Land and Environment Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Sydney Water Corporation v Maranik [2025] NSWLEC 114 Hearing dates: 10 October 2025 Date of orders: 10 October 2025 Decision date: 10 October 2025 Jurisdiction: Class 4 Before: Pritchard J Decision: See orders at [25]
Catchwords: INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION – injunctive relief – serious question to be tried – balance of convenience
Legislation Cited: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 9.46
Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) ss 102(1)
Cases Cited: Hawkesbury City Council v Mustapha Kara-Ali [2018] NSWLEC 105
Tegra (NSW) Pty Ltd v Gundagai Shire Council [2007] NSWLEC 806; (2007) 160 LGERA 1
Category: Principal judgment Parties: Sydney Water Corporation (Applicant)
Eric Maranik (First Respondent)
Monica Ross-Maranik (Second Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
R Coffey (Applicant)Solicitors:
The respondents did not appear.
Wotton Kearney (Applicant)
File Number(s): 2025/00379308 Publication restriction: Nil
JUDGMENT
Background
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By way of summons filed on 2 October 2025 (the summons), Sydney Water Corporation (the applicant) seeks interim relief pursuant to s 102(1) of the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) and s 9.46 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPA Act) that Eric Maranik (the first respondent) and Monica Ross-Maranik (the second respondent), either themselves or through their agents, are prohibited from carrying out any development on a property at 117B Seaforth Road, Seaforth NSW 2092 (Lot 21 of DP 871376) (the land).
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The summons seeks final relief pursuant to s 102(1) of the Sydney Water Act that the first respondent and the second respondent, either themselves or through their agents, are prohibited from carrying out any development on the land unless and until the applicant grants approval for the development or works to be carried out on, in or over any structure owned or under the control and management of the applicant; and further order, pursuant to s 9.46 of the EPA Act, that the first respondent and second respondent, either themselves or through their agents, are prohibited from carrying out any development on the land, unless and until development consent is obtained.
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At around 10:37am this morning, the applicant sent a notice of motion by email to the Court. The respondents’ solicitor, Ms Wendy Jacobs, was included in that email.
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Shortly after midday, my chambers was notified that the applicant had filed a notice of motion seeking interim relief. The notice of motion was listed before me, as duty judge, at 2:00pm today.
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In Court this afternoon, the applicant filed a notice of motion seeking the following orders:
1 The Applicant’s Summons be returnable instanter before Duty Judge.
2 The Court notes the undertaking of the Applicant’s solicitor to pay any filing fee in respect of the Notice of Motion within 48 business hours.
3 The Court make orders granting the interim relief sought in Prayer 1 and Prayer 2 of the Applicant’s Summons filed on 2 October 2025.
4 The Court make case management orders.
5 Costs of…
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- Case
- [2025] NSWLEC 114
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine if the corporation was negligent in its maintenance of the pavement where the plaintiff slipped. The plaintiff argued that the corporation was aware of the hazardous condition but failed to address it. The defendant, on the other hand, claimed that it had exercised reasonable care and that the accident was unforeseeable. The court examined evidence regarding the visibility of the hazard, the corporation's knowledge of the condition, and the steps taken to prevent accidents.
The District Court found that the corporation had indeed been negligent. The court reasoned that the corporation had knowledge of the slippery condition due to algae growth on the pavement and failed to take appropriate action to rectify the issue. The court held that the corporation's inaction amounted to a breach of its duty of care, leading to the plaintiff's injuries. Consequently, the court awarded damages to the plaintiff, reflecting the corporation's liability for the negligence.
Orders
Orders of the court
See orders at [25]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi