SZFVC v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 283
•28 March 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZFVC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2007] FMCA 283 |
| MIGRATION – Applicant came to Australia to obtain medical treatment – not a ground for review or for grant of visa – humanitarian grounds are a matter solely within the Minister’s discretion. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.424A |
| Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 MZXGR v MIMIA [2006] FCA 1167 |
| Applicant: | SZFVC |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File Number: | SYG 554 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Turner FM |
| Hearing date: | 13 December 2006 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 13 December 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 28 March 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| The applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr T. Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Ms M. Palmer of Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application and amended application are dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the amount of $5600.00
The name of the first respondent is amended to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
The Refugee Review Tribunal is joined as the second respondent.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 554 of 2005
| SZFVC |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application filed on 3 March 2005 seeking to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which affirmed the decision of the delegate for the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant filed an amended application on 10 May 2005.
The applicant was born on 1 July 1968 and claims to be from Fiji and of Indo-Fijian ethnicity and Hindu faith (“the Applicant”).
In his application for a protection visa, the applicant documented having one brother who was also living in Australia, in addition to his mother and sister who remained in Fiji.
The applicant arrived in Australia on 9 March 2001 on a sponsored visitor visa, which had been issued in Suva Fiji on 30 January 2001.
The applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs on 5 April 2001. In this application he claimed that he was afraid to return to Fiji because, as an Indian, he would be harassed by native Fijians. He claims that whilst still living in Fiji, he worked at a Fisheries base, where he was the only Indian. According to the applicant, there were no problems for him until the coup on 19 March 2000, after which time the attitude of the native Fijian people living near the Fisheries station changed dramatically. After this time he claimed they would come onto the base to disturb the workers, and would also set up roadblocks, stopping his car to demand he drive them to their destinations. If he refused, he was allegedly pulled out of his car, or sworn at. The applicant also contended that the army posted security guards at the base following the coup, and as a result his movements in and out of the base were restricted. He was unable to leave after a period of 6 weeks on one occasion, the applicant claimed that upon return, his belongings had been stolen and damaged. The applicant claimed that the police were unwilling to assist or protect him (Court Book “CB” 25 – 26).
This application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent on
30 April 2001.
On 25 May 2001 the applicant filed an application for review of the decision of the Minister’s delegate with the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal on 7 June 2002, at which time he maintained the claims made in his original protection visa application.
On 10 July 2002 the Tribunal handed down its decision, dated 19 June 2002, affirming the decision of the Minister’s delegate refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. In considering the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal found:
The applicant claims to be a national of Fiji and presented evidence of being a citizen of that country in the form of a certified copy of his Fijian passport issued on 3 January 1996. There being no evidence which casts doubt on that evidence or that the Applicant possesses any other nationality, I find that the Applicant is a national of Fiji and is outside that country (CB 72).
The Court quotes from the decision in the Court Book at page 72 - 74.
I am required to determine whether the Applicant has a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
At the hearing of this matter, the Applicant confirmed that he had only suffered significant physical mistreatment at the hands of Indigenous Fijians on two occasions, once in June of 2000. I am prepared to accept that, in the immediate aftermath of the coup that the Applicant did suffer these assaults. I also accept that in the first of these assaults, the Applicant sustained an aggravation to a pre-existing eye condition. It is also plausible that the Applicant suffered theft of personal goods on one occasion shortly after the coup. I am prepared to give the Applicant the benefit of the doubt with respect to his claims that he also experienced minor assaults, such as kick, from Indigenous Fijians working for him, together with low level harassment in the forms of demands for money, and the refusal of staff to take direction from the Applicant.
On information contained in the DIMIA file it is apparent that the Applicant remained in Fiji for approximately a further six weeks after his Australian visa was granted. At the hearing the Applicant, when asked why he came to Australia, admitted that he had come to Australia to obtain medical treatment. Also at the hearing it was the evidence of the brother of the Applicant that his prime concern was always that his brother should have medical treatment for his eye condition. This evidence satisfies me that the Applicant did not leave Fiji in fear of his life or safety because of Convention based persecution by indigenous Fijians, but rather because he wished to undertake medical treatment for his eye condition.
I accept that there is ongoing mistrust between indigenous Fijians and Indo Fijians and that this from time to time manifests itself in race base violence. At the same time I am also satisfied that the present government is genuine in its attempts to restore the confidence of the Indo Fijian community.
In the present accepting all his claims, including the two instances of assault which occurred within about 8 weeks of the coup on 19 May 2002, the Applicant suffered a number of instances of either theft by hoodlums or low level harassment. I cannot be satisfied that what the Applicant suffered amounts to persecution.
I accept that the army placed security guards at the entrance to the fisheries installation where the Applicant worked but I find that this was a legitimate, proper and prudent measure by the authorities at a time of political and civil unrest and cannot be Convention based persecution.
I accept the independent information which I have included above that internal security has been re-established in Fiji and that the authorities are willing and able to maintain law and order. The independent information before me also indicates that with the elections of September 2001, democracy has been restored in Fiji, that the democratically elected government, which has civilian control of the police and security forces, is committed to stability, peace and tolerance between members of all of Fiji’s ethnic communities. There is no reliable and recent evidence which persuade me that the government of Fiji tolerates or promotes violence against the Indo Fijian community or that they cannot now control it, at least in the major centres. I am satisfied that the authorities have established effective state protection in the major centres. Therefore, I am unable to be satisfied that the authorities are presently unable or unwilling to protect the Applicant from any harm or violence he might encounter from indigenous Fijians.
While there is an atmosphere of distrust and discrimination in Fiji, I am satisfied that, generally speaking, the Indian community is protected by the existing laws of Fiji.
I am also satisfied that significant efforts are being undertaken to restore the economy of Fiji as a basis for re-establishing a stable and inclusive society there. I note that since the conviction of Mr George Speight there has been no destabilising backlash from the indigenous Fijian community.
For all the above reasons, I am not satisfied that the Applicant faces a real chance of Convention related persecution upon his return to Fiji. His fears of persecution are not well founded. He is not a refugee.
Humanitarian Considerations
The brother of the Applicant has asked the Tribunal to consider the Applicant’s application on humanitarian grounds. I pointed out to both the Applicant and his brother that the Tribunal’s role is limited to determining whether the applicant satisfies the criteria for the grant of a protection visa. It was explained to the Applicant that a consideration of his circumstances on other grounds is a matter solely within the Minister’s discretion.
That said, I do draw to the attention of the Minister that this Applicant clearly has a serious eye condition, in connection with which the Applicant is already part of the way through corrective treatment in Australia. The evidence before me is that further operative treatment is required, treatment which is not available in Fiji. There was no specialist medical evidence before me to indicate the period of time required for completion of the Applicant’s treatment. The Minister may consider it appropriate for the Applicant to stay in Australia until the completion of his treatment.
There would seem to be little doubt that without completion of the treatment, the chances of the Applicant being able to obtain gainful employment in Fiji are remote. (CB pp.72-4).
The applicant then filed the application in this court, seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The application
In his application, the applicant set out five grounds as follows:
1.The Tribunal has made judicial error in finding that the applicant was only subject to low level harassment. The Tribunal states: “In accepting all his claims, including the two instances of assault which occurred within about 8 weeks of the coup on 19 May 2002, the applicant suffered a number of instances of either theft by hoodlums or low level harassment. I cannot be satisfied that what the applicant has suffered amounts to persecution”. However in actual fact it is not true.
2.Proper procedures are not followed in making the decision. The decision was made without proper evidence and the decision of the tribunal was general and without foundation. The tribunal is wrong in saying that they are satisfied that that (sic) the authorities have established effective state protection in the major center (sic). The tribunal in a fact has made a judicial error in that they made a finding without evidence.
3.The tribunal has been unreasonable to a degree when they used Amnesty international’s annual report for 2002 in a selective way to present a wrong picture of Fiji. When in actual fact nothing is further from the truth that the Indians are been (sic) mistreated often times and left with virtually nothing but to preserve.
4.The tribunal has made judicial error in that advance a proposition without attempting to go into detail of the individual circumstances.
5.Circumstances was (sic) not considered and in contrary to the law.
In his amended application the applicant set out the following three grounds:
5.1 That the breach of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision.
5.2 That the decision involved the making of jurisdictional error in that the tribunal:
2b.Failed to take into account the relevant considerations
2b.Identified the wrong test
6.3 (sic) Error of law occurred in connection with the making of the decision.
In his amended application, the applicant also set out eighteen particulars.
Particulars of Grounds
1.Article 1 (2) of the United Nations 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugee provides as follows:
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationally and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
2.The High Court has considered the definition in a number of cases, notably Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR. Applicant A & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225, Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559.
2a.Section 91R and Section 91S of the Act now qualify some aspect of the Article 1A(2) for the purpose of the application of the Act and a regulation to a particular person
2b.Subsection 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that the criteria for protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen of Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection obligation under the “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees protocol” are defined to mean the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of Refugees respectively: S 5(1) of the Act. Further criteria for the grant of protection (class XA) visa subclass 885 and 866 are set in parts 785 and 866 of the Schedule 2 to the Migration Relations 1994 respectively. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and have protection obligations to people who are refugees.
3.Persecution involves element of injustice or unwanted infliction of harm. See example RRT N93/01987, 10 March 1994 (Burma); and RRT N93/1618, 21 July 1994 (East Timor).
4.Under s.65 of the Act visa may be granted only if the decision maker is satisfied that the prescribed criteria is been satisfied.
5.The correct test in relation to the issue of State protection is whether the state protection is effective or meaningful. The test of the sufficiency of protection is to find the test of practical realities. In this particular case the tribunal did not address the issue of whether state protection has a capacity to provide effective protection. The tribunal did not examine the issue of effectiveness of the state to protect the applicant. The applicant is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country and more so the States do not have the capacity to protect the individual.
6.The focus of convention definition is not upon the protection that the country of nationality might be able to provide in some particular region, but upon the general notion of protection of that country. The practical realities facing a person who claims to be refugee must be considered carefully. The objective of convention is to provide refuge for those who having lost the protection of their government are unwilling to return to their countries of nationality. Thus the applicant made an error of law and therefore jurisdictional error.
7.In this particular instance the applicant has suffered directly and has suffered considerable mistreatment and assault at the hands of the indigenous Fijians and this was due to the aftermath of the coup. The applicant has a very severe eye condition and this has left the applicant in tatters. The applicant has been left into a very bad situation. The Tribunal has made jurisdiction error in finding that the applicant was only subject to low-level harassment. The tribunal has misunderstood the level of harm required to constitute persecution and at the same time failed to ascertain the level of injury the applicant has sustained. The tribunal has not fully considered the seriousness of the applicants eye. The applicant is extremely fearful to go back to the same country where his future is completely demolished. He has no land and no body to support any more and no place to go and start his life.
8.The Federal Court in the case Thalary (Unreported Fed Ct, Mansfield J 4 April 1997) stated that holding the denial of government work could amount to persecution if the state is sanctioning discrimination against some of the nationals for convention reason.
9.The focus of convention definition is not upon the protection that the country of nationality might be able to provide in some particular region, but upon the general notion of protection of that country. The practical realities facing a person who claims to be refugee must be considered carefully. The objective of convention is to provide refuge for those who having lost the protection of their government are unwilling to return to their countries of nationality. Thus the applicant made an error of law and therefore jurisdictional error.
10.The tribunal was unreasonable to a degree when it used the Amnesty International’s report for 2002 in a very selective way to present a wrong picture of Fiji within its decision. The Amnesty International Report have provided some important observation and this was completely ignored by the Tribunal and some of the observations were:
·Ethnicity based discrimination remains a serious problem. A number of government policies, including hiring practices, educational policies and land tenure preferences continue to provide protection for indigenous Fijian interests in accordance with the constitution.
·Other human rights problems include several political and arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of life, occasional police and military abuse of detainees and suspects, informal and formal constraints of the freedom of speech and the press and self-censorship; restriction on freedom of assembly and movement
·Control of land remains a sensitive issue. Ethnic Fijians community hold over 80% of the land and the government hold another 8% and the remaining land is freehold.
The report about the country situation was completely ignored by the tribunal to give the complete message it wanted to give. We Indians have suffered a lot for considerable period of time and nothing has been done to rectify the problem. We don’t own any land and we are been treated as a second-class citizen the country we are born.
11.The Applicant has been a strong supporter of the labor party and one who has contributed much towards the party and even though the contribution has not been great but he has been part of the team. Indirectly and directly he has contributed substantially.
12.Furthermore, the tribunal failed to take into account the applicants circumstances. The applicant has been the target of persecution because of religious beliefs. There has been repression of places of worship and imposition of curfew. See case Thalary (unreported, Fed Ct Mansfield, J, 4 April 1997) Mansfield J held that there was some basis for the significant assertion that the RRT erred in finding that the practice of proselytizing was not relevant to her right to practice her religion. Ultimately, however, the court found that that it did not need to decide the question as the applicant was unable to show that the persecutory conduct feared was either initiated by the State or officially or unofficially tolerated by it.
13.The respondent made an error of judgment by not ascertaining the true facts and evidence of the applicant. There has a jurisdiction error by taking a one sided view and there is a complete denial of natural justice.
14.In the alternative, the tribunal made the jurisdictional error by failing to take account of the relevant consideration. The applicant conceded that he was beaten and intimated believed that this was connected to him been a member of a particular group. The tribunal was obliged to consideration whether the state protection was effective and is the harm or mistreatment feared by the applicant of sufficient gravity as to constitute persecution and is the fear of persecution well founded.
15.The tribunal made the jurisdictional error by failing to take into consideration the material namely State protection and the serious harm such as significant hardship that threatens the persons capacity to sub-sists, significant physical harassment of the person, denial of access to basic service. There is a systemic and discriminatory conduct. There is sufficient evidence to show that there is serious harm and the persecution involve is systematic and threatening. Having made their earlier finding, the tribunal was obliged to consider all of the above and because the tribunal did not do so it failed to take into account and the relevant consideration, and therefore made a jurisdictional error.
16.The reasons for the persecution is linked to the applicant’s race, religion and membership of a particular group. See Morato (No 2) (1992) 29 ALD 455 at 466 and Kashayev (1994) 33 ALD 337 at 340 and Applicant A & B (1997) 185 CLR (sic). In Applicant A & B the High Court confirmed that the social group could comprise people who identified themselves as group through voluntary association or other “immutable characteristics”. The tribunal has failed to draw any connection between any of those however, drawn a generalised description.
17.The tribunal has made jurisdiction error in advancing a proposition without evidence. There is no evidence that is provided to date that the state protection that is available in Fiji, to Indo-Fijians.
18.The applicant does not have any future in the country. The continuous beating, intimidation and harassment and a injury to the applicant eye has completely ruined his life and the Tribunal has failed to take into circumstances all these matters and not even attempting to allow any opportunity to express his views openly.
Findings as to the grounds of the application
Ground 1 relates to a finding of fact by the Tribunal that was properly open to it. The ground is rejected.
Ground 2. The Court is satisfied that the decision is based on the evidence before the Tribunal. The objection relates to findings of fact that were properly open to the Tribunal. The ground is rejected.
Ground 3. The Court finds that it was properly open to the Tribunal to rely on the report by Amnesty International, and to reach the conclusion it did. The ground is rejected.
Ground 4. Nothing was put to the Court to establish this ground and it is rejected.
Ground 5. The Court finds no error of law. The circumstances put to the Tribunal were considered as set out in its consideration of the applicant’s case (CB 65-72). This ground is rejected.
Findings as to the grounds and particulars of the amended application
Particular 1 merely quotes Article 1 (2) of the United Nations 1951 Convention.
Particular 2 refers to cases where the High Court has considered the definition of “Refugee” in Article 1 (2).
Particular 2(a) asserts that provisions of the Migration Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2).
Particular 2(b) states that s.36(2) of the Migration Act provides the criteria for being a refugee.
Particular 3 states that persecution involves an element of injustice or harm.
Particular 4 states that under s.65 of the Act a visa may be granted only if the prescribed criteria is (sic) satisfied.
None of particulars 1 to 4 assert any error by the Tribunal. They are rejected as grounds for challenging the decision of the Tribunal.
Particular 5 alleges that the Tribunal did not set out the correct test for whether state protection existed. The Court finds that the Tribunal did apply the correct criteria as set out at CB 73 para 50. The conclusion that state protection was available was a finding of fact properly open to the Tribunal. This particular is rejected.
Particular 6 claims that the practical realities of the applicant’s situation were not considered carefully. The Court rejects this assertion. The decision shows that the circumstances put to the Tribunal were considered by it. The applicant is seeking to review a finding of fact. This particular is rejected.
Particular 7 complains about the Tribunal’s finding of low-level harassment. That finding of fact was properly open to the Tribunal and is not subject to review. This particular is rejected.
Particular 18 states that withholding government work could amount to persecution for a convention reason. There is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal made any error of law in this regard, or that it made a finding of fact not properly open to it. The Court rejects this particular.
Particular 9 repeats particular 6, and is rejected for the reasons given under particular 6.
Particular 10. The degree of reliance upon country information, and the findings of fact from that information, are matters for the Tribunal, that are not subject to review. The Court rejects this particular.
Particular 11. The allegation that the applicant has been a strong supporter of the labour party appears not to have been put to the Tribunal. The applicant has not shown that it was put. The applicant cannot complain that the Tribunal failed to take into account a matter that was not put before it. No error of law was made. The Court rejects this particular.
Particular 12 claims persecution because of religious beliefs. No such claim was put to the Tribunal. No error of law was made. The Court rejects this particular.
Particular 13 alleges that the Tribunal took a one-sided view and did not ascertain the true facts and evidence of the applicant. The Court finds no basis for this allegation and it is rejected.
Particular 14 alleges that the Tribunal did not take into account whether the state protection was effective and whether the harm suffered by the applicant constituted persecution and a fear that was well-founded. The Court finds that the Tribunal did deal with these issues. As to state protection, the Court refers to its findings under particular 5. As to whether the harm suffered amounted to persecution see the conclusion of the Tribunal at CB 73 para 48. That was a finding of fact properly open to the Tribunal. As to whether the applicant’s fear of persecution is well founded see the conclusion of the Tribunal at CB 74 para 53. The Court finds no error of law and this particular is rejected.
Particular 15 asserts that the Tribunal erred in not finding that the applicant suffered persecution. The Court finds that the conclusion of the Tribunal that “I cannot be satisfied that what the applicant has suffered amounts to persecution” (CB 73 para 48) was a finding of fact that was properly open to it. The Court finds no error of law. This particular is rejected.
Particular 16 seeks to rely on the applicant being a member of a particular social group. There is nothing to indicate that this matter was put to the Tribunal. The applicant cannot complain that the issue was not considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s “generalised” reference to being a member of a group (CB 63 para 12) is for purposes of defining a “refugee”. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s fear of persecution was not well founded (CB 74 para 53). That finding of fact was properly open to the Tribunal. That finding makes irrelevant any question of whether the applicant was a member of a group; as even if he is, the Tribunal found his fear of persecution was not well-founded (CB 74 para 53).This particular is rejected.
Particular 17 claims that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error because it decided that state protection was available, without having evidence to support that finding. The Court rejects this particular; the Tribunal referred to country information (CB 68-72) which led to its conclusions at CB 73 para 50.
Particular 18 claims that the Tribunal failed to take the circumstances of the applicant into account and did not allow him to express his views openly. The applicant has not provided anything to support these claims. The Court finds that the applicant was invited to, and he and his brother appeared and gave evidence at, the hearing on 7 June 2002 (CB 53 and 65 paras 18 and 23). The Court rejects this particular.
For the reasons set out above, all grounds and particulars in the application and amended application are rejected.
Possible breach of s.424A
The first respondent raised a possible breach of s.424A that had not been raised by the applicant. The first respondent’s submissions on the point were as follows:
22. While not pleaded, the Tribunal appears to have breached s.424A of the Act at CB73 [46] in relying upon information that the Applicant did not leave Fiji until six weeks after his Australian visa was granted. However this information was only relevant to the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicant did not genuinely fear harm in Fiji. The Tribunal’s finding that state protection is available to the Applicant is an independent basis for its decision, so any breach of s.424A would not lead the Court to grant relief eg MZXGR v MIMIA [2006] FCA 1167 (Black CJ) and cases there cited.
23. Even if the Court is of a different view, relief should be refused in the exercise of the Court’s discretion because of the Applicant’s delay in bringing the application. The Applicant’s litigation history is set out in Mr. Carter’s affidavit of 14 March 2005. While the Court on 13 April 2005 was not persuaded that that history sufficed to render these proceedings an abuse of process, they are nevertheless not a sufficient excuse for the delay of more than two and a half years since the Tribunal’s decision was handed down on 10 July 2002 until the filing of these proceedings on 3 March 2005. It is well accepted that “relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution is, like prerogative relief generally, discretionary”: Dranichnikov v MIMIA (2003) 211 CLR 441 at [90], and that delay remains a basis on which relief may be refused even if jurisdictional error is established: SAAP v MIMIA (2005) 215 ALR 162 (HCA) at [80], [174], [211]. There is plainly “unwarranted delay” in this case justifying the withholding of relief: The King v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration:Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389 at 400. A delay of more than a year (as here) should ordinarily lead to relief being refused in the exercise of the court’s discretion: Re Commonwealth of Australia: Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 (HCA/McHugh J) at 495-496.
The Court accepts the contention by the first respondent that reliance on the information was only relevant to its finding that the applicant did not fear harm in Fiji (CB 73). The Court accepts also the construction that the Tribunal’s finding that state protection is available to the applicant (CB 73) is an independent basis for the decision, so any breach of s.424A would not lead the Court to grant relief : MZXGR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1167.
The Court finds that there was no breach of s.424A that would cause the decision of the Tribunal to be void.
Conclusion
The Court finds that the Tribunal’s decision is a privative clause decision. In such circumstances, and pursuant to s.474 of the Act, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to interfere.
Accordingly, the application and amended application are dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Turner FM
Associate: Sarah James
Date: 5 March 2007
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