty to investigate the claims by making external inquiries, as there is generally no such positive obligation unless specific circumstances require it. The court upheld the tribunal's decision, affirming that it was open to the tribunal to determine the weight to be given to the letters based on the evidence and materials presented. The court concluded that the tribunal's findings were reasonable and based on proper consideration of the evidence, including the appellant's own admissions about the reliability of some of the documents.

The final orders of the court upheld the tribunal's decision, dismissing the appellant's appeal. The court confirmed that there was no jurisdictional error in the tribunal's handling of the evidence, and the tribunal's findings were supported by the materials before it.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant arrived in Australia in June 2004 and shortly afterwards lodged an application for a protection visa. He came using what the tribunal accepted was a false Indian passport, he being a citizen of Bangladesh, of the Buddhist faith. In February 2005 the delegate refused the application. The Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed that decision for the first time in May 2005, but its decision was set aside in June 2006. In August 2006 the tribunal, differently constituted, affirmed the decision of the delegate, but in February 2008 the Federal Magistrates Court again set that decision aside and remitted the matter to the tribunal to be heard and determined once more. On the third occasion the tribunal was differently constituted again, and conducted two hearings.NEW ARGUMENT ABOUT THE APPELLANT GIVING EVIDENCE TO THE TRIBUNAL BY TELEPHONE During the course of his submissions today the appellant suggested that at some point during the process the tribunal held a hearing at which he was present by telephone, and had not been able properly to present all his evidence, documents and material. It is not particularly clear whether that occasion occurred on one of the two hearings before the tribunal whose decision is the subject of the current appeal. There is evidence in the appeal papers that at both of the hearings the appellant was present, and presented documents to the tribunal which it recorded as having been received at the hearing, including, on the last occasion, his New South Wales driver’s licence. He was also represented on both occasions by a solicitor migration agent who corresponded with the tribunal following each of the two hearings in 2008, and provided further documents to the tribunal in answer to issues that were raised, including issues raised in a letter written by the tribunal under s 424A of the Act. No suggestion appears in her Honour’s judgment, or in the grounds of the amended application, settled by counsel who then appeared for the appellant, that he had been unable properly to present his case by reason of any use of the telephone, or his inability to be present during a hearing. Given that the appellant was represented by counsel below, and that there is no evidence before me that he suffered any difficulty at all in having his case presented to the tribunal when he was represented by a solicitor migration agent at all relevant times, I am not prepared to allow the appellant to raise this issue as a basis for consideration in the appeal. An appeal is by way of rehearing the issues canvassed at the trial. It is not an opportunity to use that as some form of stepping stone in which the whole case can be reformulated. The function of an appellant court is to re-hear on the record of the evidence and materials before the court below the proceeding and the issues then tendered with a view to identifying the error or errors complained of in the court’s decision below: see Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7-8 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ; Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 203-204 [14] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ.THE APPELLANT’S CLAIMS

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister argued that, on its face, the third letter did not raise any issue about which its writer could sensibly have been contacted. It appeared to be based on a hearsay account of the circumstances in which the appellant came to India and hardly offered any critical or significant insight as to the circumstances which the appellant claimed to have given rise to his fear of persecution in Bangladesh. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S DECISION Before her Honour, the appellant argued two grounds. First, he challenged the tribunal’s finding, which I have just recited, as to the poor probative quality of the guru’s letters and its determination not to give them any weight. Secondly, he contended that the tribunal had acted unreasonably in failing to contact the authors of these letters to verify their authenticity. The trial judge found that on a fair reading of the tribunal’s decision it was expressing its finding as to the weight which it was prepared to give the assertions in these letters, relating to the circumstances of the father’s alleged murder. Her Honour found support for this evaluation of the tribunal’s reasoning in the appellant’s apology to it relating to two other, particular letters from different Bangladeshi organisations with different addresses that each bore an identical seal of belonging only to one of them. The tribunal made its adverse finding about, among others, those two letters. The sealed letters were written a month apart by different authors and dealt differently with, among other things, the circumstances of the father’s alleged death. The appellant admitted to the tribunal that those letters were defective and that he had asked someone to prepare them for him. Her Honour found that, in the circumstances, on the evidence and material before it, the tribunal’s findings in respect of those letters were open to it, for the reasons it gave. The trial judge held that, coupled with the appellant’s admissions as to the reliability of the two sealed letters, it was also open to the tribunal to place no weight on the other letters from Bangladesh based on the evidence and material before it for the reasons that it gave. I see no error in what her Honour held. Indeed, in my opinion, it was clearly correct.THE APPEAL The appellant’s notice of appeal asserted that her Honour had erred in finding that the tribunal had not made a jurisdictional error. He contended that this was because the tribunal had acted unreasonably in failing to make inquiries about the origin and reliability of each writer’s statements in the three letters (i.e. the 2004 letter from India, and the two letters from the guru, written in 1998 and 2006). The appellant’s argument before her Honour, which I infer is repeated in the notice of appeal, sought to impose on the tribunal an obligation to enquire of the guru and the writer of the letter from India. In my opinion, in the circumstances of this case, no duty to enquire arose. As her Honour pointed out correctly, there is generally no positive duty for the tribunal to investigate claims by making enquiries outside the material presented to it by the applicant for review in support of his or her claim for a protection visa: Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43]; see also at 13 [1] and 16 [17] per Gleeson CJ and 49 [124] per Callinan J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established