Sutherland v The King

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52 CLR 356

SUTHERLAND

THE KING Criminal Law and Procedure-Trial by jury-Territory of New Guinea-Criminal

Procedure Ordinance 1889 (British New Guinea) (No. 11 of 1889), cl. 21-Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) (No. 1 of 1921)-Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) (No. 3 of 1921)-The Criminal Code (Q.) (63 Vict. No. 9), sec. 604.

By the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889 of British New Guinea (Papua) is made applicable to the Territory of New Guinea and excludes trial by jury in that Territory.

APPLICATION for special leave to appeal from the Central Court of New Guinea.

Reginald James Vivian Sutherland was tried before a Judge without a jury in the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Guinea and was found guilty on two charges of stealing as a servant certain gold specimens, the property of his employer. He was sentenced on the first count to three months' imprisonment with hard labour, and on the second count to four years' imprisonment with hard labour, concurrent with the sentence on the first count.

From these convictions and sentences Sutherland now applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The principal ground was that he was entitled to be tried before a jury.

Further material facts appear in the judgments hereunder.

52 CLR 357

O'Sullivan, for the applicant. There is not any evidence directed to the value of the gold specimens, or of the gold amalgam said to have been stolen. The evidence as to the ownership of the gold, and that it had been stolen, is insufficient and inconclusive (Trainer V. The King 1 ).

[DIXON J. referred to Schiffmann v. The King 2.] The evidence is equally consistent with the applicant's innocence as with his guilt (Peacock v. The King 3 ). As the applicant was not warned beforehand, statements relating to the gold, made by him to the police officers, are inadmissible (R. v. Currie 4; Phipson on Evidence, 7th ed. (1930), pp. 255-258).

[DIXON J. referred to Ibrahim v. The King 5.] The applicant was not tried before a jury as was his right under the law in force in the Territory of New Guinea. The Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) made applicable to New Guinea (a) the Queensland Criminal Code (b) the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, of Papua; and (c) the common law of England.

[STARKE J. referred to Jolley v. Mainka 6.] Clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, which provides that trials shall be taken by the chief magistrate alone, was not capable of being applied to New Guinea in 1921, because there was then no such person as a chief magistrate, nor any such office in New Guinea. The judiciary system set up in that Territory by the Judiciary Ordinance, No. 3 of 1921, provides for a Central Court constituted by a Chief Judge and other Judges. If the words "Chief Judge " be substituted for "chief…

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Details
Case
[1934] HCA 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Reginald James Vivian Sutherland applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence by the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Guinea for two charges of stealing gold specimens and gold amalgam. The primary ground for his appeal was that he was entitled to be tried by a jury, rather than by a judge alone as had occurred.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the applicant was lawfully tried without a jury. This involved determining the applicability and effect of various legislative provisions, including clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889 (British New Guinea), the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (New Guinea), the Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (New Guinea), and the Criminal Code of Queensland. The court also considered whether the common law of England, which includes the right to trial by jury, applied to the Territory of New Guinea.

The High Court, comprising Rich and Dixon JJ., refused the application for special leave to appeal. Both judges concluded that the applicant had been lawfully tried without a jury. Rich J. found that clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, which provided for trials by the chief magistrate alone, was applicable to New Guinea and had not been repealed, thus excluding trial by jury. Dixon J. agreed, reasoning that while the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 incorporated various laws, including the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, it did so only insofar as they were applicable and not inconsistent with other laws in force. He found that clause 21, even with amendments made by the Jury Ordinance 1907 of Papua, remained in force and was applicable to the circumstances of New Guinea, effectively excluding trial by jury. Both judges also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions.

Background

Background to the litigation

Reginald James Vivian Sutherland was tried in the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Guinea on charges of stealing gold specimens and gold amalgam, which belonged to his employer. He was tried before a single judge without a jury, as per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889 (British New Guinea), which was made applicable to the Territory of New Guinea by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (N.G.). Sutherland was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to three months' imprisonment with hard labour on the first count and four years' imprisonment with hard labour on the second count, with the terms running concurrently. Sutherland applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that he was entitled to be tried before a jury as a matter of right under the law in force in the Territory of New Guinea. Sutherland's application for special leave to appeal was based on the argument that the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, which provided that trials before the Central Court shall be by the chief magistrate sitting alone, was not applicable to New Guinea because there was no such person as a chief magistrate in New Guinea at the relevant time. Sutherland contended that the Queensland Criminal Code and the Judiciary Ordinance together provided a complete scheme for the administration of criminal law and that the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was in conflict with these laws. The case involved a complex interplay of legislation and legal principles, with arguments being made on both sides as to whether trial by jury was applicable in the Territory of New Guinea and whether Sutherland's rights had been infringed by being tried without a jury.

The case of Sutherland v The King originated in the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Guinea where Reginald James Vivian Sutherland was tried and found guilty on two charges of stealing gold specimens as a servant. He was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour, and subsequently sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The key issue in this appeal was whether Sutherland was entitled to be tried by a jury, as he claimed. The High Court considered the procedural history of the matter, including the relevant legislative framework and prior judicial decisions. The Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) incorporated certain laws from Papua, including the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889 (Papua), into the Territory of New Guinea. However, clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, which provided for trials to be conducted by the chief magistrate alone, was subject to interpretation as to its applicability in New Guinea. The Court examined the interplay between this clause and other legislative provisions, including the Queensland Criminal Code and the Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (N.G.), to determine whether trial by jury was applicable in New Guinea. After careful consideration, the High Court found that the trial by a judge without a jury was valid under the applicable laws, and therefore refused Sutherland's application for special leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21, which excludes trial by jury in Papua, was applicable to the Territory of New Guinea when incorporated by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921.
2. Whether the Queensland Criminal Code, which contains provisions for trial by jury, was applicable to the Territory of New Guinea and could override the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21.
3. Whether the Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) provided a complete scheme for the administration of criminal law in the Territory of New Guinea, rendering the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21, inapplicable.
4. Whether the applicant was entitled to be tried by a jury as a matter of common law and whether the Crown discharged the onus of showing an express provision in a law of New Guinea which deprived the applicant of the right to trial by jury.
5. Whether the evidence presented in the case was sufficient to support the applicant's conviction on both counts of stealing.
6. Whether the sentence imposed by the trial judge was excessive in the circumstances of the case.

Held
1. The court concluded that clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, which excludes trial by jury in Papua, was applicable to the Territory of New Guinea when incorporated by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921.
2. The court held that the Queensland Criminal Code, which contains provisions for trial by jury, was not applicable to the Territory of New Guinea and could not override the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21.
3. The court found that the Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) provided a complete scheme for the administration of criminal law in the Territory of New Guinea, rendering the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21, inapplicable.
4. The court determined that the applicant was not entitled to be tried by a jury as a matter of common law and that the Crown discharged the onus of showing an express provision in a law of New Guinea which deprived the applicant of the right to trial by jury.
5. The court held that the evidence presented in the case was sufficient to support the applicant's conviction on both counts of stealing.
6. The court found that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was not excessive in the circumstances of the case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court of Australia, in Sutherland v The King, considered the issue of whether the applicant was entitled to be tried by a jury in the Territory of New Guinea. The court first examined the applicability of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21, which excludes trial by jury in Papua, to the Territory of New Guinea when incorporated by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921. The court found that clause 21 was in force in Papua at the relevant date and was not impliedly repealed by the Jury Ordinance of 1907 of Papua. However, the court held that clause 21 was not applicable to the circumstances of New Guinea because it was inconsistent with the judiciary system set up in the Territory by the Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (N.G.).

Next, the court considered whether the Queensland Criminal Code, which contains provisions for trial by jury, was applicable to the Territory of New Guinea and could override the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21. The court found that the Queensland Criminal Code and the Judiciary Ordinance together provided a complete scheme for the administration of criminal law in New Guinea and that to the extent of any conflict, the Code must be deemed to have repealed the Ordinance.

The court also examined whether the Judiciary Ordinance 1921 (N.G.) provided a complete scheme for the administration of criminal law in the Territory of New Guinea, rendering the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889, clause 21, inapplicable. The court found that the Judiciary Ordinance provided for a Central Court constituted by a Chief Judge and other Judges and that the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was not capable of being incorporated in its entirety in the general scheme of the laws of New Guinea.

Regarding the applicant's entitlement to be tried by a jury as a matter of common law, the court held that the Crown had not discharged the onus of showing an express provision in a law of New Guinea which deprived the applicant of the right to trial by jury. The court found that there were no physical difficulties in New Guinea which operated to prevent the application of the jury system in that Territory.

Finally, the court considered whether the evidence presented in the case was sufficient to support the applicant's conviction on both counts of stealing. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the first count and that the evidence, although slender, was sufficient to support the finding that the applicant obtained the gold amalgam from his employer's dredge.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the applicability of laws from one jurisdiction to another depends on the specific circumstances of the receiving jurisdiction and that the incorporation of laws from one jurisdiction to another is subject to the provision that they are incorporated only in so far as they are applicable. Additionally, the court found that the applicant was not entitled to be tried by a jury as a matter of common law and that the evidence presented in the case was sufficient to support the applicant's conviction on both counts of stealing.