SZCDA v Minister for Immigration

[2006] FMCA 419

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZCDA & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2006] FMCA 419

MIGRATION – Refugee – fear of persecution based on political opinion – bias – apprehended bias – bad faith – s.424A – Tribunal’s duty to enquire – irrationality – no reviewable error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958, ss.424A(3)(a), 424A(3)(b), 424A.

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17 Re Refugee Review Tribunal Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAOSof 2002 [2003] FCAFC 142 NAOA vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW [2004] FCAFC 264 QAAC of 2004 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2005] FCAFC 92 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shang Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992 Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex Parte Durarajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 Re: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 NACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 S635/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1162 NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 VWST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286

Applicant:

SZCDA & ANOR

Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SZ 2696 of 2003

Judgment of: Nicholls FM

Hearing date: 01 March 2006

Date of Last Submission: 01 February 2006

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 6 April 2006

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Nil

Solicitors for the Applicant: Nil

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. K. Morgan

Solicitors for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $2000.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SZ 2696 of 2003

SZCDA & ANOR

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application filed in this Court on 9 December 2003 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 16 October 2003 and handed down on 11 November 2003 affirming the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister made on 13 September 2002 to refuse a protection visa to the applicant. The Tribunal is joined as the second respondent in these proceedings.

2. The applicants are husband and wife and are nationals of India who arrived in Australia on 1 May 2002. On 20 May 2002 they applied to the first respondent’s Department for protection visas. Only the applicant husband made specific claims under the Refugees Convention. (For ease, therefore, I will refer to the applicant husband as “the applicant”). The claims for protection are found in their application for a protection visa (Court Book (“CB”) 1 to CB 35, and particularly in an attached statement at CB 30 to CB 34), in the application for review (CB 73 to CB 76) and in the record of what was said at the hearing that the Tribunal conducted with the applicant on 14 August 2003. The Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing is reproduced at CB 112 to CB 113.9.

3. The applicant claimed to fear persecution in India because of his membership of the Akali Dal Party. He claimed to have joined that party in 1997, to have become an influential member, and to have been elected as vice president of the local “Karyana Association”. The applicant claimed that opposition parties (particularly the Congress Party) held rallies against the Akali Dal Party, and that on 26 January 1998 a local Congress Party parliamentarian (Mr. Samara) and the applicant had an argument that led to the applicant being reported to the police. He claimed that because of the “Akali party’s influence” the police did not take action against the applicant. He further claimed that sometime in 2000 the Akali Dal Party was divided into two: the “Badal” and the “Tohra” factions, and that he supported the Tohra faction. With the loss of the election in 2002, and the swearing in of Mr. Samara as “Cabinet Minister” in the new Government, the applicant claimed that the police then started “to give him trouble”. He claimed that he was forced to close his shop in the post-election celebrations, and that his business goods were damaged as a result of people throwing stones. He claimed that on 6 March 2002 (his wedding day) he was approached by police and asked to report to the police because of his “anti-government action”. He claimed his father paid money to the police to have them “stay away”, but he agreed to report to the police station on 8 March 2002. He claimed that when he reported he was detained, but released the next day because of a lack of evidence. He claimed that the police interest in him continued and eventually he and his wife decided to seek refuge in “an unknown place”. They went to New Delhi, but wanting to “live a peaceful life” sought, through a friend, tourist visas to Australia. They now seek protection and claim they will suffer persecution if they return to India.

4. The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” in its decision record are reproduced at CB 114.5 to CB 116.5. The Tribunal found that:

   1)It had some doubts about the applicant’s evidence (given at the hearing) that he had been a member of the Akali Dal Party from 1997 until leaving for Australia. This was because, although the applicant’s evidence was “generally plausible” when he gave evidence about fund raising and his ability to name a particular Congress Party candidate, his evidence about an Akali Dal candidate and the Akali Dal (Tohra) Party’s “fortunes” in the 2002 election was “at odds with independent county information” (CB 114.7). The Tribunal gave examples of these discrepancies at CB 114.7 to CB 114.8.

   2)However, it accepted that the applicant was a member of the Akali Dal (Tohra) Party in his home town, was involved in fund raising, was a “cashier” and that he had “attended political rallies and events” (CB 114.9 to CB 115.1).

   3)It did not accept that he had suffered persecution at the hands of Mr. Samara (the local Congress Party parliamentarian) or the police. This was based on the Tribunal’s finding that he was not a serious threat to Mr. Samara such that he would try to have him “arrested and jailed on false charges” (CB 115.2).

   4)It found that the applicant’s evidence about his detention in 2002 was inconsistent, as was his evidence about why he left the Punjab in late 2002 (CB 115.3).

   5)In any event it found that even if it accepted that the applicant had been detained as described, it was not satisfied that that treatment amounted to persecution (CB 115.4).

   6)It did not accept as plausible that a verbal altercation between the applicant and Mr. Samara would lead to such a “vendetta” against the applicant (CB 115.5).

   7)It did not accept the applicant’s claim that he was becoming more influential and powerful and as such was a threat to Mr. Samara. The Tribunal described the applicant as neither impressing as “persuasive or influential”, and commented that in any event, any influence or power would have faded significantly in his absence from March 2002 and onwards (CB 115.6).

   8)It found that since leaving India he had not kept himself informed of Party developments or maintained any contacts (CB 115.6).

   9)It found further that the applicant’s claims were not supported by independent country information, which the Tribunal accepted, to the effect that “members of legal political parties are free to express their views in accordance with the law”, and if abuse of those rights occurs there are avenues of “recourse under the law” (CB 115.7).

   10)In any event, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant could reasonably relocate safely elsewhere in India (CB 115.8). The Tribunal’s finding in this regard was based on the circumstances presented and in particular that the applicant was a 28 year old married man, had lived independently in Australia for over a year, was well educated and trilingual (CB 115.8).

   11)It rejected the applicant’s claim that he would be identified anywhere in India as being “a political supporter”. It found as implausible the applicant’s claim that Mr. Samara “would search the country for him or could find him through his relatives or if he started a business”. The Tribunal noted India’s population of 984 million and commented that “no doubt many millions of them can be regarded as ‘political supporters’”. It also found that these claims were not supported by evidence, and there was nothing before it to suggest that any attempt was made to locate the applicant since he left his local town and went to New Delhi in March 2002. Further, the Tribunal did not accept as plausible that “given the passage of time” (nearly 18 months) Mr. Samara would have retained any interest in the applicant since his departure (CB 115.9 to CB 116.3).

   On above the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, and was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. As no Convention claims were made by the applicant wife the fate of her application depended on that of her husband, and the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent Minister not to grant protection visas (CB 116.3).

5. The applicants’ originating application, filed on 9 December 2003 complains:

   “1. The tribunal made its decision in bad faith.

   2.    The tribunal deprived me of the natural justice.

   3.    The tribunal denied the evidentiary proof of my claim.

   4.    The tribunal’s decision did not reflect the material facts of my claim.

   5.    The tribunal has given a decision, which was present in the back of it’s mind.

   6.    The tribunal mixed up many facts with this decision which affected the decision.

   7.    The tribunal concentrated in particular fact, while ignored many other facts in this condition.

   8.    The tribunal make up his mind without any inquiry regarding my claim and he did not believe my genuine convention based refugee claim.

   9.    I will provide more details of grounds later.” (Errors in original)

6. The application is formulaic in presentation and style and is very similar to many others seen in the Court. An amended application filed on 9 August 2004 is another formulaic presentation also often seen in the Court, and is devoid of any particularity. Relevantly, I note the applicant did seek access to the Court’s Legal Advice Scheme. A communication on the Court’s file from Counsel on the panel of that scheme shows that while there was some difficulty in contacting the applicant, ultimately the applicant attended a conference with Counsel and was given advice. I should note that I make nothing more of the observation as to the formulaic nature of the applications other than indicating the difficulty from obtaining from the applicant the real complaints about the Tribunal’s decision. In any event the applicants claimed:

   “On the following Grounds:

   That the RRT decision was effected to take into account a relevant consideration when it assessed weather the delegate of the Minister raised reasonable grounds for not granting a protection visa.

   Particulars:

   “The tribunal did not properly consider in assessing the chance of my persecution and persecuted on my return to India based on the member of a particular social group and the involvement with the politics in India.

   The Tribunal’s satisfaction that the applicant is not a refugee was not based upon reasoning which provided a rational or logical foundation for this belief.

   The tribunal did not observe the Migration Act properly to making the decision.

   I will provide more details to support my judicial review application in my outline of submission.

   Particulars:

   I repeat the particulars to grounds.

   I WILL PROVIDE DETAILS PARTICULARS AFTER DISCUSS WITH THE PILOT SCHEME SOLICITOR” (Errors in original)

7. At the hearing before me, the applicant appeared unrepresented. He was assisted by an interpreter in the Hindi language. The respondents were represented by Ms. K. Morgan. The applicant confirmed that the second applicant in these proceedings was his wife, and that she would not be attending the hearing and that he was representing her interests as well as his own (I should also note that this case was heard in conjunction with SYG 2773 of 2004 with the applicant’s pseudonym of “SZEJB”, being the applicants’ infant son).

8. The applicant complained that he and his wife had applied to the Tribunal because they needed protection, but that whatever claims he had made the Tribunal ignored (“they just didn't worry about it”). I understood from the applicant he was claiming that the Tribunal was biased in that it had already decided the matter before even listening to his claims and did not give a decision in his favour. Despite prompting from the Court, including reference to the particulars raised in the amended application, the applicant was unable to provide anything further apart from repeating his claim that he felt the Tribunal process, in particular as it related to the hearing that the Tribunal conducted with him, was “not fair”.

9. The applicants’ originating application to this Court contains eight one line grounds of review. No particulars are provided. Grounds 1 and 5 alleged bad faith and bias on the part of the Tribunal. Essentially this represents the applicant's complaint about the Tribunal's decision as he put it to me at the hearing before me. However, in relation to these complaints the applicant has put nothing before the Court to establish any of the relevant elements as set out in authorities. For the applicant’s benefit I should at first note that an allegation of bad faith or bias on the part of a Tribunal, or an allegation that the Tribunal acted with bias, is an extremely serious matter. Such allegations of bias, whether actual bias, or the apprehension of bias, must be supported by evidence. When such allegations are made by an applicant it implies that the Tribunal member by their attitude and conduct can be shown to have preset in their mind the ultimate outcome in the matter. Allegations of actual bias carry with it an onus that it must be distinctly made and clearly proved. Actual bias requires evidence of “prejudgement” by the decision-maker in the sense that he/she is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration or of being persuaded differently, whatever evidence or argument may be presented” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17, [69], [71]-[72], [127]). The real question is whether the mind of the decision maker is open to persuasion. The applicant would need to present more than just the conclusion reached by the Tribunal or a mere assertion that it was “not fair” to support this claim. Further, allegations of apprehension of bias must be reasonable to succeed. The standards of reasonableness are determined by reference to the apprehension of “a fair-minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person” observing the Tribunal processes. (Re Refugee Review Tribunal Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28, [27]-[32]). No particulars of bias or apprehended bias are alleged. I can see no basis for review of the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of actual or apprehended bias.

10. The applicant has brought no evidence whatsoever to ground a complaint that the Tribunal did not bring an open mind to the assessment of the applicant's claims. It is rarely the case that bias can be made out with reference to the decision record alone, and no further evidence has been provided by the applicant in this respect (VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872). In addition, the application fails the test of establishing bad faith as set out in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAOSof 2002 [2003] FCAFC 142, [18]-[20] because the allegations of bad faith are not clearly alleged, no attempt at proof is offered and no personal fault or absence of honesty on the part of the decision maker has been made out.

11. Before me the applicant made reference to what he says occurred at the hearing that the Tribunal conducted with him. He claimed that after he explained to the Tribunal that it was not safe for him in India that the Tribunal said “it's alright everything is all right”, but in the end its decision was not favourable to him. The applicant has had the benefit of some legal advice. However, he has brought nothing before this Court by way of evidence as to what he says occurred at the hearing that the Tribunal conducted with him and the applicant has put no evidence before the Court to challenge the Tribunal's account of what occurred at that hearing. I note that the Court can only proceed on the evidence before it: (NAOA vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241 (“NAOA”)).

12. The Tribunal's account of the hearing that it conducted with the applicant is reproduced in its decision record at CB 112.2 to CB 113.8. The Tribunal's account shows that it clearly discussed the relevant claims with the applicant and put to the applicant its doubts about some of what he was saying. It stated, variously, that it put to the applicant that his claims were vague and unsupported, and that it had difficulty in accepting as plausible some aspects of the applicant's claims. But even apart from the question of having put no evidence to contradict the Tribunal's account of what occurred at the hearing, in relation to the applicant's claim that the Tribunal said “everything is all right” (the assumption possibly being that the applicant took this as a positive comment from the Tribunal) the applicant was unable to provide any particularity whatsoever in relation to this issue, or to explain the context or even ultimately why it was unfair. The applicant may indeed have come away from the Tribunal hearing under some misapprehension as to the Tribunal's view of what was being said (although it must be said that the Tribunal's account is quite clear in establishing the opposite). In any event there is nothing before me, and nor is there anything in what the applicant put to me, to show that he was misled in any way by the Tribunal in this regard or even that the Tribunal had any understanding that the applicant may have some misapprehension as to the view the Tribunal was taking of his evidence. In all, this complaint is not made out.

13. Ground 2 in the originating application also specifically alleges a denial of natural justice. I accept Ms. Morgan's submission that on the material before me there is nothing to show a breach of natural justice, or that the Tribunal was obliged to provide to the applicant further opportunities for comment either in a statutory context or otherwise (I note that s.422B of the Migration Act 1958 (‘the Act”) applies). The applicant claimed that the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend the hearing, that he attended the hearing and gave evidence, but that the Tribunal did not accept “the sum” of the applicant’s evidence given at the hearing. A plain reading of the Tribunal's decision record reveals that it relied on information provided by the applicant at the hearing, and on independent country information available to it. In the statutory context such information was excluded from any obligation to put such information in writing to the applicants by way of s.424A(3)(b) and s.424A(3)(a) respectively (Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW [2004] FCAFC 264 and QAAC of 2004 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2005] FCAFC 92). I cannot see that there was any breach of s.424A of the Act, or indeed any other provisions of Division 4, Part 7 of the Act. Even beyond the statutory context, the material before me shows that the applicant would have been on notice particularly at the hearing as to the relevant issues on which the Tribunal was going to rely, and that the applicant was given the opportunity of commenting. This ground also is not made out.

1. Grounds 3, 4, 6 and 7 appear to relate to alleged factual errors, and clearly it is not open for an applicant to seek review of the Tribunal's decision on the merits. These claims also fail. (Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shang Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259).

2. Ground 8 in the originating application appears to have two elements. Firstly, that the Tribunal made up its mind without making enquiries regarding the applicant's claim. The applicant has not said what enquiries the Tribunal should have pursued. In any event, I note that as Ms. Morgan submitted there is no general obligation on a Tribunal to make enquiries (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992 at [43]). Further, that if there is such an obligation arising from exceptional circumstances (per Wilcox J. in Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-170) the applicant has put forward no such exceptional circumstances which would serve to require the Tribunal to make such enquiries and nor are any such circumstances evident on the material before me. The second aspect of this complaint appears to be that the Tribunal failed to believe the applicant's claims. The answer to the applicant is that the Tribunal is not obliged to accept an applicant's claims uncritically (Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451). Nor can I see that it is necessary for there to be rebutting evidence before the Tribunal in order to reject an applicant's claims (Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347). Ultimately the view of the credibility of an applicant’s claims is of course a matter for the Tribunal (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex Parte Durarajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407).

3. The applicant's first complaint in his amended application is that the Tribunal did not properly consider the chance of the applicant being persecuted on return to India, as based on his membership of a particular social group, and his involvement with politics in India. This complaint cannot succeed. A plain reading of the Tribunal's decision reveals, as Ms. Morgan submitted at the hearing before me, that the very basis of the Tribunal's decision was the evaluation of the applicant’s position in a political party and further the circumstances arising from this situation and the evaluation of whether that participation amounted to a well founded fear of persecution. The applicant has not put forward anything to say that he was a member of any other social group, and nor is any other possible social group of which the applicant could have been a member, evident on the material before me.

4. The second complaint is that the Tribunal's decision was not based upon reasoning which provided a rational or logical foundation for its decision. While some members of the High Court in Re: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 (“S20”) expressed some support for illogicality as a ground of review, the utility of illogicality is limited. In NACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 (“NACB”) at [29] and [30] the Full Federal Court held there is nothing in the remarks of the High Court in S20 which would warrant a departure from earlier line of decisions in the Federal Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not in itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error. The Court said, at [29] and [30]:

   “[29] In our view, there is nothing in these remarks which would warrant a departure from the earlier line of decisions in this Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not of itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error.  Nor does the want of logic which has been identified in the present case sound a “warning note” of the type referred to in Epeabaka (at 422) as to whether there was only a purported, and not real, exercise of power by the RRT.

   [30] Accordingly, the conclusion we have reached in the present case is that there is substance in the argument that there was a want of logic in one aspect of the reasoning of the RRT.  However, want of logic does not of itself suffice to constitute error of law, still less error of law which is jurisdictional.  There is nothing else in the material, apart from the one aspect of illogicality, to cast doubt upon the RRT’s reasoning.  Moreover, there are several bases upon which that reasoning can, in any event, be supported.  Accordingly, on the present state of the authorities, there is no reviewable error.”

   In S635/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1162 Moore., J held that notwithstanding various observations of members of the High Court about illogical reasoning, he was bound to follow NACB. In NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 at [53] to [54] the Court stated that:

   “[53] It is desirable first to restate the uncontroversial proposition that mere factual error by the Tribunal will not ground judicial review unless it relates to a jurisdictional fact or is a manifestation of some error of law, substantive or procedural, which constitutes jurisdictional error and thereby vitiates the purported decision.  This is evident from the discussion, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, of jurisdictional error as a ground for the review of Tribunal decisions under the former Pt 8 of the Migration Act.  If the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue or poses the wrong question for itself or does not have regard to relevant material or takes into account irrelevant material, so as to affect the exercise of its powers, error of law and/or jurisdictional error may be identified (at 351 to 352 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  An error of fact in the course of a decision is unlikely to be a jurisdictional error unless the fact is a jurisdictional fact …

   [54] Error of law may occur within jurisdiction – S20/2002 at 72 [57] …The observations in the joint judgement in S20/2202 did not offer any clear guidance upon the circumstances in which factual error may amount to jurisdictional error for the purposes of the exercise by the High Court of its constitutional jurisdiction under s. 85(v) or the exercise by this Court of its analogous statutory jurisdiction under s.39B of the Judiciary Act.  The comments did, however, indicate that, absent a question of jurisdictional fact, which in itself may be a matter of some complexity involving questions of fact and law, the circumstances in which factual error will amount to or evidence jurisdictional error is likely to be quite limited.”

   I note also that there is authority in the Full Federal Court decision of VWST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286 at [16]-[19] for the proposition that illogicality would not of itself suffice to show jurisdictional error.

5. In any event, I cannot see that this claim can be made out. The material before me reveals that the Tribunal looked at the claims put before it by the applicant, and in particular as these claims were articulated at the hearing before it. The decision record further shows that the Tribunal analysed the applicant’s evidence and, as set out above, concluded that the applicant had not suffered persecution. It further found in any event, that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to another part of India. I cannot see that the Tribunal's analysis suffered for want of logic or that it was infected by irrational considerations.

6. The third complaint is that the Tribunal did not observe the Migration Act 1958 “properly” in the making of the decision. I have already dealt with this issue above. On the material before me I can find no such error. The Tribunal invited the applicant to a hearing and on the material before me complied with all the relevant notice requirements in this regard. There is nothing before me to show that the Tribunal failed to comply with s.424A. Independent country information that the Tribunal referred to in its decision clearly falls within the exception provided in s.424A(3)(a) from the requirement to put such information to the applicant pursuant to s.424A(1). The further information on which the Tribunal relied beyond that was information provided by the applicant at the hearing that the Tribunal conducted with him. This material fell within the exception in s.424A(3)(b) of the Act.

7. The applicant made claims to fear persecution in India. The Tribunal invited the applicant to a hearing where he gave evidence. The Tribunal accepted some aspects of the applicant's claims but relevantly found that other aspects were implausible, not supported by independent country information, and to some extent that the harm claimed to have been suffered was not so serious as to amount to persecution in any event. But beyond that, as a separate and independent base for its ultimate finding adverse to the applicant, the Tribunal found that if the applicant did not wish to return to his home area because of any local problem, it was satisfied that it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate elsewhere in India.  The applicant wife put forward no other claims and relied on her husband’s circumstances. On the material before me I cannot see jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. This application is therefore dismissed.

I certify that the preceding twenty (20) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM.

Associate: Sybilla waring-Lambert

Date:6 April 2006