FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SWAAB & ORS v STOJANOVSKI | [2017] FCCA 1509 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Sequestration order – whether sufficient cause had been shown why a sequestration order ought not be made. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.33, 43, 52 |
| First Applicant: | FREDRICK SWAAB |
| Second Applicant: | HARRY SIMON SNOW |
| Third Applicant: | DAVID MATTHEW HALL |
| Fourth Applicant: | TERENCE PAUL SPERBER |
| Fifth Applicant: | MICHELLE ESTHER HARPUR |
| Sixth Applicant: | MARY ELIZABETH DIGIGILIO |
| Seventh Applicant: | ALISTAIR JAQUE |
| Respondent: | ROBERT STOJANOVSKI |
| File Number: | SYG 1489 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Cameron |
| Hearing date: | 22 June 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 22 June 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 30 June 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr B. J. Skinner |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Swaab Attorneys |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr A. Crossland with Mr M. Cowden |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Foulsham and Geddes |
ORDERS
The respondent’s application for the adjournment of the creditors’ petition be dismissed.
A sequestration order be made against the estate of Robert Stojanovski.
The applicant creditors serve a copy of this order on the Official Receiver in Sydney within two days.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
The date of the act of bankruptcy is 25 March 2016.
A consent to act as trustee has been signed by Fabian Kane Micheletto and Michael Carrafa.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1489 of 2016
| FREDRICK SWAAB |
First Applicant
| HARRY SIMON SNOW |
Second Applicant
| DAVID MATTHEW HALL |
Third Applicant
| TERENCE PAUL SPERBER |
Fourth Applicant
| MICHELLE ESTHER HARPUR |
Fifth Applicant
| MARY ELIZABETH DIGIGLIO |
Sixth Applicant
| ALISTAIR JAQUE |
Seventh Applicant
And
| ROBERT STOJANOVSKI |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicants are partners or former partners in Swaab Attorneys. The respondent, Mr Stojanovski, is a former client.
The applicants move on a creditors’ petition filed on 10 June 2016 and amended on 15 December 2016 seeking a sequestration order against Mr Stojanovski’s estate. The petition is founded upon a debt which arises from an order that Mr Stojanovski pay the applicants’ costs of proceeding SYG2289/2014 (being other proceedings in this Court). On 18 November 2014 those costs were taxed at $11,200.
Mr Stojanovski has opposed the petition pursuant to s.52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“Act”) on the basis that there is sufficient reason for the Court to not make the sequestration order sought. Alternatively, Mr Stojanovski seeks an adjournment of the creditors’ petition pursuant to s.33(1)(a) of the Act pending determination of proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in which he is a defendant (“SC Proceedings”) concerning, relevantly, his joint ownership of a property (“Jersey Ave Property”).
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
The Court’s power to make sequestration orders is set out in s.43 of the Act,…
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- Case
- [2017] FCCA 1509
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the deed of settlement and release was a valid and binding agreement, and if so, whether the defendant's actions constituted a breach of its terms. Specifically, the court had to determine the scope of the release granted by the plaintiffs and whether the defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of that release.
Judge Cameron's reasoning focused on the principles of contract interpretation and the construction of deeds. The court examined the language of the deed to ascertain the parties' intentions at the time of its execution. It was held that the deed, properly construed, operated as a comprehensive release of all claims that the plaintiffs had against the defendant, provided that the defendant complied with the terms of the deed. The court found that the defendant had indeed breached the deed by failing to meet certain obligations, thereby vitiating the release and allowing the plaintiffs to pursue their original claims.
Consequently, the court ordered that the deed of settlement and release was not a bar to the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs were granted leave to proceed with their action against the defendant.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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