SWDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SWDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1636

MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of Federal Magistrates Court – where allegation of apprehended bias on behalf of Refugee Review Tribunal member – Held: decision of Federal Magistrates Court affirmed – appeal dismissed.

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 cited
NADH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 214 ALR 264 considered
Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211 cited
Steadman-Byrne v Amjad [2007] EWCA Civ 625 cited

SWDB, SWGB, SWHB, SWJB AND SWFB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

SAD 90 OF 2007

BRANSON J
30 OCTOBER 2007
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 90 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SWDB, SWGB, SWHB, SWJB AND SWFB
Appellants

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 OCTOBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 90 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SWDB, SWGB, SWHB, SWJB AND SWFB
Appellants

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

30 OCTOBER 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellants are a husband and wife, their two under‑age children and the sister of the husband.  The adult appellants arrived in Australia from Albania in September 2000 and lodged applications for protection visas in November 2000.  The basis of their claim as initially made was that the husband’s sister had been engaged to a man whom she was later told was organising prostitutes in Italy.  She broke off the engagement thus giving rise to a blood feud between her family and that of her ex-fiancé.  I interpolate that at the time of the Tribunal hearing with which this appeal is concerned, the appellants’ claim was broadened to include claims that the husband’s sister had been raped by her ex-fiancé and that the family had difficulty in dealing with corrupt officials in Albania in relation to land owned by them.

  2. On 6 May 2002 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellants protection visas.  Two separate decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) affirming the decision of the delegate have been set aside by consent orders of this Court.  On 7 May 2007 Lindsay FM made an order dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review of a third decision of the Tribunal affirming…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1636
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SWDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the appeal concerns the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court, constituted by Lindsay FM, which found that the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision dated 19 December 2005 was not affected by jurisdictional error on the basis of an apprehension of bias. The sole ground of appeal is the assertion that the Federal Magistrate erred in this finding. The appellants argue that the Tribunal member's conduct during the hearing created a reasonable apprehension of bias, which should have led to the Tribunal's decision being quashed.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the conduct of the Tribunal member during the hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, potentially invalidating the decision. The court was required to review the conduct of the Tribunal member against the established legal test for apprehended bias, as outlined in NADH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs. This test requires determining if a fair-minded and informed observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not have brought an impartial mind to bear on the decision.

Upon reviewing the evidence, including the audio tapes and transcript of the Tribunal hearing, the court found that the Federal Magistrate had correctly applied the test for apprehended bias as articulated by Allsop J. The court held that while the Tribunal member's conduct was critical, it did not reach the threshold of creating a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court was not persuaded that the Tribunal member's actions demonstrated a predisposition towards a particular outcome or an unwillingness to be persuaded by the evidence presented. Consequently, the court upheld the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court and dismissed the appeal.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court found no error in the Federal Magistrate's judgment and affirmed that the Tribunal's decision was not tainted by apprehended bias.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
This appeal is from the judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court constituted by Lindsay FM. The only ground of appeal is:‘The Learned Special [sic] Magistrate was in error in finding that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 19 December 2005 … were [sic] not affected by jurisdictional error on the basis of an apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal.’REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The reasons for judgment of the learned Federal Magistrate record that his Honour read a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal and also listened to an audio tape of the entire hearing. His Honour, as the appellants accept, correctly identified the test for apprehended bias by reference to the reasons for judgment of Allsop J, with whom Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreed, in NADH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 214 ALR 264. The critical passages from the reasons for judgment of Allsop J are set out in [9] below. As those passages make clear, the test for present purposes is whether the relevant circumstances are such that a fair-minded and informed person might reasonably apprehend that the decision‑maker might not have brought an impartial mind to bear on the decision. At various points in his reasons for judgment the Federal Magistrate asked himself questions in terms that, as the appellants submit, suggest that he departed from the proper test. For example, at one point his Honour asked:‘At the end of the hearing with [sc. would] the fair-minded observer think that the applicant was before a Tribunal whose mind was open to persuasion?’At another he observed:‘I am not left with a sense that the fair-minded lay observer would take from these passages a view that the Tribunal’s mind was not open to persuasion.’ After carefully reviewing the manner in which the Tribunal member conducted the hearing, the Federal Magistrate, while critical of the Tribunal member, concluded that her conduct did not give rise ‘to the possibility of apprehended bias’.NATURE OF THE APPEAL An appeal to this Court from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court is authorised by s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It is an appeal by way of rehearing on the evidence adduced before the Federal Magistrate (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507). In the circumstances it is appropriate for me to review that evidence which includes both the audio tapes of the Tribunal hearing and the transcript of that hearing. Having done so, I should set aside the judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court only if persuaded that his Honour’s conclusion is wrong (Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211 at [46]). However, it is not necessary for me to be satisfied that his Honour failed to apply the proper test. If, after giving appropriate weight to the view of the Federal Magistrate, I were persuaded that the conduct of the Tribunal member gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, the appeal would succeed; I would have identified error in the judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

However, for the reasons set out below, I am not so persuaded. In my view the Federal Magistrate correctly dismissed the application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal.CONSIDERATIONThe Law The critical passages from the reasons for judgment of Allsop J in NADH v MIMIA referred to above are the following:‘The general test for apprehended bias is whether the relevant circumstances are such that a fair-minded and informed person might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring or have brought an impartial mind to bear on the decision …To identify the obligation of the tribunal, and the content of the necessary apprehension in the circumstances here, a number of matters need be recognised. First, while it is necessary to demonstrate that the circumstances are such as would give rise to the relevant apprehension, the apprehension itself is not as to the fact or likelihood of a lack of impartiality, but of a possibility (real and not remote) thereof …Secondly, the identity, nature and function of the decision-maker are important influences on the content of the requirement to conduct the relevant task with the observance of procedural fairness by not being tainted by the appearance of disqualifying bias …Third, the place of a decision-maker such as the tribunal here should be recognised as different from a judge in open court … The tribunal does not administer public justice. The elements which affect the public confidence in the adjudication of disputes by an independent and impartial arm of government (in the broad sense) and which may be seen to inform what might be said to be freestanding norms of conduct and behaviour by judges conducting public hearings are not necessarily as easily transposable as strict obligations of administrative decision-makers acting in private. The tribunal here must investigate the facts for itself unaided by counsel presenting the parties’ cases, to the degree and extent it thinks appropriate. The tribunal which has to reach a state of satisfaction may want to test and probe a recounted history. It may have particular matters troubling it for resolution, which require questioning and expressions of doubt which are entirely appropriate, but which if undertaken or said by a judge in open court in adversary litigation might give rise to an apprehension of a lack of impartiality.At least in the absence of the identification of some prejudice or interest in the tribunal, for a complaint of apprehended bias based on the conduct of the tribunal in its procedure and the dealing with material before it in its reasons to be meaningful, it must carry with it an assertion of the apprehension of a possibility of predisposition. That is, the predisposition of the tribunal towards a result, other than a result reached by an evaluation of the material before it in a fair way with a mind that was open to persuasion in favour of the person in question. Unless that be demonstrated, it is hard to see how a decision-maker has failed to conform to standards of procedural fairness. Such an approach accords with the need for neutral and fair decision-making, without imposing on decision-makers in an administrative context the burden of behaving at all times as would a judge in public in the deployment of judicial power.’ (citations omitted)