FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZGMS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2005] FMCA 1861 |
| MIGRATION – RRT decision – measurement of time for lodgement of application – no power to extend. |
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1), 66(1), 412, 412(1), 412(1)(b), 483A, 494B, 494B(1), 494B(4), 494B(4)(a), 494C, 494C(1), 494C(4), 494C(4)(a)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs.2.16, 2.16(1), 2.16(3), 4.31, 4.31(1), 4.31(2)
Durrani v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 629
Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 407
SZEYR v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 1344
Tio v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 36 AAR 549
VEAN of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 570
| Applicant: | SZGMS |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG1507 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 29 November 2005 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 29 November 2005 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Applicant in person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr J A C Potts |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $2,500.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG1507 of 2005
| SZGMS |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) seeking orders which would compel the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) to exercise jurisdiction to review a decision made by a delegate refusing to grant a protection visa to the applicant.
This Court has the same jurisdiction as the Federal Court under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to make such orders if it is satisfied that in fact the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the application which was filed by the applicant.
The applicant arrived in Australia in November 2003 on a visitor’s visa, and applied for a protection visa on 3 December 2003. A brief statement attached to his application claimed that he feared persecution as a result of his practising the Christian religion as a Roman Catholic. However, few details were given by him in his application form and the delegate was not satisfied that he was at risk of persecution in China.
I am satisfied that the delegate’s decision was posted to the applicant by registered post in a letter dated and posted on 5 December 2003. The letter was addressed to the applicant’s “current postal address in Australia” given in his visa application.
I am also satisfied that an application for review was first received by the Tribunal on 14 January 2004, either at 11.50 am or 15.07 pm.
The Tribunal subsequently invited the applicant to comment on whether the review application was lodged within the prescribed period for the…
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- Case
- [2005] FMCA 1861
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the Court was required to decide were whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision and whether the application for review was lodged within the prescribed period. The Court was satisfied that the Minister's counsel correctly identified the relevant statutory provisions and their effect on current authority. The Court was also satisfied that the time limit for bringing an application for review was an inflexible and imperative requirement that denied the Tribunal jurisdiction to entertain an application for review lodged out of time. The Court noted that there was an interesting but immaterial difference between the submission of the Minister and the reasoning of the Tribunal concerning the construction of the words "commences on the day" in reg.4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
The Court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent's costs in the sum of $2,500. The Court held that the Tribunal was correct in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision as the application for review was lodged outside the prescribed 28-day period. The Court found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the application for review was lodged within the prescribed period. The Court noted that the applicant had failed to provide any explanation as to why the application for review was lodged outside the prescribed period, and that there was no evidence to suggest that any exceptional circumstances had arisen which would justify the Tribunal exercising its discretion to extend the time limit.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $2,500.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This is an application under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) seeking orders which would compel the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) to exercise jurisdiction to review a decision made by a delegate refusing to grant a protection visa to the applicant. This Court has the same jurisdiction as the Federal Court under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to make such orders if it is satisfied that in fact the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the application which was filed by the applicant. The applicant arrived in Australia in November 2003 on a visitor’s visa, and applied for a protection visa on 3 December 2003. A brief statement attached to his application claimed that he feared persecution as a result of his practising the Christian religion as a Roman Catholic. However, few details were given by him in his application form and the delegate was not satisfied that he was at risk of persecution in China. I am satisfied that the delegate’s decision was posted to the applicant by registered post in a letter dated and posted on 5 December 2003. The letter was addressed to the applicant’s “current postal address in Australia” given in his visa application. I am also satisfied that an application for review was first received by the Tribunal on 14 January 2004, either at 11.50 am or 15.07 pm. The Tribunal subsequently invited the applicant to comment on whether the review application was lodged within the prescribed period for the purposes of s.412(1)(b) of the Migration Act, and then made a decision that it did not have jurisdiction. Counsel for the Minister has in his written submission extracted the relevant statutory provisions and explained their effect on current authority in [10]‑[21] of his written submission, which I attach to these reasons. I am satisfied that he correctly identified the provisions and their effect. He cites authority binding on me, holding that the time limit for bringing an application for review is, to use the language adopted in Fernando: an inflexible and imperative requirement that denies the Tribunal jurisdiction to entertain an application for review lodged out of time. (See Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 407 (“Fernando”) at [17]). There is an interesting but immaterial difference between the submission of the Minister and the reasoning of the Tribunal. This concerns the construction in reg.4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) of the words “commences on the day” in the phrase: [The prescribed] period … commences on the day on which the applicant is notified of the decision to which the application relates, and ends at the end of … 28 days. In the present case, if the commencement time for calculating the 28 days is at midnight on 16 December 2003, then the Tribunal correctly calculated a 28 day period ending on midnight on 13 January 2004. If “commences on” includes part of 16 December 2003, as was contended by counsel for the Minister, then it ended at midnight on 12 January 2004.