SZDMO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZDMO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 384

MIGRATION – Decision of Refugee Review Tribunal refusing protection visa – decision of Federal Magistrate affirming the decision of the Tribunal – Whether the appellant was denied natural justice before the Tribunal on the basis that he was not given an opportunity to comment on country information – Whether comments made by the Tribunal suggested apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal – Whether the Tribunal misunderstood the evidence in a way relevant to giving rise to jurisdictional error.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328 – applied
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 - applied

SZDMO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

NSD 1913 of 2004

HILL J
8 APRIL 2005
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1913 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZDMO
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 APRIL 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed.
  2. The appellant pay the respondents costs of this appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1913 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZDMO
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE:

8 APRIL 2005

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HILL J:

  1. The appellant appeals against the judgment of a Federal Magistrate (Lloyd-Jones FM), dismissing an application by the appellant for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) refusing to grant to the appellant a protection visa.

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 20 September 1997.  Shortly thereafter he lodged an application for a protection visa.  That application was refused.  It is a criterion for the grant of a protection visa that the Minister, or in the event of a review, the Tribunal, is satisfied that the applicant for the visa is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force for Australia on 13 December 1973), here collectively referred to as “the Convention”.  Generally speaking, Australia will have protection obligations if the applicant for the protection visa is a refugee as defined by Article 1A(2) of the Convention.  That article defines a “refugee” as being any person who:

    “…owing…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 384
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZDMO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, SZDMO, sought to challenge the decision of the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs. The primary contention was whether the Tribunal, which had previously assessed the appellant's claim for refugee status, had erred in its decision-making process. The appeal hinged on several issues, including whether there was an apprehension of bias in the Tribunal's handling of the evidence and whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the evidence, particularly concerning the issuance of the appellant's passport.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had acted with an impartial mind and whether any perceived errors in interpreting the evidence constituted a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had misunderstood critical aspects of the evidence, specifically related to the time frame and circumstances surrounding the issuance of his passport following an alleged assault. The court needed to assess whether these misunderstandings, if any, were significant enough to affect the Tribunal's findings.

The court found that there was no evidence of apprehended bias in the Tribunal's decision-making process. The Tribunal's questioning of the appellant's evidence indicated a rigorous approach, aimed at identifying discrepancies in the appellant's account. While the appellant contended that the Tribunal had misunderstood the evidence, the court held that any misinterpretation did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional error. The court also noted that the Tribunal's findings were based on the appellant's credibility and the authenticity of the supporting documents, which the Tribunal had reasonable grounds to doubt.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. This decision affirmed the Tribunal's findings and underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the decision-making process in refugee status determinations.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents costs of this appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my view there is nothing in the transcript or in the reasons for decision that would cause a fair-minded and informed person reasonably to apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring or have brought an impartial mind to bear on the decision. There is nothing that would suggest that there was an apprehension of a possibility of predisposition, which underlies apprehended bias. At worst, what the transcript reveals is that the Tribunal adopted a probing approach to the evidence of the appellant, indicating to the appellant, while doing so, that there were difficulties with the evidence that the appellant advanced. The claim of apprehended bias fails.The transcript – did the Tribunal misunderstand the evidence? It is necessary to set out passages from the transcript to understand the submission that is made. The passages concern the evidence relating to the issue of a passport to the appellant. This evidence, it will be recalled, was regarded by the Tribunal as relevant to the question whether it was to be accepted that the appellant had, as he said, been assaulted on 1 July 1997 by members of the Awami League. The appellant had, to this point, given oral evidence concerning his regular weekly karate lessons and his job as a part time chef, twice a week. The substance of the latter evidence was that he started working as a chef, perhaps in 1990, which is what the application lodged by the appellant’s agent said, or perhaps the end of 1995 and that he had continued working as a chef during the early part of 1997. Later in that year he travelled to Australia. The questions then turned to the appellant’s account of having been “bashed” by five or six persons from the Awami League. The appellant said that as a result of the “bashing” he was in pain and badly bruised. His face and eyes were, he said, swollen. The appellant said that his father had gone to the police and lodged a complaint there while the appellant was in the clinic. The Tribunal member at this stage raised the problem that the appellant, according to his evidence, was wanted by the police but nevertheless continued to work at the same job, live in the same house and have regular karate lessons. Notwithstanding the apparent charges against the appellant, his father had gone to the police. The questioning then turned to the issuing of the passport. The appellant said it took two or three days to get the passport from the time he applied for it. He was asked to explain the process of obtaining the passport. The appellant said:“I went there, I knew a person there…like a broker... They help you in processing your papers. They give a form from the government. Then you have to give them your photograph….When I applied for the passport, that time it was a rule there that once you applied for the passport they would give it within two to three days. If it was emergency.” The Tribunal then reminded the appellant that his evidence was that he had been in hospital for 15 days after the assault. The Tribunal member then asked what happened after that. The appellant said that his father’s sister took him to her home in another district and that he stayed there for 15 to 20 days; sometimes at his grandmother’s place and sometimes at the aunt’s place. The Tribunal asked whether the appellant went anywhere else in the 15 to 20 days. The appellant said he did not remember. The Tribunal asked as to the appellant’s state at the time. The appellant said that he was “quite weak”; that he couldn’t work and that he “never went out much that time. … Very seldom”. He said he was there for his safety. When he did go out it was just to a few shops a bit further away from the aunt’s house where he would go to eat or drink tea.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL J
With respect to the submission it was clear from the independent country material that appellate courts in Bangladesh were independent and acted in accordance with law. While lower level courts were not so independent the Tribunal took the view that the appellant’s economic circumstances were such that he could appeal to the higher courts and thus have any conviction wrongly given by a lower court overturned. This view was open to the Tribunal and finding in this way did not constitute a failure on the part of the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction. It should in any event be noted that the Tribunal’s findings on this matter were alternative findings, as the Tribunal had already expressed the view that there had not been false charges laid against the appellant. It did so on the basis that it did not accept that the appellant’s evidence was truthful, further the Tribunal did not accept the genuineness of the letters tendered to corroborate the appellant’s evidence.Conclusion and orders I am of the view that even if the transcript is accepted into evidence there is nothing in the transcript that supports the argument of the appellant that the reasons of the Tribunal were affected by jurisdictional error. It can be argued that it must follow that the tender of the transcript should be rejected on the basis that it added nothing to the appellant’s case as put before the learned magistrate and should not be admitted now into evidence. On the other hand, it is obvious that in a forensic sense the transcript was clearly relevant to the matters which the appellant wished to raise on the appeal and which, in the absence of the transcript, could not otherwise have been raised in any court. It was necessary that the transcript be considered to determine whether there was made out any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. In these circumstances it seems to me to be in the interests of justice to accept the tender of the transcript, notwithstanding that the contents of it, ultimately, did not assist the appellant’s case. I would accordingly give the appellant leave to tender the transcript in the appeal notwithstanding that it was not sought to be tendered before the learned magistrate. I would, however, dismiss the appeal with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL J

Full text does not contain this section.