Swan v Hennessy (Civil Dispute)
[2019] ACAT 79
•23 August 2019
ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
SWAN & ANOR v HENNESSY (Civil Dispute) [2019] ACAT 79
XD 1434/2018
Catchwords: CIVIL DISPUTE – contracts with finance brokers – penalty clauses in contracts – time for settlement of conveyances – Australian Consumer Law and misleading and deceptive conduct – Walton’s estoppel – no tort with a loss
Legislation cited: Australian Consumer Law s 18
Cases cited: Coutts v Walls [2019] ACAT 66
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SAInc [2002] HCA 8
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8
Walton’s Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7
Tribunal: Senior Member A Anforth
Date of Orders: 23 August 2019
Date of Reasons for Decision: 23 August 2019
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) XD 1434/2018
BETWEEN:
TIMOTHY SWAN
First Applicant
JAMIE SWAN
Second Applicant
AND:
BENJAMIN HENNESSY
Respondent
TRIBUNAL: Senior Member A Anforth
DATE: 23 August 2019
ORDER
The Tribunal orders that:
1. The application is dismissed.
………………………………..
Senior Member A Anforth
REASONS FOR DECISION
The procedural history in the Tribunal
1. The applicants lodged a claim with the tribunal on 22 October 2018 against the respondent for the sum of $7,054.89 plus the $156 Tribunal filing fee. The claim set out a detailed chronology of events, with relevant documents annexed. What follows is a partial summary of that content.
2. The applicants are a married couple. Prior to their recent marriage the second applicant, Jamie Swan, owned a 50% share in a house in the ACT with her sister, Hacey Bunn, in which the second applicant lived. The mortgage was in the name of both sisters. After the marriage the first applicant, Timothy Swan, determined to purchase the half share from Hacey Bunn with the result that he and his wife would then own the whole title. Hacey Bunn intended to use the proceeds of the sale to purchase another house in which to live and hence the need to coordinate the timing of the two settlements.
3. Following the marriage, the second applicant changed her name from Bunn to Swan. The applicants decided to change her name on the house title to Swan and to do this at the same time as the conveyance of the purchase of the 50% interest by the first applicant.
4. The contract for the purchase of the 50% interest was drawn up and witnessed by the parties personally without recourse to solicitors or to any standard form agreement. The agreement provided for settlement “on a mutually agreed date.”
5. On 6 June 2018 the first applicant contacted the respondent to raise the loan for his purchase of the 50% interest. The respondent was a minority owner of the Aussie Home Loans, Queanbeyan, finance brokers (Aussie). The first applicant attended the meeting by phone and his father-in-law, Mr Peter Bunn, attended in person with the respondent.
6. It seems that the first applicant and Mr Bunn asked the respondent to ensure that the loan was approved for settlement on or before 14 September 2018. The respondent is said to have given a non-specific assurance that three to four weeks would be enough from when all documents were provided by the applicants. The first applicant said that he provided all the information requested by the respondent by 9 July 2018.
7. During this first meeting the respondent suggested, and the first applicant agreed, to appoint Bevan & Co, solicitors to act for the first applicant. Bevan & Co were the regular solicitors used by the respondent.
8. No written agreement was drawn up between Aussie and the first applicant. If there was such an agreement, neither party referred to it or tendered a copy.
9. The first applicant said that on or shortly before 23 July 2018, Hacey Bunn expressed concern ‘that there were no fixed/finalised arrangements crystallising for the settlement’ of the purchase of her half share of the house. In response to that concern and at Hacey’s request, the first applicant said he drafted an Addendum to the purchase agreement under which he would pay Hacey various specified amounts for each day that passed after 14 September 2018 up to settlement, plus any rent for early occupancy that Hacey Bunn was required to pay to the vendor of the house she was buying
10. Before the first applicant signed the Addendum, he rang the respondent and told the respondent of the proposed Addendum. The respondent is said to have assured the first applicant that settlement would occur by the end of July 2018. On the basis of this assurance the first applicant signed the Addendum.
11. The first applicant asserts that over the remainder of July and in August 2018 there were all manner of holds ups with the preparation of the documents for the loan and the purchase, which were the result of the respondent’s lack of diligence. On 21 August 2018 the first applicant rang the respondent to check on progress and expressed his concerns about the delays. The respondent is said to have given a further assurance that settlement would occur before the end of August.
12. Further problems arose and settlement did not occur at the end of August 2018. On 6 September 2018 the first applicant rang the respondent and reminded him of the penalties in the Addendum and that the crucial date of 14 September 2018 was approaching. The respondent is said to have given a further assurance that the settlement would take place before 14 September 2018.
13. On 14 September 2018 the documents were not ready for settlement. The first applicant rang the respondent who explained the nature of the further delays. The first applicant asserts that he raised the issue of the penalties under the Addendum and the respondent said he would personally pay those costs, but this was to be a private matter between them.
14. The documents were available for signing by the applicants on 20 September, but the applicants were in Sydney on a private matter. Arrangements were made for the documents to be sent to Aussie in the Alexandra office in Sydney. This arrangement misfired and the meeting occurred at the Annandale office of Aussie. At the Annandale office it transpired that not all of the documents required for signing were present.
15. On 22 September 2018 the second applicant was due to fly out to Singapore for a week for work. In anticipation of any further problems arising the second applicant executed a Power of Attorney (POA) in favour of her father, Mr Bunn.
16. On 25 September Mr Bunn met with the respondent at the Queanbeyan office of Aussie. Mr Bunn essentially did a ‘sit in’ and refused to leave until all relevant documents were signed and a settlement date was booked in. He demanded to speak to the manager of agency who then became involved. Amongst other things, the ACT Land Titles Office had rejected the form to change the surname of the second applicant and it would need to be re-executed by the second applicant who was then in Singapore. The respondent is said to have raised the plan of sending the documents to the Australian Embassy in Singapore for the second applicant to sign and return them through the Embassy. This plan did not eventuate. Mr Bunn decided to personally attend the Land Titles Office and rely on the POA. He then returned to Aussie in Queanbeyan to press the issue of a settlement date. Eventually the respondent advised that settlement was booked for 27 September 2018.
17. During the discourse between Mr Bunn and the respondent, it is asserted that Mr Bunn gave the respondent a copy of the Addendum and that the respondent again affirmed his intention to personally pay for any of the penalties arising under the Addendum.
18. That same afternoon the ACT Land Titles Office advised Aussie Queanbeyan that the POA was defective and would have to be re-executed by the second applicant (who was in Singapore). A series of communications ensued between the parties concerning this problem. On the evening of 26 September 2018, the first applicant decided he had no choice but for the second applicant to fly back from Singapore at the respondent’s expense, to sign the documents. He said he put the respondent on notice of this plan. The second applicant was to arrive at Brisbane early on the 28 September 2018. Later the same day the respondent’s manager advised the first applicant that settlement had been booked for 28 September and it was not necessary for the second applicant to return to Australia to sign any documents. By the time the first applicant received this information the second applicant was already in transit.
19. The settlement went ahead on 28 September 2018.
20. On 9 October 2018 the applicants served a letter of demand on the respondent. The demand was composed of the following amounts:
(a) $1,750 for seven days at $250 per day for the period 14-20 September 2018.
(b) $4,000 for eight days at $500 per day for the period 21-28 September 2018.
(c) $1,140 for three weeks rent incurred by the first applicant for the period 28 September 2018 to 19 October 2018.
(d) $119.56 for travel costs to attend Aussie at Queanbeyan and Annandale.
(e) $54.93 for taxis for the second applicant in Singapore and from Brisbane Airport to home.
(f) $6,000 estimated cost of reimbursement to the second applicant’s employer for the early return to Australia and for the estimated cost of the second applicant returning to Singapore in the future, at her own costs, to complete the partly completed training course.
21. On 20 November 2018 the respondent filed a response in which he denied liability and asserted that he was not the proper respondent. The respondent said he required more time to collect statements from various people.
22. On 18 December 2018 directions were made for the parties to file and serve their evidence.
23. On 25 January 2019 the solicitor for the respondent filed an amended response seeking summary dismissal of the application. The response:
(a) raised various issues of alleged defective ‘pleadings’;
(b) denied any contract or other lawful obligation on the part of the respondent;
(c) in the alternative, raised what appear to various instances of the applicant’s failure to protect themselves and to mitigate their losses by failing to take appropriate legal advice; and
(d) asserted part of the delay had been caused by the applicants’ solicitors.
24. On 7 February 2019 the applicants filed a chronology of events and statements by:
(a) Mr Bunn dated February 2019; and
(b) the second applicant dated 5 February 2019.
25. The statements by Mr Bunn and the second applicant repeated the content of the application set out above and annexed corroborating documents.
26. On 8 March 2019 the applicants filed their submissions with 36 annexures.
27. On 15 March 2019 the applicants filed a tender bundle of documents that included:
(a) the applicants’ and respondent’s chronology;
(b) an undated statements by the respondent; and
(c) a range of documents that the applicants proposed to rely upon.
28. In his undated statement the respondent said:
(a) he did not promise that settlement would occur by any particular date;
(b) there were delays in the settlement for various reasons;
(c) he had never seen the Addendum between Hacey and the first applicant until the hearing in the Tribunal;
(d) he had never promised to pay the penalties in the Addendum; and
(e) he was only vaguely aware of the second applicant returning to Australia from Singapore. He was on leave at that time.
29. The matter was heard on 29 March 2019. The first applicant appeared in person with Mr Bunn. Neither the first applicant nor Mr Bunn are lawyers. The second applicant was not present. Mr Willing, solicitor, appeared for the respondent. The respondent was not present.
30. There was discussion about the non-attendance of the second applicant and the respondent and their non-availability for cross-examination. The Tribunal explained the difficulty in assessing the weight to be accorded to the evidence contained in a written statement when the author was not present for cross examination. The parties decided that they wished to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the above, and that they would each take such risk as the non-attendance of the second applicant and the respondent raised in the weight to be attached to their evidence.
31. The Tribunal noted that the claim as filed appeared to be raising a cause of action in contract, but perhaps also one in tort and misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). These issues were discussed with the first applicant.
32. The action in contract was said to arise from the alleged promise by the respondent to personally pay any penalties the applicants incurred under the Addendum. The first applicant made it clear that he was not intending any action against Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd as the employer. The action was against the respondent personally, based on his alleged promise to personally pay any penalties arising under the Addendum. There was general discussion about the elements required for a binding contract.
33. The action in tort was said to arise from the alleged negligent/incompetent manner in which the respondent conducted his part of the transactions.
34. The action in ACL arose from the alleged representations of expertise and efficiency by the respondent, and his assurances concerning his capacity to deliver the loan approval and settlement of the conveyance by 14 September 2018. There was general discussion about the elements required for this cause of action including the need for the applicants to show that those representations were false at the time they were made and that any loss the applicants sustained arose from their reliance upon the representations by the respondent.
35. In light of these causes of action, it was not apparent to the Tribunal why the second applicant was a party to the proceedings. The second applicant was not a party to the loan application, the contract of purchase of the 50% interest in the house or the Addendum with its potential penalties. At best she was a witness.
36. Mr Willing, solicitor, raised concerns about the Tribunal’s involvement in formulating the causes of action for the applicants. The Tribunal explained that the applicants’ voluminous application and statements made their intention sufficiently clear, and the Tribunal’s involvement was only to attempt to put those intentions into a relevant legal framework. The applicants were unrepresented (whether deliberately or otherwise) and this introduced an apparent power imbalance in terms of the parties understanding of the relevant law. The Tribunal’s task was to pursue the truth of what happened and whether that truth gave rise to a right to compensation. It was not the Tribunal’s role to perform the kind of purely adjudicative function of a Magistrate or Judge.
37. By way of illustration only, the Tribunal gave the well-known example of a formal university debate where the topic is ‘Is Santa Claus real?’. The debate has rules concerning what can be said, by whom and when. The adjudicator has minimal involvement in what is said, and scores performances according to a set of rules. It is entirely possible for the team for affirmative to win the debate and for the adjudicator to announce the finding ‘Santa Claus is real.’
38. The Tribunal is not a mere adjudicator in this sense.
39. The Tribunal is intended to provide a form for dispute resolution that is financially, intellectually and emotionally accessible to the ordinary citizen in a timely manner. The disputes that come to the Tribunal are generally for a modest amount (under $25,000) but not all disputes are about money or can be valued in monetary terms. There is no necessary (or even general) correlation between the complexity of the issues of fact and law raised in a dispute and its monetary value.
40. The fees charged by lawyers in the kind of matters that come before the Tribunal is usually out of all proportion to the amount in dispute, and the people who choose to use lawyers are generally high wealth parties (including governments) or people with an intense emotional involvement. The use of lawyers should not be made a de-facto necessity and nor is the potential remuneration of lawyers an important consideration. If these goals are to be achieved, then it becomes necessary for the Tribunal to abandon the adjudicator role and become involved in the big picture and in the details.
41. Mr Willing submitted that there was no contract formed because a finance broker is the agent of the lender institution and not of the borrower. The broker is paid a commission by the lender and not by the borrower. There is therefore no consideration in the contractual sense flowing from the borrower to the broker.
42. Mr Willing denied that there was any promise by the respondent, expressly or implicitly, to have the loan approved by any particular date. He further submitted that even if the respondent did make some representation about dates that it was not a promise and it was not something the applicants relied upon and altered their position to their detriment.
43. The latter point was put to the first applicant who said that if he had known that the respondent was not taking the time constraint seriously, he would have escalated his grievance to a higher level in Aussie. The Tribunal pointed out that the first applicant had in fact taken this escalation action anyway. The first applicant then said that he may not have persevered with the respondent but might have gone to another broker.
44. The first applicant gave evidence under affirmation. He said he was the author of the content of the application filed in the proceedings and he adopted its contents as being true and correct as it stood.
45. In cross examination he said that the Addendum was drafted by Mr Bunn and he did not seek or obtain any legal advice about the Addendum. In particular, the first applicant did not tell the solicitors acting for him in the conveyance (Bevan & Co) about the Addendum.
46. The first applicant said that he told the respondent about the Addendum by phone in late July but did not give the respondent a copy (electronic or hard copy). The first applicant agreed with the proposition that at no time did he refer to the Addendum in any email or other correspondence with the respondent. The first respondent said that in his haste he may have forgotten to raise the issue of the Addendum in those emails.
47. The first applicant was asked whether he was aware that some of the delay was caused by his own solicitors. He said he was not so aware at the time.
48. The first applicant asserted that he had personally spoken with the respondent on 10 September and received an assurance that settlement of the purchase would occur by 14 September 2018. Mr Willing took the first applicant to an email of 11 September 2018 from the first applicant to the respondent which made no mention of settlement expected on 14 September 2018 and contained statements that suggested settlement about a week after that date. Mr Willing took the first applicant to an email from the first applicant to the respondent on 14 September 2018 which also made no reference to settlement expected to occur on that day and indicated an expectation that it would occur the following week.
49. The first applicant was questioned on how the penalty rates in the Addendum had been arrived at. He said that Mr Bunn had drafted the document and inserted these rates. The first applicant had not personally turned his mind to their appropriateness.
50. The first applicant was asked about any actual losses suffered by Hacey. He said he did not know. At the time he entered the Addendum and up to his settlement on 28 September 2018 he had been unaware of the date for Hacey’s settlement and any potential penalties she faced.
51. The first applicant said that only $1,000 had been paid to Hacey under the Addendum “and we came to agreement …we would wait until this matter was settled before the final costs are sought by her…”
52. Mr Bunn gave evidence under affirmation and adopted his statement filed in the proceedings.
53. Mr Bunn said that he was a retired loans officer with a bank and is the father of the second applicant and of Hacey.
54. Mr Bunn conducted most the negotiations and communications with the respondent on behalf of the applicants. He was the directing mind in dealing with the execution of documents in the week prior to settlement, and in having he second applicant return from Singapore.
55. Mr Bunn said he drew up the Addendum to ensure that Hacey would not be out of pocket if the first applicant was unable to settle on time. He said that Hacey was purchasing a unit from her employer and was, or had, moved into occupation prior to settlement. Mr Bunn agreed that he had not actually seen Hacey’s agreement with her employer and did not know the specifics of any potential penalties she faced under that agreement for a late settlement, although he assumed that Hacey would have to pay an occupation fee. He was asked whether this state of knowledge formed the basis on which he drafted the Addendum. He said it was.
56. During the lunch break it seems that Mr Bunn personally rang the respondent to check on the reason for his non-attendance. At the resumption of the hearing Mr Willing took strong exception to this action and asked that Mr Bunn be removed from any further role as a representative for the applicants. By this time the evidence was complete, and the Tribunal declined Mr Willing’s request.
57. The Tribunal then turned to submissions and informed the parties:
(a) the evidence of the respondent as it stood did not deny that he had been told about the Addendum consistent with the first applicant’s evidence, the respondent only denied that he made any promises to have settlement done by a particular date. Given the respondent was not present for cross examination there seemed no basis upon which to reject the first applicant’s on this point; and
(b) there was no evidence of Hacey’s agreement, any penalty clauses in it or her losses. She was not called to give that evidence and it could not be simply assumed that they existed or existed in any particular form.
58. At the end of the hearing it was agreed that the liability issue would be reserved for hearing and the matter may be relisted for further hearing on the quantum of the applicants’ losses, depending on the outcome of the liability issue. Orders were made allowing the parties to file and serve final submissions.
59. On 6 May 2019 the applicants filed their final submissions in which they asserted:
(a) the applicants were prejudiced by the failure of the respondent to appear at the hearing and make himself available for cross examination;
(b) the respondent’s statement was unsigned and undated and should be disregarded; and
(c) the content of the respondent’s statement was vague as were the submissions made on the respondent’s behalf by his solicitor.
60. On 21 May 2019 the respondent filed his final submissions. In this submission the respondent:
(a) denied any knowledge of the Addendum until the hearing in the Tribunal;
(b) asserted that the application was deficiently pleaded to constitute a claim in tort or under the ACL;
(c) asserted a denial of procedural fairness in relation to the construction of the claim as one under the ACL;
(d) the applicants had consciously determined not to seek legal advice. In these circumstances the Tribunal should “exercise caution in filling gaps in that party’s arguments which could have been rectified by that advice”;
(e) there is no evidence of the usual length of time for settlements of the present kind;
(f) part of the delays were caused by the applicants;
(g) the respondent discharged any duty of care he owed to the applicants;
(h) there was no contract at law between the applicants and the respondent concerning the alleged promise to pay the penalties in the Addendum. The respondent did not know of the Addendum and even if he did there was no offer, acceptance or consideration necessary to constitute a contract at law;
(i) no Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn from the respondent’s failure to appear at the hearing, any more so than an inference should be drawn from the failure of either the respondent or second applicant to appear;
(j) there was no evidence to justify the amount of the penalties in the Addendum or that any loss of that kind had in fact occurred;
(k) there was no representation by the respondent in the nature of a promise to settle before 14 September 2018 and hence no misleading or deceptive representation of that kind;
(l) the applicants only assert the first such promise by the respondent on or after 14 September 2018, which cannot possibly be taken as a promise to settle on that same date; and
(m) the failure to settle on 14 September 2018 arose from various causes some of which were beyond the respondent’s control.
Consideration of the issues
61. In the present case it seems that no formal agreement between the first applicant and Aussie Home Loans was ever drawn up. There is some doubt about the nature of the relationship between a borrower and a finance broker and whether it does constitute a contract at law.
62. Assuming without deciding that the agreement between the first applicant and Aussie Home Loan was a contract at law for brokering services, then the contract was with the company, Aussie Home Loans, and not with the first respondent personally.
63. The first respondent explicitly denied any intention to bring the claim against the company and insisted that the claim lay against the respondent personally based on his alleged oral promise to personally pay any penalties incurred under the Addendum.
64. The Tribunal is satisfied that the matter of the Addendum was raised with the respondent in the June meeting, but is not satisfied that the respondent made any promise or commitment to pay any penalties referred to in the Addendum, or if it were made, that it was made in a way that was seriously intended. The absence of any reference to that promise in any of the voluminous later correspondence between the applicants and the respondent and the tone and content of that later communications is inconsistent with the first applicant’s now professed belief that there was a binding agreement on the Addendum issue.
65. Even if the respondent did make such a promise, it could not give rise to a contract in law between him and the first applicant because:
(a) there was no consideration passing from the first applicant to the respondent for that promise;
(b) the respondent was not a party to the contract to which the Addendum formed a variation; and
(c) the respondent did not have control over the events necessary to be able to honour the alleged promise to settle on or before 14 September 2018. The timing of the settlement was dependant on the efficiency of a range of other stakeholders, including the first respondent’s own solicitors.
66. These findings are enough to dispose of the claim in contract, but there are other considerations that mitigate against finding a contract concerning the Addendum:
(a) The relationship between the parties to the Addendum was a close family one, and the first applicant said he only decided to enter the Addendum to console his sister-in-law. The Addendum was drawn up by Mr Bunn, also a close family member and none of them took any independent advice. These factors point to the Addendum being in the character of a private and domestic arrangement not intended to create binding and enforceable rights and obligations.
(b) The alleged promise to settle by 14 September 2018 was the kind of promise the respondent could not seriously make because it depended on the participation of other stakeholders. The first respondent and Mr Bunn would, or should, have known this, and should have taken the respondent’s promise (if made) to be aspirational only.
(c) The clauses in the Addendum were ‘penalty clauses’ in the contractual sense and not a genuine pre-estimate of expected economic loss. As such these terms would not be binding on the first applicant and so no issue of indemnity arises.
(d) The first applicant has not in fact paid the penalties to Ms Bunn and it seems that they have an agreement that the penalties will not be paid until the outcome of this case. The inference is that Ms Bunn will not seek to enforce the penalties against the first applicant (even if they were lawful) but would do so if the money was to come from the respondent. This is consistent with obvious domestic and aspirational nature of the Addendum.
67. Allied to the action in contract is the possibility of the alleged promise raising a ‘promissory estoppel’ in the sense of Walton’s Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7. This cause of action requires that the respondent have made a clear promise of future action, intended to be taken seriously by the first applicant and relied upon by the first applicant, who then altered his position to his detriment.
68. In the present case the relevant promise is to settle the purchase by 14 September and in default thereof, to personally pay whatever penalties are payable under the Addendum:
(a) The Addendum was drawn up and executed two weeks before the meeting with the respondent on 6 June. It was not responsive to anything said by the respondent. It was already the intended course of action by the first applicant and not one adopted in response to the respondent’s promises.
(b) The alleged promise (if made) was not one that could or should have been taken seriously by the first applicant;
(c) Even if the exchange of the Addendum between the first applicant and Ms Bunn occurred after the meeting of 6 June, it was still not an action motivated by any promise by the respondent; and
(d) The first applicant has not sustained any loss as a result of the respondent’s alleged promises.
69. There is no cause of action in estoppel.
70. For same reasons given above there is no cause of action in misleading and deceptive conduct under the ACL.
71. The action in tort hinges on the allegation that the respondent was negligent in the way he discharged his duties, when judged relative to the ordinary competent finance broker.
72. The case in tort must fail because:
(a) there was no evidence of the industry norm in terms of the timing of the kind of transactions undertaken by the respondent;
(b) the causes of the delays were multifactorial, and it would be necessary to identify the delays caused by the respondent personally (and not Aussie Home Loans) and their significance in the overall delay. There was no evidence of this;
(c) some of the delays were caused by the first applicant’s own solicitors; and
(d) the first applicant has in fact sustained no loss as a result of any delay caused by the respondent because the Addendum does not give rise to an enforceable debt against him. A tort is not complete unless loss is suffered.
73. Even if the cause of action in contract, tort or the ACL had been made, the applicants’ claim for the cost of the second applicant returning one day early from Singapore, would not be sustainable. The second applicant was due to be in Singapore until 29 September for training. She returned early on 28 September and her costs were met by her employer. There is no evidence of any debt owed to the employer, or any evidence to support the submission put that the second applicant may have to return to Singapore in the future at her own cost to complete the remaining day of the training course. The submission is not intrinsically likely.
74. The second applicant’s return from Singapore was said to be for the purpose of signing the documents to change her surname on the title. This was not necessary for the completion of the purchase by the first applicant, it was a mere convenience. It was not necessary for the second applicant to return at the time and in the circumstances she did, and any costs incurred in doing so were not a cost rising from any negligence or breach of contract on the part of the respondent. The Tribunal found something disingenuous about the entirety of this part of the applicant’s narrative.
Conclusion
75. There is no basis in law for the applicants’ claims and therefore the claim is dismissed.
………………………………..
Senior Member A Anforth
HEARING DETAILS
FILE NUMBER:
XD 1434/2018
PARTIES, APPLICANTS:
Timothy Swan
Jamie Swan
PARTIES, RESPONDENT:
Benjamin Hennessy
COUNSEL APPEARING, APPLICANT
N/A
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT
Mr N Willing
SOLICITORS FOR APPLICANT
N/A
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT
Sparke Helmore
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS:
Senior Member A Anforth
DATES OF HEARING:
29 March 2019
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