Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Sydney Security Services Pty Ltd v iGuard Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1808 Hearing dates: 7 December 2016 Decision date: 07 December 2016 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McCallum J Decision: Plaintiff’s application for injunctive relief granted; defendants restrained from publishing specified imputations; defendants restrained from deleting, altering or modifying any system recording publication of specified imputations
Catchwords: INJUNCTIONS – application for interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of allegedly defamatory material – caution to be exercised – public interest in free speech – weight to be given to that consideration where alleged publisher denies publishing any matter defamatory of the plaintiff Legislation Cited: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 25 Cases Cited: ABC v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Sydney Security Services Pty Ltd (plaintiff)
iGuard Australia Pty Ltd (first defendant)
Christopher James Clifford (second defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
A Hughes (plaintiff) (ex parte)
MN Lawyers & Associates Pty Ltd
File Number(s): 2016/36532
Judgment
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HER HONOUR: By summons filed 6 December 2016, Sydney Security Services Pty Ltd seeks urgent interlocutory relief on an ex parte basis to restrain the defendants, iGuard Australia Pty Ltd and Mr Christopher Clifford, from publishing allegedly defamatory material concerning the governance of Sydney Security.
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Dr Hughes, who appears for Sydney Security, noted a preliminary matter by way of disclosure. Section 9 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) provides that a corporation has no cause of action unless it was an “excluded corporation” at the time of publication of the matter complained of. Sydney Security is probably an excluded corporation; it certainly had fewer than ten employees at that time. However, the company, which carries on the business of providing security services, also retains security personnel on a contract basis as needed. Dr Hughes disclosed that, if such personnel are to be included within the count of persons the corporation “employs”, it would be necessary to check records to be confident that number is not greater than nine. That issue is addressed further below.
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The circumstances in which the application is brought may be summarised as follows. The sole director of the plaintiff company is Ms Anwar Abud. Ms Abud was formerly married to Mr Ben Roberts. As I understand the evidence, they are not yet divorced but their relationship has come to an end and final property orders have been made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Prior to their separation, Mr Roberts conducted a different security business through a company known as Sargent Security (Aust) Pty Ltd, which is now in liquidation.
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The defendant iGuard conducts a security business in competition with the business currently conducted by the plaintiff company. The second defendant, Mr Clifford, was formerly an employee of the plaintiff and a shareholder in that company; he now works for iGuard.
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Ms Abud first developed concerns that the plaintiff company was being defamed when, in August of this year, her office received a phone call…
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- Case
- [2016] NSWSC 1808
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the plaintiff had made out a strong case on the merits for an interlocutory injunction and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. The court also needed to consider the public interest in free speech, particularly as the defendant denied that it had published any defamatory material. The court was required to weigh the potential harm to the plaintiff's reputation against the public interest in open discussion and debate. The court considered the strength of the plaintiff's case, the likelihood of success at trial, the degree of irreparable harm that would result from the publication of the material, and the harm that would result from the grant or refusal of the injunction.
The court held that the plaintiff had not made out a strong case on the merits for an interlocutory injunction. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the statements were defamatory or that they had caused any harm to its reputation or business. The court also found that the public interest in free speech weighed heavily in favour of the defendant. The court held that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction and that the plaintiff had not satisfied the threshold for an interlocutory injunction. The court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the plaintiff's application. The defendant was not required to remove any previously published content.
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