SZEPU v Refugee Review Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZEPU v Refugee Review Tribunal [2006] FCA 633

MIGRATION – protection visa – appeal from decision of Federal Magistrate – whether Tribunal committed jurisdictional error – where findings of credibility by the Tribunal open to it – whether Tribunal erred in relation to question of ‘real chance’ of persecution - whether Tribunal erred in applying test of ‘serious harm’ under s 91R(1)(b) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Tribunal’s reliance on country information constituted error – whether Tribunal was biased – no error established

Abeyesinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1558 cited
Mashayekhi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 381 cited
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703 cited
Re Minister for Immigration ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 cited
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 cited
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited

SZEPU v REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL and MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

NSD 3 OF 2006

YOUNG J
10 MAY 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 3 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZEPU
APPELLANT

AND:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

YOUNG J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the costs of the second respondent of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 3 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

SZEPU
APPELLANT

AND:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

YOUNG J

DATE:

10 MAY 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of Nicholls FM made on 13 December 2005.  The Federal Magistrate dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) which was handed down on 30 August 2001.  By that decision, the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the second respondent to refuse the appellant a protection visa. 

  2. The appeal is being heard by me as a single judge pursuant to s 25 (1AA)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). An appeal to this Court from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court is an appeal by way of re-hearing, but the process remains a process for the correction of error. As Kenny J said in Abeyesinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1558 [4]:

    ‘On an appeal by way of re-hearing, the powers of an appellate court are exercisable only if the…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 633
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Szepu v Refugee Review Tribunal, the appellant, an Indian citizen, appealed against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal which rejected his claim for a protection visa. The appellant's claim was based on his membership of the Marxist Leninist Naxalite party, and his fear of persecution if returned to India. The appeal raised several jurisdictional errors, including the Tribunal's approach to the requirement of a well-founded fear of persecution, its assessment of 'serious harm', reliance on country information rather than appellant's information, incorrect identification of the appellant's social and political group, and alleged bias. The Federal Magistrate, Nicholls FM, dismissed the appeal.

The legal issues in this case centred on the correct interpretation and application of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Refugee Convention in assessing the appellant's claim for a protection visa. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had erred in its findings on the appellant's credibility and the likelihood of persecution upon return to India. Other issues included the proper approach to assessing 'serious harm', the appropriate weight to be given to country information and the appellant's personal information, and the identification of the correct social and political group.

Nicholls FM found that the Tribunal's findings on credibility were open to it, and the Tribunal had provided a rational basis for its decision, relying on logically probative matters. The FM held that the Tribunal did not err in its approach to the requirement of a well-founded fear of persecution, and the 'real chance' test was appropriately applied. The FM also found that the Tribunal's assessment of 'serious harm' was correct, and its reliance on country information was justified. Furthermore, the FM held that the Tribunal correctly identified the appellant's social and political group, and there was no evidence of bias. The FM concluded that the grounds of appeal did not establish any appealable error by the Tribunal.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the second respondent of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the second respondent of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Tribunal’s findings on credibility were central to its decision. A finding on credibility that was open to the Tribunal on the material before it does not give rise to an error of law: see Mashayekhi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 381 and W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703. Findings on credibility were described by McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 as the function of the primary decision-maker, par excellence: at 423 [67]. That does not mean that such findings are invulnerable to review, but it does mean that they will not ordinarily be reviewable if the Tribunal has provided a rational basis for rejecting the claims and relied upon matters that were logically probative of the issues it was determining: see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 at 552 and 559. THE APPELLANT’S BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of India. His claim for a protection visa was founded on the contention that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of his membership of the Marxist Leninist Naxalite party. The notice of appeal alleged a number of jurisdictional errors. First, it was contended that the Tribunal erred in adopting an unduly harsh approach to the requirement that there be a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, and more particularly, that the Tribunal did not apply the ‘real chance’ test enunciated in cases such as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 and Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (‘Chan’). Those cases require both a subjective apprehension of persecution and an apprehension that is grounded in objective reality. This has been described as a ‘real chance’ of persecution, namely, a chance that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility: see Chan at 389, 398, 407 and 429. Secondly, the notice of appeal contended that the Tribunal made errors in its assessment of ‘serious harm’ as embodied in s 91R(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Thirdly, the notice of appeal contended that the Tribunal erred by basing its findings on country information concerning the Naxalite movement, rather than on information provided by the appellant. The fourth ground of appeal was that the Tribunal misdirected itself by failing to correctly identify the appellant’s social and political group, which was described as a non-violent segment of the Naxalite movement. Finally, the notice of appeal raised a contention that the Tribunal was biased. This contention appears to be largely premised upon the way in which the Tribunal questioned the appellant and then proceeded to reach conclusions as to his credibility. In addition to the grounds set out in the notice of appeal, I have taken into account the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant and the oral submissions made on behalf of the appellant by Mr Jayawardena. In my opinion, the grounds raised by the notice of appeal, the written submissions and oral submissions on behalf of the appellant do not establish any appealable error by Nicholls FM.DISCUSSION

Decision

Reasons for decision

YOUNG J
Issues
1. Did the Tribunal err in adopting an unduly harsh approach to the requirement that there be a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason?
2. Did the Tribunal fail to apply the'real chance' test in assessing the appellant's claim for a protection visa?
3. Did the Tribunal make errors in its assessment of 'serious harm' as embodied in s 91R(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
4. Did the Tribunal err by basing its findings on country information concerning the Naxalite movement, rather than on information provided by the appellant?
5. Did the Tribunal misdirect itself by failing to correctly identify the appellant's social and political group?
6. Did the Tribunal exhibit bias in its questioning of the appellant and its conclusions regarding his credibility?

Held
1. The court held that the Tribunal did not err in adopting an unduly harsh approach to the requirement that there be a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The appeal on this point was dismissed.
2. The court found that the Tribunal did not fail to apply the 'real chance' test in assessing the appellant's claim for a protection visa. This contention of the appeal was dismissed.
3. The court determined that the Tribunal did not make errors in its assessment of 'serious harm' as embodied in s 91R(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This aspect of the appeal was dismissed.
4. The court held that the Tribunal did not err by basing its findings on country information concerning the Naxalite movement, rather than on information provided by the appellant. The appeal on this ground was dismissed.
5. The court found that the Tribunal did not misdirect itself by failing to correctly identify the appellant's social and political group. The appeal on this point was dismissed.
6. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not exhibit bias in its questioning of the appellant and its conclusions regarding his credibility. The appeal on this ground was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: YOUNG J

The court began by noting that findings on credibility made by the Tribunal are generally not subject to review unless there is a rational basis for rejecting the claims and the findings are logically probative of the issues being determined. In this case, the court found that the Tribunal provided a rational basis for its findings on credibility and relied upon matters that were logically probative of the issues. The court rejected the argument that the Tribunal adopted an unduly harsh approach to the requirement of a well-founded fear of persecution, stating that the Tribunal's approach was consistent with established legal principles. The court also found that the Tribunal correctly applied the 'real chance' test in assessing the appellant's claim, as it had considered both the subjective and objective aspects of the appellant's fear of persecution. Furthermore, the court held that the Tribunal's assessment of 'serious harm' was not erroneous and that the use of country information was appropriate. The court rejected the argument that the Tribunal failed to correctly identify the appellant's social and political group, stating that the Tribunal's findings on this point were supported by the evidence. Finally, the court found no evidence of bias in the Tribunal's questioning of the appellant or in its conclusions regarding his credibility. Therefore, the court dismissed all grounds of appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the second respondent. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, of this decision is that findings on credibility made by the Refugee Review Tribunal are generally not subject to review unless there is a rational basis for rejecting the claims and the findings are logically probative of the issues being determined.