SZGOX v Minister for Immigration - [2005] FMCA 1721

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZGOX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2005] FMCA 1721

MIGRATION – RRT decision – Chinese fearing persecution as Falun Gong practitioner – Tribunal disbelieved claims – questioning about knowledge of Falun Gong beliefs not unfair – no error found.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R(3), 422B, 424A(3)(a), 474(1), 483A, Pt.8

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572
SZAQY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2005] FCA 1382
SZBDF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1493
SZEGT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514
WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511
WAKK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 225

Applicant:

SZGOX

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG1643 of 2005

Judgment of:

Smith FM

Hearing date:

8 November 2005

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

8 November 2005

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr B Young

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr S Lloyd

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The Tribunal be included as second respondent, and note the undertaking by the solicitor for the first respondent to file a submitting appearance by the second respondent.
The application is dismissed.
The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,500.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG1643 of 2005

SZGOX

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(revised from transcript)

This is an application under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 16 June 2005 and handed down on 17 June 2005. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate taken on 10 March 2005 which refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant on an application she lodged on 14 February 2005. The proceedings at each stage have been expedited due to the fact that the applicant has been held in immigration detention.
Section 483A gives the Court “the same jurisdiction as the Federal Court in relation to a matter arising under this Act”. The relevant jurisdiction is under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) but subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration Act. The limitations have the effect that I do not have power to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and send the matter back to the Tribunal unless I am satisfied that the decision was affected by jurisdictional error. I do not have power myself to decide whether the applicant’s claims should be believed, nor whether she qualifies for a protection visa or any other permission to stay in Australia. The power to make the final decision about these matters is given to the Minister for Immigration and the officials in her Department and the immigration Tribunals.
The applicant arrived in Australia in November 2004 as a visitor, and was taken into detention some weeks after her arrival for what were considered to be breaches of her visa. It is unnecessary for me to identify the circumstances. While in detention she engaged an experienced firm of solicitors, Craddock Murray and Neumann, to prepare a protection visa application which was lodged on her behalf on 14 February 2005.
The applicant’s visa application attached a statutory declaration in which she claimed that she was a national of China and had left that country to seek protection in Australia. She claimed that following an illness in 1989 she had tried various forms of treatment and:
4.Eventually in about 1995 I tried Falun Gong. At that time Falun Gong was flourishing across China.
5.After only one month of Falun Gong practice my health improved.
6.I continued practicing Falun Gong.
7.In 1999 the Chinese authorities cracked down on Falun Gong practice.
The applicant claimed that in September 1999 a district official questioned her about her Falun Gong practices and told her to cease her practices. She claimed that she then assisted the official and “forcefully propagated against Falun Gong”. She said:
16.Despite ceasing my Falun Gong activities, my family and I continued to be persecuted: my husband lost his job and whenever I applied for a job I was rejected.
17.Eventually, I decided I had to leave China.
18.Since arriving in Australia on 16 November 2004 I have been able to resume my Falun Gong practices.
19.If I am forced to return to China I will be forced to again stop practicing Falun Gong.
A delegate refused her application on 10 March 2005, and the applicant appealed to the Tribunal with the assistance of her solicitor. She attended a hearing accompanied by a solicitor on 20 April 2005.
The Tribunal gave an account of the hearing in its reasons which appears broadly consistent with a transcript which is in evidence before me. The transcript was prepared by the applicant’s barrister who had accepted instructions on very short notice. The transcript was tendered at the start of today’s hearing without the Minister having opportunity to check its accuracy against the tapes. However, for the purposes of this judgment I am prepared to assume its accuracy.
Following the Tribunal’s hearing, the applicant’s solicitor made a submission which contained several criticisms of how the hearing was conducted. These were addressed by the principal member of the Tribunal and there is correspondence concerning this in the documents before me. The Tribunal also discussed the complaints in the course of its reasons. However, none of the matters raised by the solicitor have been pursued in the grounds of review which were argued today by the applicant’s counsel.
The solicitor’s post‑hearing submission contained:
5.Husband’s practice of Falun Gong
At the Hearing the Member questioned the Applicant’s honesty on the basis that while her statutory declaration does not state that her husband practiced Falun Gong she stated that her husband, in her oral testimony she claims to be a Falun Gong practitioner.
In this regard, we note that while the Applicant’s written statement does not state that her husband was a Falun Gong practitioner, the statement does not state that the Applicant’s husband was not a Falun Gong practitioner.
To confirm that the Applicant’s husband is in fact a Falun Gong practitioner who has fled China and moved to the US we attach a letter (including translation) from the Applicant’s husband to the member dated 25 April 2005.
We also enclose a testimonial (including translation) from Bei Xin Gong Mao Ltd dated 11 April 2005 which attests to the Applicant’s claims.
The document purporting to be a letter from the applicant’s husband does not bear any signature or indication of authenticity, and states in general terms:
My wife had practiced Falun Gong from 1995, because she was weak and frequently disease, after practicing Falun Gong she became well.
The Government had persecuted our family seriously because PRC persecuted Falun Gong in 1999.
Both of us lost our jobs, besides Police followed to interrogate us. We were suffering the serious threat of job and life.
In this kind of situation, I had no alternative but to leave to America. …
The post‑hearing submission from the solicitor also enclosed:
a statement from the Applicant confirming her Falun Gong beliefs which has been attested to by other Falun Gong practitioners with whom the Applicant has associated with in Australia.
This document is in the form of a petition and says:
I am (the applicant’s name), an active member of Falun Gong. It is well known that Chinese government now still persecutes Falun Gong practitioners. I am one of the victims. All of the Villawood Detention’s Falun Gong people know me personally, their names are mentioned as following: …
There is then a list of six names with signatures dated 27 April 2005.
In its statement of reasons, the Tribunal identified the applicant’s claims and commenced its examination of her evidence with reference to country information describing Falun Gong teaching. This included the following passages:
Started in 1992 by Li, a former government clerk, Falun Gong combines elements of Buddhism, Daoism and Chinese theories of qi, or cosmic energy forces. In Li’s rendition, those who practice the right exercises activate an invisible wheel in the abdomen that sucks in good energy and expels bad forces, improving health and happiness.
…
Falun Gong is a form of qigong developed in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, a railway official with no particular spiritual or medical training. One advantage Falun Gong has over other forms of qigong is that its exercises are relatively simple, can be learned quickly, and can be performed anywhere, making it ideal for people living busy lives in modern cities. Most Chinese see qigong as a form of health practice rather than a religion. They aim to improve their lives in this world rather than to achieve an afterlife. It seems reasonable for Chinese Falun Gong practitioners, therefore, to claim that they are not practicing a religion. Such a claim, however, draws on a deep structure of cultural assumptions subtly different from those in the West. Chinese traditions assume a profound interpenetration of matter and spirit, body and soul. To bring health benefits, the physical exercises of qigong must be accompanied by moral cultivation. For Falun Gong, for example the virtues to cultivate are Truth (zhen), Benevolence (shan), and Forbearance (ren). And moral cultivation involves spiritual exercise, a way of focusing the mind. Like most qigong practitioners, Falun Gong members do not make a clear distinction between physical and spiritual healing. Thus, from a Western viewpoint, most forms of qigong look more like religion than medicine.
The Tribunal referred to other country information concerning the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China. It then referred to what was said at the hearing.
The Tribunal asked the applicant a series of questions designed to test the applicant’s knowledge as to the five exercises which constitute the exercise regime of the practice and also to test the applicant’s knowledge of the moral or spiritual element in the practice. I shall set out below an extract from the transcript in relation to this questioning, which became the subject of the submissions of counsel for the applicant.
In a passage of the transcript which was not the subject of any of the grounds of review, the Tribunal asked the applicant who had taught her how to perform the five exercises, and she initially gave the name of a person whom she said she met “as soon as I came into detention centre”. When the Tribunal said:
I put it to you that if you were a Falun Gong practitioner years ago in China, that somebody in China would have taught you the exercises rather than someone in the detention centre.
The applicant then said:
In China yes someone did.
In my opinion, it was open to the Tribunal to form a view that she had given inconsistent answers concerning when she was taught the Falun Gong exercises.
The Tribunal also described how, in the course of the hearing and contrary to statements in her visa application form, the applicant told the Tribunal that she had not left her husband in China, but that he had left China before her and had become a refugee in the USA.
The Tribunal referred to the post‑hearing submission and documents which were forwarded by the applicant’s solicitors. The Tribunal said that it “received and fully considered … all the documents to which that more recent submission refers”. The Tribunal said in relation to the “petition”:
To the extent that the present Applicant has witnesses they are other detainees with whom she claims to practice Falun Gong exercises who have signed their names on a petition to the Tribunal that she or her adviser prepared. There is no evidence of their having any expertise in the matter of assessing the sincerity of the Applicant’s attachment to Falun Gong and she herself displayed a scant understanding of core Falun Gong beliefs at the RRT hearing, saying that she regarded it as just another form of qi gong.
There is no further reference to the petition by the Tribunal, in particular under the heading “Findings and Reasons”. I do not accept the submission of counsel for the applicant that in some way the Tribunal drew an adverse conclusion from the contents of that document when arriving at its conclusions. It appears to me that the document verified no more than that the applicant was known to “all of the Villawood Detention’s Falun Gong people” as a Falun Gong practitioner. I do not read the Tribunal’s reasons as having found against the applicant in that respect.
Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a national of the PRC and stated its conclusion at the start:
As will be seen from the Tribunal’s findings below, the Tribunal is of the view that the Applicant has not been and is not of interest to the PRC authorities as she was not a Falun Gong follower in the PRC and has only recently familiarised herself with Falun Gong exercises, to the extent that she has at all, in order to create grounds for refugee status.
The Tribunal said that it:
places considerable weight on the fact that the Applicant displayed negligible knowledge about how the exercises are supposed to energise or cultivate the practitioner. She showed no sign of having learned anything more than superficial Falun Gong teaching. She certainly did not appear to know anything about the “wheel” which is essential to Falun Gong belief.
The Tribunal found her lack of knowledge inconsistent with her claims to have been a practitioner regularly in China from 1995 to 1999.
In relation to her inconsistent evidence as to how she learned the five exercises, the Tribunal said:
The Applicant generally sought to portray herself as a person who was not a neophyte, but rather as a person who had practiced Falun Gong regularly from 1995 to 1999. She also claimed at one stage that her husband was also a practitioner. However, at the RRT hearing she also said that she first learned the five Falun Gong exercises from a named person whom she first met in the detention centre. The Tribunal believes the latter account to be true, for the Applicant ultimately displayed a shallow and superficial relationship with Falun Gong very much at odds with her claims about immersing herself in Falun Gong in the 1990s. In accepting that account to be the only reliable explanation for her lack of familiarity with Falun Gong, the Tribunal does not accept the Applicant’s claims about practicing it in the PRC, or about what happened to her in 1999 with O, or what happened to her husband, whether he remained in the PRC or went to the USA.
In relation to the documents forwarded after the Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal said:
The Tribunal considered the letter purporting to be from the Applicant’s husband in “America.” Although the letter appears to have been sent from an American time zone, it lacks plausible detail as to its specific origin and authorship. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it is from the Applicant’s husband. In any event, bearing in mind what the Applicant said at the RRT hearing about when and where she first learned the Falun Gong exercises, the Tribunal cannot give this letter any weight.
The Applicant also showed at the RRT hearing that she was not interested in linking up with the Falun Gong movement in Sydney. At first she said she was “too busy” helping friends, but her evidence soon revealed that her days were generally free, so even though she was supposedly in possession of Falun Gong contact details, she did not make use of them. The Applicant’s claimed interest in Falun Gong evidently began after she was detained and the Tribunal finds that it is superficial and disingenuous. The Tribunal is of the view that the Applicant has engaged in Falun Gong activities in detention, to the limited extent that she has, in order to create a claim for refugee status (s91R(3) of the Act refers). The Tribunal dismisses her actions as actions undertaken in bad faith.
The Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of Convention‑related persecution in the PRC, and that her claimed fear of such persecution was not well founded.
The grounds of review argued by the applicant’s counsel did not take issue with the Tribunal’s application of s.91R(3) of the Migration Act. This is a provision which does not allow applicants to raise a sur place claim for state protection of Australia based on conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless:
(b)the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.
Counsel for the applicant argued two grounds. The first ground, which he put as his principal submission, was that:
1.A denial of procedural fairness in respect of the actions of the Tribunal to subject the Applicant to unreasonable close examination of her understanding of Falun Gong principles. Failure to afford basic procedural fairness amounted to jurisdictional error, with the consequence that the Tribunal decision should be set aside.
The submission was based on a passage in the transcript which appears from page 24 through to page 32, in which the Tribunal questioned the applicant about her Falun Gong practices and knowledge. I shall not set out the whole of that transcript. It commences with the Tribunal asking very general questions after warning the applicant:
Tribunal:I’m just going to ask you a couple of things that I think you can probably help me with. I’m just ask you for a while just to tell me and demonstrate to me what you know.
The Tribunal then asked the applicant what attracted her to Falun Gong and what it “gives you in your life”. The Tribunal asked her to “explain to me what practising Gong means”. It asked her: “What’s the thing that can give you a better life or make your life less better?” These questions did not elicit coherent responses.
The Tribunal’s questioning then proceeded:
Tribunal:Okay, now when you practise Falun Gong what are you aiming to do, what are you, what is the aim of practising Falun Gong?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              Bring true health and ?
Tribunal:Okay, those are physical needs or benefits. Any others?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              ?
Tribunal:For example what are these many benefits?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              How to cultivate yourself and they will give benefit to your son and your family.
Tribunal:Can you give me more detail about how you cultivate yourself?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              In true health and all your life including job will go smoothly. How should I express myself, I don’t know?
Tribunal:Well you could express yourself the way other Falun Gong practitioners might have expressed them to you perhaps repeat to me some of the teaching that you heard.
Applicant (through Interpreter):              Or like me who practice Falun Gong 6 o’clock in the morning to 12 pm, four times a day.
Tribunal:In Falun Gong teaching [what] is the source of your energy, or the focus of your energy?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              What are ? source of energy.
Tribunal:Source, well the origin, the focal point of energy cultivation. What is it?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              Original point.
Tribunal:The focal point. What’s the central phenomenon in Falun Gong from which all good or bad energy emanates?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              After my ? was improved I thought it was good because before that I had seen many doctors, spent a lot of money. After I practised Falun Gong my ? was cured.
Tribunal:Now I nearly gave you the answer in my question and you didn’t seem to pick up on it so I’m going to ask you again. We going into your body, we go inside the body of a Falun Gong practitioner. What thing holds and distributes the energy?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              I don’t know [what] we’re talking about.
Tribunal: I put it to you that a Falun Gong practitioner would know.
Applicant (through Interpreter):              I practising but … I look at this?
Tribunal:When you learnt the exercises did someone explain what the exercises are suppose to do and what the benefits are suppose to be?
Applicant (through Interpreter):              Yes sometimes people tell me about that but I can’t remember.
Tribunal:I’m finding your evidence a bit vague on this. Particularly when I asked you what thing inside your body is the central point where energy is deposited and distributed you said you just don’t know and it seemed very odd that a Falun Gong practitioner can’t give any answer to that question apart from ? I don’t know what you’re talking about.

Counsel for the applicant argued that this questioning was an “unreasonable close examination” of the applicant’s understanding of Falun Gong principles. I had difficulty understanding what he meant by “close examination” and why these questions of the Tribunal were unreasonable in the sense of being unfair so as to give rise to concerns protected by principles of procedural fairness.
In support, counsel cited Tamberlin J’s judgment in SZAQY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2005] FCA 1382 (“SZAQY”):
[29]I have some concern, from a procedural fairness point of view, about the subjection of an appellant to a close examination of her philosophic understanding, combined with a fine critique of the component movements of exercises, without warning and without giving the appellant the chance to consider the sources of information relied on by the member to justify the importance of such scrutiny. This may amount to procedural unfairness. It is clear that the appellant appears to have had a substantial knowledge of Falun Gong. In this particular case, the appellant has not raised the ground that there was unfairness in the approach taken by the member. Nevertheless, in my view, great care must be taken when weighing the degree of understanding of what may be fine points of exercise choreography, especially where the assessment is made by somebody who, on the evidence, does not appear to have any expert knowledge of, or familiarity with, Falun Gong principles or exercises. Indeed, without giving the appellant an opportunity to make submissions about the reliability of the material on which such an examination is made so as to enable an appellant to challenge the rules and principles applied by the member in evaluating his or her familiarity with Falun Gong philosophy and practice, such an approach could amount to procedural unfairness: NAXW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 644 per Tamberlin J.
Counsel for the applicant made four criticisms of how the Tribunal questioned the applicant in the above extract. First, that the Tribunal did not fairly warn the applicant before the hearing or before commencing the questioning that she would be questioned about her knowledge. Secondly, the Tribunal did not inform the applicant as to the source of its information which it was using to understand Falun Gong so as to ask questions of the applicant. Thirdly, that the Tribunal did not give the applicant an opportunity to make submissions about the reliability of that information used by the Tribunal to frame its questions. Fourthly, the Tribunal failed to raise with the applicant the errors which it perceived her to have made in her answers.
However, I am not persuaded by any of these criticisms. I do not consider the concerns expressed obiter by Tamberlin J in SZAQY have relevance to the questioning of the present Tribunal. The case considered by his Honour concerned questioning which appears to have entered areas of refinement which the present Tribunal’s questions never reached. The present transcript shows the Tribunal attempting to identify in an applicant what it regarded as elementary knowledge in a Falun Gong practitioner.
In my opinion, the Tribunal had general information concerning Falun Gong beliefs, including that which I have extracted above, which it was entitled to use when seeking to assess the claims of a Falun Gong practitioner. I can find nothing unreasonable or irrational in the Tribunal’s drawing on this information when questioning the applicant. I do not consider that any unfairness resulted from the content or manner of its questioning.
In my opinion, it should have been apparent to the applicant and her attending solicitor prior to the hearing that it would be likely that the Tribunal might question her about her Falun Gong practices and knowledge, and I do not think any unfairness arose from a lack of warning from the Tribunal. No evidence has been led from either the applicant or her solicitor to establish any unfairness by reason of surprise or lack of opportunity to prepare for this questioning.
In relation to the content of the questioning, I consider that the Tribunal led fairly in its questioning from general to more testing questions. Counsel for the applicant criticised the Tribunal for asking: “Can you give me more detail about how you cultivate yourself?” But the word “cultivate” had been provided by the applicant herself, and there was nothing unfair about the Tribunal’s questioning which sought to build upon her response.
The complaint that the Tribunal failed to reveal the general information upon which it had based its questioning, in my opinion, does not raise a failure of procedural fairness according to common law. I consider that the Tribunal was permitted to use its general knowledge gained from its own researches on Falun Gong, without being obliged to reveal its general knowledge before, during, or after its questioning.
Moreover, a further answer to the complaint that this general knowledge was not put to the applicant is found in the provisions of s.422B and s.424A(3)(a). In my opinion, the weight of current authority is that adverse material not specific to the applicant, such as information concerning the general practices and theory of Falun Gong, is not required to be put to an applicant whether by way of a written invitation or some other form (see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572, SZBDF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1493, and SZEGT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514).
For the above reasons, I do not accept that the Tribunal’s proceedings and its decision were affected by the errors argued under ground 1 of the amended application.
Ground 2 of the amended application has two parts:
2.The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error under the following headings:
a)Failure to provide the Applicant an opportunity to be heard on the genuineness of the facsimile from the Applicant’s husband which was contained in the Applicant’s written submissions dated 28 April 2005 or to call evidence supporting its genuineness;
b)Failure to provide the Applicant an opportunity to be heard on the genuineness of the Petition which was contained in the Applicant’s written submissions dated 28 April 2005 or to call evidence supporting its genuineness.
As I have indicated above, I do not read the Tribunal’s decision as reflecting upon “the genuineness of the Petition”. I do not consider that there could have been any requirement on the Tribunal to afford the opportunity which is contended under paragraph (b).
In relation to paragraph (a), it is necessary to consider the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to “the letter purporting to be from the Applicant’s husband” which I have set out above at [24]. In my opinion, it is clear from this reasoning that the Tribunal did not find against the “genuineness of the facsimile” in the sense of rejecting it as a forgery or as a document not being what it purported to be. However, the Tribunal identified aspects apparent on the face of the document going to its weight, both in relation to its authorship and lack of detail. I think on a fair reading of its statement that “the Tribunal cannot give this letter any weight”, the Tribunal should be understood to have fully considered what weight it could give to the letter, but to have decided that it was in conflict with the applicant’s own evidence and the Tribunal’s assessment of “when and where she first learned the Falun Gong exercises”. It did accept the letter as establishing the contrary.
In my opinion, there was nothing about the Tribunal’s reasoning concerning this piece of evidence which required it to have foreshadowed its reasoning to the applicant, nor to have given the applicant further opportunity to meet the Tribunal’s adverse assessment of the letter. This case is not one where the Tribunal said anything which might have misled the applicant as to how the Tribunal might assess the evidentiary weight of the document. I would apply to the present situation the statement by the Full Court in WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511 (“WACO”):
[46]… There would be no unfairness where the person affected knew what he was required to prove to the decision maker and was given the opportunity to do so. An appellant then cannot complain if his application is rejected because the decision maker, without notice to him has rejected what was put forward.
I consider that the present situation is not comparable to the situation which occurred in WACO, but is comparable to the situation which a recent Full Court referred to in WAKK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 225 at [70].
I therefore consider that the second ground of the amended application should not be upheld.
For the above reasons, and notwithstanding the best endeavours of the applicant’s counsel, I am unable to find that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The decision is therefore a privative clause decision for which relief is barred under s.474(1), and I must dismiss the application.

I certify that the preceding forty‑seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM

Associate: Lilian Khaw

Date: 25 November 2005