SZAPS v Minister for Immigration
[2004] FMCA 287
•6 May 2004
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZAPS & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2004] FMCA 287 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of protection visas – applicants claiming persecution in Sri Lanka on the basis of imputed political opinion by association with Tamils – no reviewable error found – application dismissed. |
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.422B, 424A
Migration Law Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth), s.2
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration (2003) 75 ALD 630
Chand v Minister for Immigration (unreported, FCA, Full Court, 7 November 1997)
Minister for Immigration v Raajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
NAHI v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 10
Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte “A” (1997) 190 CLR 225
Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Lam (2003) 195 ALR 502
Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57
Stead v SGIO (1986) 161 CLR 141
VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 82
First Applicant: Second Applicant: | SZAPS APPLICANT X |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File No: | SZ832 of 2003 |
| Delivered on: | 6 May 2004 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Hearing date: | 6 May 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Driver FM |
REPRESENTATION
The applicants appeared in person
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr J Potts |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The second applicant in the application filed on 14 May 2003 be joined as the second applicant to the amended application filed on 28 August 2003.
The first applicant is appointed as litigation guardian of the second applicant pursuant to rule 11.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
The first applicant is relieved of the obligation to file a written consent or to serve written notice on the respondent.
The application is dismissed.
The first applicant is to pay the costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the sum of $4,000.
The first applicant is to pay the setting down fee of $327 within 14 days or obtain a waiver.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SZ832 of 2003
| SZAPS |
First Applicant
APPLICANT X
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) made on 26 March 2003 and handed down on 16 April 2003. The RRT affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant to the applicants protection visas. There are two applicants, a mother and her son. Although the second applicant, the child, appeared on the original application for review filed on 14 May 2003, he was inadvertently omitted from the amended application filed on 28 August 2003. I ordered that the child be joined as a second applicant to the amended application. I also appointed the applicant mother as litigation guardian of the child. The applicant mother, who I will refer to as the applicant, relies upon her amended application. She has not filed any evidence in support of her application nor has she filed any written submissions. I note that orders for the filing of evidence and written submissions were made before a registrar on 19 June 2003.
The applicants are from Sri Lanka and made claims of persecution in that country by reason of their association with Tamils. The relevant background facts are set out in written submissions prepared on behalf of the respondent Minister by Mr Potts. I adopt paragraphs 2- 14 of those written submissions for the purpose of this judgment:
The applicants are mother and son. The first applicant mother is 36 years old, and her son, the second applicant, is 7 (almost 8) years old (court book, page 1). Both are Sri Lankan nationals from Gonapola, Maharagana (apparently part of Colombo) in Sri Lanka (court book, pages 12, 14, 24). They arrived in Australia on 29 September 2001, travelling on visitors (Class TR) visas (court book, pages 13-14, 39). They were the applicants for a protection (Class XA) visas in an application made on 28 December 2001 (court book, pages 1-53). The first applicant was the primary applicant, with the second applicant applying as a member of the first applicant’s family unit.[1] The first applicant claimed that she was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugee Convention, as amended by the Refugee Protocol, because she feared persecution by reason of her imputed political opinion and association with Tamils (court book, pages 30-33).
[1] court book, pages 9, 11-22 (first applicant mother); and 23-27 (second applicant son).
On 21 February 2002 the Department sent a s.424A letter to the first applicant advising her that certain information might form the basis of the delegate’s decision and inviting her comment.[2]
[2] court book, pages at 66-67. The delegate seemed to think that there was a response (court book, pages 73.4-73.5), and stated that the applicant had responded to this letter by letter “dated 18/2/2002”. Either the delegate was mistaken, or some correspondence was erroneously dated.
The Minister’s delegate refused the application for a protection visa on 28 February 2002 (court book, pages 70-75).
On 27 March 2002 the applicants applied to the RRT for review of the delegate’s decision (court book, pages 76-79).
On 21 March 2003 the RRT held a hearing, where both applicants appeared, and at which the first applicant gave evidence. Their migration agent/solicitor did not attend (court book, page 111).
On 26 March 2003 the RRT made its decision, which was handed down on 16 February 2003, affirming the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse the grant of a protection visas to the applicants (court book, pages 115-129). On 16 April 2003 a copy of the RRT’s decision was sent to the applicants, and copied to their solicitor/migration agent (court book, page 114).
On 14 May 2003 that the applicants filed their application for judicial review in this Court. On or about 27 August 2003, an amended application of that date was filed by the applicants.
The first applicant’s claims
The first applicant’s original claims were contained in a typewritten statement made on 28 December 2001, accompanying the applicants’ protection visa application (court book, pages 30-33). In that statement the first applicant claimed:
a)her father, who had been a chief printer at the University of Moratuma, as well as President of the Workers Union at that University, had been an advocate for students employed by the university, and also Tamil students, whenever they faced discrimination and harassment within the University (court book, pages 30.4-30.5);
b)as a result of his activities, her father was ill-treated by the local police and CID officers, who spread news among radical political figures that her father was assisting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“the LTTE”) (court book, page 30.6);
c)due to continuous harassment by security officers and political radicals, her father “had to retire from his services” (court book, page 30.6);
d)her father was continuously providing accommodation in the family home to Tamil students, for which he was arrested by CID officers in 1994, but was released due to the assistance of the first applicant’s father-in-law, who was a senior police officer, and her brother-in-law, who was a sub-inspector of police (court book, pages 30.6 and 30.9);
e)neighbours complained about the Tamil students, calling them “Tigers”, and sought their removal, which the first applicant’s father prevented by approaching senior police (court book, page 30.9);
f)despite these troubles, her father continued to provide accommodation to Tamils, many of whom were prepared to pay “huge … fees due to safety reasons” (court book, page 30.10);
g)it turned out to be dangerous for Tamil students, and Sinhalese people like the first applicant’s family, to accommodate Tamils (court book, page 31.3);
h)her father was interrogated numerous times and released promptly by the first applicant’s father-in-law and brother-in-law (court book, page 31.4);
i)her husband, a sales consultant, also came across many Tamil customers in Colombo (court book, page 31.4);
j)due to continuous arguments and misunderstandings between certain police and her husband, CID officers started following her husband around Colombo, which led to her husband threatening these officers, based on his father’s and brother’s positions in the police (court book, page31.5);
k)radical politicians accused her father-in-law and brother-in-law of dealings with the LTTE (court book, page31.5);
l)the applicant’s sister married a Tamil, who left Sri Lanka in 1990, but after 1996, his siblings, who were all Tamils, came to Colombo and became very close with the first applicant who accompanied them in Colombo whenever they went shopping or to attend to official matters (court book, page 31.6);
m)after the police and CID targeted her father and father-in-law she began to fear for her safety (court book, page 31.7)
n)in August 1999 she and her sister-in-law’s family were called “Tigers” by three Rajagiriya police officers, which led to her husband assaulting them, leading to the police leaving after warning them that they would be dealt with severely (court book, pages 31.7-31.8);
o)the following day she, her husband and her father were taken for questioning at Rajagiriya police station, where she was severely assaulted and threatened, and her husband was also assaulted and her father threatened (court book, pages 31.8-32.1);
p)her father-in-law was also threatened with suspension, and died of a heart attack in September 1999 (court book, page32.2);
q)after his death, there were continuous threatening calls, and her brother-in-law (the police officer) was threatened with an unfavourable transfer if he failed to keep away from the Kotte police officers (court book, page32.4);
r)her husband was abducted and assaulted by police, and left Sri Lanka (court book, page 32.4);
s)in March 2001, the Kotte police searched her father’s house, where she had been staying since her husband’s departure, and was told that her husband was wanted for his involvement in the LTTE, and that the police had been informed that the family was entertaining Tamils (court book, page32.7);
t)in May 2001, she was detained with her sister-in-law during a round up, and interrogated and detained for two nights, and had false allegations levelled against her, and was assaulted until she fainted (court book, pages 32.7-32.10);
u)her father procured her release the following day with a bribe (court book, page 33.1);
v)in August 2001, she was followed by Rajagiriya police officers, who made “foul demeaning remarks”, and who followed her subsequently, and threatened her in an attempt to procure sexual favours, and threatened to abduct her son, and her, and to rape and kill her (court book, pages 33.2-33.4);
w)as a result, she went to work accompanied by her father, who was assaulted and injured, after which she travelled with friends and work mates, until receiving her visa to travel to Australia; and
x)she feared that she would be abducted at any time by these police officers, and taken to the station and raped there (court book, page 33.4).
The applicant’s solicitor/migration agent made further claims based on country information (court book, pages 33-36), and submitted a number of articles (court book, pages 40-49).
On 18 February 2002, the first applicant put further submissions in support of her claim in the form of a letter from her solicitor/migration agent (court book, pages 57-58), including further articles (court book, pages 59-65). The applicant claimed that her four sisters in law were totally dependent on her to attend to their official matters, as they were not fluent in Sinhalese (court book, page 57.10). Members of certain political parties and Buddhist Monks were harassing the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and had abducted, tortured and murdered Sinhalese people acting against their orders and assisting Tamils in general (court book, pages 58.2-58.4). She feared returning to Sri-Lanka whilst the army and security officers were in search of Sinhalese folks who had been supporting federalism and regional autonomy for the Tamils in order to take revenge on them (court book, page 58.5).
It seems that the first applicant made two statements dated 2 June 2002 (court book, pages 82-83), and submitted further documentation to the RRT.
By letter dated 20 March 2003, received on 21 March 2003, the first applicant’s solicitor/migration agent made further submissions on her behalf (court book, pages 93-96), and submitted further articles and documents in support (court book, pages 97-110). The letter sought to give the first applicant’s explanation for certain matters found by the delegate, and made submissions about certain country information. In particular, the applicant complained that the delegate had failed to address her claims of sexual harassment and threats by police.
The first applicant also gave oral evidence before the RRT (court book, page 111).
Mr Potts also deals accurately with the decision of the RRT in summary form. I adopt paragraphs 15 through to 19 of his written submissions for the purpose of this judgment:
The RRT reviewed firstly the relevant law in unobjectionable terms (court book, pages 116-118). It then outlined the first applicant’s claims and the evidence before the RRT (court book, pages 118-122). It then considered certain country information (court book, pages 122-126).
The RRT then found the first applicant not to be a credible witness (court book, page 126.10), and rejected most of her evidence and her claims.
As such, the RRT was not satisfied that the applicant had left Sri Lanka because of the circumstances she had described (court book, page 127.1).
The RRT accepted that the applicants were from Colombo and Sinhalese, but also noted and accepted country information in respect of ethnic differences in Sri Lanka, and the plausibility of Sinhalese being attributed by the authorities with LTTE association (court book, page 127.3). The RRT found the first applicant’s testimony as to the circumstances in which she claimed to have been imputed with LTTE association to be weak and unconvincing (court book, page 127.4). In light of the unconvincing and generalised nature of the applicant’s testimony, the RRT did not accept the first applicant’s claim that she was imputed with an LTTE association because of her family’s association with Tamils, and that she was arrested and mistreated by the police because of this (court book, page 127.9). The RRT also did not accept that the first applicant faced harm or harassment from the police on her return because of an imputed association with the LTTE or association with Tamils (court book, pages 127.10-128.1). The RRT did not accept this claim because it did not accept that the applicant did in fact come to the attention of the police prior to her departure from Sri Lanka because of a suspected association with the LTTE. As such the RRT did not accept that the police wanted to take revenge upon her because of her association with Tamils (court book, page 128.1).
As such, the RRT was not satisfied that the first applicant had a well‑founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Convention, or faced a real chance of persecution on her return to Sri Lanka (court book, page 128.3).
I also adopt paragraphs 20 and 21 of Mr Potts' written submissions as an accurate statement of the grounds of review advanced in the amended application:
By their amended application dated 27 August 2003, the applicants state two grounds of review, viz:
a)the RRT “exceeded jurisdiction”; and
b)erred in law and constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction.
These grounds are particularised, and the particulars may be conveniently categorised under four broad headings, viz:
a)failing to consider certain matters;
b)failing to consider the individual circumstances of the applicant;
c)failing to accord natural justice to the applicant; and
d)failing to take into account relevant considerations (which is no different to (a), but will be dealt with separately for ease of reference).
Mr Potts deals with the first ground of review in paragraphs 23 through to 28 of his written submissions:
It is said that the RRT failed to consider:
a)the significance of the family relationship the applicant had with the Tamils;
b)whether the relationship made it more plausible that she would be perceived as supporting the LTTE; and
c)whether the applicant would be persecuted on return to Sri Lanka as a result of her abuse of police in defence of Tamils and perceived support of Tamils.
This is essentially a complaint about the RRT’s ultimate conclusions of fact. In that sense, it is a complaint about the merits of the applicants’ case, rather than the legality of it. To engage in fact finding about the merits of the applicants’ case is no part of the function of the Court in dealing with an application for relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). It is necessary for the applicants to establish jurisdictional error. Whatever be the boundaries of jurisdictional error, they do not comprehend errors of fact as to the merits of the case put to the RRT: NAHI v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10].
As Kenny J said in Minister for Immigration v Raajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [146]:
A Tribunal such as the RRT does not commit an error of law merely because it finds facts wrongly or upon a doubtful basis, or because it adopts unsound or questionable reasoning.
The RRT was “entitled to attribute greater weight to one piece of evidence as against another and to act on its opinion that one version of the facts is more probable than another”: Chand v Minister for Immigration (unreported, FCA, Full Court, 7 November 1997). In doing so it committed no jurisdictional error.
In any event, the specific errors alleged are inaccurate. The RRT specifically refers to the applicants’ family’s relationship with the Tamils (court book, page 119). The significance of that relationship was a matter for the RRT to weigh. Whether that made it more plausible that the first applicant would be perceived as supporting the LTTE was a matter for the RRT to determine. It clearly considered the family relationship (court book, pages 127.5, 127.9), and decided that the evidence was insufficient to persuade it of an imputed association with the LTTE. As to whether she would be persecuted as a result of her abuse of police in defence of Tamils, the RRT had regard to the applicant’s written claims (court book, page 119.4), and referred to the fact that people were angry with her because her family had shown support for the Tamils (court book, pages 121.10-122.1). The RRT rejected these claims. The RRT is not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence before it in giving its reasons.
The alleged errors particularised have not been made out.
I agree with and adopt those paragraphs of Mr Potts' submissions for the purposes of this judgment.
The only doubt arising in my mind concerned the third paragraph of the particulars in respect of the first ground of review. The amended application asserts that the RRT failed to consider whether the applicant would be persecuted on return to Sri Lanka as a result of her abuse of police in defence of Tamils and perceived support of Tamils. Mr Potts initially had some difficulty in identifying where the applicant had made such a claim. He did take me to at least one possible example of such a claim on page 31 of the court book. The applicant was herself uncertain about this particular and asked me for an explanation of it. When I explained it to her she told me that the particular was a mistake. The particular should have read that the RRT failed to consider whether the applicant would be persecuted on return to Sri Lanka as a result of her abuse by police in defence of Tamils and perceived support of Tamils.
In my view, it does not matter whether the applicant is asserting that she had trouble with the Sri Lankan police because she was abusive of them or whether she was abused by them. It was part of the applicant's claims that she and her family had trouble with the police. The applicant's claims are adequately summarised by the presiding member on pages 119 through to 122 of the court book. On page 126 of the court book the presiding member stated that she did not find the applicant to be credible on several aspects of her claims. On page 127 of the court book the presiding member provides a brief summary of those claims. The presiding member went on to say that she found the applicant's testimony in relation to circumstances by which she claims to have been imputed with a Tamil Tiger association to be weak and unconvincing. It is clear to me that all of the elements or integers of the applicant's claims were considered by the presiding member. There is, in my view, no substance to the first ground of review.
The second ground of review is dealt with by Mr Potts in paragraphs 29 and 30 of his written submissions:
It is said that the RRT relied on country information reports without consideration of the individual circumstances of the applicant or how those circumstances related to the reports or might be distinguished from them.
The RRT clearly did have regard to independent country information, however, its use of that information was unobjectionable. The RRT clearly had regard to the first applicant’s claims as to her individual circumstances. It weighed her claims, as well as the independent country information. The weight that the RRT chose to give to the country information was a matter for it. The asserted jurisdictional error of failing to consider the individual circumstances of the applicant is without foundation and should be rejected.
It is not entirely clear what jurisdictional error is asserted by this ground. To the extent that the ground is an assertion of a failure to consider relevant considerations or an assertion that the RRT asked itself the wrong question I reject it and adopt Mr Potts’ submissions.
I also reject the third ground of review. I adopt paragraphs 31 through to 40 of Mr Potts' written submissions:
It is said that the RRT failed to accord natural justice to the applicant because the applicant was “not given an adequate opportunity to respond to country information reports negative to her case” and this was due to the RRT’s failure to:
a)give a copy of the reports to the applicant;
b)accurately reveal to the applicant the contents of the reports; and
c)tell the applicant how and why the information contained in the reports was relevant to the review.
The applicants have put forward no evidence in the form of a transcript to show exactly what transpired at the hearing before the RRT. The Court cannot be satisfied, based on the material before it, that there was any denial of natural justice to the applicants.
The respondent accepts that s.422B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) does not apply in this case. [3]
[3]The application for review to the RRT was filed on 27 March 2002 (court book, pages 76-79), and s.422B applies to any application for review made on or after the commencement of s.422B, which commenced on 4 July 2002, see: s 2, Sch 1 item 7(5), Migration Law Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth).
Notwithstanding s.424A, it is accepted that some common law rules of procedural fairness continue to apply to the RRT’s decision: Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57.
The fair hearing rule, under which an applicant is entitled to have an opportunity to respond to adverse material, is subject to an important qualification: Stead v SGIO (1986) 161 CLR 141. The further question to be asked is whether, if the applicants had had an opportunity to comment on adverse material, it would have made any difference. This qualification was recently confirmed by the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Lam (2003) 195 ALR 502 where the High Court found that the rules of procedural fairness are not mechanical. There will not be a denial of procedural fairness in the legal sense unless there is unfairness in fact. It is the applicants who bear the onus of establishing that they could have used the opportunity to make a difference to the outcome. The applicants do not have to satisfy the Court, had they had the opportunity, that they could have produced material or made submissions that would necessarily have produced a different outcome. They only have to satisfy the Court of the possibility of a different outcome: Stead at 146-147. In Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte “A” Kirby J expressed the matter as the need to establish an arguable case, but the test is no different.
In Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte “A” Kirby J said at [54]:
[T]he applicant has not placed before this Court a clear indication of the type of evidence or material that he would have placed before the tribunal if he had known of the country information made available to it. In default of some indication of the nature of the opportunity which the applicant says he was denied (and the presentation of evidence or material that would constitute an arguable case that might result in a different outcome) any omission by the tribunal to disclose the country information to the applicant (assuming such disclosure to be obligatory) was not shown to be material in this case.
In this case, the applicants have placed no such material before the Court. The applicants have put forward no evidence demonstrating what steps they would have taken, but were prevented from taking, based upon the alleged non-disclosure of country information.
As has been said, it is not clear, in the absence of some evidence, precisely what transpired at the hearing before the RRT. The RRT’s reasons record that it put adverse country information to the applicant (court book, page 121.2). In the absence of some evidence to the contrary, the Court should accept the RRT did so, and did so adequately.
The substance of the adverse country information was disclosed to the applicants in a s.424A letter sent on 21 February 2002 (court book, pages 66-67). There was no denial of natural justice or non-compliance with s.424A in respect of those cables. Equally, the applicants were on notice that those documents were relevant, as the delegate had expressly referred to having had regard to them in his decision (court book, page 71.1). These matters were also expressly relied upon by the delegate in making his decision (court book, page 73). At this time the applicants were legally represented. There was no breach of natural justice resulting from the use of these cables by the RRT.
The applicants have failed to prove any denial of natural justice, nor any practical injustice resulting. This ground should be rejected.
There is no doubt in my mind that the RRT met any obligation it had to disclose information pursuant to s.424A(1) of the Migration Act. Mr Potts took me to the decision of the Full Federal Court in VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 82, in particular at paragraph 14. That decisions stands for the proposition that the country information relied upon by the RRT may not need to have been disclosed by reference to s.424A(3).
It is unnecessary to resolve that issue because the particulars of the country information relied upon by the RRT were disclosed. They were disclosed in a form of a letter appearing on pages 66 and 67 of the court book. They were further disclosed during the course of the RRT hearing as set out on page 121 of the court book. There was no breach of s.424A(1) and no breach of any procedural fairness obligation arising from the general law.
There is no substance to the fourth ground of review advanced in the amended application. This is a further assertion of the failure to take into account relevant considerations. The assertion has no substance because the applicant's claims were considered by the RRT. The applicant was not believed but there was no obligation on the RRT to believe her. The position might have been different if the RRT had expressed acceptance of the applicant's claims and nevertheless found that she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. However, the applicant's claims were rejected on credibility grounds. The RRT’s findings on credibility were reasonably open to it on the material before it. For completeness I adopt paragraphs 41 to 44 of Mr Potts' written submissions:
It is said that the RRT failed to take into account the relevant considerations of the particular circumstances and events with regard to the applicant’s relatives, and in particular:
a)the cumulative effect on the imputed political opinion of the applicant of the constant harassment and arrest of the applicant’s father;
b)the interrogation, beating and abduction of the applicant’s husband;
c)the demotion of the applicant’s brother in law; and
d)the applicant’s intervention on behalf of Tamils with her father-in-law.
First, it should be noted that the applicant did not claim that her brother-in-law had in fact been demoted, but rather, that he had been threatened with an unfavourable transfer (court book, page 32.3).
The RRT rejected the first applicant’s story. It did so after consideration of all of these matters. Some were expressly referred to, such as the matter referred to in sub-para (d) supra (court book, page 127.5). There is no basis for concluding that the RRT failed to consider these matters, or their potential cumulative effect. The RRT was considering whether, in totality, the evidence disclosed sufficient material, as a whole, for the RRT to be satisfied that the first applicant had been imputed with an association with the LTTE. The ultimate conclusion of the RRT was, that in weighing all the evidence, it was not satisfied about the applicant’s claims. There was no failure to consider any relevant matter.
This ground should be rejected.
For completeness I also note that Mr Potts took me to the decision of the Full Federal Court in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration (2003) 75 ALD 630 in particular at paragraph 46. I accept from that decision that in this case no jurisdictional error can be imputed from the failure by the RRT to expressly refer in its reasons to every contention made by the applicant. The relevant elements or integers of the applicant's claims were considered. That is all that the RRT had to do.
There is no jurisdictional error in the decision of the RRT, it follows that the decision is a privative clause decision. Accordingly, I must dismiss the application.
On the question of costs, Mr Potts submits that costs should follow the event and tells me that solicitor/client costs of approximately $5,400 have been incurred. The applicant referred to her impecuniosity. However, that is not a reason for me to refrain from making a costs order. I will order that the applicant pay the Minister's costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, which I fix in the sum of $4,000. In addition, the applicant has not yet paid the setting down fee payable prior to the hearing of this matter. I will order that the first applicant pay that fee of $327 within 21 days or obtain a waiver.
I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Driver FM
Associate:
Date: 10 May 2004
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