SZDBB v Minister for Immigration
[2006] FMCA 298
•7 March 2006
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZDBB & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 298 |
| MIGRATION – Review of decision of RRT – where the applicant is a Chinese Christian citizen of Indonesia - whether the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction in failing to ask whether the standards of protection in Indonesia met international standards of protection – whether the Tribunal misunderstood what is meant by the term “persecution” – whether the Tribunal failed to disclose country information that was adverse to the applicant’s claim – whether that particular country information was material to the decision of the Tribunal – circumstances where practical evidence of the effect of procedural fairness will be required. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.424A(3)(a) |
| Minister for Immigration v Respondents S152/2003 [2004] HCA 18 Kioa v West (1986) 60 ALJR Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2005] HCA 72 Applicant S370/2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] 1514 VAF v Minister for Immigration 2004] FCAFC 123 Applicant NAFF of 2002v Minister for Immigration [2004] HCA 62 Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal; Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] 190 ALR 601 Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 VAAD v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCAFC 117 |
| First Applicant: Second Applicant: Third Applicant | SZDBB SZDBC SZDBD |
| First Respondent: Second Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 770 of 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Raphael FM |
| Hearing date: | 27 February 2006 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 27 February 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 7 March 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr G Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
Application dismissed.
Applicant to pay the respondents’ costs assessed in the sum of $5,000.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 770 of 2004
| SZDBB |
First Applicant
SZDBC
Second Applicant
SZDBD
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant is a Chinese Christian citizen of Indonesia. She and her daughter, the second applicant, arrived in Australia on 9 July 1998. On 6 August 1998 they lodged an application for protection visas with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. On 26 August 1998 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant protection visa and on 22 September 1998 the applicants applied for review of that decision. The Tribunal conducted a hearing into the application at which it spoke to the first applicant and also to her husband who had remained in Indonesia and was not seeking asylum. On 8 February 2000 the Tribunal determined to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant protection visas.
The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence that she had lived in Jakarta from 1988 to 1998 and had experienced first hand the serious riots which took place on 13 May 1998:
“On 13 May 1998 after burial of the murdered students about 16.00 hour came out from nowhere hundreds of people on the street in front of our complex. I was at our shophouse and from my third floor I saw hundreds of people mostly men, breaking and destroying the walls and security house of the complex. They broke unto the Bank Central Asia which is located approximately 100 metres from out house, burning cars beat-up Chinese and stealing whatever they could obtain from all the houses which they could managed to break-in. They throw stones to all the windows, destroying all my windows. Luckily they could not break in to my premises although they had banged and noise yelling, “kill the Chinese”, and chanting like animals and crazy people. Many of the shophouses next to us were robbed ransacked and destroyed.” [CB 114]
The applicant told the Tribunal that she had heard accounts of rapes and suicides and that two of her cousins had lost their houses when they were burnt down. She said that the window of her car was smashed and her rings and purse were snatched from the car at the traffic lights and nobody came to her assistance. The applicant told the Tribunal that she remained fearful after the situation had quietened down but in July 1998 had told her husband she wished to travel to Australia for a holiday and once here determined to remain.
The Tribunal at CB 122 said:
“I put the details of the independent information to the applicant and explained that my job was to consider what had happened to her in the past, but most importantly I had to consider what may happen in the reasonably foreseeable future as the purpose of the Convention was to protect from prospective Convention persecution rather than to compensate for past suffering.”
In its findings and reasons commencing at CB 125 the Tribunal notes that the applicant had lived a privileged life in Indonesia and had not suffered discrimination such as to amount to persecution. It noted that this was not the subject of her claims which were based upon the fear of the horrifying situation which she and her daughters experienced in 1998. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been affected by these events and that this had left her with a deep subjective fear. However, the Tribunal noted that its duty was to decide whether or not there was a well-founded fear based upon an objective test. It accepted that the new government then in power was fragile and faced serious problems, but came to the view that some positive steps had been taken:
“The Convention on racial discrimination has been ratified; security had been increased; security forces are mobilised and used to protect Indonesian citizens against harm from demonstrations.
The country’s leaders, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawatit Sukarnoputri are committed to unifying the country and are moderates in regard to racial and religious issues and uphold the constitutional right to freedom of religion and to recognise the Chinese ethnic community as citizens with equal rights under the Constitution. The current government was elected through a democratic process which demonstrates that it was selected by a majority of citizens and a constitutionally determined process.
This being the case, the evidence leads me to find the state recognises its responsibility to protect and to guarantee the constitutional rights of all its citizens including ethnic Chinese citizens.”
After noting that there was a disproportionate level of crime towards Chinese ethnic citizens which it believed resulted from a conception of Chinese as wealthy and that this situation was not peculiar to Indonesia, the Tribunal said:
“What is relevant is the willingness of the state to protect and the current regime in Indonesia has demonstrated that it is willing both in policy and practice to do that. At the same time I accept the submissions of the Applicant and her husband that the risks are less in Australia that in Indonesia. However, unless the state is unwilling or unable to protect this differing level of safety does not, of itself, bring the matter within the ambit of the Convention.”
The Tribunal then indicated that it could only speculate upon the situation in the future based upon the facts before it and that whilst it could not rule out the possibility of further incidents such as the burning of a church which had recently taken place in Jakarta it found that given the changes that had occurred, isolated and localised incidents would be random and short lived and that the Indonesian authorities would act to protect citizens in such cases. The Tribunal concluded that having considered the applicant’s account and independent information and the state’s willingness and preparedness to protect its citizens it was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution for reasons of her race or religion now or in the foreseeable future.
The Tribunal had come to its views utilising the information before it, namely the delegate’s decision, and certain country information including a report prepared by an academic expert in relation to another similar application which concluded:
“I would have to say that the objective grounds for that fear are much less now that they have been in the last thirty years.” [CB 221]
This report was referred to in the grounds and reasons at CB 120 and reproduced at CB 219-221.
The applicant produced a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal and filed an amended application alleging that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in two ways. The first allegation was:
“1. The Refugee Review Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Act and or acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
A. The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to ask a question it was required by law to ask.
(i)The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to ask, when determining whether or not the Applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution, if Indonesia had a reasonably effective and impartial police force and justice system.
The RRT also failed to ask if the standards of protection that Indonesia could offer met the standards of protection required by international standards, such as those considered by the European Court of Human Right in Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245. It was required to do so: MIMIA v Respondents S152/2003 [2004]HCA 18.
Rather, the RRT stated that what ‘is relevant is the willingness of the state to protect and the current regime in Indonesia has demonstrated that it is willing both in policy and practice to do that.’ (RB 126)
B. The Refugee Review Tribunal misinterpreted the applicable law and misapplied the law to the facts.
(i) The RRT misinterpreted the law relating to what persecution is for the purposes of the Refugees Convention.
The RRT erred in its interpretation because it was of the misunderstanding that one of the elements of the formula or persecution is that what is relevant to the state’s willingness to protect. (RB 126) It then applied this erroneous interpretation to the facts, with the consequences that it failed to determine if the standard of protection that Indonesia could offer met the standards of protection required by international standards, such as those considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245: MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 [2004] HCA 18.”
Needless to say it would have been difficult for the Tribunal in 2000 to have rehearsed the test of effective protection contained in Minister for Immigration v Respondents S152/2003 [2004] HCA 18, a decision handed down by the High Court some four years later. But it is instructive to consider that decision and to note what it really said. Perhaps the best sense can be obtained from the judgment of McHugh J at [32-34] where his Honour opined:
“32 …When a person fears persecution for a Convention reason from the random and uncoordinated acts of private individuals, the ability of that person's country to eliminate or reduce the risk of persecution may be relevant in determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution. It is likely to be relevant to that issue when the persecutor is known or readily ascertainable. But determining whether the government of the country of nationality is able to prevent harm from the random and uncoordinated acts of private individuals is not a necessary element in determining whether the person's fear of harm from random acts is well-founded. The need for such a determination is a variable factor that may be decisive in some cases but irrelevant in others. Nor is the absence of protection of the person by the State, in the context of a purported duty to protect, an element of persecution.
33 In determining the issue of well-founded fear, the critical question is whether the evidence established a real chance that the asylum seeker will be persecuted for a reason proscribed by the Convention, if returned to the country of nationality. If the evidence shows that the persecutors have targeted the asylum seeker, the ability of the country of nationality to protect that person will be relevant to the issue of well-founded fear. If the evidence shows no more than that private individuals randomly harm the class of persons to which the asylum seeker belongs but fails to show that that person has a real chance of suffering harm, the ability of the country to eliminate those acts is irrelevant…
34 In the present case, the Tribunal found that in the past the male respondent had not suffered acts of persecution for a Convention reason and that there was only a remote chance that he would suffer such acts in the future. That was a factual conclusion open to the Tribunal and was not reviewable in the Federal Court. Having made that finding of fact, the Tribunal was not bound to determine whether the country of nationality had the ability - in a practical sense or otherwise - to eliminate those acts.”
In other words, there is no need to test whether a state complies with the international norms of the provision of adequate protection unless the applicant is in need of that protection. It seems to me that the decision of the Tribunal in this case was that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution because the situation in Indonesia had improved since the dreadful events of May 1998 and that whilst the Tribunal could not rule out the possibility of further incidents occurring, those incidents were not on the scale of the May 1998 incidents (the Tribunal referred to the recent burning of a church) and that the government of Indonesia had acted to protect its citizens in such cases. The Tribunal extrapolated from its information about the past and the present to conclude that the applicant did not face a real chance of persecution for reasons of her race or religion now or in the foreseeable future. The integer of this decision meant that there was no need for the Tribunal to have analysed the nature of the state protection provided by Indonesia because the Tribunal had made the factual finding that any harm that might arise would come from the isolated, localised, random or short lived incidents and did not constitute persecution. As Kirby J said in S152/2003 (supra) at [123]:
“In the end, this is yet another case where persons who failed before the Tribunal on the merits, sought to re-canvass factual findings in an impermissible way and to argue their claim for judicial review in a manner significantly different from the argument advanced before the Tribunal…”
The second argument put by the applicant alleged that the Tribunal failed to disclose country information that it had which was adverse to the applicant’s claim and which, it is submitted, was material to the Tribunal’s decision. The documents which the applicant says should have been put to her are primarily an expert opinion by Charles A Coppel of the University of Melbourne prepared for another RRT case and referred to at [5] of these reasons. Whilst I am satisfied that these documents would all have been excluded by s.424A(3)(a) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), this section was not part of the legislation at the relevant time. The matter has to be looked at on the basis of procedural fairness. The applicant focuses particularly on the Professor Coppel report because she suggests that the transcript would indicate the applicant was misled in this regard. At Question 30 the Tribunal asks:
“Q30. One expert on Indonesia has said that the situation in 1998 is the worst situation since 1965.
A. Yes.
Q31. Do you agree with that expert’s opinion or –
A. Yes. Back in ’65 I was still little, I did not experience it personally.
Q32. Sure, but in your lifetime is 1998, the situation in May-June the worst you have ever seen?
A. Yes, yes.
Q33. Okay. Was there anything else you wanted to say before I turn to your husband?
A. I only would like to hope to get permission to stay here because I can feel the peace rather than living there. Over there maybe one day such an incident would happen to me. This time it did not happen to me but I would not know what would happen in the future.”
The applicant argues that this part of the conversation with the Tribunal would appear to indicate that it would be accepting of a proposition that the events of 1998 were the worst it had been since 1965 when it was aware of an opinion which stated inter alia:
“I would have to say that the objective grounds for that fear are much less now than they have been for the last thirty years.”
Mr Dobbie, on behalf of the applicant in his helpful written submissions, deals in detail with the requirements of procedural fairness expressed by Brennan J in Kioa v West (1986) 60 ALJR 113 at [140-144] and the views of the High Court in Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2005] HCA 72 where two propositions put by Brennan J in Kioa v West (supra) were approved at [15]:
“Particular emphasis was given in argument in this Court, as it had in the courts below, to two propositions stated by Brennan J. The first proposition was that "in the ordinary case where no problem of confidentiality arises an opportunity should be given to deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made"; the second proposition was that "[i]nformation of that kind creates a real risk of prejudice, albeit subconscious, and it is unfair to deny a person whose interests are likely to be affected by the decision an opportunity to deal with the information".”
At [16] the court opined:
“Moreover, what is meant by "credible, relevant and significant" must be understood having regard also to the emphasis that his Honour had given earlier in his reasons to the fundamental point that principles of natural justice, or procedural fairness, "are not concerned with the merits of a particular exercise of power but with the procedure that must be observed in its exercise". Because principles of procedural fairness focus upon procedures rather than outcomes, it is evident that they are principles that govern what a decision-maker must do in the course of deciding how the particular power given to the decision-maker is to be exercised.”
Mr Dobbie’s case is that there is some form of direct relationship between the questions asked by the Tribunal that I have extracted and the report from Professor Coppel. I am not sure that that is the case. The questions asked by the Tribunal referred to a particular time and to the seriousness of the riots that were then taking place. A perusal of Professor Coppel’s report particularly at CB 220 would indicate that he agreed that the 1998 riots were traumatic for ethnic Chinese. He then in the last paragraph “looks to the future” and for the reasons given earlier in his report made the suggestion that things were better now than they had been in the last thirty years. I do not think that these remarks contradicted the response given by the applicant to the questions. But was the information provided by Professor Coppel information that is credible, relevant and significant? Was it information that influenced the Tribunal in its decision? The answer to the first of those questions must surely be yes. If that is the case it is necessary to look closely at the transcript to see whether or not any suggestion of improvement in the situation that could have been drawn from Professor Coppel’s report was made to the applicant and she was given the opportunity to respond to it. I do not believe it was necessary for the Tribunal to have extracted the whole report and given it to the applicant provided it can be seen that she was aware of the nature of that opinion: Applicant S370/2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] 1514 at [18]; VAF v Minister for Immigration 2004] FCAFC 123 at [30]; Kioa v West (1986) 60 ALJR per Mason J. At page 6 of the Transcript the Tribunal indicates to the applicant that it believes her story of what occurred in the riots and accepts that discussing those matters would be painful for her. The Tribunal says:
“...So what I’d like to ask you now is, what do you believe would happen if you returned to Indonesia now or sometime in the near future.”
This indicates that the thrust of the Tribunal’s concern was for the future and I should look at what else was said to see whether it indicated that the Tribunal had evidence that things had significantly improved. At Question 15 on page 7 of the Transcript the Tribunal commences a lengthy statement setting out it’s understanding of the situation for the Chinese in Indonesia both before the riots and afterwards. At page 8 the Tribunal says:
“Even though the main riots were for a short period in May, the unrest and general disturbances continued and ultimately in June Suharto resigned and as we all know, Habibie came into power. Many people in Indonesia still weren’t happy with this because they saw Habibie as just being another part of Suharto’s government. But a number of things happened when Habibie and his new Cabinet was installed. Investigations were undertaken by the Human Rights Commission of Indonesia. There was huge criticism from the international community about the way the Indonesian government had handled the riots and shortly after Habibie was installed as the head of the state he went to the Chinatown area of Jakarta and the Minister for Justice at that time, Minister Muladi, promised to rationalise, to agree or to sign an agreement with an international convention against racial discrimination. He did uphold that promise and in fact in April 1999 that convention on racial discrimination was signed by the Indonesian government. At the same time the Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry – I’m hopeless and pronouncing this name, his name is Ginanjar Kartasamita, thank you – he and the Cabinet recognised that if Indonesia was ever going to get out of its economic mess it needed the expertise of the Chinese. He also pledged to work towards anti-discrimination between ethnic Chinese people and Indonesia people in business and after July 1998 the evidence then is that the military did intervene in riots as did the police and security forces. There were, however, still riots which occurred from time to time in various parts of the country. The difference between the riots of May 1998 and the smaller riots was that the military and the police moved quickly to break them up. As I said earlier, many people were still upset that Habibie and his Cabinet had been installed and the country moved to general elections. We also know the result of those elections and the Cabinet that was subsequently elected. Although there was some disagreement that Megawati Sukarnoputri did not become head of state and Abdurrahman Wahid did instead, international reports concerning Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri are that both of those people are what we can moderates. Both over a period of time before their election have shown that they are supportive of the ethnic Chinese community and both have demonstrated that they recognise the right of people to practice a religion of their choice. I’ve been talking for a long time and so I’ll leave it open now for you to give me any opinion that you have concerning that and I notice your husband has been taking notes so I’ll also then turn to him and ask him for his opinion.”
The applicant responded with further references to the 1998 riots until at Question 27 the Tribunal said:
“Q27. Okay, as I said to you, I accept and I believe you when you tell me that. What do you think the situation would be now with those changes that we’ve talked about?
A. With those changes in my own view there are still incidents taking place in Jakarta like two months ago a big church belonging to a foundation was burned and some – there were some casualties, those who were burned and there were also seriously injured. Even some days ago I heard there was something about a Christian holy war”
It was only two questions after this that the question about the expert on Indonesia saying that the situation was the worst since 1965 was put.
I am of the view that the context of the questioning, whilst indicating that things had improved subsequent to 1998 did not go so far as to suggest that the situation today was the best that it had been in thirty years as suggested by Professor Coppel.
The interpretation which I put on the Tribunal’s reasons for decision is that its ground for finding that there would be no “real chance that the applicant would face persecution for reasons of her race or religion in the foreseeable future in Indonesia was based more upon the actual facts on the ground being the change of government and the demonstrated intentions of first President Habibie and then President Abdurrahman Wahid and his Minister Megawati Sukarnoputri discussed in the extract from the transcript set out at page 8, rather than Professor Coppel’s view about the situation “being the best for thirty years”. Professor Coppel’s views may have reinforced the Tribunal but did not bring the Tribunal to its decision. As the matters that did bring the Tribunal to its decision were discussed with the applicant I do not think that there was any failure to provide procedural fairness in not putting the Coppel document directly to her. In relation to the other documents referred to by the applicant I make these points:
a)DFAT Country Information Report 180/99 of 28 April 1999
The Applicant says that this report refers to more effective discipline within the Indonesian armed forces than that there had been a tighter approach on the part of the security apparatus to the containment of unrest. This seems to be covered by the references to the military moving in quickly to break up smaller riots contained at page nine of the transcript.
b)Indonesian Observer “National Joint team denies internal riot, pledges to reveal riot findings next week”, 29 October 1998
I believe that article which is intended to show that the government did not wish to suppress information about the riots is covered in the transcript by the references to the criticism of the way Indonesia handled the riots and then intentions of the government to respond.
c)“Indonesia forms anti-rape task forced in wake of riots”, 8 July 1998, CISNET CX30532
The applicant quotes from this document to the effect that the Ministers in August 1998 had denied that rapes had taken place during the riots. This is not material adverse to the applicant, it would tend to support her views.
d)“Habibie beefs up security amid Indonesia riot fears”, 19 August 1998, CISNET CX31536
I believe that the sense of this article that President Habibie had pledged to safeguard the lives or property of the country’s ethnic Chinese could be taken from the statement of the Tribunal. But perhaps more importantly it is not a document that goes to the foreseeable future because that was dealt with by the Tribunal in it’s views as to the Presidency of Mr Wahid.
e)CISNET document CX36172-Indonesia’s elections
This document states that the Christian community was delighted with the democratic elections in Indonesia. There is a reference in the Tribunal’s discussion as to the new government recognising the right of people to practice a religion of their choice so that the sense of this article is covered.
f)DFAT advice in its report on 26 November 1999
This is said to include information that President Abdurrahman Wahid had demanded a security approach to problems such as Aceh and that he had stressed the need for wide-ranging reforms in areas such as the Judiciary. My reading of the transcript does not suggest that the applicant raised any questions as to the independence of the judiciary. I cannot accept that this is a document that was needed to be shown to the applicant for the purposes of providing her with procedural fairness.
Like many decisions in this area, the cases of the parties are well balanced. I could quite see that some courts could come to the view that to put the question of procedural fairness beyond all doubt the Professor Coppel report should have been shown to the applicant. I am not of that view for the reasons which I have indicated. I think that Professor Coppel’s views only corroborated an already found opinion based upon the change of government and the efforts being made by that changed government to improve the situation. Those matters were put to the applicant.
I would add that I think that there is force in the respondent’s argument that the applicant has never said what was the practical unfairness of not having been given the various documents referred to in these reasons and what further evidence she would have brought if that had been done. Whilst I accept that evidence of practical unfairness is not always necessary particularly where there is a mandated requirement, this is not such a case. In the joint judgment of McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in Applicant NAFF of 2002v Minister for Immigration [2004] HCA 62 at [34] the court said:
“The entitlement of the appellant to complain about the failure of the Tribunal to complete the review process does not depend on the tender of evidence that he was misled or prejudiced. It is true that in some cases it may be necessary for disappointed applicants for review to file evidence about what steps they would have taken if the alleged breach of procedural fairness had not occurred.”
I am satisfied that there was such an obligation on the applicant in this case. We are here talking about specific evidence that the applicant says she did not see. It would not be difficult for her to say what she would have done had she seen it. Certainly now long after the event. This case is analogous to both Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal; Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] 190 ALR 601 and the cases that there followed in this regard. In VAAD v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCAFC 117 he Full Bench of the Federal Court made it quite plain that the applicants were under a duty to state what they would have done had they knowledge of the Part B documents. The court said at [52] :
“As the Federal Magistrate correctly noted, the agreed statement of facts in Muin included that the representative applicants, Mr Muin and Mr Lie, believed the Tribunal had received the Part B documents and had they known otherwise, they would have taken steps to correct that situation. However, in Lam the applicant’s failure to demonstrate that he was misled and his conduct affected by reliance of the alleged representations was fatal to his claim of procedural fairness.”
The Full Court makes reference to the earlier High Court decision Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 where Gleeson J at [36-37] said in relation to the claims of the applicant in that case that:
“ [36]... no attempt is made to show that the applicant held any subjective expectation in consequence of which he did, or omitted to do, anything. Nor is it shown that he lost an opportunity to put any information or argument to the decision-maker, or otherwise suffered any detriment.
[37] ...A particular example of such detriment is a case where the statement of intention has been relied upon and, acting on the faith of it, a person has refrained from putting material before a decision-maker...Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice.”For all these reasons I am unable to find that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in the manner in which it conducted the review in this case. I dismiss the application and I order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs assessed in the sum of $5,000.
I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Raphael FM
Associate:
Date:
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