Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Sydney Harbour Federation Trust v McCluskey [2012] NSWSC 253 Hearing dates: 12 December 2011 Decision date: 23 March 2012 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Harrison J Decision: 1. DECLARE that by notice of termination dated 24 June 2010 Sydney Harbour Federation Trust validly terminated the Residential Tenancy Agreement made between it and the second defendant in respect of the premises known as Townhouse 2, Macquarie Lightstation, Old South Head Road, Vaucluse.
2. ORDER that the second defendant give vacant possession of the premises to Sydney Harbour Federation Trust.
3. GRANT leave to Sydney Harbour Federation Trust forthwith to apply for a writ of possession in respect of the premises.
4. ORDER that execution upon any writ of possession issued to Sydney Harbour Federation Trust be stayed up to and including midnight on 30 April 2012 upon condition that the second defendant continues to pay rent to Sydney Harbour Federation Trust in accordance with the Residential Tenancy Agreement and otherwise continues to observe and to comply with its terms.
5. GRANT liberty to apply in respect of the meaning or enforcement of these orders on two days' notice.
Catchwords: LANDLORD AND TENANT - termination of tenancy - whether plaintiff validly terminated a Residential Tenancy Agreement made between it and the second defendant - where the lease incorporated by reference the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 - where s 71 Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001 (Cth) excluded the application of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 -- whether s 71 resulted in the acquisition of property for the purposes of s 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution - no acquisition of property - whether lease otherwise validly terminated -lease validly terminated in accordance with the general law Legislation Cited: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970
Lands Acquisition Act 1989
Residential Tenancies Act 1987
Residential Tenancies Act 2010
Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001Cases Cited: Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey; Santos Ltd v Chaffey [2007] HCA 34; (2007) 231 CLR 651
Commonwealth v WMC Resources Ltd [1998] HCA 8; (1998) 194 CLR 1
Dockrill v Cavanagh (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 78
Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1994] HCA 6; (1994) 179 CLR 297
Minister for State for the Army v Dalziel [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 CLR 261
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [1994] HCA 9; (1994) 179 CLR 155
Queens Club Garden Estates Ltd v Bignell [1924] 1 KB 117
Quest Rose Hill Pty Ltd v White [2010] NSWSC 939
Roads and Traffic Authority v Swain (1997) 41 NSWLR 452
Scicluna v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2008] NSWCA 277; (2008) 72 NSWLR 674Category: Principal judgment Parties: Sydney Harbour Federation Trust (Plaintiff)
Lena Lahood-Seghabi (Second Defendant)Representation: B Walker SC with M W Sneddon (Plaintiff)
D P Robinson SC with P M Lane (Second Defendant)
Robinson Legal (Plaintiff)
Cunningham…
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- Case
- [2012] NSWSC 253
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the exclusion of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 by section 71 of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001 (Cth) resulted in an acquisition of property under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. It held that there was no acquisition of property because the second defendant's asserted right to maintain possession of the property until an order is made by the Tribunal under section 64(2)(c)(ii) of the 1987 Act never existed. Consequently, section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution was not engaged. The court reasoned that the second defendant's so-called rights were susceptible to statutory alteration, modification, or extinguishment and their modification or extinguishment did not effect an acquisition. Therefore, the lease was one that could be terminated in accordance with the general law.
In light of the court's reasoning, the plaintiff was entitled to validly terminate the lease under the general law. The court's decision was based on the premise that the exclusion of state laws by section 71 of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001 (Cth) did not result in the acquisition of property under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The second defendant's rights, which were derived from the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (NSW), were not akin to the leasehold interest considered in Minister for State for the Army v Dalziel [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 CLR 261. Instead, these rights had no existence apart from statute and were susceptible to statutory alteration, modification, or extinguishment. As a result, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the lease in accordance with the general law.
The final orders of the court were that the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the lease in accordance with the general law and that the second defendant's claims were dismissed. The court also held that there was no acquisition of property under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution and that the exclusion of state laws by section 71 of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act 2001 (Cth) did not engage section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In any event, in so far as the lease is concerned, s 71 of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust Act excludes, and is deemed always to have excluded, the application of all State laws respecting tenancy, including the 1987 Act. Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution is therefore not engaged since the second defendant's asserted right to maintain possession of the property until an order is made by the Tribunal under s 64(2)(c)(ii) of the 1987 Act never existed. There was never any thing, and certainly no property, that has been acquired by operation of s 71. Accordingly, the lease is one that can be terminated in accordance with the general law. Quite apart from this line of reasoning, in my view the second defendant's so-called right to have the Tribunal deal with the Trust's application to make an order terminating the agreement under s 64(2)(c)(ii) of the 1987 Act is not a right of property which can only be acquired on just terms within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution (see Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [1994] HCA 9; (1994) 179 CLR 155) on the one hand, and there would not in any event appear to have been an acquisition of it (see Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey; Santos Ltd v Chaffey [2007] HCA 34; (2007) 231 CLR 651) on the other hand. The second defendant's "right" was in this case of its very nature susceptible of statutory alteration, modification or extinguishment and its alteration, modification or extinguishment here does not effect an acquisition. Moreover, all of the second defendant's other nominated rights, possessed by her as a tenant whose tenancy was subject to the 1987 Act, are in my view of the same character. Specifically these were identified as a right to contest any increase in rent in ss 45 to 49, a right to apply for recognition of another person to have the agreement vested in him or her in s 35, and a right to limit the landlord to a period of 30 days within which to apply to the Tribunal concerning a breach in s 16. These rights, all said to arise from the provisions of the 1987 Act, are in my opinion, and by way of example, far removed from the leasehold interest that was the subject of the alleged acquisition of property that attracted the operation of s 51(xxxi) with which the High Court was concerned in Minister for State for the Army v Dalziel [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 CLR 261. Unlike the extinguishment of the right to bring an action for damages considered in Georgiadis, upon which the second defendant relies, the issue at stake in this case is the modification or extinguishment of so-called rights of property that have no existence apart from statute. In this respect I observe that the Trust submitted, and I accept, that the potentially adjustable nature of a lease granted by the Commonwealth in respect of a Commonwealth place is "obvious". As Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said in Georgiadis at 305-306: In Commonwealth v WMC Resources Ltd [1998] HCA 8; (1998) 194 CLR 1, Brennan CJ dealt with this passage at [16] and [17] as follows: