Swanson v Northern Territory of Australia

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Swanson v Northern Territory of Australia [2007] NTCA 4

PARTIES:SWANSON, KENNETH DON

v

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:AP 12 of 2006

DELIVERED:  25 JULY 2007

HEARING DATES:  4, 5 JUNE 2007

JUDGMENT OF:  ANGEL, MILDREN and SOUTHWOOD JJ

APPEAL FROM: MARTIN (BR) CJ delivered 16 NOVEMBER 2006 [2006] NTSC 88

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:M Doyle

Respondent:  J Tippett QC

Solicitors:

Appellant:Povey Stirk

Respondent:  Collier Deane

Judgment category classification:    C

Judgment ID Number:  Ang200708

Number of pages:  13

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Swanson v Northern Territory of Australia [2007] NTCA 4

No. AP 12 of 2006

BETWEEN:

KENNETH DON SWANSON

Appellant

AND:

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

CORAM:     ANGEL, MILDREN and SOUTHWOOD JJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 25 July 2007)

ANGEL J:

  1. This appeal should be dismissed with costs for the reasons given by Mildren J.

  2. As to Ground 2 of the appeal, the question was whether reasonable administrative action taken by the school’s Acting Principal in connection with the appellant’s employment caused the appellant’s injuries.  Whilst this was ultimately a question of fact, as Lord Hoffman said in Environmental Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22 at 31 E–H:

    “… one cannot give a commonsense answer to a question of causation for the purposes of attributing responsibility under some rule without knowing the purpose and scope of the rule … 

    Before answering questions about causation, it is therefore first necessary to identify the scope of the relevant rule.  This is not a question of commonsense fact; it is a question of law”.

  3. The relevant rule in the present case is the definition of “injury” in s 3(1) of the Act.  The case involved a question of statutory construction, having regard to the policy of the Act.  Was the Acting Principal’s conduct reasonable administrative action in connection with the appellant’s employment?  Plainly it was.  Procedural fairness required that as a matter of reasonable administrative practice any allegation of misconduct by a teacher with respect to students should be brought to the attention of the teacher concerned to enable that teacher to respond.  Clearly any such action could cause some degree of stress and the statutory immunity of an employer from responsibility for any adverse consequences is intended to encourage fairness and frankness in the workplace and discourage suppression, where grievances might fester unresolved.

  4. The immediate cause of the appellant’s injury was and was found to be the relaying of the students’ complaints to the appellant by the Acting Principal of the school.  It was the fact of relaying the complaints not the mode of relaying them that caused the appellant’s injury.  The complaints were not relayed to the appellant by anyone else or by any other means.  The Acting Principal’s action in relaying the complaints was rightly conceded at the trial and before this…

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Details
Case
[2007] NTCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Swanson v Northern Territory of Australia involved the appellant, a high school teacher, who sought compensation under the Work Health Act for an injury he claimed was work-related. The appellant argued that the injury, an adjustment disorder with anxiety, stemmed from a meeting with the Assistant Principal regarding allegations of misconduct. The respondent, the Northern Territory of Australia, maintained that the injury was a result of reasonable administrative action taken in connection with the appellant's employment, thus not compensable under the Act. The appeal was brought before the Supreme Court, which was tasked with determining whether the Chief Justice had erred in law by not finding that the Magistrate had failed to afford the appellant natural justice and by upholding the Magistrate's decision that the appellant's injury was not compensable.

The court considered two grounds of appeal. The first ground was that the Chief Justice failed to find that the Magistrate did not provide natural justice to the appellant during the hearing. The second ground was that the Chief Justice erred in law by upholding the Magistrate's finding that the appellant's injury was not compensable as it resulted from the respondent's reasonable administrative action. The court found that the appellant had not provided any evidence to support an alternative cause for his injury beyond the meeting with the Assistant Principal. Consequently, the court concluded that the Magistrate's findings of fact were not vitiated by any legal error, and therefore, the appeal on both grounds could not succeed.

The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. The reasoning was grounded in the principle that appeals from the Work Health Court to the Supreme Court are limited to questions of law, and factual findings cannot be revisited unless they are legally erroneous. The court found no such legal error in the Magistrate's decision and thus upheld the dismissal of the appeal. The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of Martin (BR) CJ who dismissed an appeal by the appellant worker from a decision of the Work Health Court. The grounds of appeal to this Court are, first that the Chief Justice erred in law in failing to find that the learned Magistrate had failed to afford the appellant natural justice in the conduct of the hearing, and second, that his Honour erred in law in upholding the learned Magistrate’s finding that the appellant’s injury was not a compensable injury under the Work Health Act because the injury resulted from the respondent’s reasonable administrative action taken in connection with the worker’s employment (see the definition of “injury” in s 3(1) of the Act).Background The appellant is a fully qualified high school teacher and from January 1986 was employed as such by the respondent. In February 2001, he was employed at a high school in Alice Springs. Information was received by staff at the school concerning an allegation of misconduct by the appellant in the course of his duties as a teacher. On 27 February 2001 the Assistant Principal, Mr Peter Swan, spoke with the appellant concerning the allegations. The allegations in the meantime had been put into writing. At the time of this meeting the Principal was absent from the school and it is not in contest that Mr Swan was acting within the scope of his duties as the Assistant Principal. Mr Swan told the appellant about the nature of the allegations which had been made. The allegation was essentially that the appellant, who was teaching dancing at the time, touched the girls on the shoulder and was trying to look down their tops. Mr Swan who had had the benefit of receiving information from another teacher who had spoken to the girls advised the appellant that he felt that nothing untoward had occurred, but that he should be aware of the nature of the complaints that had been raised and he suggested that the appellant not put himself in a position of compromise with respect to these students in the future. He offered the appellant the opportunity of looking at the letters, but the appellant said that he did not wish to look at them. Mr Swan’s evidence was that the purpose of the meeting was to let the appellant know about the allegations and to suggest that the appellant make sure that he took protective measures in the future. He told the appellant that there would be no enquiry about the matter as there was no basis for one. The appellant said to him, “Thank you for letting me know” and then left the office. Following that conversation the appellant sought medical treatment and was certified unfit for work. The appellant claimed to have suffered a work related injury, namely, an adjustment disorder with anxiety. The appellant sought medical treatment and was certified unfit for work. A claim for compensation pursuant to the Act was accepted by the respondent. Commencing on 27 February 2001 weekly payments were made to the appellant pursuant to the provisions of the Act on the basis of total incapacity.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to ground 2, Mr Doyle submitted that the learned Magistrate erred in not considering whether or not there was another independent cause of the injury to the worker. In his submission, if the mental injury was caused by the fact that a complaint was made by the girls, this was either the true cause of the injury or, alternatively, an independent cause of the injury. In support of this submission, Mr Doyle relied upon the decision of this Court in Rivard v Northern Territory of Australia (1999) 129 NTR 1. In my opinion this ground cannot succeed. To the extent there was psychiatric or other evidence which suggested the possibility of another cause other than the reasonable administrative action of the employer for the worker’s mental injury, it was not supported by any evidence from the worker. On the contrary there was evidence before the learned Magistrate that the true cause of the injury was the result of the meeting which the worker had with the Assistant Principal, Mr Swan, on 27 February 2001. The learned Magistrate noted that the worker stopped work at 10:15 AM on 27 February 2001 and this was the time when, according to the claim form, the injury occurred. This was consistent with the time of the meeting with the Assistant Principal. Moreover the appellant himself had pleaded in both the original Particulars of Claim and in the Amended Particulars of Claim that the injury he suffered was as a result of being informed of the allegations by the Assistant Principal. In the absence of any evidence from the worker as to the existence of some other cause, it was open to the learned Magistrate to find as a fact that the appellant’s injury was the result of reasonable administrative action by the employer. Appeals to the Supreme Court from the Work Health Court are limited to questions of law and it is not open to an appellate court to entertain an appeal based on a finding of fact unless the factual finding can be attacked as an error of law. In the absence of any evidence from the worker on this issue it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate’s findings of fact were vitiated by any legal error.Conclusion In conclusion I would dismiss the appeal with costs. I agree with the Reasons for Decision of Mildren J. The appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established