SZDCV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZDCV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 462

Appeal from: SZDCV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3264
File number: NSD 9 of 2017
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 5 May 2017
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 36(2)(b), (c)
Cases cited: SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235
Date of hearing: 5 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Warner Knight of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 9 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZDCV

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)

NICHOLAS J:

BACKGROUND

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), dated 19 January 2016 which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) not to grant the appellant a protection visa.

  2. The appellant entered Australia on 3 January 1997 as the holder of a Tourist (Subclass 676) visa and has lived in Australia ever since.  She first applied for a protection visa on 27 March 1997.  Her application was refused by a decision of 7 April 1997.  The appellant sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”).  On 11 August 1998 the RRT affirmed the decision of 7 April 1997.

  3. The appellant then brought a proceeding for judicial review of the RRT’s decision.  By consent the matter was remitted to the RRT for reconsideration.  However, the RRT (which was differently constituted) also affirmed the decision of 7 April 1997.  The appellant then applied for judicial review of the second RRT decision.  The application for judicial review was unsuccessful. 

  4. Following the decision of the Full Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235, the appellant made another application for a protection visa. It is this second application for a protection visa that is the subject of the Tribunal’s decision which the appellant challenged before the primary judge. This application was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 25 September 2014. On 19 January 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

  5. The appellant is a national of Indonesia and was born in Medan in 1961.  She is of Chinese ethnicity and the Christian religion.  The…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 462
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZDCV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a resident of Australia for over nineteen years, challenged the decision of the Tribunal to refuse her application for a protection visa. The appellant, who is of Indonesian origin, argued that she faced real risks of harm if she were to return to Indonesia, including persecution and degrading treatment or punishment. She was not legally represented before the primary judge but was assisted by an interpreter and her daughter, who was permitted to address the court on her behalf. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not meaningfully advance her grounds of appeal and that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.

The legal issues before the court involved whether the Tribunal’s decision contained any jurisdictional error, and whether the appellant had demonstrated that her continued residence in Australia was at risk due to her alleged circumstances in Indonesia. The primary judge considered the appellant's grounds of appeal and the materials before the Tribunal but found no basis for setting aside the Tribunal’s decision. The court held that its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the merits of the Tribunal’s decision and factual findings, which it did not find to be legally unreasonable or lacking in intelligible justification.

The court's reasoning hinged on the appellant’s inability to meaningfully advance her grounds of appeal without legal representation and the absence of any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The primary judge emphasised that the court's role was not to re-evaluate the merits or the factual findings of the Tribunal but to ensure that the decision-making process was legally sound. Given the appellant's submissions and the evidence presented, the court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and rational.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed. The dismissal of the appeal affirmed the Tribunal's decision, and the order for costs reflected the court's view that the appeal was without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, an Indonesian national, had resided in Australia for over nineteen years. She initially applied for a Protection visa in 1997, which was refused. The appellant subsequently applied for review of this decision, and over the years, there were multiple reviews and hearings. The appellant claimed to face significant harm if returned to Indonesia, including persecution, degrading treatment, and hardship. The matter reached the Tribunal, which again found against the appellant. Unrepresented but assisted by her daughter and an interpreter, the appellant appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Court.

The appellant's case initially came before the Tribunal, which made a decision that she was not entitled to a Protection visa. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the appellant appealed to the Court. The appeal was heard before the primary judge, who found that neither the appellant nor her daughter could meaningfully advance the grounds of appeal. The primary judge dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs. The appellant then sought leave to appeal to a higher court, which is the subject of the current decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant, in her application, also asserted that the Tribunal failed to acknowledge the real risk of harm that the appellant would suffer if she was required to return to Indonesia. THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION The appellant was not legally represented before the primary judge but was assisted by her daughter who his Honour permitted to address the Court on the appellant’s behalf. The daughter did not appear at the hearing of the appeal, but the appellant was assisted by an interpreter. The primary judge’s reasons refer to the Tribunal’s reasons and the grounds of review relied upon by the appellant. The primary judge said in his reasons for judgment:[21]Unfortunately, neither the Applicant herself nor her daughter, whom I permitted to address the Court, could meaningfully advance the Grounds relied upon in this proceeding.[22]Obviously this case is an unfortunate one for the Applicant. She has now resided in Australia for more than nineteen years and is understandably reluctant at her age to return to Indonesia. On the other hand, she has known since the first refusal of a Protection visa by the first Delegate on 7 April 1997 that her continued residence in this country was no sure thing.[23]The jurisdiction of this Court under s.476 of the Act is limited to providing relief in respect of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal and that jurisdiction does not involve reviewing the merits of the Tribunal’s decision nor the factual findings made by it.[24]Having regard to the difficulty faced by the Applicant in making meaningful submissions to this Court in support of her Grounds, I have independently considered the Decision Record of the Tribunal, but I cannot discern jurisdictional error. The Tribunal’s decision does not appear in any way irrational, capricious, lacking an intelligible justification or otherwise legally unreasonable, and the findings made by the Tribunal appear to have been open to it upon the materials then before it. His Honour ordered that the application be dismissed with costs. THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL At the commencement of today’s hearing, I explained to the appellant the limits on the powers of the primary judge and of this Court to set aside decisions of the Tribunal in the absence of any jurisdictional error. The first two grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant in this Court assert that the Tribunal’s decision was wrong and that the appellant had been truthful in her claims. The notice of appeal asserts in ground 3:The Tribunal had no basis to attack my credibility and the Tribunal failed to understand my terrible circumstances which amount to serious harm. The Tribunal failed to consider my subjective well founded fear of harm and persecution as well as the fear of being subjected to degrading treatment or punishment. The Tribunal erred in law by ignoring the hardship which rise to the level of significant harm. The appellant filed a written submission the day prior to her hearing which, like the grounds of appeal, does not appear to have been prepared with the benefit of professional legal assistance. Her written submission asserts that the Tribunal failed to consider various matters and re-affirms the truth of her evidence before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the primary judge's reasons for judgment and the grounds of review relied upon by the appellant. The court noted that the appellant was not legally represented before the primary judge but was assisted by an interpreter and her daughter who was permitted to address the Court on the appellant's behalf. The court found that neither the appellant nor her daughter could meaningfully advance the grounds relied upon in this proceeding. The court held that the jurisdiction of the Court was limited to providing relief in respect of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal and that jurisdiction did not involve reviewing the merits of the Tribunal's decision nor the factual findings made by it. The court found that the Tribunal's decision did not appear in any way irrational, capricious, lacking an intelligible justification or otherwise legally unreasonable, and the findings made by the Tribunal appeared to have been open to it upon the materials then before it. The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Tribunal's decision contained jurisdictional error. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court will not set aside decisions of the Tribunal in the absence of any jurisdictional error.