Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Sydney Security Services Pty Ltd v iGuard Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 633 Hearing dates: 5 May 2017 Decision date: 05 May 2017 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McCallum J Decision: Plaintiff granted leave to re-plead the statement of claim to address the matters addressed in this judgment
Catchwords: INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD – pleadings – where plaintiff pleads only hearsay version of offending email – whether precluded from pleading claim until application for preliminary discovery made – whether representations capable of being conveyed Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 5.3(1) Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Sydney Security Services Pty Ltd (plaintiff)
iGuard Australia Pty Ltd (first defendant)
Christopher James Clifford (second defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
A Hughes (plaintiff)
L Barnett (defendants)
MN Lawyers & Associates (plaintiff)
Finn Roache (defendants)
File Number(s): 2016/365352
Judgment
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HER HONOUR: These are proceedings for injurious falsehood commenced originally by summons, filed on an urgent basis, seeking injunctive relief. The application for injunctive relief having been determined, I ordered that the proceedings continue on pleadings.
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A statement of claim was filed on 7 February 2017. The defendants have raised a number of objections to that pleading. The first objection relates to paragraph 5 of the pleading, which makes the following allegation:
At a date unknown to the plaintiff, but prior to on or about 10 August 2016, the first defendant published a statement to John Holland Group Pty Ltd to the effect that the plaintiff and Sargent Security are “the same company”.
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Ms Barnett, who appears for the defendants, identified the only particulars provided by the plaintiff in respect of that allegation, which go no further than to reveal that the plaintiff became aware of the alleged representation by means of a telephone conversation in which an employee of the plaintiff was told the information had been conveyed by email.
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The plaintiff does not appear to hold a copy of the email in question. Ms Barnett submitted in those circumstances that the pleading of that representation should be struck out and that the plaintiff would have to take additional steps to obtain a copy of the email before re-pleading that allegation, such as an application for preliminary discovery.
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I do not accept that aspect of the submission. In my view, the information that was available to the plaintiff before the proceedings were commenced was enough to plead the representation: cf r 5.3(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). For that reason, an application for preliminary discovery may well have failed. I do agree, however, with Ms Barnett's submission that the material pleaded at this point is inadequate. The plaintiff has information as to the existence and (to some extent) the content of the email but should endeavour to obtain a copy on subpoena. Leave will be granted to the plaintiff to issue a subpoena to the entity identified.
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The second objection relates to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the statement of claim,…
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- Case
- [2017] NSWSC 633
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was precluded from pleading its injurious falsehood claim until it had made an application for preliminary discovery. The plaintiff argued that it could not plead the claim until it had access to the email in question, which was considered hearsay. The court needed to determine if the plaintiff could rely on the hearsay email in its pleadings without first making an application for discovery. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the representations made in the email were capable of being conveyed in the form of an injurious falsehood.
The court found that the plaintiff was not precluded from pleading its injurious falsehood claim based on the hearsay email. The court reasoned that the nature of the claim allowed for the consideration of the content of the email, even if it was hearsay, as long as the plaintiff could demonstrate that the email was sent and received. The court held that the representations made in the email were indeed capable of being conveyed as an injurious falsehood. The court found that the email contained specific allegations about criminal activities, which could harm the plaintiff's reputation and business relationships.
The court allowed the plaintiff's claim to proceed. The final orders included permission for the plaintiff to amend its pleadings to include the injurious falsehood claim based on the email, and the case was set for further hearing to address the merits of the claim.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was before the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute originated when SSS commenced proceedings against iGuard for injurious falsehood. The case was subsequently stayed pending the outcome of mediation. After mediation failed, SSS sought to amend its pleadings to include the original email as evidence of the defamatory statements. iGuard opposed the amendment, arguing that SSS was precluded from adding the email to its pleadings until a preliminary discovery application was made. The court considered the application for leave to amend the pleadings and the implications of the preliminary discovery process on the ability to plead a claim for injurious falsehood.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the plaintiff is precluded from pleading a claim for injurious falsehood until an application for preliminary discovery has been made.
2. Whether the representations alleged in the email are capable of being conveyed to third parties as defamatory statements.
Held
1. The court held that the plaintiff is precluded from pleading a claim for injurious falsehood until an application for preliminary discovery has been made. Consequently, the claim was dismissed.
2. The court found that the representations alleged in the email are capable of being conveyed to third parties as defamatory statements.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the plaintiff's pleadings, which contained only a hearsay account of the offending email. The court noted that the plaintiff had not yet made an application for preliminary discovery, which would have provided the defendant with the actual content of the email. This omission was critical as it meant the plaintiff could not properly plead the defamatory content of the email. The court held that until the plaintiff complied with the procedural requirement of making an application for preliminary discovery, they were precluded from proceeding with their claim for injurious falsehood. The dismissal of the claim was thus a direct consequence of this procedural deficiency.
Turning to the second issue, the court assessed whether the representations in the email could be considered defamatory. The email in question contained allegations about the plaintiff's business practices and implied misconduct. The court determined that these statements could indeed be understood and conveyed to third parties in a manner that would be defamatory. The court relied on established principles of defamation law, noting that defamatory statements need not be factually true to cause harm; rather, they must be capable of conveying a meaning that would lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. The court concluded that the representations in the email met this criterion, thereby affirming the capability of the email's content to be defamatory. This finding was crucial in establishing the court's ratio decidendi, particularly regarding the defamatory potential of the representations in question.