Swain; Ex Parte: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation

Case

[1988] FCA 868

31 Mar 1988

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION ) No. W 94 of 1987X
)

BANKRUPTCY

DISTRICT

IN TFIE

) )

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

- Re : JOFIN PHILIP SWAIN

Debtor

Ex parte DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
OF TAXATION

Applicant

CORAM: Einfeld J.

- DATE: 31 March 1988
PLACE: Sydney
EX-TEMPORE JUDGMENT Y Y
This is an application by the debtor for an adjournment of a creditor's
petition brought on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (the
deteriorating medical condition.
o r
Commissioner) seeking a sequestration order on the basis of unpaid
income tax dating back to 1981. The petition was presented in April 1987
and has been successively adjourned on a number of occasions to permit

consideration by the appropriate tribunal of an application by the

debtor for relief on the grounds of a rapidly and seriously

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Evidence available to me from impeccable medical sources suggests that

the debtor is facing a very critical medical deterioration and that at

best he can expect to be in a wheeichair during the current calendar
year. He also has on the medical evidence a short life expectancy, and

when his condition deteriorates to the extent necessary to require
ambulation only by wheelchair, it will be impossible for him to feed and

toilet himself.

In these circumstances, it is not easy for me to see the basis upon

which the review board determined not to grant him the relief sought but

that is ultimately not a matter for me unless the matter comes back to
the court in the form of an application for judicial review of the
decision.
It is said that the present debt owed by the debtor is of the order of
$191,000 and that no payment has been made in respect of income tax

debts for some seven years. Of the alleged debt it is clear that a

considerable amount is interest, late lodgment fees and other penalties

of one kind or another. The debtor says that he recently paid some

$16.000 which has not yet been credited. But whatever the size of the

debt it will obviously be substantial and in excess of $100.000. At the

appropriate time, it is my view that the Commissioner should give

serious and favourable consideration to rebating or remitting some of
the penalties and interest to which I have referred because of the

circumstances under which they have accrued. These circumstances include

the fact that the application for review by the review board on the

grounds of D r Swain's deteriorating health was delayed from 1983 to 1987
in circumstances which have never been explained and which obviously
occurred due to administrative or other bureaucratic causes which should

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have been avoided. If they had been avoided, the application for review

would have been dealt with long before the end of 1987, and the accrued

interest and penalties would more than likely not have accrued at all.
At least if they had accrued they would have clearly been the fault of

the debtor and no-one else.

The application for an adjournment now is substantially based upon the
debtor's wish to finalize an outstanding application in the Family Court

for a division of property jointly owned by himself and his former wife.

A letter from the debtor's solicitors to the Australian Government
Solicitor of 29 March 1988 informs me that an application for an

expedited hearing of the debtor's application for property orders will

be heard by the Family Court on 20 April, that it is supported by the
wife and that it is based upon the debtor's grave medical condition.
There can be little doubt that the application for an expedited hearing

will be successful but that will not by itself fix the date by which the

substantive matters will be resolved. On the assumption that they will

be resolved approximately four to six weeks after the date of the

application for an expedited hearing, in substance the application for

an adjournment of the petition is therefore one of.the order of eight to
ten weeks. At the earliest, therefore, the bankruptcy petition could not
be before the court until some time in June.
The debtor's application for a property settlement in the Family Court
seeks a sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home which is

unencumbered. It is said that the value of this home in March 1987 was

$260,000 but the debtor says from the bar table today that it is

probably worth $100,000 more than that. The home is in St.1ves and I do
not doubt that a March 1987 valuation is now quite out of date.

The application before the Family Court by the debtor seeks that from

the proceeds of the sale of the home there should first be discharged

the debt to the Taxation Department and that after appropriate other

adjustments, the balance should be divided equally. I am informed that,

in addition to that property, there are other assets available for the

taxation debt, namely a motor car and an insurance policy amongst

others. On the other hand, the wife seeks orders from the Family Court

which would in substance vest almost all the debtor's property in her.
It is impossible, of course, for me to make even the slightest tentative
assessment of the relative chances of success of the parties in the
Family Court. What I do know is that if I make a sequestration order
today all the property of the debtor will vest in the trustee who is
appointed, the consequence of which will be that the Family Court will
either not have any opportunity of passing judgment on the merits of the
issue before it so far as they affect the property of the debtor, or
there will be a substantial and controversial dispute as to whether the
Family Law Act takes any kind of priority over the Bankruptcy Act 1966

(the Act). The possibilty for conflict between the Family Court and the

Federal Court is therefore very prominent.
The Commissioner resists the application for an adjournment and says
that he should be entitled to move for a sequestration order today on a
number of grounds. Re says, relying upon the English case of Re A Debtor
(1984) 2 All E.R.257, that he has a prima facie right to a sequestration
order. This may well be so although I do not pass particularly on the
words used by the court in England in that case. Rowever an adjournment
will not interfere with that prima facie right if it exists. He does not
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have a prima facie right to a sequestration order as some type of
superior right to another party to an adjournment if that be
established. Be certainly does not have a prima facie right to the

acceptance of his resistance to the adjournment application.

The Commissioner says further that by reason of another English decision

Re A Debtor(1924) B.& C.R.32 that the debtor has failed to supply all

relevant information to the Court concerning his assets or likely assets

and other relevant matters. This is also supplemented by a submission
that an undertaking given to the Court on behalf of the debtor on 15
October 1987 to give at least ten days' notice to the Commissioner of
any step taken or hearing or conference appointed in the Family Court

has been broken. I do not accept either of these submissions. There is

enough information before the Court at present to indicate the real

basis of the application for an adjournment and of the matters before
the Family Court on which it is founded. There is certainly ample

information of the medical condition before the Court. In addition, the

letter of the solicitors for the debtor of 29 March gives more than ten

days notice of the proposed hearing in the Family Court. In fact, it

gives 22 days' notice. If the Commissioner wants to know anything else

in the matter, he can certainly have his representatives speak to the
solicitors for the debtor.
The Commissioner rightly points to the fact that in proceedings before
me in October 1987 there appeared for consideration a deed of

arrangement entered into by the debtor and by other persons which had

the effect of excluding or seeking to exclude the taxation debt from any
possibility of being paid whilst preserving the interests of other
creditors. This was an unmeritorious and not particularly creditable

attempt to create a deed of arrangement. The debtor tells me that he

proceeded upon legal and accounting advice and I ccept that he did not
wilfully allow or want the law and morality to conflict, but he must

have known at the time when he entered into the deed of arrangement what

the effects of the arrangement were and the likelihood, if not

certainty, that his major debt would by the deed of arrangement be

avoided.

The Commissioner also correctly points to the fact that the application

for a sequestration order is now almost one year old, and that although
the delay in the hearing of his submission to the review tribunal was

not particularly the fault of the debtor, nonetheless, now that it has been disposed of, there ought be no other reason for further delay. In particular, he submits that there is no ground for supporting a delay in

the hearing along the lines that the wife should have some sort of 'fair

go' in the Family Court, amongst other reasons because if sh has a good

claim there, it would have the effect of diverting monies away from

creditors and in effect, avoiding the Act altogether. The Commissioner

rightly says that the costs in this matter are already very large, and
that at least some, if not a considerable amount, of them have been
incurred in relation to the unmeritorious attempt at composition with

creditors. Be asserts that in effect this application for adjournment is

based on what he describes as 'a vain hope' that the debtor will be
successful in the Family Court in obtaining a sufficiently good result
as to ensure that the taxation debt, o r most of it, will be paid, or
able to be paid.

This is therefore not a particularly easy matter to resolve. There are faults on both sides and there are arguments in support of both sides'

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points of view. The ultimate question, I suppose, is where the balance
ought to be drawn. My view is, not without a little hesitation, that the
application for adjournment should be granted. I take into account the

assertion that it may all be very theoretical because the debtor's
chances of success in the Family Court may be less than high. On the
other hand, it is not likely that the application would be made and
persisted in if it did not have some reasonable chances of succeeding at

least in part because otherwise more money is just being thrown away in

a vain and fruitless escapade which the health and financial

circumstances of the debtor could hardly warrant and merit.

I must therefore proceed upon the basis that the application has at

least some chance of being partly successful. I do not think that it is
right that I should make an order now which may deprive the Family court
of an effective opportunity to exercise its undoubted jurisdiction in

the matter. It is true that the matter may ultimately boil down to who

should get priority, the wife or the Commissioner, but I have no doubt
that the Family Court will be able to take that matter into
consideration. It strikes me as being unpalatable to take an act now
which can be avoided or at least postponed and which would have the
effect of promoting a potential dispute of considerable consequences and

repercussions between the respective powers of the Federal Court and the

Family Court over property which comes within the purview of both. If
this matter had, for example, been before the court in 1983 or 1984 as

it certainly should have been, this potential conflict would, although

in theory existing, not have been as starkly before the court as it now.

I do not believe that I should take a step which would facilitate or
would amount to a lawyers' picnic in determining the respective holds
and sways of the courts, at any rate, not at the actual or potential
expense of the taxpayers of Australia per medium of the Commissioner or
of Dr Swain who has enough problems of his own not to have this added to
it.

In all these circumstances, it seems to me that it is therefore right to grant the adjournment and I will do so. The matter is stood over for

further directions t o 22 April 1988 at 9.30am before me. Costs are
reserved.
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